CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

2ND EDITION

MARK GOLDEN

VISIT…

Children and Childhood in Classical Athens

Ancient Society and History

MARK GOLDEN

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Second Edition

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Contents

List of Figures vii
Preface to the Second Edition ix
Preface to the First Edition xv

One Characteristics of Childhood and Children 1
Two The Child in the Household and the Community 20
Three The Child and His or Her Peers 44
Four Parents and Children 68
Five Brothers, Sisters, and Grandparents 98
Six Outsiders and Alliances 119
Seven Change over Time 141

List of Abbreviations 155
Notes 157
Bibliography 197
Source Index 223
General Index 237

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Figures

The shoemaker Xanthippus and his daughters 16
A father takes his son to the shoemaker's. 25
A *pais amphithalēs* rides in a wedding procession. 27
A family sacrifices a sheep to Asclepius. 29
Older girls mind small children while they swing. 30
A woman works wool while a girl sits nearby. 31
Boys feed chickens. 32
A father and his son stand before an image of Zeus Meilichios. 37
Boys play school. 48
A boy recites to a group of women. 54
A schoolgirl and her slave (?). 63
A girl and a tortoise. 64
Arrhēphoroi play ball. 66
Brothers on a *chous*. 100
A boy and a woman in a domestic scene. 105
A girl shakes a rattle for a baby boy. 107
Grave stele of a youth and his little sister. 108

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Preface to the Second Edition

"What can be more tedious," she said with a laugh, "than someone else's childhood?"[1]

Luckily for me, Matt McAdam at Johns Hopkins University Press does not share the (fictional) Elizabeth Wallace's disdain for childhood history. When he invited me to prepare a second edition of *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens,* I was pleased to comply. After all, the original was published back in 1990. My son Max was a newborn, Pauline Ripat was a student in my introductory course on Greece and Rome, the local Canadian Football League team, the Winnipeg Blue Bombers, had just won their tenth Grey Cup, and the Toronto Blue Jays had not yet played in the World Series. Now Max and his girlfriend live down the hall, Dr. Ripat chairs my department, and the Bombers and the Jays have spent twenty years giving their fans the blues. At the same time, new evidence related to the book's subject and (especially) new interpretations of the evidence have become available. In fact, Robert Garland was writing his excellent *The Greek Way of Life* (1990), which includes substantial chapters on childbirth, the growing child, and coming of age, while I was working on the first edition of this book.[2]

Revised editions have a long history in our field. The Greek poet Stesichorus revised his view of Helen of Troy in his palinode after being blinded by the Muses; Aristophanes rewrote the ending of *The Clouds* to secure a better verdict from the judges at the festival of Dionysus; Ovid reissued his *Amores* in three books instead of five. Modern works on the ancient world also undergo revisions, whether through the revitalization of old editions (as in the Oxford

Classical Texts and Loeb Classical Library series) or by incorporating authors' second thoughts.[3] My favorite example involves Brooks Otis's successive takes on *Metamorphoses,* by Ovid. In a 1938 article, Otis argued that *Metamorphoses* was an Augustan epic, designed to celebrate and glorify Augustus much as (Otis thought) Virgil's *Aeneid* did. A generation later, in 1966, Otis, older and wiser, published a big book on Ovid as an epic poet, which represented his palinode: *Metamorphoses* was shot through with a latent anti-Augustanism, since Ovid was utterly out of sympathy with the earnest approval of Augustus that we read in *The Aeneid* or the great odes of Horace. But he was apparently not older or wiser enough: the second edition of the book appeared soon after, in 1970. Here, Otis confirmed that oral and printed criticism, as well as his own reflection, had led him to revise his judgment; "my error or inconsistency," he wrote, "seems so obvious to me now that I am somewhat amazed at my former stupidity or failure to see it."[4] He therefore replaced the book's final chapter with a new conclusion asserting that Ovid's anti-Augustanism was not latent but intentional.

I have not been blinded by the Muses (though my eyeglasses are new since 1990) and have not experienced a change of heart like Otis's. This book retains the shape and nature of its first edition; I have even resisted the temptation to retitle it *The Second Childhood of Mark Golden.* If we may separate three strands in the historiography of childhood—concepts of childhood, adults' treatment of children, and the child's own experience—this edition too stresses the second (the relationship of adults and children) and devotes less space to the Athenian idea of childhood and (in particular) to Athenian children's own impressions.[5] Also like the first edition, it restricts itself almost entirely to the children of Athenian citizens and privileges literary sources (by which I mean texts of any type). But it is certainly different nonetheless. I have corrected a few slips, some caught by reviewers and others perhaps my own guilty secrets. (For instance, the National Security Agency may note that my characterization of Mao Zedong has been altered.) I have updated references to the evidence to take account of new standard works, such as Kassel's and Austin's *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* and the new Athenian fascicles of *Inscriptiones Graecae* (both still in progress), Kannicht's edition of the fragments of Euripides, and Clairmont's corpus of Attic tombstones. I have also made an effort to acknowledge recent research in the endnotes—these have undergone extensive reworking. But the main text, too, has changed considerably. I have rewritten the whole of the final chapter, in the belief that its subject, the occurrence and implications of change over time, is best addressed through a discussion more directly connected with childhood than the dowries of New Comedy (its main focus in the first edition). Moreover, three current trends in the historiography of childhood have influenced this edi-

tion to varying degrees: the emphases on the agency of children, on the archaeology of childhood, and on the representation of children in art.

Children as Agents

Children's social status today is affected by two contradictory currents.[6] One (which we may label "protectionist") is older, at least in North America. The original legal recognition of children in the United States stemmed from the "Mary Ellen affair" of 1874: in the absence of any laws against the abuse and neglect of children, a social worker persuaded the Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals to prosecute a young girl's parents on the grounds that children are an animal species and so likewise entitled to protection. Since then, state authority over childhood has increased steadily virtually everywhere, though it has perhaps been more intrusive in people's democracies and Catholic countries than in bourgeois democracies and nations in which Protestantism is the state religion.[7] The other, "liberationist," current has rarely had much effect on political life (though it may claim some of the credit for the lowering of the voting age in Canada from 21 to 18). But it is reflected in the recent academic interest in seeing children as active members of society as well as constituents of a category defined by others.[8] As Eleanor Scott puts it, "The power of the infant exists."[9]

Studies have emphasized the individual child's capacity to cope with dissonance, diversity, and change; groups, too, have been a focus of interest, antisocial and violent gangs predominantly.[10] Researchers into antiquity uncover tantalizing traces of children's self-expression. So small palmprints on the tablets used by scribes at Bronze Age Knossos and handprints on a pot from south Italy and a Hellenistic Etruscan tile may bear witness to children's roles in production.[11] Children's graffiti have been identified from Roman Italy.[12] Others' bones speak for them, often to tell a tale of hard work and suffering.[13] A fourth-century lead letter of complaint from the Athenian agora even preserves the words of a young apprentice.[14] Yet these are disappointingly scarce and far from easy to interpret. (My son Max's name remains fixed in the sidewalk on the way to his school, but the crew who poured the cement did not regard his signature as a contribution to their task.) Lesley Beaumont has recently proposed that the comparatively plentiful classical Athenian evidence for children's roles in religious ritual may reflect their own choices and feelings. The presence of a roller or a goat on a grave relief is taken to betoken youthful piety and reverence for Dionysus, a means to ensure the god's protection in the afterlife.[15] Certainly we should accept that some children experienced profound religious feelings, then

as now. But it was Athenian parents who arranged for their tombstones, and their neighbors saw them along with the gods: if they have any religious significance at all (rather than displaying childish toys and pets), they are as likely to attest to parents' belief that they themselves had followed the usual norms and so bore no blame for their children's deaths. I am more inclined to entertain the idea that children had impact on their surroundings as a group, numerous as they were. (Maybe one-third of Athenian citizens were children under the age of fifteen.) Sanne Houby-Nielsen's proposal to see the placement of children's graves as one of the elements that shaped the growing city of Athens seems attractive in this regard.[16] Of course, here again it was adults who made the decisions.

The Archaeology of Childhood

If children's agency rarely figures in the usual literary sources, archaeology must come to play a more important role in identifying it.[17] To quote Grete Lillehammer, a pioneer in moving the archaeology of childhood from the margins of the discipline and out of the limited confines of the mother-child relationship, "Children do not write history, they make it."[18] Whether we can recognize and distinguish them or not, children shape the archaeological record, from the toys or tools (or both) they used when alive to the skeletons that allow insights into their diet, diseases, and traumas. The age and sex of these, and their location and treatment are all potentially significant—as is their absence. Already of value for the history of early modern America, the Byzantines, and the medieval period, such studies have a special attraction for historians of ancient Greek and Roman childhood.[19] The evidence (of burials above all) is often ample; it offers information for the children outside the elite, with which our literary sources are preoccupied; and women's predominance in funerary work and ritual, in providing grave goods especially, means that their ideas play a more prominent part than usual. Recent books by Crelier (2008) and Beaumont (2012) and collections by Cohen and Rutter (2007), Guimier-Sorbets and Morizot (2010), and Hermary and Dubois (2012) have influenced my revisions, mainly in providing many indications of variations in the mortuary treatment of children of different ages and sexes and of changes, both those that characterize the classical period and those that occurred within it. Perhaps the main impact of archaeology, however, has come from new findings about the architecture of domestic space. The classical Athenian dwelling now seems likely to have been both more spacious and less restrictive than I once believed. As a result, the picture of young boys and girls spending their days in the company of women in a dedicated and closed-off part of the house no longer seems to represent reality. Conscious of Virginia

Woolf's criticism of Edwardian novelists—"They have given us a house in the hope that we may be able to deduce the human beings who live there"—I am hesitant to make too much more of this. But the environment of Athenian family life does now look more desirable than it did.

Images of Children

The representation of children in Greek art is a long-established subject of scholarly interest, from Klein's brief book (1932), written some eighty years ago, and the specialized studies of Hirsch-Dyczek (1983) and Vorster (1983) to Hilde Rühfel's two splendid volumes (1984a, 1984b) and now Lesley Beaumont's magisterial survey (2012). A feature of more recent work is the kind of close reading of details we are more accustomed to encounter from philologists. When Hamilton writes about the small *choes* connected to the Anthesteria (1992) or Sourvinou-Inwood examines the *krateriskoi* linked to the Arkteia (1988) or Beaumont directs her gaze to an enviable range of artistic media and genres, we are treated to analyses and interpretations as penetrating and nuanced as those in textual editions, commentaries, and translations. Among much else, such detailed studies show that classical Athenians had many childhoods, not just many children. So, to cite one example only, Tim McNiven tracks how baby boys, restricted on Attic vases to a few broad gestures, develop a more varied and subtle repertoire as they approach manhood, using their fingers as well as their hands, whereas girls never outgrow the hand gestures of infants.[20] As is the case with literary texts, however, experts often disagree (as Beaumont does with McNiven on whether young children shake hands with others on tombstones, with Sourvinou-Inwood on the depiction of girls with budding breasts on the *krateriskoi,* and with Hamilton on the inclusion of girls on the miniature *choes*).[21] Some generalizations may be exceptionally unreliable; no statement about the *krateriskoi* will seem safe until more of the surviving pots are published. In other instances, it is exceptions that are problematic. How often can contradictions between text and image be accounted for by the purchase of ready-made objects?[22] When can we be sure that an unusual depiction is merely a short-lived iconographic experiment?[23] I am much indebted to the scholars who have devoted so much care to the collection, examination, and explication of our many images of classical Athenian children, and I have tried to incorporate their work into my discussions of the different stages of childhood at Athens in particular. However, I have rarely felt confident enough to intervene in debates on the import of individual images and usually content myself with providing references to better-informed opinion in my notes.

This may sound ungrateful. On the contrary: as in the first edition of this

book, I am well aware of how much I owe to many individuals. Thanks for kindnesses of every kind go to Lesley Beaumont, Diane Cline, Michael Dudley, Liyana Fauzi, Emma Griffiths, Kathleen Lynch, Heather Matheson, Peter Mauritsch, Elizabeth Meyer, Janet Mowat, Corinne Pache, Bruce Robertson, Lynne Schultz, Allison Surtees, and Conor Whately. John Tamm read the proofs and prepared the indexes. Some of the ideas in this preface were shared with a seminar in the School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics at the University of Queensland, where I was fortunate enough to be R. D. Milns Visiting Professor in September 2013. As I near the end of forty-odd years of working in Canadian universities, it seems fitting to reflect on the start of my career and to recall the two Toronto teachers who made it possible. Emmet Robbins, gifted in everything except good fortune, introduced me to my most important foreign languages, Ancient Greek and e-mail. Mac Wallace provided the model of personal generosity, intellectual curiosity, and scholarly rigor that I have tried to emulate ever since. This book is dedicated to their memory.

Preface to the First Edition

"Nobody cares about your birth or upbringing or education," Socrates tells Alcibiades, "or about any other Athenian's—except maybe some lover" (Pl. *Alcib. I* 122B). And about these subjects at least Athenian lovers did not kiss and tell: the evidence is scattered and scant. As a result, modern scholarship, too, has had little to say about children and childhood in classical Athens. Although the bibliography on ancient childhood by Karras and Wiesehöfer (1981) lists about thirteen hundred items, strikingly few concern Athens, and many of those that do date from before the Second World War. There is no book-length discussion in English.

This book investigates the place children and childhood held in Athenian public and private life from roughly 500 to 300 B.C. (I have occasionally supplemented our evidence on classical Athens, or filled gaps in it, with material from other periods and places.) The focus is on *paides*—boys before majority and girls before marriage. But after outlining the nature of interpersonal relations between children and others, I follow them into later life in an effort to explore patterns of continuity and conflict between the worlds of the household and the community. The man who acts as a citizen is still his parents' son; the head of a household and his wife retain ties with the siblings whose home they once shared; boys are first slaves' charges and then their masters. Old ties, new identities—these both clash and coexist.

Rather than seek to establish one central thesis, I have chosen to explore the interactions of children with adults and with each other in a number of contexts. This program amounts to a series of essays on socialization. That no clear-cut

conclusion results is in keeping with the nature of this many-faceted process: complex, conflict-ridden, discontinuous, dysfunctional. Socialization—"the process by which we learn the ways of a given society or social group so that we can function within it" (Elkin and Handel [1984] 4)—occurs in all human communities (and in some others too). Adults endeavor to shape their children, formally and informally, to take their places (or the places of their more fortunate contemporaries) in the world they know. But while men and women make societies in this way, they do not make them just as they choose: the intentions and outcomes of socialization often diverge, and the products of the process are often surprising, undesired, even undesirable.

One reason—rapid technological and social change—was less relevant in ancient Greek society than it is today. Other factors identified by students of contemporary cultures affected Athens too. For example, some psychologists now caution against imagining development to be an unbroken continuum; the events of infancy need not always determine the moods and behaviors of adolescents, still less those of adults (Kagan [1984] 73–111). Consequently, desired qualities must be reinforced throughout childhood. Yet as children grow, their social worlds expand, they enter different subgroups within society, and these may place on them incompatible demands, or at least inspire conflicting loyalties (cf. Harré [1974]). It should also be recognized that the socialization of men and women, of masters and slaves, in societies riven (as Athens was) with sexism and class distinctions must involve the pervasive limiting of human potential, and in some cases may even contribute to widespread pathology. Finally, children cannot be regarded as purely passive objects of socialization: the process is interactive, and one in which both resistance and creativity play a part.

Thus, while the experiences, associations, and emotional ties of early childhood are not to be neglected, the child's later years are a formative force too, and the maintenance of early patterns is subject to structural conditions, especially those determining the control and transmission of property and power. This is the understanding which underlies much of this book, coming into particular prominence in its second half.

The first chapter sets out the attitudinal environment, the characteristic attributes of childhood and of its stages in Athenian eyes. These eyes, unavoidably, are adults'. In the next two chapters, however, I move a little closer to the "meaning of life as seen from the floor, or from the crib" (Thomas Wolfe's words in *Look Homeward, Angel*) by focusing on what children actually did. Chapter 2 demonstrates that they played significant and significantly varied roles within the household and the community from an early age. Chapter 3 shows that boys (especially) and girls enjoyed an extensive social life with their peers outside the household. To a surprising degree, children were part of the *polis* at the

same time that they were prepared for it. In Chapters 4 through 6 I return to the household—more specifically, to its emotional environment, comparatively neglected in most studies of the Athenian family. I discuss affective relations involving children and their parents (Chapter 4), their siblings and grandparents (Chapter 5), and the slaves and other outsiders who shared the household with them (Chapter 6). I identify a number of points of tension, setting broad community expectations against personal experiences and beliefs, or ideals of family solidarity against individual and civic interests. The book concludes with a brief coda (Chapter 7) on a dimension of childhood and the household that is deemphasized throughout, change over time.

This study is based primarily on literary texts, broadly defined. Since I hope that it will be of use to those without a specialist's familiarity with classical Athens—I have translated all the Greek—a word about this evidence is in order. (For a fuller treatment, with which I am generally in agreement, see Dover [1974] xi–xii and 1–45.) Unfortunately, almost all our sources are male members of the Athenian elite, though this is not always true of their subjects or of those to whom their work is directed.

Much of my discussion relies on speeches written for delivery in Athenian law courts (or, in some cases, as rhetorical exercises in that genre). These speeches are not always reliable on points of fact. However, the speakers' ascriptions of motives and references to norms must have seemed plausible or appealing to a large panel of jurors, who were meant to represent the Athenian community as a whole. Similarly, gravestones are valuable because the sentiments they record are conventional; they too are to be given pride of place. The characters and institutions of Attic comedy—both the Old Comedy of Aristophanes (and others) in the fifth and early fourth centuries and the New Comedy of Menander (and others) in the later fourth and early third centuries—are taken from public and private life; the situations they face, despite parody and exaggeration, are recognizably those of real life (though the outcomes often are not). However, the Latin adaptations of Greek New Comedy by Plautus and Terence put us at a further remove from classical Athens. Of their plays, I make use primarily of those which are known or thought to be based on Menander or his contemporaries and set at Athens; exceptions are noted.

In tragedy, in contrast to comedy, neither characters nor institutions belong to everyday life; most plays are not set at Athens at all, and many of the kings and queens who are their heroes and heroines speak and behave in a way that is quite out of place in the world of the audience, a contrast of which Euripides in particular makes much use. Yet the playwrights and players were Athenians, and the plays were presented under public auspices at great community festivals. The issues they raise must have been not only of some interest to their au-

diences but also clear enough in their broad lines to be recognized on first hearing by the number and kind of citizens who might today attend a hockey game; of course, this does not guarantee that contemporary scholars will always agree on what these are. I have therefore felt free to refer to them to establish a starting point for further research in other sources, to buttress conclusions reached on other grounds (as in Chapter 6), or simply because they often express commonplaces in an unusual or powerful way. As for myth in general, I have assumed that almost all Greek myths were known to Athenians of the classical period, but not all tellings of those myths. I have naturally placed more emphasis on versions that are known to have been current at Athens or most likely were. Here again my use of this material is predominantly rhetorical, to illustrate or color.

Some other important sources—Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle—present different problems. All three stand somewhat apart from the Athenian city-state: Plato as the fiercest critic of its institutions, Aristotle as an immigrant and noncitizen, and Xenophon, quite literally, as a long-time exile. Plato and Aristotle are, besides, men of extraordinary ability, and thus hardly typical of their times; Xenophon is less outstanding intellectually, but not always more conventional. Yet when their conclusions and recommendations coincide with contemporary reality, they generally provide the most articulate and thorough accounts available; when they do not, they are often guides to points of tension and contention. If only it were easier to know when these sources speak for others and when they speak just for themselves!

Finally, there is the case of spurious or doubtful works like [Pl.] *Axiochus* and [Arist.] *Problems,* in which the words are unlikely to be Plato's or Aristotle's and the ideas may not be. I include them here on the assumption that the attitudes they express do usually represent some sector of opinion from the classical period, but they (and others like them) are of course to be treated with still more caution than incontestably genuine texts.

I have invoked iconographic evidence as well, but to say that my use of it is selective is to imply a much greater knowledge of the whole body of such material than I possess. Most of the vase paintings and grave reliefs to which (mainly) I refer have been drawn from secondary sources, in particular the two recent volumes by Hilde Rühfel (1984a, 1984b). Nor is my treatment sophisticated. I have usually been content to describe images depicted on vases and gravestones without considering whether they represent scenes of everyday life or expressions of an ideal. Fortunately, for the determination of attitudes this distinction is seldom essential, but the reader should be as aware as I am of my shortcomings in this area.

My adult interest in childhood dates back some twenty years, to the occupation of the University of Toronto's main administration building in support of a demand for on-campus day care. It found a more conventional academic expression in my Ph.D. dissertation, "Aspects of Childhood in Classical Athens" (University of Toronto 1981). Much of that earlier work has appeared in journals; other portions have enjoyed an underground existence in friends' footnotes.

No one completes any scholarly undertaking without help, myself least of all. Virginia Hunter and Mac Wallace kindly and critically read the typescript of this book in its entirety. Others read portions in draft or replied to my requests for information or advice: Alan Booth, Per Brask, Tom Burch, Anne Carson, Cheryl Cox, Nigel Crowther, Rory Egan, Mark Kilfoyle, Don Kyle, John Oates, Dan Stone, Hector Williams. My department head at the University of Winnipeg, Iain McDougall, graciously deferred his own sabbatical so that I could take up a fellowship at the National Humanities Center in 1987–88. The fellows and staff of the Center provided an ideal environment for writing this or any book. Maggie Blades, Karen Carroll, and Linda Morgan turned manuscript into diskette, a process only a little less demanding than transforming lead into gold, and incidentally taught me how to spell like an American (though I still talk funny). Christine Bray and Marilyn Loat patiently prepared the final version. I derived less immediate but equally crucial assistance, ideas, and inspiration from the work of those responsible for the recent Roman revolution in the study of the family. However, Wiedemann (1989) came into my hands too late to be used here.

The abbreviations used in citing ancient authors and works are generally those found in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* or in H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. Stuart Jones, eds., *A Greek-English Lexicon* (hereafter cited as LSJ).

All ancient dates in this book are B.C. unless otherwise indicated. Athenians dated years by the name of the eponymous archon, one of nine annual magistrates. Since the Athenian year began in the equivalent of our June or July, dates are sometimes given in compound form (e.g., 451/0).

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Children and Childhood in Classical Athens

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One

Characteristics of Childhood and Children

The Attributes of Children

The child is father of the man, wrote Wordsworth.[1] Some Greeks agreed. Childhood prodigies, signs of future superiority, were a staple of myth and biography.[2] Achilles killed a boar when he was only six, Cyrus was chosen to play king by his contemporaries at the age of ten and able to give shrewd advice at fifteen or sixteen, the always arrogant Alcibiades threw himself in front of a wagon and stopped it when playing in the street "while still small."[3] The newborn Cypselus charmed his would-be murderers and signaled his future ascendancy in Corinth by smiling by divine chance; ordinary infants were thought not to smile before the age of forty days.[4] In conformity with this view, theorists of education like Plato and Aristotle stress the importance of proper training and environment from the moment of birth and even before for the development of good citizens.[5] "The lessons of childhood marvelously grip the mind," Critias remarks, apparently quoting current wisdom.[6] Aristophanes, as befits a comic poet, portrays those who have spent their childhood learning well how to act badly: the Sausage-Seller distracted the cooks when he was a boy (*paidos ontos*) and stole their meat; he employs the same ruse to trick Paphlagon as an adult (Ar. *Eq.* 417–420, 1195–1200). Socrates speaks of wanting a certain something from childhood (*ek paidos*), just like everyone else; in Agesilaus's case, this was glory.[7]

Yet there was another tendency, too, to stress the discontinuities between one time of life and another. In *The Symposium,* Plato has Diotima mention the idea that a man is the same from childhood (*ek paidariou*) to old age. But, she con-

tinues, though he is called the same, he does not retain the same characteristics. He is always becoming a new person (or a young man: *neos*), physically and intellectually, in his opinions and in his temperament (Pl. *Symp.* 207D–208A). Aristotle, dealing with the various senses in which one thing is said to be formed from another, groups together the sayings "From day comes night" and "From the boy comes the man" (*Gen. An.* 1.724a23). This perspective informs the reflection, frequent in the orators, that there is no way to tell how a child will turn out (a motive for the adoption of adults).[8] It takes its most developed form in the various schemes dividing human life into two, three, four, five, six, seven, and even ten stages, based on numerology or astrology, the number of seasons or of fingers on each hand, with more or less discrete traits.[9] To cite just one example that was meant to be of practical value for life in the *polis,* Aristotle's advice on how to win friends and influence people through public speaking places a good deal of emphasis on understanding the emotions and actions appropriate to each of three periods: youth, the prime of life, and old age (Arist. *Rh.* 2.1389a1–1390b12). But his analysis, which goes on to take into account other determinants of character such as birth, wealth, and power, is not simple-minded. In other writers, too, periodization is informed by nuanced common sense. That some characteristics change more than others is one of the bases of Electra's skepticism when asked if she ever made Orestes some garment that might identify him. He'd have outgrown it, she replies.[10] So, too, change was recognized to be more likely at some times than at others, easier for a man of twenty than for one of fifty.[11]

It is within this context that we should situate Athenian ascriptions of characteristics to childhood and to children: a range of opinions on the relative importance of continuity and change within the course of human life.[12] In general, our sources stress continuity, describing children with reference to the same criteria they apply to adults—physical fitness, moral development, intelligence—and finding them wanting. Predictably, children are thought to approach adult norms more closely as they grow older; this process is marked by stages, which differ according to author and context. But children may also be regarded as so lacking in some adult qualities that they seem more closely to resemble another species altogether, or so free from others that they transcend the usual human limitations and enter into a privileged relationship with the gods.

We may group children's characteristics into neutral, positive, and negative attributes. Neutral attributes are those that children share with the dominant group through which Athenians usually defined their community, male citizen adults in the prime of life; positive attributes are those that mark children especially or much more than the dominant group; and negative attributes are those that represent a lack or shortfall of some quality adult citizens possess. In

practice, of course, the use of these categories involves considerable difficulty. Designation of a quality as positive or negative must, in those frequent cases where no guidance is given by our sources, be a matter of subjective judgment. Furthermore, even an impression of the mix of these different categories of characteristics in the makeup of the Athenian idea of childhood is hard to come by. Though Athenians clearly recognized that children could see and hear and possessed other senses from infancy (e.g., Pl. *Phd.* 75B), our sources usually pass over those qualities that are shared with adult males like themselves (and so seem unremarkable), in favor of those that differentiate children.

This interest in the *differentia* of children in contrast to adults unfortunately pushes distinctions between boys and girls into the background. Such divergences were certainly noted, from a boy baby's tendency to move more in the womb to the higher pitch of a girl's voice; we can even find a trace of the modern schoolboy taunt "You throw like a girl."[13] But we learn less of them from explicit statements in our sources than we would like. (How, exactly, for example, was the characteristic virtue of a girl unlike a boy's? Plato's Meno does not say: Pl. *Meno* 71E.) These sources, all male, are slanted in another way as well: the material presented here stems all too often from the opinions of two exceptional residents of Athens, Plato and Aristotle. This is a weakness no account can avoid, a reflection both of the volume of their work and of the special interest they seem to have taken in childhood as a mirror for human nature and in children as the raw material of the citizen community.[14] As much as one can tell, however, their attitudes toward children's moral and intellectual qualities are not atypical, though their views on the physiology of childhood sometimes represent only strands in a complex debate in the ancient scholarly literature.

This first section of the chapter, then, presents a *catalogue raisonné* of Athenian conceptions of children and childhood. By *children* I mean those the Athenians called *paides:* boys before their admission to their deme at the age of seventeen or eighteen and girls before their marriage.[15] Most of the texts drawn upon do indeed include some form of the word *pais;* but other terms and expressions are found as well. It is thus possible at times that very young children only, or youths just of age, are meant, but such instances are too few to affect my general conclusions. This collection of qualities primarily provides information on the ideas and attitudes of adults. But such ideas, and especially such attitudes, do find expression, even if it is only muted. If—when—they do, they must contribute to some degree to children's definitions of themselves. My catalog, therefore, is also a blueprint, however faint. Full discussion of the terminology of childhood at Athens and the relationship between this vocabulary and popular and philosophical notions of childhood's stages I leave to the chapter's second section.

What I have called negative attributes predominate in this catalog. Though characters in tragedy occasionally envy children their freedom from the burdens of adult life, especially those they must bear themselves, the Greeks of the classical period were generally not nostalgic for childhood.[16] It was a privilege of the gods, or of the ones they especially loved, to pass through childhood quickly, to be born with many of the powers they would display when grown. So, in their first days of life, Apollo slays Python and founds his oracle at Delphi, Hermes steals his brother's cattle, Heracles kills the snakes Hera sends against him in his cradle.[17] They are not just miniature versions of their adult selves—Hermes, for instance, when seized by the angry Apollo, wins his release by dirtying his diapers. But they are certainly free from the usual limitations of their age group. In contrast, when Zeus is temporarily overcome by Typhon (or Typhoeus), he finds himself in the Corycian cave, much like the one where he was born, with the sinews of his hands and feet severed so that he cannot walk. In defeat, he is a helpless baby (Apollod. 1.6.3). And the Boeotian poet Hesiod expresses the degeneracy of his Silver Race by saying that children then stayed with their mothers for one hundred years.[18]

Children were regarded as physically weak, morally incompetent, mentally incapable. (It is to indicate the Cypriot king Evagoras's extraordinary nature that Isocrates's eulogy recalls his "beauty and strength and good sense" as a child: Isoc. 9.22.) Aside from scientific writings, our sources seem much the least concerned with physical infirmity, perhaps because it was too obvious to occasion specific comment.[19] At any rate, one of the few literary passages to make mention of children's lack of strength is in fact concerned with underlining the impotence of a group of old men; members of the chorus of *Agamemnon,* "no better than a child," refer to their "child-like strength" (Aesch. *Ag.* 75, 81). Elsewhere, bodily weakness is often linked with other limitations, as in Cyrus's explanation of why men have the advantage of boys in learning to ride. (Men are cleverer than boys, and also abler at putting into practice what they have learned because of superior strength: Xen. *Cyr.* 4.3.10–11.)

Moral incompetence, as we might expect, is primarily a philosopher's problem. Plato's outlook seems to be summarized in a scene in which Socrates praises the Spartans for their temperance (*sōphrosynē*), orderliness, easygoing temperament, greatness of spirit, discipline, bravery, endurance, willingness to work, will to win, and love of honor. In all these respects, he tells Alcibiades, the Athenian is like a child by comparison (*Alcib. I* 122C); in all, a child would be wanting.[20] Aristotle thinks that children have free will but not *prohairesis,* "resolve, purpose," and cannot therefore be really happy or moral.[21] But morality is also the subject of a comment by the orator Aeschines, who regards the ability to distinguish right from wrong as the mark of the adult male citizen.[22] It

was courage that children were felt to lack in particular;[23] children might seem brave, but this was dismissed as mere ignorance and thoughtlessness.[24] Readily frightened as they were, children were easy prey for stories about female bogies like Empousa, Gello, Gorgo, Lamia, Mormo (or Mormolyke).[25] Vase painters portray Athena doffing her helmet, or wearing the aegis, the emblem with the fearsome face of the Gorgon, back to front to avoid alarming the baby Erichthonius.[26] Such fears may have inspired Aeschylus to invent the bloodsucking Erinyes of *The Oresteia* in order "to reawaken them in an adult audience."[27]

Intellectual incapacity is touched on far more often, and in sources of many different kinds. One of the most popular Greek proverbs, "Old men are children again," always refers, as far as we can tell from ancient commentators and extant examples, to mental incompetence.[28] Aeschylus's Prometheus says that Hermes is "a child and even more mindless" if he expects to learn his secrets.[29] In Sophocles, Oedipus hesitates to give his children advice because they do not yet possess *phrenes,* "wits" (*OT* 1511–1512). Old Comedy makes much ado about humor so crude only children laugh—thick, red-tipped codpieces, "Megarian jokes."[30] Pericles, so the story goes, compared the Samians to children who cry while accepting scraps, because the Samians didn't appreciate Athenian rule (Arist. *Rh.* 3.1407a2).[31] Xenophon's idealized Cyrus knows Astyages is drunk when he does things he would not allow even children to do; his Agesilaus shows Tissaphernes to be a mere child at intrigue.[32] Hyperides recalls that the dead he is commemorating were once *paides . . . aphrones,* "mindless children," though now born anew, as it were, as valiant men (*Epit.* 29). The fullest compendium of children's intellectual shortcomings comes from Plato, concerned as he is with knowledge as a key to ethical development as well. Plato (or his speakers) claims that children know little, are gullible and easily persuaded, can understand only the simplest things, talk nonsense, and make unreliable judges.[33] Some adults, we are told, tease children (and amuse themselves) by talking to them in a high-flown and mock-serious manner (Pl. *Resp.* 8.545E); it is of course the incongruity that makes the joke. Superiority is expressed by saying a man makes others appear like children or less than children; inferiority is denoted by the taunt "Even a child could refute you"; an argument is made conclusive by the clincher "Not even a child would deny this."[34]

Plato often groups children with women, slaves, and animals.[35] These are also associated in Aristotle, for whom boys bear a physical resemblance to women (because they do not yet concoct semen), animals stand in the same relation to humans as children to adults, and both animals and children are as inferior to adults as bad and foolish men are to good and wise ones; as one consequence, the opinions of animals and children are regarded with equal contempt.[36] Children are also linked with the sick, the drunk, the insane, and the wicked.[37] No

sensible person would choose to live with children's powers of reasoning or to return to childhood once he left it.[38] One specific weakness that Aristotle adds to Plato's list is a short memory.[39] Children, it seems, are simply in too troubled and unstable a state to acquire knowledge and exercise sound judgment (Arist. *Phys.* 7.247b19).

Of course, the child has the potential to outgrow all these limitations; as Aristotle says, he is not yet complete and whole.[40] It is interesting, however, that the child is seldom a symbol of what is to come, and that when he is, the future hopes he represents are often unrealized. Hector's son Scamandrius is called by the people of Troy Astyanax, "defender of the city"; he is to be Hector's successor in this role, but first father is killed and then son, and the city that looks to them for help is destroyed. More often, children figure in images that ignore their future capabilities in favor of their futility in the present. The child builds castles in the sand, and then whirls them away.[41] The child chases a winged bird, which flees from his grasp.[42] Most moving of all is the beautiful picture first presented in Sophocles's satyr play *Lovers of Achilles* and later proverbial: "Lovesickness is a joy mixed with pain. I can make a good comparison, I think. When the frost has come in bright weather, and children seize a solid lump of ice in their hands, at first they find a new delight; but finally their desire won't let it go, yet what they have will not stay in their hands. So the same passion often lets lovers love and not love at the same time."[43] Even in this inelegant translation, the metaphor is apt and full of resonance. We are attracted (or so some thought) to our lovers by their sparkle and charm; yet love itself is fleeting; childhood too does not linger; and the youth, *pais* in the terminology of Greek homoerotic poetry, whose love is sought by the lovers of Achilles will himself be as short-lived and as brilliant as a piece of gleaming ice. Here we have a vision of childhood rich with loss and longing. But there is beauty and grace in the image as well, for children have qualities adults lack, and some of these are thought to be attractive.

Most prominent among the positive physical characteristics of children are the sweet smell of their breath and skin and their softness. Mentioned in contexts full of pathos by parents in tragedy, these are also discussed and explained by the philosophers.[44] According to the *Problems* ascribed to Aristotle, a child's smell stays sweet until puberty, at which point the sweat becomes saltier and stronger-smelling.[45] Plato explains the softness of children's bodies in an interesting account of the aging process. When they are young, creatures are formed of firmly interlocked triangles of matter. These are soft, as they are newly produced from marrow and nourished on milk. As older and weaker triangles that make up food and drink come into contact with them, they overcome these invaders and so grow. In time, however, the body's triangles begin to weaken

after so many battles, and can no longer assimilate new ones to themselves. They are divided by newcomers and decay, the process that is called old age (Pl. *Tim.* 81CD). The plasticity and malleability of the child, physical and intellectual, is a fundamental starting point for Plato's regimen in both of his major Utopian treatises.[46] Crying, too, was a childhood trait, sometimes an unwelcome symptom—Plato seems to disapprove—and sometimes viewed as an exercise contributing to the child's growth (Aristotle's opinion).[47] Children's wailing is described by distinctive words, *blēkhanō* (otherwise used of sheep and goats) and *brykhaomai* (usually applied to the bellowing of beasts and the raging of storms).[48] Their mode of speech also was their own. As among other species (except cattle), children have higher voices than adults.[49] They display characteristic errors in articulation—*iskhnophōnia* (likely stammering or speaking haltingly), *traulotēs* (lisping, especially confusing /r/ and /l/), *psellotēs* (simplifying consonant clusters).[50] Plato's Callicles takes pleasure in listening to small children lisp.[51] Baby talk is quoted on the comic stage and in Theophrastus's character sketches.[52] In addition, we are told that children have dense bodies (and so suffer from leprosy less than men), are snub-nosed, get thinner in the summer, are particularly prone to head lice, and are especially likely to get dizzy if they look at things a long way off.[53] And, sweet though their skins may be, their body products are not, a perception exploited for humorous ends.[54]

One physical characteristic has implications for children's temperament. In a number of places in the Aristotelian *Problems,* we read that children are moister and hotter than adults.[55] As a result, they are more hot-tempered as well, greedier and angrier than men.[56] Aristotle elsewhere notes their passion, and he regards childhood as the time when the appetite for pleasure is strongest.[57] All this is in agreement with Plato, who says the young are "fiery" and groups children with slaves, women, and the lower classes as those who have the most desires, pleasures, and pains.[58] Specific pleasures include sweets—a honeycomb stuffed in a newborn's mouth might stop its crying—and music.[59] Passionate as they are, children are energetic, unable to keep still in body and voice, and susceptible to crying out or leaping about in a disorderly fashion.[60] Because their reason is as yet uncurbed, they are treacherous, fierce, hubristic; in short, they are the most difficult to manage of all wild creatures.[61] Lack of discipline renders them changeable; Plato regards children's tendency to alter their games from day to day as dangerous (Pl. *Leg.* 7.797B). Yet variability and unpredictability may also be termed playfulness and are sometimes viewed more favorably by those with less concern for controlling all aspects of community life. In a play by Sophocles, the satyr Silenus (unsuited by temperament for service as one of Plato's rulers) presents a pleasant vignette of the charm of a child's random

responses. "Whenever I bring [the baby Dionysus] food, he straightway touches my nose and reaches for my bald head, smiling sweetly all the while" (Soph. fr. 171R.).

As the rhetorical use of children to denigrate opponents indicates, to behave in a manner appropriate to an earlier stage of life was generally regarded as a regression. Aristoxenus, an associate of Aristotle who lived at Athens in the later fourth century and is best known as a writer on music, is perhaps most explicit: children should not behave like infants (*nēpiazoien*), youths like children (*paidarieuointo*), or adults like young men (*neanieuointo*); and old men should not become crazy.[62] So Bdelycleon taunts his father for proposing to tell a children's story in adult company, and Socrates puns on the root of *paizein* when he hesitates to appear to be playing, though he is an old man.[63] What about precocity? We have already alluded to the motif of early achievement as a sign of great things to come. Of course, attitudes must to some degree depend on just what is achieved. Both Alcibiades and his son of the same name were rebuked for sexual activities inappropriate to their status as minors.[64] Less controversial activities elicited two rather different reactions, respect and affection.

Immature and lacking in experience, children were also believed to be innocent, and so were easily associated with phenomena outside the usual areas of citizen interaction: nature and the gods.[65] As a proverb put it, "Wine and children tell the truth";[66] children's chance comments might be credited with oracular force, their advice be valued for its special insight.[67] Herodotus, who knew a good story when he heard one, passes on an excellent illustration (5.49–51). When the Greeks of Asia Minor were planning to revolt from Persian rule, Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, came to Sparta to enlist the aid of King Cleomenes. At first, Cleomenes was inclined to help his fellow Greeks. But when Aristagoras unwisely revealed that the distance from the coast to the heart of the Persian empire was some three months' journey, he changed his mind. Aristagoras then turned from persuasion to bribery, and he had upped the ante to fifty talents when Cleomenes's daughter Gorgo, a girl of eight or nine, cried out, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you if you don't go away." Cleomenes, pleased by his daughter's advice, left, and Aristagoras went away empty-handed; as it happened, the revolt ended in disaster.[68] For another illustration, we may turn to Athenian drama. One of the techniques of Greek tragedy is to express its themes in verbal and visual imagery alike. In Sophocles's *Antigone,* Creon insists on the proper deference due to certain set hierarchies: man over woman, father over son, king over subjects. Others, Antigone and his own son Haemon among them, invoke different considerations, and Creon's rigidity has a tragic result, not least for himself. Tiresias is the one who brings home to Creon that he is in

error. A boy leads the blind seer on stage, the same boy who had earlier reported to him the rejected sacrifices that mark the displeasure of the gods. The boy (he says) is his guide, as he is a guide to others (Soph. *Ant.* 1012–1014). The boy's role, and Tiresias's respect for his contribution, underline one of the play's themes, that true wisdom may come from unlikely sources; children, young women, and an old, blind man may understand the gods' wishes as well as their social superiors do.

A second response involves a combination that is characteristic of the Athenian attitude toward children: their limitations are recognized, but they themselves are loved and enjoyed. From this point of view, clever comments and wisdom beyond their years are neither regarded as special delivery from the gods nor dismissed with contempt. Either reaction would constitute taking the children too seriously; the comic Strepsiades's proud recital of his son's attainments as a boy—making toy houses, boats, wagons, and frogs from pomegranate peel—is treated with gentle mockery (Ar. *Nub.* 877–881). They are simply cute. Our most developed portrait of what we would today call a cute kid comes in the account of the young Cyrus's stay with his grandfather Astyages, king of the Medes, in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia.* Of course, Xenophon would hardly trouble to compose his romance on Cyrus's early years if the boy had not become a great king and conqueror, his methods a model for the Athenian's own day. For the author, there is always a subtext in these stories; they are early signs of Cyrus's exceptional success. But the other characters involved in them, the adults who witness Cyrus's precocious perspicacity, cannot know his destiny. Their response is often simply appreciative laughter, generally (as seems likely) at speech and behavior they regard as typically childish (or at least boyish): exuberance, lack of tact, inquisitiveness.[69] When Cyrus imitates the cupbearer Sacas and puts on his serious and decorous countenance, both his mother and her father laugh heartily (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.3.8–9). They find him entertaining (1.3.12). Xenophon himself seems sympathetic to this view, for he sums up Cyrus's long disquisition on justice and the law with the words "So Cyrus often used to chatter" (*elalei:* 1.4.1, cf. 12), and he says that his hero's loquacity and relentless curiosity did not seem unpleasant because he was so fresh and naive (1.4.3). The young Cyrus, in fact, was like a pet puppy (*skylakōdes:* 1.4.4). Later in this work, we are introduced retrospectively to another cute kid. Cyaxares offers Cyrus his daughter with these words: "This is the girl you often used to pet when you stayed with us as a boy. Whenever anyone asked her whom she would marry, she used to answer, 'Cyrus' " (8.5.19–20). We might be tempted to take this as simply another example of truth out of the mouths of babes. But it is clear in the telling that Cyaxares does not mean to imply that the marriage has been made in

heaven, fated in any way. His intention is rather to reawaken in the adult Cyrus the same feelings of warmth he had for the girl when they were both children and she said such cute things.

The Vocabulary of Childhood and Its Stages

Broadly speaking, the words for *children* we find in our texts were chosen according to three criteria: their denotation, their resonance of connotation and tone, and their suitability to the genre to which the text belongs.[70] For example, of the common words for those in transition from child to adult, *neaniskos* and *meirakion,* absent from tragic drama, are found in the verse of comedy, which employs a more prosaic vocabulary than other genres of poetry. On the question of connotation and tone, it is less easy to be so categorical, as a brief examination of the two most common words for *child* in the sense "offspring," *pais* and *teknon,* may indicate.[71] They are distinguishable in many ways. *Pais,* formed from an Indo-European root meaning "small" or "insignificant," means both "child" and "young person"; it has a very broad range, it and its derivatives being applied to others of subordinate status, slaves and the junior partners in homosexual couples, from an early period; it is rarely found in emotional appeals from parent to child or from old to young, at least in early Greek verse; and at times it is so lacking in affective overtones that *pai* is later used as an ejaculation, much like our "Oh, boy!"[72] *Teknon,* related to *tiktō,* "I give birth," never means "young person" but always means "child" (literally or metaphorically); in early Greek poetry, it is frequently used by parents to address their children in contexts of consolation, exhortation, and reproof. Given these facts, it is natural for standard reference works to seek to establish thoroughgoing and more or less strict differences of usage between these words, such as the dictum that *pais* has special reference to the father, *teknon* (the more emotive term) to the mother, in tragedy above all.[73]

But such formulations cannot be pressed. In Aeschylus, Xerxes is often termed the *pais* of his mother, Atossa, Clytemnestra calls her son Orestes *pais* as well as *teknon,* and Danaus addresses his daughters as both *paides* and *tekna.*[74] In *Philoctetes,* Sophocles's Neoptolemus is called both *pais* and *teknon.* (Then, at 1423, Heracles refers to him as a man [*andri*], in recognition of his wise decision to return Philoctetes's bow.) In Euripides, Hecuba addresses her daughter Polyxena as *teknon* and *pais* in the same line, and the phrases *ateknos paidōn* and *apaidas teknōn* seem synonymous.[75] Certainly *teknon* may sometimes increase the emotional intensity of a passage, as it does when Oedipus uses it to address his suppliant subjects in the opening words of *OT.* The word indicates his paternal concern for the citizens of Thebes;[76] it also initiates the ironic undercurrent run-

ning through the play, in which the regal father figure will be humbled, revealed as sinner and son. But in many other instances, the choice may depend more on aesthetic effects (such as alliteration) or on wordplay than on recognizable patterns of connotation.[77] And of course poets in particular may choose to stretch or even subvert a word's usual usage for effect.[78]

Any discussion of the ages denoted by various words for *children* must consider an important question: How much does vocabulary reveal about social history? In the opening chapter of his pathbreaking book on the history of childhood, Philippe Ariès notes the wide range covered by the word *enfant* and the absence of words for *baby* and *adolescent* in early modern France. He argues that these are significant indicators that the notions of infancy and adolescence as separate stages with their own positive attributes were correspondingly late to develop.[79] Michel Manson's work on Roman childhood has pursued this theme. According to Manson, *infans* and *infantia* begin to refer to early childhood only in the late first century B.C.; this represents "a reflection of the discovery of the small child" at that time.[80] But contrary opinions are persuasive. Other recent studies in Roman social history exhibit close attention to legal and philological niceties while at the same time insisting on the inadequacy of such evidence to express the realities of institutions and those who live within them, and indeed on its potential to mislead. For example, examination of the epigraphic record reveals that the mother-father-child(ren) triad was at the core of Roman kinship relations despite the fact that neither of the common Latin words for household, *familia* and *domus,* regularly refers to the nuclear family.[81] I suggest here that the Athenian vocabulary for *children* neither mirrors nor seriously misleads. Though classical Attic had several nouns designating infants, children in their earliest years, most were not in common use and several were elastic; and no other stages of childhood were delineated by a single word. Yet artists and writers certainly show an awareness of and interest in infancy and other stages of the child's development.

Ancient authors occasionally present neat and plausible schemes in which words are presented in order of the age group to which they refer or even with what look like exact definitions attached. The most extensive list is that of the Hellenistic scholar Aristophanes of Byzantium. Designations for males include *brephos,* the newborn; *paidion,* the nursling; *paidarion,* the child who can walk and speak; *paidiskos; pais,* roughly, the child who can be educated; *pallēks* or *boupais* or *antipais* or *mellephēbos; ephēbos* (and its local equivalents); *meirakion; meiraks; neaniskos; neanias;* and so on until old age.[82] An account ascribed to Hippocrates includes seven stages of life, each identified with a set age span; the first four are *paidion* (until age 7), *pais* (7–14), *meirakion* (14–21), and *neaniskos* (21–28).[83] These two systems are loosely compatible—at least, each places the

terms *paidion, pais, meirakion,* and *neaniskos* in the same order. But other evidence is less easy to assimilate to them. For example, in a passage of Menander, the order runs *pais, ephēbos, meirakion, anēr, gerōn* (*Men.* fr. 494K.-A.); in other Athenian authors, *neaniskos* rarely refers to a youth who has not yet reached the age of majority, sometimes to an ephebe, sometimes to a young man who is old enough to participate more fully in civic life;[84] and *meirakion* and *neaniskos* are often interchangeable; so are *pais* and *paidion, paidion* and *paidarion,* on occasion.[85] Usage is thoroughly inconsistent.[86]

Some words do indeed have a well-demarcated chronological reference. *Pais* itself is quite clearly defined both as a technical term and in common usage. When it does not mean "child of," it refers to a male child before his enrollment in a deme and his consequent entry into civic life and (less strictly) to a female child before her corresponding change in status, her marriage.[87] A number of words refer to very young children in particular. Most, however, belong to the language of poetry, and some may be applied to older children as well. *Nēpios,* common in epic and later poetry, seems always to mean "baby," but the noun is quite rare in Attic prose.[88] *Brephos* is still more unusual outside poetry; it occurs only in two passages of Xenophon. In one of these, newborn children are referred to both as *ta neogna brephē* and as *tōn neognōn teknōn,* which implies that *brephos* on its own was not felt to express extreme youth more clearly than *teknon.*[89] (In later Greek prose, it may describe a child as old as six.)[90] The noun *mikros,* "the little one," is rarer still, attested only in a comedy by Menander; *mikkos,* found twice in a satyr play by Aeschylus, is Doric dialect and thus probably not current in Athenian speech and prose (though it is found as a personal name).[91] Among more common words in prose diction, *paidion* and other diminutive forms such as *paidarion* and *teknidion* are, as we would expect, often applied to very young children. But not invariably. All three of Socrates's sons, two small (*smikroi*) and one large (*megas*), are referred to as *paidia.*[92] This is a characteristic of other diminutives as well; *meirakion* and *meirakiskos, neanias* and *neaniskos* are sometimes synonyms.[93] Further elaboration is required to give even *paidion* and *paidarion* the meaning "small child" unequivocally, an adjective or a descriptive phrase.[94] It seems that classical Attic had no terms to refer to any stage of childhood except the first, and even for this its vocabulary was far from precise. But this should not be taken as evidence that the Athenians themselves did not bother to distinguish this and other age levels within childhood.

Newborns attract special notice, not always for any distinctive qualities of their own but because they exhibit the characteristics of children in general to a very high degree. For example, the skin of children (*tōn paidōn*) is said to be closely packed, as if their pores were closed—and the skin of young children (*tōn paidiōn*) most of all (Theophr. fr. 9.18 Wimmer). Newborns have the

smoothest body of all; even the bones in their head are soft.[95] They exemplify less attractive attributes too, lack of intelligence and of strength. When Cassandra suddenly speaks words it is willing to hear, the chorus comments, "Even a newborn child would understand that" (Aesch. *Ag.* 1162–1163). Similarly, according to a picturesque passage in a lost tragedy, "Not only a woman but a new-born child may tickle the bristly boar with a tender hand and throw him easier than any wrestler" (*Trag. Adesp.* fr. 383K.-S.). Orestes's nurse, summing up her charge's early days, indicates that the philosophers were not alone in perceiving children, especially small ones, as akin to animals: "I got him from his mother and reared him, enduring shrill summonses which kept me walking about all night and which were troublesome and unprofitable for me. You have to rear something which doesn't speak like an animal. . . . The child *en sparganois* doesn't say anything if it's hungry or thirsty or needs to urinate; the young guts of children are a law unto themselves. I had to be a prophet, and often I got it wrong, and had to clean his clothes."[96] Aristotle indicates that newborns have white hair, eyelids, and eyebrows, and eyes a shade of blue—all a consequence of a shortage of food and symptoms of weakness; human children may be born perfect, with all their senses intact—but they are the most imperfect of all such animals.[97] Furthermore, they sleep a lot in the first stage of life;[98] though they laugh and cry in their sleep, they do not dream until they are four or five;[99] they are bigger on top than their elders, smaller where their weight is supported—it is for this reason that they can't walk and that Aristotle says, "All children are dwarfs."[100]

Unable to speak, eat, move, or control their bowels even as well as older children, infants and toddlers were catered to through special equipment: feeding bottles, potty-stools, cradles, perhaps walkers.[101] They also wore *spargana,* usually translated (as by the lexicographers) as "swaddling clothes."[102] Plato recommends that children be swaddled until the age of two; Soranus, a medical writer of the second century A.D., regards tight wrapping as of great importance for modeling the infant's body, stipulating that the bonds be drawn most tightly at the knees and ankles (to produce finer joints), less so in the region of the thighs and calves.[103] Late reliefs show infants swaddled according to this prescription, with only their hands and feet free of their bonds, and Plutarch approvingly says that Spartan children were unique in Greece in not being swaddled.[104] Yet (aside from Plato) there is no archaic or classical evidence that children were in fact bound in this way; the only child indisputably depicted in swaddling clothes on Athenian vases is the newborn god Dionysus.[105] The story that Cronus ingested a rock enveloped in *spargana* under the delusion that it was his son Zeus is itself a little easier to swallow if we imagine the rock as completely covered with cloth, but hardly plausible nonetheless, since no real baby could

survive such a thorough wrapping (Hes. *Th.* 485–491). It is possible that our late sources, Plutarch and the lexicographers, merely reflect their contemporary customs and that Plato's plans, as often, do not; *spargana,* then, would be rather like our diapers, rags that could be placed on a baby's bottom as required and easily removed.[106] However, children are sometimes to be observed wrapped more or less tightly on archaic and classical grave reliefs and among terracotta figurines.[107] Therefore, it is probably safer to accept that children were swaddled for a very short period after birth—the forty or sixty days Soranus speaks of?—and that Plato's eccentricity lies in his recommendation of a much longer period. We may then assume that babies shown unswaddled are older than this, or that artists have chosen to depict them without swaddling bands, the more readily to represent interactions with adult caregivers; in modern cultures, cradle boards, swaddling bands, and similar restrictions on infants' body movements are typically applied for only part of the day, and in fact Soranus recommends removing swaddling for a daily bath and massage.[108] Whatever their precise nature, however, *spargana* were as unique to very young children as the other apparatus mentioned here, material reminders of their special nature.

Other stages too are identified in art. Greek artists were slower in establishing conventions for the depiction of children than they were in determining those for other age groups, perhaps because there was no widespread agreement as to which of the many ways in which children differed from their elders most merited emphasis; the lack of a stereotypical image for children in turn made it difficult to develop methods of displaying variations within the category.[109] Nevertheless, recent studies of art produced at Athens (or purchased by Athenian customers) in the classical period distinguish at least three stages of childhood, though researchers find rather different phases in one genre or another and do not always agree on the age limits they set on these phases. The most thorough account, by Lesley Beaumont, examines conventions for identifying three divisions: birth and infancy, prepubescent childhood, pubescent youth.[110] From the end of the sixth century, both later stages are subdivided for boys, prepubescence for girls as well; older and younger pubescent girls are visibly distinguished by one hundred years later. Marie-Claire Crelier, however, sees four stages on red-figure vases: newborns, the very small (from six to eighteen months), young children (from three to five years), and older children/adolescents (from seven to eleven).[111] Similarly, freestanding sculpture reveals four stages to Olympia Bobou: infants, children aged two to five, children aged six to nine, and pre-adolescents.[112] Discussing funerary reliefs, Janet Grossman notes "the care that sculptors took to depict children at particular stages of growth and development, ranging from infancy to late adolescence."[113]

These stages are signaled by a variety of markers—body shape and size, the

location and length of hair, dress, gestures, attributes such as toys and pets, the relations between figures—in a range of genres (vase paintings, grave reliefs, dedicatory plaques, terracotta figurines). The visual cues are not always easy to read. For one thing, they often mask or deny distinctions between children and others who do not enjoy the preeminent status of adult male citizens. So the grave stele of the shoemaker Xanthippus is usually taken to depict this dead father flanked by his daughters, two smaller figures; but Beaumont, pointing to her distinctive earring and hairstyle and the hint of a breast beneath her garments, has argued persuasively that the larger of the females represents his wife.[114] Other diminutive figures may be slaves or even dwarfs.[115] We must also allow for the tendency to credit children (dead ones above all) with attributes or achievements they had not yet attained. An example: the grave monument for Eupherus shows a muscular athlete. Yet the skeleton, which (unusually) survives, is of a petite boy in his mid-teens, "too slight to have achieved the heavy bulk and strong muscles of his commemorative representation."[116] Despite such difficulties, however, there is no doubt that Athenian iconography reveals both awareness of significant development within childhood and an interest in expressing it. The grave stele of Phanostrate is a striking instance, including as it does three standing girls, all different in height, and a baby boy.[117]

Archaeology tells a similar, though not identical, story.[118] (Thus Crelier sees only three groupings of children in the funerary record, one fewer than in her reading of red-figure vases.) Athenian infants were not cremated; *enchytrismos,* "pot burial," was reserved for those who died within the first year or so of life—their burials often included baby feeders. Older infants, up to the age of three or thereabouts, were interred in terracotta tubs, *larnakes,* often along with figurines of pet animals. Many of both groups were buried apart from adult graves, frequently in cemeteries near or on the road to sanctuaries devoted to goddesses linked to fertility and childbirth, such as Demeter and Artemis. Children who survived infancy were generally inhumed much like adults, in pit or tile graves or wooden coffins, but (a significant difference) still rarely cremated; their grave goods are more gender-specific than those for younger children, with wheeled objects of all kinds associated with boys and small female figurines, "dolls," with girls. But they cease being distinguished from adults when they are perhaps as young as eight or ten and certainly by age fourteen.

Among literary sources, the aims of narrative often preclude close investigation of a character's age. Eurysaces, son of Ajax in Sophocles's play, is sometimes presented as very young and sometimes as old enough to help carry his father's body. Sophocles is more concerned with appealing to the pathos of the situation, and with underlining the new family responsibilities Eurysaces will now have thrust on him, than with establishing the precise stage of his develop-

The shoemaker Xanthippus and his daughters—or is the taller figure his wife? London, British Museum 628. © The Trustees of the British Museum.

ment.[119] We must turn to didactic treatises for explicit expressions of opinion on the stages of childhood, their precise chronological ages, and their characteristics; this concern for precision is in fact one of the ways in which such theorists differentiate themselves from ordinary Athenians. Plato and Aristotle give the fullest and most self-conscious accounts in their programmatic works *Laws* and *Politics.*[120] It is Plato's Athenian spokesman in *Laws* who recommends that the baby be swaddled from birth until the age of two and then carried about by its nurses until the age of three (7.789E). The period from three to six is to be characterized by games with other children and the administration of mild forms of discipline (7.793E). Then, at seven, boys and girls begin to live separate lives and formal education begins (7.794C). Boys of ten will study literature for three years, and those of thirteen will go on to master the lyre for three years more (7.810A). *Laws* offers other characterizations of the periods of childhood, which are not entirely consistent with these (or with observable facts). During the first three years, the child is said to make a lot of noise but not to understand language, so a nurse can judge his wants only from his crying (7.791E–792E). During his first five years, he is thought to grow more quickly in height than in the next twenty (7.788D).[121]

Ten is a benchmark in another Utopian work, *The Republic,* where all the residents of the ideal city of Magnesia who reach this age are to be sent into the fields to work (*Resp.* 7.540E–541A). In a third dialogue, influenced but not written by Plato, Socrates outlines the particular problems to which stages of childhood are prone. The newborn, beginning life in grief, weeps because of need or cold or heat or a blow, not yet able to say what he wants and able only to cry to indicate discomfort. But when he turns seven, he drains sorrow's cup to the dregs, tyrannized by *paidagōgoi* (the male slaves responsible for his conduct) and teachers, and as he grows older he takes on still other instructors as his masters ([Pl.] *Ax.* 366D–367A).

In *Politics,* the critical ages are two, five, seven, and fourteen. Up to the age of two, children are to drink plenty of milk but little wine, to exercise as much as possible, and to become accustomed to the cold (7.1336a2–24, 1336b36); from two until five, the child should continue to exercise through play, but both the forms of play and the stories told to children of this age must be supervised by officials, the *paidonomoi* (7.1336a24–40). Children are to be reared at home until the age of seven and protected as much as possible from indecent talk and images; one consequence is that they are not to be permitted to attend comedies and similarly scurrilous dramatic fare (7.1336b1–36). At seven, children begin formal education outside the home, a period divided into two halves, before and after *hēbē,* puberty, at fourteen (7.1336b36–1337a7). Other authors confirm the significance of the age seven, when baby teeth (or "milk teeth") were thought to

be replaced, a connection as ancient as Solon.[122] The importance accorded the ages five, six, and seven finds parallels in many cultures studied by anthropologists, in which this is commonly a time for the child's attributes and social roles to change; it is also reflected in some leading theories of cognitive development.[123] *Hēbē* too is an important time for other Greek writers; again, their view of its crucial characteristics—the breaking of the voice, the beginning of the growth of hair on the chin, cheeks, armpits, and genitals, and sexual maturity above all—is hardly unique.[124]

Incidental information on specific ages from other sources is less coherent. For example, one speaker in an Attic lawsuit, Lysias's client, describes himself at thirteen as ignorant of what oligarchy was, without any financial motives to wish his father ill, and quite incapable of rescuing him from harm; his intention is to free himself of any guilt for the actions of the Thirty.[125] A second litigant says he was thirteen when his brother was born and was therefore old enough for his assertion that they are both sons of the same man to be trustworthy (Isae. 12.10). As always, we must evaluate this seemingly contradictory evidence with the understanding that the orators were not primarily concerned to provide precise information to the jurors, let alone to us. But in each passage there is a trace of the common-sense conviction that children near or in their teens are very nearly able to act with adult force, if not foresight, as indeed a slave not yet twelve is said to have done in almost killing his master with a knife (Antiph. 5.69).

Broader portraits of more vaguely defined stages are not uncommon. For example, in *The Republic,* Glaucon terms *trophē,* the stage between birth (*genesis*) and formal education (*paideia*), the most difficult.[126] In respect to children's speech, we again find an appreciation for change over time within the period of childhood. Aristotle observes that children at first can't talk at all and then stumble in their speech for a long time.[127] They begin by calling every man "father" and every woman "mother" until they learn to whom these special terms apply (Arist. *Phys.* 1.184b12). Cyrus, or so Xenophon supposes, grew less talkative as he matured, his voice became more subdued, and he didn't interrupt as often (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.4.1–4). Tastes, too, change over the course of childhood: very small children (*ta pany smikra paidia*) prefer puppet shows, older ones (*hoi meizous paides*) comedies (Pl. *Leg.* 2.658CD). The thrust of all this evidence is that stages of childhood, though legally and politically irrelevant and only irregularly and imprecisely marked off in the Attic vocabulary, were widely recognized at Athens.

It would be easy enough to demonstrate that these ideas about children, childhood, and its stages for the most part mirror the social reality of classical Athens—at least as seen through a glass darkly. Children as a group failed to mea-

sure up to adult male standards of strength, spirit, and sense; they were therefore excluded from the political and legal privileges of citizens who had come of age. Again, just as childhood was widely believed to be divisible into stages leading to maturity (though the demarcations of these stages differed, and they themselves left little trace in the language), so also young Athenians took their place in the household and in the world beyond by degrees; some, but by no means all, of this process of integration into the adult community was signaled by formal ritual acts. Yet it is worth noting that the steps in children's admission into Athenian society do not always match up with the stages of childhood discussed above. I take this as a welcome reminder that mirrors merely reflect reality; they do not reproduce it in the round. Similarly, the imposition of patterns on the evidence, necessary though it is, may sometimes obscure a complexity that is in itself a matter of interest. This conviction underlies the next chapter, in which I will show that children's participation in household and community life was more widespread and more varied than is generally recognized.

Two

The Child in the Household and the Community

The Child in the Household

Athenian children were social beings almost from the beginning of life. Being born, a biological event, was insufficient to make a child a member of an *oikos* or *oikia,* a household. Even children with two citizen parents had no automatic right of entry; they had to be accepted by the *kyrios,* the household's head, and his decision was based on a complex of factors, impossible to identify in any one case, but certainly including cultural constructs such as gender—girls were rejected more often—and the optimum size of the family.[1] Two ceremonies marked this acceptance.[2] The *amphidromia,* which took place on the fifth or seventh day after birth, involved a sacrifice; the father (naked, according to one late source) carried the child around the household hearth; women purified themselves; friends and relatives sent traditional gifts, octopuses and cuttlefish, but did not attend unless they had been present at the birth. It was presumably at this time that the family decorated the doorway of its home, announcing the birth of a boy with a wreath of olive, that of a girl with wool "because of their spinning."[3] Girls and the children of poorer families might be named at the same rite. However, those families who could or would bear the extra expense bestowed the name at a second celebration, on the evening of the tenth day after birth, the *dekatē.* This, too, involved an offering to the gods but was rather more festive—it featured a dance by women, who were rewarded with a special cake—and was open (presumably by invitation) to outsiders.

Athenians had just one personal name, most often made up of two elements with more or less transparent connotations; an example for boys is Hegesistratus, "army leader." Shorter names occurred as well, generally formed from the same elements that appear in compounds (Hegesias, Straton) or referring to personal characteristics (Pyrrhus, "fiery, red-haired") or circumstances (Didymus, "twin"). Girls' names were for the most part simply feminine forms of boys' (Hegesistrate, Pyrrha, Didyma). Such speaking names gave parents the opportunity to express opinions on public issues—Lacedaemonius, son of Sparta's ally Cimon, bore a political manifesto as much as a name—and also to mold their children's sense of themselves; they were at the same time indications of family (or broader community) values and a means of maintaining those values and transmitting them to others.[4] The use of names such as Hegesistrate for girls, who were not encouraged to grow up to lead armies, may be taken to reflect the dominance of (culturally defined) masculine attributes at Athens and the role of women as transmitters of goods and status rather than as actors in their own right. However, girls' names are far less likely to contain elements that express specific qualities needed for battle, such as *alkē* ("courage, boldness"), *kratos* ("power"), and *sthenos* ("strength"); these were apparently thought to contradict stereotypes of femininity too forcefully. Similarly, girls' names are much more likely to express their participation in the social life of the community than to recall the political institutions from which women were excluded; compounds including *agora* and *dikē* far outnumber those with *dēmos* and *polis*. (So a Timodemus might name his daughter Timagora.) Names connoting good nature or physical attractiveness are characteristically feminine too: Eucoline was Miss Congeniality. The forms of certain names likewise sent a message to and about women. Some women bore names identical with abstract nouns (Euphrosyne, "happiness"; Philia, "friendship"; and so on); others bore names in the form of diminutives, grammatically neuter in gender, such as Boidion and Lysion. These may have contributed to a tendency to depersonalize and objectify women, to present them as things—and rather insignificant things at that.[5]

Though they had no surnames or family names, the Athenians could use personal names to advertise a child's membership in the family. The Athenian system of nomenclature included the personal name; the father's name, the patronymic, in the genitive case; and the demotic, which indicated the deme to which the family belonged. Hegesistratus might more fully be referred to as Hegesistratus Hegesiou Kephalethen—Hegesistratus, son of Hegesias, of the deme Cephale.[6] Such a system of nomenclature has an obvious hereditary component, the patronymic. Deme membership, too, was passed down in the male line, being based on the area where some paternal ancestor had lived when Cleisthenes redesigned the political map of Athens in the late sixth century. Besides

these formal family links, moreover, personal names themselves often ran in families.[7] In Plato's *Politicus,* Socrates says that two young strangers, Theaetetus and Socrates, are related to him after a fashion—Theaetetus because they look a little alike, Socrates because they share the same name, "which implies some sort of kinship" (Pl. *Pol.* 257D). Grandsons were regularly named for grandfathers—more precisely, a man's first son after his father. The family of Hagnias of the deme Erchia included five men named Dromeas, three named Hagnias, and four named Diocles. Other "family names" involved the sharing of one syllable (or a variation), usually the first, with the same semantic element. For example, Callicrates of Erchia named his sons Calliphanes, Callisthenes, and Callistratus. We know the names and patronymics of some twenty-six hundred Athenian males attested before 300; just under one-third bear names that are identical to or share one element with their father's and thus mark them as members of his family. This figure, excluding as it does sons named for other family members, represents the minimum number of those identified in this way almost from birth. The number of women whose fathers are known is much smaller, but large enough to assure that daughters were linked by name with their fathers significantly less often than sons. So, too, their role in the devolution of property was more marginal, their opportunities to bring the family fame much fewer.

Children were also admitted into family-based social groups, the *genos* and the phratry, at an early age. We know of three introductions to *genē,* exclusive groups of unknown origin associated with certain cults.[8] One involves the adoption of an adult heir (Isae. 7.13, 15, 17, 26, 43); the others, exceptional circumstances. Callias introduced to his *genos,* the Ceryces, a child he had denied before his phraters several years before; Phrastor sent away his wife and then relented and tried (unsuccessfully) to introduce her child into his *genos.*[9] How old were these boys? Phrastor's wife was pregnant when he sent her away. He grew sick and accepted the child soon after—it must have been very young indeed. Callias's son was quite grown up when he joined the Ceryces, but he was much younger when Callias rejected him before his phraters, probably newborn, and it is likely that he would have been introduced to the *genos* as well as to the phratry at that time if Callias had accepted him. This admittedly imperfect evidence suggests that children were usually introduced into their *genē* soon after birth.

Unlike the *genē,* which were restricted to a portion of the citizen body only, phratries were open to Athenians of every social status; all boys were introduced to their fathers', and at least some girls were.[10] Our evidence for them is consequently fuller, but not more straightforward. Children were introduced at the Apaturia, a festival held each autumn.[11] But our sources do not agree on the age of those introduced.[12] Some suggest they were newborn, under a year old,

or very young; an ancient commentator on Plato sets the age at three or four years and may be confirmed by a papyrus fragment of a speech by Isaeus—it is noteworthy here that the speaker feels no need to be more precise. Other passages imply a child could be still older—even seven—though a late introduction might be irregular or suspicious.[13]

A related problem is posed by evidence for a double introduction to the phraters. Two offerings, the *meion* and the *koureion,* are mentioned in the decree of the Demotionidae.[14] That decree also provides for the listing of those who will one day undergo the scrutiny of the phratry Deceleieis. Each person's name is to be registered "in the first year or in the one he sacrifices the *koureion*" (line 118). The natural reading of this decree is that there were two possible times for admission—at the first celebration of the Apaturia after birth and at the time the *koureion* was offered.[15] The text requires registration at either or both of these times; this may imply that only one of these sacrifices had to be offered. Since the *koureion* was obligatory (the date of the scrutiny was set as the year after the *koureion*), the *meion* may have been an optional ceremony for the year of birth. Perhaps here, too, only the wealthy risked extra expenditure on a newborn or very young child; others may have omitted the *meion* entirely or offered it only when a child's survival seemed more assured.[16]

The *koureion* probably takes its name from the offering of hair made on the part of those introduced to the phratry; these may have waited until this occasion to cut the topknot, which distinguishes boys on some vases.[17] Hair styles demarcate age and status elsewhere in the ancient Mediterranean, most elaborately perhaps on Crete, and a change of fashion makes a fitting accompaniment for a rite of passage.[18] In the absence of any direct evidence, Labarbe (1953) put forward an ingenious argument that boys offered the *koureion* at the age of sixteen. His case is based on the sixth speech of Isaeus, which deals with the attempt of Euctemon to introduce the son of a woman called Alce to his phratry. After an initial setback, the boy is admitted (Isae. 6.18–26). After these events (*meta tauta*), Euctemon's son Philoctemon is killed off Chios, and sometime later (*hysteron khronōi*) his son-in-law Phanostratus sets off on an expedition with Timotheus (27). Labarbe, concerned to establish the chronology, sets the expedition at the end of the summer of 366/5, on the strength of *IG* 2^2 1609, which associates Timotheus and Phanostratus with a cleruchy to Samos. Philoctemon's death is put a short time before, at the end of 367/6 or the beginning of 366/5; the rejection by the phratry at the Apaturia, in the fall of 367; and the boy's acceptance at the Thargelia, the next spring (at the end of 367/6). Labarbe dates the speech before the summer of 363/2. Alce's son was then *oupō hyper eikosin etē* (14), not yet twenty-one, and was, therefore, born in 383/2. Consequently, he was sixteen at the time of the *koureion.*

Unfortunately, appealing though it may be, this is a very fragile reconstruction. The inscription *IG* 2^2 1609 may refer to 370/69, not to 366/5.[19] The intervals between the acceptance of Alce's son, Philoctemon's death, and Phanostratus's departure need not be nearly so short as Labarbe imagines.[20] Moreover, there is no justification for the supposition that Alce's son was not accepted by the phraters at the regular time, the Apaturia. The failure of any one of the elements in Labarbe's scheme renders the whole invalid. And yet it is possible that the *koureion* did involve sixteen-year-olds after all.

The question is tied up with a complex of issues regarding *hēbē,* a word with a number of related but distinct connotations. In the first instance, *hēbē* refers to the onset of puberty, usually set at fourteen.[21] The word is also used of legal maturity; the Athenians provided for the sons of those killed in battle until *hēbē,* that is, until their admission to a deme in the eighteenth archon-year after their birth.[22] But the orators also express legal maturity in the context of entry into an inheritance by using a curious phrase, *epi dietes hēbēsai,* "to be two years older than *hēbē.*"[23] One lexicographer brings this term into conformity with the age of majority by setting *hēbē,* eccentrically, two years later than usual; but among most scholars of antiquity, the assumption is that *hēbē* here is puberty, to be thought of as fourteen, and that the age in question is therefore sixteen.[24] How are we to explain this belief, which seems so completely at odds with Athenian practice during the classical period? I would suggest that the expression *epi dietes hēbēsai* was originally applied to boys at the time they offered the *koureion* and were registered in their phratry. While fourteen was the age generally identified as the onset of *hēbē,* it was well known in antiquity that boys did not all mature at the same rate.[25] To delay ritual recognition for two years would make it more likely that the boys involved had all, in fact, reached puberty;[26] this argument gains force if all boys born in the same year offered the *koureion* at the same festival, in the same way as they were admitted to a deme in the same archon-year. It is generally agreed that, before Cleisthenes's reforms, admission to the phratry was the equivalent of entry into the citizen body and to such citizen rights as inheritance.[27] It would be natural enough for an old phrase used to express legal maturity before Cleisthenes to become fossilized and remain in use with its former force, even though its literal meaning no longer corresponded to the age of those it described; all the more so since phratry membership was often adduced as proof of eligibility for citizenship and the two events could be regarded, both causally and conceptually, as related stages in the process of coming of age.

The child, then, was a member of a family, a family's phratry, perhaps a family's *genos.* But such formal definitions could have only limited significance, especially to a small child. Children apprehend the social world more concretely,



A father takes his son to the shoemaker's. Oxford, Ashmolean Museum 563.

classifying persons and relations primarily by the things they do to and with them. A mother is not a kinship category, but someone who provides food and comfort and so on. An Athenian son would know his father as the man who took him to the shoemaker's or accompanied him (and perhaps his *paidagōgos*) to the theater.[28] (On each occasion, he would incidentally learn a lesson about how to be a man, competent in commercial interactions, a conduit of commu-

nity culture.) Along the same lines, to approximate a child's experience of the family, we must, in Beryl Rawson's words, "also take account of what activities families undertook together."[29] Such a project may also afford incidental insight; it is suggestive both for Roman ideals of family life and for Roman conceptions of entertainment that (as Rawson points out) married men, women, and schoolboys all sat separately to watch plays, gladiatorial shows, and some other spectacles, whereas they watched the horse races at the Circus together.

I begin with religion.[30] *Amphidromia, dekatē,* introductions to *genos* and phratry—all include ritual acts. Religion, of course, pervaded Athenian life, from the invocations to the gods that prefaced decrees, to the plays presented in Dionysus's theater in his honor, to the temples on the Acropolis, which dominate the city's skyline even now. That families are so often involved in cult activities of one kind or another is another index of religion's importance.[31] Some of these (like those already discussed) revolved around the children themselves. And we should not imagine that children were always bystanders—Eubulides, for example, distributed the meat at his celebration of the *koureion.*[32] In others, some children had distinctive responsibilities. Athenian marriages reserved an important role for the *pais amphithalēs,* a child with both parents living; such a child served as an index of one household's good fortune and (so it was hoped) an omen for another's.[33] On the night before the marriage, the groom slept in the bride's house accompanied by a *pais amphithalēs,* likely female, and the bride too may have shared a bed, with a boy *amphithalēs* (Poll. 3.39–40). At the ceremony itself, a boy *amphithalēs,* crowned with a wreath of thorns and acorns, circulated among the guests, distributing bread from a basket that resembled a child's cradle.[34] *Amphithaleis* also accompanied the processions of the bride and groom and then of the wedding gifts on the day after the ceremony.[35] At other times, children took part in ritual activity simply as members of the family, as at funerals, another important occasion for the assertion of solidarity.[36]

Families sacrificed together, too. A fourth-century votive relief from Brauron is framed by a young man holding a bull and a woman bearing a stool, both probably cult functionaries or family slaves. Between them we see a bearded man, two women (one a nurse?), and four children of different sizes—all about to make an offering to Artemis.[37] Four children appear in a fourth-century votive for Asclepius, too—he was the most favored recipient when children were no longer babies but not yet adolescent.[38] Indeed, "perhaps the most immediately striking aspect of the representation of children in votive reliefs is the sheer number of reliefs that depict them";[39] over 40 percent of extant Attic votive reliefs include children, sometimes in prominent positions. Literary evidence confirms that, in general, an effort was made to include children in cult observances, at least within the city itself, though exceptions seem to have been

A *pais amphithalēs* rides in a wedding procession. New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 56.11.1 (Walter C. Baker Gift 1956). © The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Photograph: Art Resource, NY.

made in the case of rites involving abusive language (Arist. *Pol.* 7.1336b18).[40] Euxitheus's relatives took him to the temple of Apollo Patroos and other sacred places (Dem. 57.54). The Superstitious Man wants his children and his wife (or a nurse) to accompany him to Orphic rites (Theophr. *Char.* 16.12). Theophrastus brought his sons to religious ceremonies all over Attica and introduced the adopted one, Astyphilus, to worshipers of Heracles, "so that he might share in their association" (*koinōnias,* Isae. 9.30).[41] As this phrase alerts us, there is more at stake here than piety alone. It has been suggested that the images with which children came into contact in these special spaces provided influential information on their roles and behaviors;[42] certainly Plato advises that decorum at least

be required on visits to temples (Pl. *Leg.* 7.794A). Furthermore, such religious activities, solemn and significant as they must have seemed, would naturally bind children together with those who shared in them. Worshiping in concert as a manifestation of common purpose, fathers strengthen bonds with their sons and families gain the gods as witnesses (and, with luck, guarantors) of their unity. Astyphilus's career illuminates one explicit way in which families fostered a sense of identity in children. Right from childhood (*eutheōs ek paidiou*), his uncle and other relatives told him how his natural father had met his death, and he never spoke to the son of the man responsible once he reached the age of reason (Isae. 9.20). The cult activities mentioned here are clearly another means to this end.

Secular activities, too, afforded children a chance to contribute. Arethusius and his brothers sent a boy from the city, likely a family member, to Apollodorus's farm to pick some roses; they hoped that Apollodorus, taking him for a slave, would handle him roughly, and so leave himself open to a charge of *hybris* ([Dem.] 53.16). Work inside and outside the family home was a more straightforward way to lend a hand.[43] Children make economic contributions to their families in many cultures, in ways that differ so greatly in respect to age, social status, gender roles, and organization of labor that any except the most careful use of comparative material is hazardous in the extreme.[44] One thrust of recent research does seem to be of wide relevance, however: to stress children's indirect contributions, undemanding but time-consuming work that frees adults for more highly skilled tasks. Included here are such activities as running errands, housecleaning, collecting firewood, caring for animals, and (especially) minding younger children. But we should not slight the value of children's share in the primary production of food and other necessities; their productivity in some areas of agriculture (cutting fodder, for one) may be nearly as great as adults'. There can be no doubt that Athenian children took a hand in many of the tasks children do in peasant societies today, though our scattered and largely anecdotal evidence permits few generalizations. Child care, a major responsibility of girls (though not theirs alone) in many cultures, was probably a common enough chore for Athenian girls, such as those we see minding a smaller girl and boy in a swinging scene on an archaic amphora.[45] Because of its relevance to male-female relations at Athens, I will defer discussion of child care until my treatment of siblings in Chapter 5. What is worth mentioning here is that in this regard, as in others, girls help out in their family of birth while they prepare for their future role in their husband's household. Similarly, Ischomachus's wife learned little except to make a cloak from wool and to give spinning out to maids before her marriage, presumably as a result of pitching in on domestic duties when she was younger (Xen. *Oec.* 7.6); a sixth-century votive offering to

A family sacrifices a sheep to Asclepius. Athens, National Archaeological Museum 1407. Photograph by Irini Miari.

Athena Ergane, the goddess associated with handicraft, displays a woman working wool while a girl sits on the ground nearby.[46] So, too, girls must have learned another aspect of women's work, food preparation, hands on—one derivation suggested for *thygatēr,* "daughter," is "preparer of the meal."[47] Boys also might learn adult roles in the course of contributing to the work of the household. A potter's sons help out in their father's workshop, observing all the while; then they begin to pot themselves.[48] The tradition that Solon released sons who had not been taught a trade from the obligation to support their fathers must be based on the prevalence of this pattern (Plut. *Sol.* 22.1).

We cannot say how early children began to participate in this way. It was perhaps true of Athens, as of some modern small-scale societies, that children in larger families tended to work more and earlier than those who had fewer siblings, partly because of the model older brothers and sisters provide.[49] Plato furnishes our only evidence on the ages thought appropriate to certain tasks, recommending that all Magnesia's residents over ten be sent into the fields (*Resp.* 7.540E–541A). The contributions of poorer children were probably of special importance to their families. Phrynichus had to tend sheep in the fields while a wealthier boy was at school in the city.[50] According to his rival Demosthenes, Aeschines helped his impoverished father run a grammar school by grinding ink,

Older girls mind small children while they swing. Photograph: Landesmuseum Württemberg, Stuttgart.

sponging benches, and sweeping the schoolroom, "the function of a servant, not a free boy"; Demosthenes himself was spared these indignities.[51] In comedy, Cnemon's daughter accompanies him to the fields (Men. *Dysc.* 333–334). If she is to be thought of as sharing his labor (which the text does not exclude), this is perhaps a symptom of the old man's niggardly ways; he requires her to work even though he has the resources to hire or buy other help.[52] Greeks in the classical period generally regarded sons and daughters in menial occupations as substitutes for slave labor.[53] It is possible that the children of some slave-owning families did chores too, to release slaves for other tasks or as a form of discipline and training. To quote Aristotle: "Some menial duties are honorable for free men if performed when they are still young" (*tōn neōn, Pol.* 7.1333a8). But his own criticisms of the license allowed to the children of the very rich tell against such practices at the top of the social scale (*Pol.* 4.1295b15, 5.1310a24).[54]

The ancient economy was primarily based on land. The agricultural labor of children—clearing stones from fields, breaking up clods of earth, tending animals—therefore carries an extra weight in any evaluation of their contribu-



A woman works wool while a girl sits nearby. Athens, Acropolis Museum 2525.

tions to the family as an economic unit.[55] The consumption of food and drink, like their production, is also an important arena for social interaction and may provide a means to measure social status. The symposium, "the group of men which expresses its identity through the ritual drinking session," has been called the organizing principle of Greek life, responsible (among much else) for the form and content of lyric poetry and for the ascendancy of painted pottery as a form of art.[56] The right to dine in the *prytaneion* was the greatest honor the *polis* could bestow; the *prytaneis,* the representatives of the democracy, ate together in the *tholos* in their month of office.[57] An army messmate might be preferred to kin as an heir (Isae. 4.18). At Rome, patron and *clientes* ate together to manifest their solidarity; but they might eat different food, and status distinctions could be reinforced through seating arrangements.[58] Family eating patterns at Athens also are both complex and instructive. Small cups discovered in domestic contexts (and elsewhere) have been plausibly explained as child-sized.[59] When and where would children use them? Children might be included in invitations to parties, such as the neighborhood celebration with which the audience is teased in *Lysistrata* (Ar. *Lys.* 1065–1071). But they (and their mothers) are generally



Boys feed chickens. Athens, National Archaeological Museum 1654. Photograph by Andreas Skiadaresis.

out of place at evening symposia. (One of the distinctive features of Socrates's simple *polis* is a focus on family life, including dinners at which citizens will feast in the company of their children [Pl. *Resp.* 2.372B].) When children are (exceptionally) allowed to attend, they are distinguished from adult male symposiasts by sitting and from slaves by being clothed. Autolycus, a special guest at a symposium held in his honor after a victory in the boys' *pankration,* sits by his father's side while the others recline "as usual."[60] Reclining and drinking alcohol are regarded by Aristotle as attributes of maturity.[61] After the meal and the liba-

tions, however, it was customary for children to make an appearance in order to entertain the guests.[62]

On less elaborate occasions, too, fathers fed their male visitors apart from the rest of the family. When Euphiletus has a friend over to eat with him, they go upstairs, which is temporarily serving as his living space while his wife tends to their baby on the story below (Lys. 1.23). In what looks like an unusual case, Theophrastus's Obsequious Man bids his host's children join them at dinner (*Char.* 5.5); they are presumably male, for otherwise the guest's conceit that they are as like as figs to their father would be no compliment. Normally the children would eat with their mother, who would not be expected to attend a meal with strangers.[63] Xenophon's Utopian account of life among the Persians provides a reversal of normal Athenian practice; he relates that Persian boys up to the age of sixteen or seventeen eat not with their mothers but (when their rulers so order) with their teachers (*Cyr.* 1.2.8). Boys of this age might be called *meirakia,* like the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias. These friends of Socrates, resolved to take better care of their boys than most Athenian fathers, pride themselves on sharing their table with them rather than just letting them go their own way (Pl. *Lach.* 179AB, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.14.4). Less attentive fathers might find their sons carrying on like Conon and his fellow *meirakia,* who formed a gang, the Triballi, and gathered together to dine on such disgraceful delicacies as the testicles of pigs sacrificed to purify the assembly (Dem. 54.39). Exceptional at opposite extremes, each example confirms that teenage boys did not usually eat with their fathers. The children's main meal seems to have been at midday (Ar. fr. 360K.-A.). When Evergus and his gang burst into an enemy's house, they find his wife, children, and a freed slave nurse at lunch in the courtyard; one of the children is a boy ([Dem.] 47.55, 61). I see no reason why a father might not join them if he happened to be home.[64] In general, however, children ate with their mothers, not their fathers; and boys who were admitted to the men's club of the symposium were clearly set apart from their elders. Eating and drinking, then, far from offering the whole family an opportunity for communal activity, tended to express and reinforce cleavages within it. Boys, social inferiors destined to inherit the father's dominant role, were placed in an ambiguous position. They usually ate with their mothers and sisters but might also be granted an early taste of privileges to come.

The Child in the Community

Until they reached the age of majority, boys could not vote in the assembly, represent themselves in a court of law, make a will, enter into contracts (at all or

for more than a set amount),[65] or serve in the armed forces;[66] girls were lifelong minors. In respect to interactions with adults, children's lives were generally circumscribed within the circle of the family and its connections. "From the beginning" (as Demosthenes puts it in his funeral oration) "the dead were outstanding in every aspect of their upbringing, practicing what was fitting at every age, and they pleased all they should, their parents, friends, relations. . . . But when they arrived at manhood, they made their quality known, not just to their fellow citizens, but to all" (*Epit.* 16–17). Aristotle, struggling to define citizenship, concludes that the sons of citizens aren't citizens in the same sense as adults but are only incomplete citizens, citizens *eks hypotheseōs,* "by presumption."[67] On a more practical plane, when Hyperides wants to stress how flagrant is the corruption of his enemies, he says that even little children in the schools—who would not be expected to have any interest in politics—know about the speakers who take Macedonian money.[68] Children's lack of competence in the public realm provides the basis for a joke in a comedy by Eupolis (fr. 133K.-A.). *Mē paidi tēn makhairan,* "no knife for the boy," was a popular proverb, found also in a variant form, "No sword for the boy," and related to a number of other sayings that suit contexts in which someone harms or may harm himself.[69] So, when a phrase begins *mē paidi,* Eupolis's audience expects the usual completion, a knife, a sword, or some other dangerous weapon. Then a twist: the concluding words are *ta koina,* "the community." The humor arises not from the change alone, but also from the fact that the spectators must shift their focus in an unexpected way. Eupolis's parody depends for its effect on the fact that the proverb normally implies that the child is at risk. Suddenly, the onlookers, detached up to now, are forced to recognize that the danger this time is to themselves; they sit up and take notice. Of course, the impact of the change is all the greater because children's qualifications for managing *ta koina* were thought to be so slender. In another comedy, Antiphanes's *Sappho,* the Lesbian poet poses a riddle: what is female in nature and hides under its clothes children (*brephē*) who are voiceless and yet shout? It's the *polis*—feminine in gender—and the children she rears are speakers in the democratic assembly, venal and quarrelsome.[70]

But we should not imagine that the barrier between childhood and the adult world of the *polis* could not be crossed, or that the transformation at majority was complete. Even after they came of age, Athenian men were still too young for certain responsibilities, such as service on juries or on the Council of 500.[71] By the same token, minors were not completely excluded from civic life; though they could not share fully in the community, they were part of it nonetheless. Given the profound interpenetration of family and *polis* in classical Athens, it is only to be expected that their involvement was usually mediated through the family and its members and expressed in its terms.[72] We have already seen that

fathers introduced their sons and (less often) their daughters to fellow citizens who belonged to the same phratry or *genos;* such an introduction was important proof of citizen status in contested cases. Less formally, too, fathers might make their sons, in particular, known to a wider circle; Lysimachus may first have met Socrates when he was a boy and accompanied his father to a shrine or some other gathering of their demesmen (Pl. *Lach.* 187E). On the ideological level, the land of Attica is sometimes described as mother and the political community as mother or (more frequently) father of all Athenians.[73] As such, the city is concerned with the birth of children, the support of boys (at least) whose fathers were killed in war (or in restoring the democracy at the end of the fifth century), and the dowering of the daughters of those who had earned its thanks; and it deserves the support, *tropheia,* owed to parents in return.[74] In addition, the Athenians often brought their children into public discourse, adducing them as motives for revolution or counterrevolution, invoking them to persuade jurors to convict in political trials, swearing on their heads to guarantee commitment to a political position, including them in exhortations before battle.[75] A two-way street: jurors are urged to remember that they will have to report what they have decided to their wives and children.[76] In all these ways, both boys and girls are clearly regarded as the children of the *polis,* not the family's alone.

What is more, in some ways children might be very much like adults. Despite their legal limitations, minors were apparently liable for involuntary homicide on the same basis as other Athenians. One of Antiphon's rhetorical exercises deals with the death of a boy, struck and killed when he walked into the path of a javelin tossed by a youth, a *meirakion* or *neaniskos.* The dead boy is certainly underage; the unlucky athlete probably is, as his father not only speaks on his behalf but refers to himself, too, as the accused.[77] Though the father of each boy argues that it is the other who is to blame, neither suggests that age diminishes their responsibility. Likewise, trials for the intentional murder of minors were held at the Areopagus, just like those in which the victims were adult citizens. It is also possible that children (boys, anyway) were able to testify in Athenian lawsuits. Certainly they were present in courtrooms; adults could testify to what they saw or knew as children (Isae. 12.10); and the testimony of another group without full legal rights, slaves, was admissible (though only if obtained under torture).[78] As it happens, however, our only instances of boys' giving evidence or of taking an oath to support a prosecution (both hypothetical) concern cases of homicide, and it is best to assume that these, involving as they do questions of pollution, make up a special class of crime.[79]

Indeed, religion provided the main avenue for children into the life of the *polis,* just as cult observance was perhaps the most important family activity. Cult might even take them outside the city, as envoys of a kind; boys joined ephebes

in the Pythais, an expedition to Delphi undertaken in response to lightning strikes.[80] Unlike some other Greeks, Athenians had no local cults of heroized children (though Attic vases reveal a fondness for hometown children of myth like Erichthonius and Itys) and did not permit children to serve as priests.[81] But children regularly took part, sometimes at center stage, in a number of citywide religious festivals at Athens itself.

Unmarried girls were likely prominent in the celebratory *pannychides,* "all-nighters," of the Panathenaea, the Tauropolia and the Brauronia. Children may have been a focus of the Diasia, the most important Attic festival for the serpentine Zeus Meilichios, "the kindly one." It was on this occasion that Strepsiades bought his six-year-old son a toy wagon, and a famous votive relief shows a man and a young boy standing in front of an image of the god in the form of a snake.[82] The Anthesteria, held ten days before the Diasia in the spring month of Anthesterion, is certainly connected with children, especially its second day, Choes. In fact, it seems to have been an occasion for otherwise marginal groups in general to join a city celebration; slaves took part too. But details are less clear than some scholars' confident accounts allow, and we should be cautious about viewing the festival as a kind of coming-out party into the community.

According to a standard English-language book on the Athenian festivals, "It was an Athenian custom on this day [Choes] to crown with flowers children who were three years old." This is widely accepted.[83] But the wreaths for children ("in the third year after birth") are mentioned only in a late work, *Heroicus,* usually ascribed to Philostratus (35.9 De Lannoy), and he does not even identify the festival by name (though it is probably what he has in mind when he refers to the month of Anthesterion). A more critical point: the time Philostratus refers to in this work is not the classical period, but the years just after the Trojan War. Now, the Athenians may well have celebrated the Anthesteria at this time, but we cannot expect Philostratus to have been an eyewitness; nor is *Heroicus*—a fantastic demonstration that the heroes of the Trojan War were still alive—the most reliable of repositories of antiquarian lore. Like many contemporary works, including others of Philostratus's own, it is apt to invent tradition. It is more likely that Philostratus's reference is to the Athens of his own day (which he knew well); it is still more so because he shifts to the present tense to bring in the wreaths, and the only other evidence for a set age of participation in the festival of Choes is roughly contemporary with him.[84] Of course, cult practices are often conservative and remarkably consistent over time. But the Athenians did not hesitate to bring in new cults when it suited them, and (in this case) one of the festival's most striking features, the miniature wine jugs that gave the day of Choes its name, seem to have been a short-lived fashion of the later fifth century.[85] Moreover, wreathed children on these *choes* are occasionally shown

A father and his son stand before an image of Zeus Meilichios. Berlin, Staatliche Museen K92.

crawling and so are likely younger than three; others may be assimilated to satyrs, notorious for their lack of self-control—an odd association if they are to be thought of as joining the civic community.[86] Finally, the festival's links with Orestes, myth's most notorious matricide, are more suitable for older children who are leaving home for good than for toddlers, who will soon return to the world of women.

The *choes* bear in many cases (though far from all) illustrations of children, boys chiefly, undertaking a wide variety of activities.[87] Scholars have often concluded that these represent events at the festival. A *chous* showing Orestes (connected in legend with the festival's founding) is thought to illustrate "some parody of the story of Orestes, played by little children at the festival of the Choes"; other suggestions have included crawl-offs, dogcart races, ball games, and wrestling.[88] The *choes* themselves, pint-size versions of the vessels used in the drinking contests that characterize the festival, are evidence of such mimicry of adult activities, since they were probably given to children as gifts at this time. But many of the scenes are found on vases of other shapes, and few are connected to the Anthesteria in literary sources.[89] It is therefore best to explain these depictions differently, as products of the whimsy of artists and their customers (e.g., those showing children as Silens or Erotes or racing in carts drawn by deer), as records of informal play at the festival, or as portrayals of everyday life.[90] (That representations of gender roles are less rigid on *choes* than on funerary lekythoi or grave stelai may perhaps reflect the messiness of real life, in which sisters

sometimes play with their brothers' things.) Children's involvement in one festival activity, however, is beyond doubt. This was the Aiora, a rite in which they sat in swings tied to the branches of trees. It is not quite clear whether this is to be thought of as a fertility rite (and so took place on Choes) or as a rite of purification (on the third day of the Anthesteria, Chytroi).[91] Children's roles may tip the balance toward the first of these views.

Still another festival with special significance for children was the Oschophoria, held in the autumn just after the Apaturia and, like it, much concerned with the coming of age of Athenian boys. Those who took part in the procession and foot races from Athens to Phaleron were ephebes, not boys.[92] But fables and stories were part of the rites as well, and these were apparently directed toward children (Plut. *Thes.* 23.3). All too predictably, we know nothing about them. They were perhaps devoted to the exploits of Theseus, who rescued the Athenian boys and girls destined for the Cretan Minotaur but then inadvertently caused his father's death; a boy among boys on his departure, he replaces his father as king on his return. It is also possible, however, that they (or some of them) bore some relation to a story we do know. The old men in Aristophanes's *Lysistrata* taunt their female contemporaries with the tale of Melanion, which they heard as children (*eti pais ōn*). Melanion was a young man (*neaniskos*) who fled marriage, pursuing a life in the mountains; here he hunted hares with his dog, set snares, and loathed women so much that he never came home (Ar. *Lys.* 781–796). Cross-dressing is a feature of the Oschophoria—the two youths leading the procession appeared as girls—as it is of other passage rites. Melanion's flight from women may seem to mark the opposite pole; but in fact it is analogous, a move beyond the norms of male culture in the *polis.* And Theseus, too, fought against women, the Amazons. Melanion's story would suit this festival.[93] Children themselves provided the text at another festival held at the same time, the Pyanopsia. Carrying the *eiresiōnē,* an olive branch wreathed with wool and decorated with model lyres and vases and with fruits of the earth, they went from house to house begging for treats and singing a song of plenty; a late Hellenistic calendar frieze shows one boy, a *pais amphithalēs,* bringing the *eiresiōnē* to the Temple of Apollo.[94] Inscriptions from the first century B.C. and the Roman Imperial period reveal that such boys were seven years old or thereabouts.[95] At another autumn festival, the Proerosia, boys, also perhaps *paides amphithaleis,* were involved in ritual plowing of the earth.

All adult Athenians—like all other Greeks and even slaves—were eligible for the Eleusinian Mysteries. A vase showing children among those walking in the procession to Eleusis confirms what the admission of slaves suggests, that they too could become initiates.[96] Some children played a prominent role. Each year, a boy or a girl was elected by lot and initiated at public expense to serve as the

pais aph' hestias.[97] According to the late author Porphyry, the *pais* was an intermediary between the other initiates and "the divine," placating the gods like priests who perform sacrifices for their cities (*Abst.* 4.5). Similarly, it is a child (whether a boy or a girl is uncertain) who presents (or accepts) Athena's robe, the *peplos,* on the east frieze of the Parthenon.[98] In each instance, it is presumably children's very marginality that makes their role appropriate. Not yet fully integrated into the social world of the *polis,* they are interested outsiders, a status they share with the gods with whom they intercede.

Children enjoyed theatrical presentations, puppet shows, musical contests, the spectacles Plato says delighted the young at sacrifices, going so far as to spur on those competing on stage (perhaps in recitations).[99] Casual references in Plato and comic appeals to the audience guarantee the presence of boys at the great dramatic festivals in honor of Dionysus, and (though they go unnoticed, as often, in our sources) the connection of women with the god in other contexts provides a plausible justification for the attendance of girls as well.[100] It has even been proposed (rather implausibly) that satyr plays, said to be simpler in style and moral framework than other genres, were used to teach children dramatic conventions and to reward them for sitting through the three tragedies that preceded them.[101] But did boys actually appear on stage? Boy actors won prizes even against adult competitors during the Roman period (though they may simply have recited passages from plays rather than performed them), and mosaics indicate that boys took supernumerary roles in Hellenistic productions of New Comedy.[102] The ability of boys to fill the numerous but relatively minor speaking and nonspeaking roles for infants and older children in both tragedy and comedy is therefore not in question. Nor would their appearance in choruses in such plays as Euripides's *Suppliants* and Aristophanes's *Wasps* (and perhaps, too, his *Peace* and *Frogs*) be out of place, similar as it would be to their role as choral singers in any festival.[103] Children's lines are after all almost without exception in lyric meters, providing young star singers a chance to show off their voices. It is therefore tempting to follow Sifakis (1979b) in his contention that children both appeared on stage and sang their own parts. Children in tragedy, he says, are depicted in a conventional role—helpless, in danger, seeking protection. This stereotype demands an equally conventional portrayal of children on stage. Yet the children of tragedy say much the same things, in much the same language, as adults. What, then, does their conventional portrayal involve? Sifakis asserts that children are regularly depicted as small adults in Greek art until the Hellenistic period and that tragedy must have used a similar convention. "Children . . . must absolutely *look* their very young age. The cardinal point here is size" (73). Therefore, child actors must have represented children.

Unfortunately, however, the parallel from art is misleading (quite apart from

the fact, which Sifakis admits but evades, that children are sometimes shown realistically).[104] A vase painter can distinguish children and adults only through external characteristics, unless he adds identifying inscriptions. On stage, however, the means of identification are many; direct address is only the most obvious. There is no *need* for children to be distinguished from adults by size. And Sifakis's remarks about convention, though sound enough in general, are applied rather arbitrarily. It is one thing for children to appear in a conventional role, another for that role to be further emphasized by a distinctive physical representation. We might even argue that the children's conventional role rendered any further differentiation unnecessary—it is, after all, precisely the nature of the convention that is at issue. This might indeed have been to show children as small, or (just as easily) for men to play all roles, those of children and women. Other alternatives, such as children's lines being delivered by adults offstage or even on, also could be passed off as conventions.[105]

The appeal to convention is thus less convincing than Sifakis thinks. Nevertheless, the balance of probabilities does favor his case, in comedy as much as in tragedy. Considerations of staging are important. Emma Griffiths notes that children's roles in tragedy require very little movement when compared to those of mature characters and that their stage activity is signaled explicitly in our texts; "when any independent movement is required of a child figure, he or she is given a direct verbal cue to act."[106] In addition, whereas texts frequently comment on the manner in which the elderly move—they are feeble, halting—they say nothing of children's; their bounce and vigor is presumably guaranteed by the young actors themselves. Perhaps these child actors were members of theatrical families learning their trade.[107] If this is so, one of Athenian drama's most important themes, the conflict of *polis* and *oikos,* would be undercut in the way plays were produced. So the presentation of war orphans in armor at the City Dionysia expresses an ideology made problematic in Sophocles's *Philoctetes,* featuring as it does a young man (Neoptolemus), orphaned by the Trojan War, who balks at his military role, and in Euripides's *Trojan Women,* where the murder of the orphaned Astyanax subverts the promise made to Athens's children.[108]

In all these festivals, one or more children join in the city's rites as adults' equals or as their representatives. Less directly, too, cult activity brought children into community life, by preparing them for their future. This can be seen most clearly through a brief examination of some cult functions of girls. Their ritual life was on the whole richer than that of boys, and, since married women's ritual life often took place separate from men and in secret, it provided the most visible presence of females in the Athenian religious community.[109] (Unmarried *kanēphoroi,* "basket-bearers," took part in every ritual procession.) Four of their contributions are listed in an often-cited speech by the women's chorus in

Lysistrata (Ar. *Lys.* 641–647). "As soon as I was seven I was an *arrhēphoros.* Then at ten I was an *aletris* for the foundress, and shedding my saffron robe I was an *arktos* (bear) at the Brauronia. And once I carried a sacred basket, a fine girl wearing a chain of figs."[110]

It has been argued that these verses outline four grades (*arrhēphoros, aletris, arktos, kanēphoros*) of what was once a system of initiation tied to the four-year cycle of the Greater Panathenaea and that the grades still retained some of their initiatory character in the classical period.[111] The passage from *Lysistrata* is then taken to show that every Athenian girl in Aristophanes's time passed through the grades the chorus mentions. Since later evidence indicates that there were just two (or four) *arrhēphoroi* and that these came from elite families, that only girls of lofty birth could be *aletrides* or even perhaps *arktoi,* and that not every girl could be a *kanēphoros,* the rite must have become exclusive only after Aristophanes (237).[112] Now, already in archaic Athens, Harmodius's sister was declared unfit to carry a basket. As the slur is more likely to have been against her chastity than against her family's status, however, a more fundamental objection is in order.[113] *Lysistrata* is, after all, a comedy. Aristophanes's women are portrayed as presenting a case, arguing that their training gives them the motive and experience to manage the city. There is surely a touch of irony here: how better to undercut what must have seemed an uproarious claim, at least to the men in the audience, than to have the women obtain the benefits of many more rituals than any one girl would share in, and so show just how ill-prepared they really were?[114] Understanding its tone in this way clears up one of the passage's puzzling features, the implication that service as an *aletris* was simultaneous (or nearly so) with being a bear at Brauron. One solution, to read *kaita* as "and then shedding," puts the two activities into a sequence but still allows for little time between them; *arktoi,* too, were ten years old.[115] And *arrhēphoroi* may have served for more than one year, perhaps from one Greater Panathenaea to another, so that they might also be ten—another overlap.[116] I suspect that the impression of a jumble of activities is intentional, and it is accentuated by the use of *pote,* "once," as if carrying a basket had to be fit into the chorus's hectic schedule. This could only make the women's pretensions seem still more ridiculous, sound and fury signifying nothing of practical value to the *polis.*

These four offices might still make up a series of initiation rites, but one that only a few girls of elite families went through completely or in part. Such a program would also be of great interest to other Athenian girls. Identification with it would be easier if each *arrhēphoros* represented all the girls born in the same year.[117] But we know very little about the *aletrides,* nothing that shows that they were involved in any initiation rite. And there were *kanēphoroi* for so many divinities, Dionysus and Apollo among them, that the nature of the rite referred

to here is impossible to specify.[118] We should regretfully reject the proposed initiation system, even as a vestige.[119] But this is not to deny the role of public rites in preparing girls for later life. On the contrary, they served two important purposes.

First, these ceremonies often set girls in duties or apparel that reflected their training in women's work. Two *arrhēphoroi* went on a mysterious nighttime journey to the underground precinct of Aphrodite on the Acropolis (carrying, it may be, images of children or even live infants, or perhaps a phallus and serpents made of dough).[120] But they (or two others) also had a more mundane task, helping to set up the weaving of Athena's *peplos.*[121] *Arktoi* worked at weaving as well.[122] The *aletrides* ground meal for a special kind of cake, the *popana,* offered to Athena.[123] *Kanēphoroi* at the Panathenaea were powdered with barley flour—baking again (Hermippus fr. 25K.-A.). In other rites, too, girls had the trappings suited to their sex. Other girls actually wove the *peplos,* the *ergastinai.*[124] On the sixth day of the spring month of Munychion, girls walked to the Delphinion carrying boughs of olive wrapped with wool (Plut. *Thes.* 18.1). Two girls, called *loutrides* or *plyntrides,* washed the statue of Athena on the Acropolis (Ar. fr. 849K.-A.). *Deipnophoroi,* "food carriers," more likely girls than married women, took part in the Oschophoria, representing the mothers of the Athenian children sent to Crete.[125] In every instance, these girls served the gods in ways women were to serve their households; that they gained honor in doing so must have made the activities themselves more desirable.

The second contribution public cults made to the socialization of women is still more important. Marriage marked the biggest break in a girl's life; it made up, in fact, the transition from girl to woman, a transformation dramatically highlighted by the marriage rituals themselves, which bore many similarities to those of funerals.[126] But marriage did not involve a change in legal or political status, for wives were as subordinate as daughters. It signaled a change in control: the husband replaced the father (or, in his absence, the brother or another male family member) as a woman's *kyrios.*

At marriage, a young girl had to leave the family with whom she had spent almost all of her life and join another, quite separate, *oikos.* It is true that her dowry provided, in law, an important ongoing connection with her original household. But this can have had little immediate impact on the trauma of separation. "We women are the most wretched of creatures," says Medea. "A wife comes to new customs and habits, and she has to be a prophet to tell how to treat her husband. She doesn't learn at home."[127] Marriage was a responsibility that a girl raised entirely within her own household might have been unwilling, or psychologically unable, to take on. It was the public festivals, which joined girls from many *oikoi,* that did the most to allow the Athenian girl to see herself

in a social context outside the home, as a member of a larger group than her own household. They were a necessary link between a girlhood spent in a father's house and a woman's life in a husband's.

It is fitting to close this chapter with religion, for cult observance is a thread running through the child's life in both the family and the community. Or rather, a coat of many colors to cover each area. For while children's innocence, especially sexual purity, is usually invoked to explain their service in cult, it is worth noting that their functions are not always the same; nor do their roles always stem from the same view of their relation to *oikos* and *polis*.[128] In some cults, children retain what may be called their secular guise, as when listening to stories at the Oschophoria. But there is nothing childlike about the dark descent of the *arrhēphoroi*. Furthermore, some children seem to owe their role to their membership in a successful and surviving family—for instance, the *paides amphithaleis*. Others, however, such as the *paides aph' hestias* (who did not have to be *amphithaleis*), were recommended precisely by their social separation from other, adult initiates. Girls may be considered a special case. Forever marginal and yet essential for both the family and the community, their roles in public cults paradoxically stress their domestic duties. I prefer to end by stressing diversity in this way because this very complexity affords the clearest indication that children were more developed as social creatures than their legal and political liabilities might suggest. Restricted though they largely were to the sphere of religion, they displayed therein a range of roles almost as rich, an identity nearly as many-faceted, as the roles and identity of adult Athenians. Like them, too, they enjoyed a variety of social contacts with their age mates of the same sex, the subject of my next chapter.

Three

The Child and His or Her Peers

The Social Life of Boys

I turn now to boys' interactions with their contemporaries outside the household. I begin with children's play, the sphere least under adult control, move on to sex and schooling (where the *kyrios* and his agents much influenced what went on), and conclude with a discussion of boys' cultural and athletic competitions at religious festivals within the city and outside it, contexts created and controlled by representatives of the entire citizen community. As this plan signals, the link between the child's peer groupings and his life in the adult community—contrast and continuity—will be an important theme.

Very young children knew little of what went on outside the household and knew few people except those who shared or entered it. But as boys got older, they began to move out into the community and to make friends. No doubt many friendships failed to last; Aristotle comments on the ease with which the young make and drop friends, in part because they change so quickly and develop in such different directions.[1] But some ties continued. One of the inducements Astyages offers his grandson Cyrus in persuading him to visit is to provide *sympaistores,* "playmates"; years later, some Medes volunteer to follow Cyrus because they had known him as a child and were his friends.[2] This is fiction, but not far-fetched. Demosthenes's father chose as guardians for his wife and children two nephews and a man who was not a relative at all. This was an unusual choice and might be thought imprudent—after all, the guardians allegedly cheated Demosthenes and his sister on a grand scale. Demosthenes, anxious to absolve his father of negligence, explains it by saying the man was a

friend from boyhood (Dem. 27.4, *ek paidos*). Perhaps there were some among the jurors who felt that the elder Demosthenes had gotten just what he deserved, agreeing with an unnamed associate of Socrates that the friendships of children and wild beasts are usually harmful (Pl. *Clit.* 409DE).

But the belief that boyhood friends were loyal in their affections was widespread enough for Isocrates to bring as character witnesses those who knew him in his youth, and for Demosthenes to deny that those who testify on his behalf do so from friendship arising between contemporaries.[3] So strong were such links that Cleocritus can appeal to opponents on the field of battle, supporters of the tyranny of the Thirty, to stop the civil war on the grounds that he and the others on his side have shared with them in the city's rites and festivals, served in choruses together—and been at the same schools.[4] More than this, there was a suspicion in some circles that children might exert a formative influence on one another. Encouraging the Athenian stranger to expound his views in the opening book of Plato's *Laws,* Megillus tells him that his family once represented Athenian interests in his native Sparta. "Your Athenians hurt us," Spartan boys would say to him from his youth, or "Your Athenians helped us." As a consequence, Megillus delights in the Athenian manner of speech (though he finds it perhaps less pleasing at the end of the stranger's interminable discourse) and regards Athens as a city of special virtue (Pl. *Leg.* 1.642BD).

Astyages's offer, the cynicism of Socrates's friend, Megillus's memoir—all testify to adult interest in children's interactions with their peers. In fact, the most important forums for such interactions were organized and controlled by the adult community, the religious festivals in which boys competed as performers and athletes. Less formally, too, community standards influenced the choice of friends and the forms of friendship, most notably in the conventions that shaped homosexual relations among boys and young men. Even playmates could be selected only from those available, and relatives and family connections must have been numerous among them. In one sphere, however, children seem to have been free to do as they liked, following recognized patterns, to be sure, and under adult eyes, but on the whole able to interact in ways that (whatever their origins) must have been experienced as very much their own. This sphere was children's play.[5]

On a linguistic level, the Greek conception of childhood is inextricably intertwined with play. *Pais,* "child," shares the root of a family of words including *paizō,* "I play"; *to paigma,* "play, sport"; *hē paignia,* "sport, game"; *to paignion,* "plaything"; *hē paidia,* "child's play, pastime." Play characterizes children in contrast to adults, who are involved in more serious and more consequential activity,[6] and it may therefore be used by comic poets and philosophers to ridicule grown-ups and their pretensions to importance, to suggest that they are mere

children *sub specie aeternitatis.* In *Birds,* Aristophanes presents two older Athenians, Pisthetaerus and Euelpides. Anxious about an avian attack, they formulate a plan of action in terms taken from *chytrinda,* a child's game combining elements of monkey-in-the-middle and tag.[7] In this moment of tension, when they are trying to pass themselves off as brave soldiers, they risibly take on the tactics of children.[8] Institutions, too, might be mocked in this way, as Plato the comic poet mocks ostracism by associating with it *ostrakinda,* a chase game involving two teams.[9] Plato the philosopher describes the earth as a child's ball and humans themselves as playthings of the divine.[10] Though children's play may be pleasurable to observe, grown men who join in invite contempt; it is the obsequious man who plays with his host's children.[11] Later in antiquity, stories played on the paradox of famous figures of the period of Greece's greatness—Agesilaus, Archytas, Socrates—wasting time in childish pursuits; in one tale, Heraclitus prefers playing knucklebones with children to taking part in the political life of Ephesus, thus neatly turning his fellow citizens' contempt for such pastimes against them.[12]

Despite its denigration, however, children's play was of surprising interest to the Athenians, an interest reflected in the popular art of Old Comedy and in the more esoteric dialogues of Plato.[13] Plato's concern is not just casual or illustrative. Sounding rather like a modern functionalist—an anthropologist king—he identifies certain qualities and consequences of children's play and then prescribes accordingly. Children love to play and will invent games whenever they come together (*Leg.* 7.793E–794A). But it is irresponsible simply to allow them to play as they like; "lawless" games make children unruly, unlikely to mature into serious, law-abiding men, and constant chopping and changing and the love of novelty may threaten the established order.[14] The enthusiasm for play is to be diverted into productive channels: play should help identify aptitudes, toys should prepare the child for his or her role in life—future builders should construct toy houses—and skills should be taught with the aid of games, as among the Egyptians.[15] Aristotle is in agreement with the thrust of this program (*Pol.* 7.1336a29–34).

But the interpenetration of child's play and adult life is less tidy than these theorists would prefer. That some pastimes were thought appropriate to one age alone is suggested by the term *ephēbikē,* "the ephebe game," applied to a team ball game otherwise called *episkyros* or *epikoinos* (Poll. 9.104), and is symbolized by the dedication of toys by girls before marriage and by boys at puberty, especially to Artemis and Hermes, all over the Greek world; these include clay animals, dolls, rattles, small cymbals and other noisemakers, tops, knucklebones, and balls.[16] It is knucklebones, *astragaloi,* that seem most strongly to characterize children in contrast to adult males.[17] As a cynical saw attributed to

a number of political leaders puts it, "You fool children with knucklebones, but men with oaths."[18] Polyclitus's statue of two boys, "considered by many the most faultless work of sculpture," showed them playing *astragalismos,* and *astragaloi* are commonly included in school scenes.[19] And it is these that Aristophanes's jurors (wrongly) assume their boys will want as a gift from the wages for their own weighty duties (Ar. *Vesp.* 295). Other pursuits, however, were carried over into manhood; Socrates says that no one can be an expert at *petteia* and *kybeia,* games making use of counters and dice, except someone who has concentrated on them from childhood.[20]

In still others, there is an oblique connection to later life. Tests of strength (like *helkystinda* and *ephelkystinda,* varieties of tug-of-war) or games of flight and pursuit (like *ostrakinda*) had an obvious utility in a community that went to war on foot and fought it hand to hand; blood sports, too, like cock-fighting, might prepare a boy for battle.[21] Less predictably, Xenophon finds cheating at *posinda,* a children's guessing game, to be good preparation for the deception he regards as so important in warfare.[22] Other forms of play combine mimesis of adult life with commentary on it in a tone Plato might not approve of. A cup shows three boys playing school; one, who sits and holds a rod, is the teacher.[23] They (and other boys shown on a similar *chous*) may well be playing their roles straight, but it is hard to believe that this was always so.[24] Rather, elements of satire and caricature were probably involved at times, as in another *chous,* which shows a boy with an oversize comic mask apparently aping older actors.[25] Such ironic reflections of adult values and behavior may be as significant in children's mimicry as more respectful imitation.[26]

Another complex reflection of social reality is provided by one of the forms of the game blind man's bluff, generically termed *myinda.* The best known variant, *chalkē myia,* "bronze fly," includes a chant and response referring to the capture of an insect. In *drapetinda,* "runaway slave," the boy who is "it" covers his eyes and tries to catch runaways instead; these must replace him if they cannot escape.[27] Such games of alternation help instill the perception that social relationships depend on the serial adoption of roles of one kind and another. In this instance, however, the reversal of roles implicitly challenges the master-slave hierarchy fundamental to classical Greek society. Among similarly subversive games, we may adduce ring-around-the-rosy, in which (according to one view) children model the social system by acting in concert only to destroy it by collapsing.[28] I don't think we should underrate the element of hostility expressed here; children are, after all, very much social subordinates, subject to adult authority and control in many ways, and so not necessarily enamored of the system in which they seemingly play so minor a part. But there is more to such games than that; they are positive as well as negative. Games like *drapetinda* give children a

Boys play school. New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 17.230.10 (Rogers Fund 1917). © The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Photograph: Art Resource, NY.

chance to manipulate and even deny social categories that structure their world and the world of adults too, an opportunity to display even when young the power they may expect (or at least wish) will come to them as they mature. It is, I suspect, very rare for play of this sort to lead to a revolution, such as the abolition of slavery; to that extent we may regard it as analogous to the reversals and transgressions of normal rules marking many festivals that end with the reestablishment of order. But we should admit the possibility that the feelings of competence and creativity aroused in such games may not be aroused merely to be appeased; instead, they may be fostered, at least for individual children, and contribute to an abiding interest in change.

Men took a more active interest in boys' sex lives. At least in comedies and satyr plays, admittedly a raunchier environment than everyday Athens, boys were identified as sexual beings from an early age, addressed as *posthōn,* "penis," and referred to as *posthaliskos,* "little pecker."[29] The satyr Silenus even propositions the baby Perseus, promising a space in his bed with Danaë and a share of the fun.[30] Aristotle, straighter-faced, observes that boys enjoy rubbing their penises before (though only shortly before) they are able to ejaculate, just like men who are unable to reproduce.[31] Awareness of boys' interest in the subject leads Xenophon to approve of the Persian reluctance to discuss sex in front of the very young lest their lack of discipline lead to excess (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.34).[32]

For most boys, puberty would of course precede legal majority and passage from the group of *paides* by several years. But their outlets for heterosexual activity were limited. Though Mnesilochus, pretending to be a citizen wife, claims to have had a young lover from the age of seven, Mediterranean machismo and its legal incarnation, Solon's law condoning the murder of men caught in the act of adultery, made such escapades risky in real life (though this is not to say that some did not take the risks).[33] Slave girls and prostitutes were safer as well as more available.[34] I expect that sex with the household's female slaves was the prerogative of its master and other citizen males, including adolescents; it seems to have been something of a family joke for Euphiletus and his newlywed wife.[35] As for prostitutes, we have already seen that a boy's whoring could provide ammunition to political enemies, especially if such precocious predilections could be presented as precursors of adult license. Extravagance, squandering one's patrimony, was usually a major count in such an indictment of an *apolesioikon meirakion,* "a house-destroying youth."[36] But some fathers, in life as in New Comedy, were probably amused and even pleased by adolescent randiness. It would be interesting to know whether an introduction to female sexuality was sometimes thought to be one of a father's legacies to his sons. There is no evidence for this that I am aware of; but a curious hydria by the Harrow Painter may just possibly show a father accompanying his son (or sons) to a brothel.[37]

It was only in homosexual relations that Athenian boys could achieve sexual intimacy with other Athenians and (perhaps as important) demonstrate their success in attracting their peers.[38] At what age were such relationships acceptable? Among later writers, Strato praises the charms of a boy of twelve (*Anth. Pal.* 12.4). Xenophon, writing in our period, says that Episthenes of Amphipolis was moved by the beauty of a boy just reaching puberty, say, fourteen or so (Xen. *An.* 7.4.7). There is no clear-cut evidence from Athens itself. It was certainly illegal to sell a boy's favors or force them (as prostitution and sexual assault incurred penalties when adult Athenians were involved as well).[39] But David Cohen has suggested that homosexual relations with an underage boy might be regarded as *hybris,* "outrage, abuse," even if they were entered into freely, without payment or violence, because Athenian law had some notion equivalent to statutory rape in modern legal systems.[40]

This seems unlikely. In his speech on love in Plato's *Symposium,* Pausanias praises those who love boys only when they begin to acquire understanding, which he associates with the growth of the beard. Before that, boys are young and thoughtless, easy to take advantage of, and there ought to be a law against sex with them (Pl. *Symp.* 181DE). Pausanias's perspective is perhaps unusual—it is changing partners, promiscuity for lack of a more neutral word, that he most disapproves of. But his statement must mean that no such law existed at

this time, whether we take that to be the dramatic date of the dialogue (416) or its period of composition (the early fourth century). I do not deny that others might feel unease about homoerotic relationships involving boys; I merely suggest that Cohen's grounds are misstated. Cohen's case rests heavily on a few passages in which *hybris* and its derivatives clearly refer to instances of sexual relations between consenting adults. But there is no need to conclude that these texts employ *hybris* in a technical legal sense, even the one in which words of this family occur in a forensic context. Euphiletus says Eratosthenes, his wife's seducer, committed *hybris,* but as much against him and his household as against her (Lys. 1.4, 16, 25). It is Euphiletus's status as *kyrios* that has been flouted; the sexual nature of the insult is essentially irrelevant. This distinction is directly relevant to the case of boys.

In its public manifestations, at least, Athenian male homosexuality was shaped by a number of conventions. It did not involve equals. As Dover puts it, "Homosexual relationships . . . are regarded as the product not of the reciprocated sentiment of equals but of the pursuit of those of lower status by those of higher status."[41] Both parties might be young men, but one, the *pais, erōmenos,* or *paidika,* is normally younger than the other, the *erastēs.* Common Greek views on the appropriate relations of men of different ages require that the younger partner be regarded as subordinate to the other, and he plays the passive role in sexual activity. Yet certain conventions de-emphasize or deny his subordinate status. Thus, the older partner has to court the younger man or boy, to approach a social inferior as a suppliant. In addition, on vases depicting homosexual activity, it is the older partner who bends his knees and not infrequently his head before the younger one; the latter, for his part, stands upright and shows no sign of either constraint or pleasure, neither under the authority of his partner nor in the grip of pleasure or any other emotion.

Many students of this institution have regarded these conventions as a way to distinguish the younger partners from women; I prefer to stress the importance of drawing lines between citizen *paides* and those other *paides,* the slaves they associate with and are thought to resemble in so many ways. There is little disagreement, however, on the benefits that were said to accrue to the boys themselves or on the role of male homosexuality as an institution of transition between boyhood and maturity. Broadly speaking, regular intimacy with an older member of the citizen elite provides a boy with a model of appropriate attitudes and behaviors, a source of wisdom. And the good conduct of the older partner is fostered by this role.[42] In individual instances, involvement with a particularly well-connected or gifted partner may prove socially and politically valuable, not just for the boy but for his whole family.[43] Since this was a kind of passage rite, a boy was supposed to outgrow his role as a junior partner, first by taking on

the active role and acting as an adviser and model for a younger protégé, and then by assuming a new (though by no means exclusive) sexual identity as the husband of an Athenian citizen woman, *kyrios* of a household, father and master of *paides*.[44]

This is obviously a drastically schematized representation of the emotional and social complexities involved in such relationships. Its very crudity, however, serves to reveal the points of tension within these homosexual liaisons involving boys. If a boy had the wrong partner or partners, his social standing might be threatened or at least not advanced; if he continued to play the passive role as he grew older, he called into question both the Athenian conception of conduct appropriate to an adult male citizen (remaining too "womanish" or too "slavish") and his own capacity to live up to it. It is with such matters that our sources concern themselves. Boys are said to give themselves to lampsellers and the like in preference to the traditional elite (Ar. *Eq.* 736–740). Dover rightly emphasizes that the comic poets reserve their ridicule for adult males who play the passive part; they do not express contempt for active homosexuals.[45] A passage from Aristotle is instructive (*NE* 7.1148b15). Here we do find a condemnation of boys' passive homosexuality, the position espoused by Pausanias in *The Symposium*. It is not the liaisons themselves that are problematic, however, but rather their consequences for the future, since Aristotle believes that enjoyment of so unnatural a pleasure in adult males must be based on habits inculcated in boyhood.[46] In other words, passive homosexuality may potentially cause problems, but it is not necessarily wrong in itself.

Most Athenians were probably less worried about the effects of homosexuality in general on boys than about the particular partners boys chose. Laws, *paidagōgoi,* peer pressure—all operated to prevent undesirable matches. Much of a boy's time, especially among the elite, was spent in a gymnasium or a palaestra, taking formal instruction or just working out and conversing with friends.[47] The Greeks exercised in the nude, or very nearly so. These athletic facilities were therefore prime pick-up points, and the law consequently forbade slaves to exercise or anoint themselves with oil in palaestrae.[48] How about other locales where boys might gather in groups? A law is said to have restricted the hours of operation of schools and regulated visits to them (Aeschin. 1.9–12). Boys on their way to school or elsewhere outside the home were the focus of admiring eyes; *paidagōgoi* went along.[49] Of course, such measures alone could not prevent boys from taking up with their schoolfellows. But when Critobulus fell for Clinias, his father put him into Socrates's hands (Xen. *Symp.* 4.24). Sometimes, however, friends might be on the other side. In Plato, we are told that initially, at least, a boy may be turned against a suitor by schoolmates or others who say it is disgraceful to have sex with him and that a boy's friends will call him names to

dissuade involvement with someone a father disapproves of.[50] The impression this evidence gives is that a boy's sexual friendships were taken seriously and that a father's opposition was no mean obstacle; no wonder Pisthetaerus's ideal city is one in which a father would reproach him for *not* fondling his son (Ar. *Av.* 137–142).

Yet it is important to recognize that some relationships did meet with approval. Xenophon's *Symposium* is a fictional account of a dinner party held by Callias in honor of his lover Autolycus, who has just won the boys' *pankration* at the Greater Panathenaea, and of Autolycus's father, Lycon; father, son, and lover all go to the party together (Xen. *Symp.* 1.2–3). Later in the evening, Socrates takes Lycon's presence as a sign that the friendship of Callias and Autolycus is spiritual, not carnal; the noble *erastēs* keeps nothing secret from the father of the one he loves (8.11, cf. 19). Socrates's distinction, one often made in Plato's dialogues, is even less convincing here. Like Plato, Xenophon is interested in exalting spiritual relations among men above physical sexuality, though unlike him he offers heterosexuality as an alternative. (His *Symposium* ends with boy and girl slaves, representing Dionysus and Ariadne, tenderly kissing, a scene that so inflames the guests that the unmarried resolve to end their bachelor days and those with wives ride off to enjoy them: 9.2–7.) But Lycon's role rings true. It is echoed in the episode in which Critobulus, judged by the two young slaves to be more attractive than Socrates, is urged to claim his reward, a kiss from each—but not before obtaining the consent of their *kyrios,* their Syracusan owner (5.4–6.1). Though the boy in this instance is a slave, the suggestion a joke, some such approach to a boy's father might well have preceded conventional and approved relations between citizen young men and boys. I do not think a breach of etiquette was a crime in itself. But failure to conform to this convention might certainly cause an outraged father to feel his authority had been mocked, and he could conceivably try to convince a jury made up of other household heads that this amounted to *hybris,* just as Euphiletus did.

I have already mentioned schoolfellows among a boy's friends, including those who remained friendly in later life; schoolboys made enemies as well.[51] Schools were important areas of peer interaction.[52] But this activity took place under strict supervision, not only by the teacher himself but by the slave *paidagōgos* who accompanied at least the better-off boys to school and into the schoolroom. Schooling was not compulsory, nor were schools organized or staffed by the community (though education was encouraged and schools may have been regulated by law);[53] attendance was essentially a private matter between a boy's father or guardian and the teacher, an independent entrepreneur.[54] The *paidagōgos,* a familiar member of the household, afforded the boy some continuity between home and the school environment. More important,

however, he was the *kyrios*'s agent, an instantiation of his interest and an extension of his authority into the teacher's classroom; in a fragment of a law-court speech, perhaps by Isaeus, a speaker indicates how close two Athenian boys were by saying that they went to school accompanied by the same *paidagōgos*.[55] Certainly both fathers and mothers took an interest in their children's education. Niceratus's father had him learn Homer by heart, and fathers arranged contests in recitation during the Apaturia.[56] Some fathers could even make a nuisance of themselves, going to the schools and palaestrae and taking up teachers' time with idle chatter (Theophr. *Char.* 7.5). A mid-fifth-century cup by the Sabouroff Painter depicts a boy reciting to a group of women; some two generations later, Xenocrateia dedicated a shrine to Cephisus and other deities at Phaleron in recognition of her son Xeniades's education (*didaskalias*).[57]

The later literary tradition and the evidence of school scenes on Attic vases combine to assure the existence of education outside the home as early as the beginning of the fifth century.[58] Boys probably attended from the age of seven or so, as suggested by Plato and Aristotle.[59] Traditionally, schooling was divided into three areas—reading and writing (*grammata*), physical training (*gymnastikē*), and music and the poetry that was sung to it (*mousikē*)—and sometimes a fourth, painting and drawing.[60] Plato's *Laws* puts forward a system of stages, in which letters and the lyre are taught in turn, and an authority on ancient education has argued that "such a pattern was traditional in the Greek world."[61] I suspect, however, that this is a pet theory of Plato's, like his call for compulsory schooling (Pl. *Leg.* 7.804D).[62] One often-overlooked indication of concurrent education in several subjects: Epicurus, a student at Athens in the late fourth century, is said to have turned to philosophy in disgust at the shortcomings of his *grammatistai* at fourteen (Diog. Laert. 10.2). This is some time after he would have come into the hands of the teacher of *mousikē,* the *kitharistēs,* if *Laws* represented Athenian reality.

More than one subject could be taught at the same spot, but physical training often required special facilities. Boys might therefore have to visit more than one locale in the course of their day's schooling. We would expect that these schools were reasonably close to a boy's home and that boys from the same neighborhood attended together, as, according to Aristophanes, children from the same *kōmē,* "region of the city," did (*Ar. Nub.* 965). We might also expect better-off boys to go to different, perhaps more expensive, schools (as Demosthenes implies), but this may not always have been so; at any rate, some Athenians regarded equality in education for rich and poor as a mark of democracy.[63] There certainly were distinctions. Wealthy children began school at a younger age and attended for a longer period, and *mousikē* may have been regarded as an unnecessary luxury by the poor; perhaps *gymnastikē* too.[64] But even Aristophanes's

A boy recites to a group of women. Amsterdam, Allard Pierson Museum 8210.

Sausage-Seller can read and write, and, in the words of a popular saying, only dunces don't know their letters or how to swim.[65] Athenian schools, then, would be rather like contemporary neighborhood schools in bringing together boys of somewhat different social and economic status who lived in the same region of the city; the need to travel between schools, however, would bring them out into the community more.

Relatively cohesive to begin with, students might be made more so by the harsh discipline of the classroom. We should not ignore the role of schools as simply agencies of social control. Boys needed some occupation; as Aristotle puts it picturesquely, education is an older child's rattle (Arist. *Pol.* 8.1340b26). At the level of the individual school, teachers deserved respect: Plato regards the failure of pupils to heed them (and their *paidagōgoi*) as a way station on the road to tyranny; Aristotle brackets them with gods and parents as those it is wrong to contradict.[66] But respect was not always forthcoming, especially, perhaps, from the richer students, those who are described by Aristotle as unused to submitting to authority even in school (*Pol.* 4.1295b15). So teachers imposed their authority through beatings; *paideuō,* "I teach," also has the meaning "I correct, I discipline" in classical Attic.[67] Judging by the story that Heracles repaid his

music teacher Linus by killing him with a stool, such treatment was expected to instill in boys some hostility toward their teachers.[68] Herondas mentions, and a later gem shows, boys helping the teacher administer a beating, and this may well have taken place in classical Athenian classrooms too, as a tactic of divide and rule.[69] But the *paidagōgos* must have assisted here more often, if only because boys greatly outnumbered their teachers.[70] We hear of schools with 60 and 120 pupils, though not at Athens.[71]

The stress on discipline and punishment reflects the goal of Athenian schooling, to produce citizens with the hoplite virtues of courage and self-control rather than to teach skills. As Hyperides puts it in his funeral oration, "We educate children so that they may become good men (*andres agathoi*), and they show that they were well educated as children by being especially brave in battle."[72] According to Protagoras, parents urge teachers to pay more attention to good behavior (*eukosmia*) than to progress in letters or *mousikē* (Pl. *Prot.* 325D). Significantly, it is in this moral realm that the *polis* can be said to educate its citizens.[73] Methods of instruction, like the emphasis on order, seem tailor-made to stifle originality and self-expression, relying as they did on mimicry and memory. Boys learned to write by following the furrows of an inscribed alphabet and tracing letters lightly sketched in wax; and they concentrated on memorizing texts, from lists of words (if we may judge from papyrus finds from Hellenistic Egypt) to the works of Homer and other poets.[74] But competition, a critical feature of Athenian boyhood as of adult life, provided opportunities for the display of individual talent and for attention and acclaim. Only in later literary sources do we read of boys praying to the muses for success at school or thanking them for a victory in penmanship (and a prize of knucklebones).[75] But vase paintings indicate that contests in recitation and *mousikē* were known already in classical Athenian education.[76]

Boys also met and matched themselves with one another through musical and athletic competitions at the city's major religious festivals. Here, too, they mingled under the close supervision of adults, but their interaction was structured and superintended according to terms established by the *polis,* not their own fathers.

Boys as well as men competed in singing to the *aulos* and (likely) playing the *kithara* at the Amphiaraia at Oropus, a community under Athenian control, in the fourth century (*IG* 7 414, dated from 377 to 322); the only identified winners are from Sicyon and nearby Thebes, not Athens. This festival seems to have been influenced by the contemporary Panathenaea, where men too competed as *aulos*-singers and kitharists, but it is hazardous to assume that boys joined them there as well: at Eretria, the contemporary Artemisia offered prizes for only boy *aulos*-singers and only adult male kitharists.[77]

Choruses of boys competed at the Hephaesteia and the Prometheia (*IG* 2^2 1138.11). More is known of their activities at the City Dionysia and Thargelia. At the City Dionysia dithyrambic choruses of fifty boys performed, each chorus under a choragus chosen from one of the ten Attic tribes.[78] Five dithyrambic choruses of the same size took part in the Thargelia, each representing two tribes.[79] Fourth-century regulations required that the choragus be more than forty years of age.[80] This was not the rule in the fifth century; the speaker of Lysias 21 was choragus for the Thargelia in the year following his majority at age seventeen or eighteen, and Alcibiades was not yet forty when he assaulted a rival choragus.[81]

Antiphon's speech *On the Chorus Member* affords welcome insight into the workings of these competitions (Antiph. 6.11–14). The speech, which concerns the poisoning of Diodotus, a member of a boys' dithyrambic chorus at the Thargelia in the later fifth century, is delivered by the man accused of his murder, the choragus. The defendant outlines his preparations for the contest, indicating how seriously these competitions (and victories in them) were taken.[82] He fitted out a training room (*didaskaleion*) in his house, had the boys come to practice there, and arranged for four men (two with previous experience in this line) to see to their needs, all at his own expense. The training room was the one he had previously used for the Dionysia; we may assume, then, that day-boarding was in effect for that festival at least. He notes, as a special point in his favor, that he recruited the chorus without fining, or even antagonizing, a single parent. The implication is that the choragus could press into service any boy he wished; his office let him overrule a *kyrios*'s control of his child. Perhaps this became more controversial in the fourth century, and the requirement that a choragus be an older citizen was an attempt to enhance his authority.

It is more plausible, however, that the demand for older choragi "had something to do with changing attitudes to pederasty."[83] Public officials in charge of ephebes had to be forty years old as well (Arist. *AthPol* 42.2); in those days before the invention of the midlife crisis, they were thought to be more sober and sexually self-controlled than younger men. But we should not imagine that the welfare of boy choristers alone was at risk. The Athenians were well aware of the disruptions the erotic attractions of the young could cause; Plato refers to "the passion for *paides,* both male and female, which has given rise to countless evils for individuals and for entire cities."[84] Why should such entanglements appear more dangerous in the fourth century than before? As will become evident in Chapter 7, I am generally skeptical about answers to questions of this type, and I do not exclude any I offer here. But it is hard to read the most articulate members of the Athenian oligarchical elite—Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato—without concluding that their society was volatile and unstable (in their eyes at least)

and only too likely to erupt in civic strife. The change in the age of choragi may be regarded as an attempt to remove one potential point of tension.

These competitions, set as they were amid the city's celebrations of its gods, must have given the boy singers a powerful sense of belonging to the community and contributing to its welfare. Their preliminaries had a similar effect, smaller in scale but more immediate. We have reason to believe that boys attended schools in their own neighborhood, and other evidence, too, suggests that they had only a narrow experience of Attica. (About twenty years old and ambitious to make his mark in public affairs, Glaucon has never been to the silver mines at Laureion: Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.12.) In the choruses, however, they shared quarters with other boys of their tribe and (at the Thargelia) with boys of another tribe as well. Of course, the tribes were not geographical entities; each grouped Athenians from all over the city. Choral competition therefore brought boys face to face with their peers from elsewhere in the *polis* at the same time that it introduced them to the community as a whole. In this way, a boy's circle of acquaintances could extend beyond his family and neighbors. Moreover, he was not the only one to benefit. Since the tribe was the basic organizational unit of the Athenian armed forces, this boyhood identification with the tribe and camaraderie with its members could only improve Athens's military morale and effectiveness when boy singers became adult soldiers. Did the choruses bridge class divisions too? It seems unlikely that boy choristers were drawn from the mass of the Athenian population, the thetes who were too poor to pay for heavy infantry weaponry or armor. But literary sources and demographic models are not definitive enough to end debate over the involvement of at least some from outside the Athenian elite.[85] Their participation might afford another motive for the fourth-century raising of the minimum age for choragi: sexually tinged patronage according to the old elite ethos may have become less desirable—or less tolerable—as Athens grew away from the aristocratic roots of that institution.[86]

Competition and its rewards were features of all these areas of Athenian life, but nowhere more than in sports. Sports gave boys a chance not only to identify their place within the community but perhaps also to escape it.[87] In local competitions for Athenians alone, they set themselves against their fellows in individual sports and joined with their tribesmen in team events. At the Panathenaea and the great panhellenic games, they found themselves on a wider stage, Athenians among Greeks from all over the Mediterranean world. Successful athletes at Athens and elsewhere could win glory or material rewards that might help them transcend their origins.

Boys competed at all four major panhellenic games: the Olympics (traditionally founded in 776) from the year 632, the Isthmian Games, the Nemean Games, and the Pythian Games at Delphi from the time of their reorganiza-

tion in the earlier sixth century. At both the Olympics and the Pythian Games, athletes were divided into two age classes, boys (*paides*) and men (*andres*); at the Isthmian and Nemean games there was an intermediate class, "the beardless" (*ageneioi*).[88] We are nowhere told why Greeks thought it desirable to introduce contests defined by age when they never established (for example) weight classes in combat events; one possibility is that they were intended to prevent sons from competing against (and perhaps defeating) their fathers. This might be thought most undesirable in the head-to-head matches in wrestling, boxing, and *pankration,* in the latter two above all, since these ended only when one fighter submitted or was unable to continue. So a boxing match at a Bar Mitzvah party is vetoed in a modern novel by the reflection that "a son doesn't hit his father, not even when it's sport."[89] Support might be sought in the facts that sons seem to have been rather more likely to replicate their fathers' Olympic triumphs in combat events than in footraces and that, at Olympia, all combat events were divided into adult and boys' competitions, whereas this was so only for the *stadion* among the footraces; however, the separate *pankration* for boys dated only from 200.[90] Nor do we always know the boundaries for these classes. There was apparently a minimum age for competitors, at least in some events, for Pherias of Aegina was excluded from wrestling with the *paides* at the Olympics of 468 because he was too young; he was still a *pais* in the competition four years later, but this time he participated and won (Paus. 6.14.1). The youngest winner we know of is Damiscus of Messene, fastest in the Olympic *stadion* race in 368 at the age of twelve.[91] The upper limit of the *paides* age class at Olympia and Delphi was probably seventeen; any boy who turned eighteen in the year of the games was excluded. (Nicasylus of Rhodes, eighteen, had to wrestle with the men at Olympia [Paus. 6.14.2].) It may be with this threshold in mind that Aristotle recommends that boys not begin hard training until three years after puberty—in other words, at seventeen (Arist. *Pol.* 8.1339al).

Defining *ageneioi,* and establishing the effect of this class on the age limits of the others, is still less straightforward, and it is complicated by the likelihood of variation over time and place and the fact that almost all our evidence is post-classical. So "Pythian boys" (*paides Pythikoi*), presumably named for the boys' age class at Delphi, are younger than "Isthmian boys" (*paides Isthmikoi*) in late games, while boys at the Panathenaea (which also had three classes of competitors) are said to be older in late sources.[92] This is really the realm of guesswork, but it cannot be too much of a mistake to imagine *ageneioi* as young as sixteen and as old as twenty. Precision is perhaps as undesirable as it is unattainable. The ancient Greeks had no birth certificates, many Greek states probably considered all children born within the same year to be the same age for civic purposes at least (as Sparta and Athens did), and these years did not all begin and

end at the same time: the allocation of athletes to the proper age class must have been left to the judgment of those in charge of the games, influenced (no less importantly) by the arguments of the competitors and their supporters. (It was owing to the intercession of King Agesilaus of Sparta that the son of Eualces of Athens, "biggest of the boys," competed with the others at Olympia.)[93] And the athletes themselves could sometimes choose to ignore age boundaries. When Pythagoras, a Samian wrestler of the early sixth century, was excluded from the competition for boys at Olympia and ridiculed because of his long hair and purple robe, he promptly entered the men's event and won.[94] A later athlete is said to have won four victories on one day at Nemea, competing both as a *pais* and as an *ageneios* (Euseb. *Chron.* 1.212 Schöne).

Whereas children's games only rarely and indirectly reflected adult activity, the program for boys in these competitions more or less paralleled that for men, though there certainly were differences. (For example, the *pankration,* one of the most dangerous events, was first open to boys only in 346 at Delphi and in 200 at Olympia, and boys used a light-weight discus in the *pentathlon:* Paus. 1.35.5.) In one festival or another, boys competed in the *stadion,* a race of about 200 yards; the *diaulos,* 400 yards; the *hippios,* 800 yards; the *dolichos,* a middle-distance run; wrestling; boxing; the *pankration,* which combined elements of each of the other combat sports and forbade only biting and gouging; and the *pentathlon* (the *stadion,* discus, javelin, jump, and wrestling). Little is known of the boys' place on the program, though in Plutarch's day, at least, their competitions often preceded the men's, either as a block (as at Olympia, where the boys ran, wrestled, and boxed a day before the men) or in each separate event (as at Delphi: Plut. *Mor.* 639A).[95]

At Athens, athletics were a part of a number of religious festivals—the Heracleia at Marathon, the Eleusinia, and the Oschophoria.[96] The Hermaea, celebrated by boys and youths in the palaestrae, and gymnasia, of which Hermes was an important patron, featured athletic contests in later antiquity and probably in the classical period as well.[97] A series of second-century inscriptions supplies the boys' program for the Theseia, including *stadion, diaulos, dolichos,* wrestling, boxing, *pankration,* and fighting in armor (*IG* 2^2 956–965).[98] Of particular interest is the division of *paides* into three groups, the first, second, and third ages, perhaps permitting younger boys than usual to take part; the youngest boys, the first two groups, did not run the longest footrace. The torch race, run perhaps in relays, included teams of *paides, ephēboi,* and *neaniskoi;* here younger children might be thought too irresponsible to handle fire. In neither case can we be sure that the format dates back to the classical period, and it is in later festivals that we hear the most of such a multiplication of divisions.[99] But the myth of Theseus included the rescue of Athenian boys and girls from the Crete of the

Minotaur, and his festival might therefore have been thought to be especially suitable for the participation of younger children right from its inception in the early fifth century.

For the Greater Panathenaea, celebrated every four years in honor of the goddess Athena, we have a very important piece of evidence, an inscription from the early fourth century, fragmentary and incomplete but richly informative (*IG* 2^2 2311).[100] This sets out both program and prizes. Athletic events included the *stadion* race, the *pentathlon,* wrestling, boxing, and *pankration* for boys and *ageneioi*—it is interesting that Athens made room for boy pancratiasts before Delphi or Olymeia did. The same events were apparently held for men as well, but that section of the stone has been lost. Also listed were an ambitious equestrian program, competitions for singers and musicians, and other events. Unlike the four great panhellenic festivals, the so-called crown games, the Greater Panathenaea gave value prizes, including second-place awards in the athletic and equestrian events. In every case, they were smaller for boys than for *ageneioi,* but only somewhat so. Thus, the winner of the boys' *stadion* race received fifty Panathenaic amphorae of olive oil and the second-place finisher received ten, while the *ageneios* who won this event received sixty and the next competitor twelve. The victorious boy pancratiast won forty amphorae, his leading rival eight; the *ageneioi* who finished first and second won perhaps fifty and ten (these lines are missing). In the other athletic contests, boy winners received thirty amphorae and runners-up six; *ageneioi* winners were awarded forty amphorae and runners-up eight. (Our only evidence on men's prizes, an epigram for the Corinthian pentathlete Nicolaidas, unfortunately dates from a much earlier period, the late sixth or early fifth century. Nicolaidas won sixty amphorae of olive oil: Simonides, *Anth. Pal.* 13.19.) That boys' competitions were not regarded as unimportant is further indicated by the prizes for pyrrhic dancing. Winning tribes in each class—boys, *ageneioi,* and men—received the same prizes, 100 drachmas in money and an ox.[101]

The Greater Panathenaea was not unique in the attention it directed toward boy victors. Boy winners at the great panhellenic games, like other victors, dedicated statues or had statues dedicated for them—Pausanias describes many in the sixth book of his *Description of Greece*—and were the subjects of odes by the paid praise poets, Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides.[102] Their triumphs were sources of pride for their communities; the Clazomenians dedicated a statue for the boy runner Herodotus because he was their first Olympic victor.[103] A city's first victor among the *paides* also was likely to gain special recognition.[104] We know of few Athenian *paides* (or *ageneioi*) who won at the great panhellenic games during the archaic and classical periods.[105] One is Epichares, who finished first in the Olympic *stadion* race for boys in the early fourth century, win-

ning "a wreath for the city," and was respected, we are told, as long as he lived.[106] His achievement is among his grandson's claims on the sympathy of a jury.

Winners at these games also received gifts from the community; at Athens these included meals in the *prytaneion* and a grant of money, said (on dubious authority) to be one of Solon's measures, 500 drachmas for Olympic victors, 100 for Isthmian.[107] There is no reason to exclude boys from these generous benefits. At the Greater Panathenaea, of course, the prizes themselves were substantial. It is naturally difficult to calculate a modern equivalent for the value of fifty large jars of olive oil, but by any reasonable estimate these awards were very large indeed, tantamount to a year's wages or more, enough to buy a house or several slaves. They raise the question of athletics as a means of social mobility. According to a scenario sketched by David Young, a boy of natural ability but moderate means might win such a prize at the Greater Panathenaea (or at smaller local games), buy with it the leisure and training necessary to succeed at other age levels, and so establish himself and his family among the city's elite.[108] This is guesswork, though the guesswork of a gifted scholar. The little we know of the social origins of Athens's champion athletes confirms the view that most were already privileged by birth or wealth before their victories, and we cannot point with confidence to any example of the curriculum vitae imagined by Young.[109] Yet it is not implausible, and something like it may lie behind the story of Melesias, who won the *pankration* for *ageneioi* at Nemea in the later sixth century, subsequently repeated as a man, and then became a famous trainer.[110] Plato says his was a great family—it included his son Thucydides, an important rival of Pericles—but Melesias is in fact its first known member (Pl. *Meno* 94D).

The Social Life of Girls

Though I will argue in Chapter 5 that girls spent a good deal of time with their brothers as children, restrictions on their movements and Athenian ideas on the sexes' separate spheres generally kept boys and girls apart outside the home. Plato sets the age for them to go their separate ways at six (Pl. *Leg.* 7.794C). This line of demarcation is roughly confirmed by the iconography of Athenian funerary monuments, on which boys and girls some years after infancy are usually depicted with different characteristic attributes: wheeled sticks or carts for boys, ducks (and some other fowl) and dolls for girls.[111] (Pheidippides was six when his father bought him a toy wagon during the Diasia: Ar. *Nub.* 861–864.) Adolescent sexuality increased the stakes in separating the sexes. Plato's idea that youths (*koroi*) and girls (*korai*) should dance together so as to encourage better-informed choices of marriage partners must have scandalized many Athenians, even without the added fillip that they wear as few clothes as decency allowed,

just as the Spartan practices that informed it did.[112] Even with the daughters of other families, Athenian girls' involvement was more limited than their brothers' with other boys. They did not compete in athletic festivals in other Greek centers or (again unlike Spartan girls) in public contests within the city itself during the archaic and classical periods.[113]

Nor is it likely that they attended school outside the home. It is true that at least some Athenian women were functionally literate, and vases do show girls taking instruction in dancing and in *mousikē,* playing flute, cithara, or lyre.[114] But lessons might well have been taken at home; this is especially plausible in the case of vases on which only one girl is shown (though not only then). One vase, which depicts an older girl carrying writing tablets by a strap, much like boys on other pots, is the best evidence for girls' schooling outside the home: she is attended by another girl of the same size, perhaps a slave playing the part of a *paidagōgos.* But even in this case, only the girl's literacy can be assumed, not the locale where she learned it; and the shape of the vase, a vessel for drinking wine, may suggest that she is an educated (and expensive) hetaera, not a respectable citizen girl at all.[115] Similarly, I take a red-figure phiale on which a girl and several women dance under the eye of an instructor to be an illustration of the training of courtesans.[116] Most girls' contacts, then, were with kin or neighbors, another reflection of their smaller social world. Two younger cousins live next door to each other and are raised together in Menander (*Asp.* 122–129). A joke in comedy takes off from the possibility that a mother might invite her daughter's friend, a neighborhood *pais,* to share in a celebration for Hecate (Ar. *Lys.* 700–702).

We know little enough of other activities. Swimmers on archaic vases may represent citizen girls; they are nude among themselves, clothed in the presence of men.[117] Girls played *chelichelōnē,* "torty-tortoise," a tag game rather like *chytrinda:* the "tortoise"—an animal associated with the home, wool-working, and the love of children[118]—sits in the middle while other girls circle her, engaging in a series of queries and replies that ends with her attempt to catch one of them:

> Torty-tortoise, what are you doing in the middle?
> I'm weaving wool and Milesian thread.
> What was your son doing when he died?
> From white horses into the sea he was—jumping.[119]

The game is one the poet Erinna, who lived perhaps on the island of Telos in the early Hellenistic period and gives what is as close as we can get to a first-person account of Greek girlhood, played with her friend Baucis.[120] These girls had dolls as well and played with them (so Erinna writes), perhaps on a

A schoolgirl and her slave (?). New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 06.1021.167 (Rogers Fund 1906). © The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Photograph: Art Resource, NY.

sleepover at Baucis's house. One of the early commentators on Erinna's poem interpreted its fragmentary text as a description of the girls' imitating young mothers caring for their babies, but extant examples of dolls and their depiction on gravestones, from Athens and elsewhere, indicate that they were meant to represent girls of marriageable age.[121] If the *nymphai* of the poem does refer to brides and is not, as sometimes, simply another word for "dolls," a plausible explanation is that Erinna and Baucis dressed their dolls as the brides they hoped one day to be, a pastime consistent with the dedication of dolls to Artemis and other deities at the time of a girl's marriage and with the lexicographer Pollux's comment that torty-tortoise was a game for *parthenoi,* nubile girls.[122] In the end, Baucis died just before or after her wedding and Erinna's poem mixes epithalamium and lament for her.

Marriage, of course, meant an end to or at least a change in girls' friendships, involving as it did not only a shift in role but also, in many cases, movement from one part of the community to another. A "speculative discussion" suggests that at least as many Athenian marriages were contracted between those

A girl and a tortoise. London, British Museum F101. © The Trustees of the British Museum.

whose families belonged to different demes as between those belonging to the same deme, and some of those involved must still have lived at or near their ancestral homes.[123] Regretted by Erinna, this transition is the background to the abduction of Persephone—she was playing and picking flowers with her friends when the ground opened before her and Hades carried her off (*Hym. Cer.* 4–19, 414–428).[124] It was mediated by the participation of young women, along with youths (*korois te kai korais*), in the wedding itself, notably as singers on the morning after.[125]

Choruses were important institutions of socialization for girls in other parts of the Greek world.[126] At Sparta, Alcman's *Partheneion,* or "Maiden-Song," was performed at a festival (for Helen?) by a choir of adolescent girls as one of their rites of initiation. Less formally, Sappho's young female friends may have sung some of her poems together on archaic Lesbos; this expression of female solidarity before the group's dissolution at marriage would mirror an important theme

of the wedding songs, the movement from a life spent among other young girls to the world of men. Such coteries were unknown, such passage rites less prominent, at Athens, where the individual household bore more of the burden of socializing female citizens, but choruses of girls did sing and dance there, too, on special occasions such as the Greater Panathenaea and perhaps some other festivals as well.[127] These girls must have spent some time together at practice, but we should not assume that they spent as much time away from home as boy choristers, nor did groups of girl choristers compete. An early-first-century inscription that records a vote to honor the *ergastinai* who wove Athena's *peplos*—perhaps as many as one hundred—may indicate that they lived at home, though their fathers' supervisory role is mentioned only in a restored portion of the fragmentary text (*IG* 2^2 1036). Some religious rites, however, did require girls to live together outside their homes for a time; at Athens too, then, cult practices served not only to integrate girls into the larger community but also to form them into a community of their own. The *arrhēphoroi,* two or four in number, lived on the Acropolis during their tour of duty; they had the use of a field on the way to Aphrodite's shrine "in the garden," and a hydria of the later fifth century may show them there playing ball, Aphrodite in their midst.[128]

More significant in terms of the numbers involved were the Thesmophoria and the Arkteia. Since the Thesmophoria, a fall festival for Demeter and her daughter Persephone, mainly concerned natural and human fertility, some have assumed that only married women took part.[129] But a participant carries a baby girl at her breast in a comedy by Aristophanes; ancient scholars refer to noble maidens and virgin priestesses; and in fact the rites, especially the curious exhumation of piglets cast into caves some time before, and the myth of Persephone attached to them, seem peculiarly relevant to girls who themselves are to be transformed from wild beings whose sexuality must be checked into chastely wedded wives.[130] Perhaps, however, some girls stayed at home to look after their fathers and brothers. For during the three days of the festival, Athenian girls and women camped out near the Pnyx (the meeting place for the Athenian male citizen assembly) and made up a city of women separate from and parallel to that of men. Like theirs, it was a city with divisions. The women celebrating the Thesmophoria were apparently arranged according to the demes their husbands and fathers belonged to, so that ties among men were privileged even in this setting (cf. Isae. 3.80, 8.19); links among girls and women would reinforce men's. Two further elements that might drive women apart, the exchange of abuse and scourging, are attested from other rites for Demeter (the Eleusinian Mysteries) and from fertility cults. We can only speculate on their effects here; much, of course, must depend on form and feeling. On the one hand, even ritualized mockery might arouse resentment and so work against community feeling. Yet

Arrhēphoroi play ball. Tübingen, Inv. 1632a. b.

if strong emotions, even negative ones, are aroused and then put to rest—which seems likely in this case—group solidarity is not just maintained but often enhanced.

The Arkteia, for Artemis, was quite different, held far from the center of civic activity at Brauron, on the east coast of Attica, and aimed solely at girls; something similar may have taken place at Munychia and other Attic sanctuaries of Artemis as well. Most of our (late) literary sources suggest that all Athenian girls spent some time in the sanctuary of Artemis Brauronia serving the goddess as *arktoi,* "bears," before their marriage.[131] Against this, we may note that a scholium on Aristophanes refers to "selected maidens" (*epilegomenai parthenai*) and that if (as the original excavator thought) a three-sided Doric stoa in the sanctuary was the residence of the *arktoi,* it appears too small for the numbers we would expect it to have housed if Brauron was the only or even the main site for the Arkteia.[132] But Athenian girls customarily carried out other ritual tasks before marriage, such as a sacrifice to Athena on the Acropolis; not all "bears" need have stayed at the sanctuary at the same time; and the scholium's text and the identification of the stoa are in any case uncertain. (The building's rooms were likely used by men for meals.) The evidence clearly favors the tradition that participation in the *arkteia* was widespread, if not universal.[133] It is all the more disappointing, then (though not exactly unprecedented), that we know so little about the activities of the "bears." Indications that they took part in contests—footraces, perhaps even spinning bees—are especially tantalizing, although the evidence, almost entirely iconographic, is open to other interpretations.[134] If they did, we could conclude that the *arkteia,* like boys' athletic competitions, afforded girls more than just an opportunity to meet their peers; it

also made possible the display of exceptional merit among them. A crucial (and characteristic) difference is that boys' superiority was exhibited and publicized to the whole community and even (at the Greater Panathenaea) to outsiders, while girls won recognition only within their own group. Dedications to Artemis Brauronia found on the Acropolis often fail to indicate even girls' family affiliations. And other differences among them are denied in the main public manifestation of the cult, the long procession from Athens to Brauron (about twenty-five miles) every four years.[135] This included all those who had served the goddess since the last celebration of the Brauronia, many hundreds of girls. They reestablished old acquaintances certainly, but, just as important, they asserted the unity of the group before the eyes of onlookers, including men (cf. Ar. *Pax* 872–876).

Four

Parents and Children

Personal Relations within the Household

Aristotle begins his *Politics* with a discussion of the residential household, the *oikia* or *oikos*. Consisting of the nuclear family, its relatives and dependents, its possessions, animate and inanimate, the household is viewed as the basis of the *polis*. It includes both people and things; appropriately, Aristotle starts off with an analysis of the relationship of the master of the household with one of its constituents that is both person and thing, the slave. He regards the slave primarily as part of the property of the household. But things, he says, are less important in household management than people, and he promises to examine the household's human relations later in his account. In the opinion of most commentators, however, this promise is not fulfilled.[1]

Better late than never. In this chapter and the next two, I propose to carry out Aristotle's program. It may be surprising to some that such a project needs doing, since W. K. Lacey's intelligent and valuable account of the ancient Greek family (1968) has existed for more than forty years. Lacey's book, however, treats much more than the classical Athenian family, devoting chapters to Homer, archaic Greece, women, Plato, Sparta, Crete, and "the family in other states"; as a result, less is said about Athens than might be. It also focuses (as the index's subhead signals) on "legal, political and religious aspects"; interpersonal relations are slighted, touched on only in passing. And though Lacey is well aware that slaves and others shared the *oikos,* his concern with the family itself prevents him from treating them at any length. The 1980s resurgence of interest in

family history, felt first in Roman studies, led in time to a spate of scholarship that updated and developed Lacey's themes and others. In English alone this included books on Greek bastardy, Athenian adoption, fathers and sons, birth and motherhood, weddings, stepmothers, family violence on the tragic stage, and the definition and dynamics of the household.[2] Reviewing one of these, I called for a new synthesis on the Greek family, and behold! soon enough there were two.[3] (If only I had as much influence on my own family.) Valuable as they are, however, each has shortcomings for my purposes. Cynthia Patterson's *The Family in Greek History* (1998) observes the family at a distance, discussing it in the abstract without examining any single historical example, and her index omits children altogether (though *paides* do earn one entry). Case studies are a welcome feature of Sarah Pomeroy's *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece* (1997), but it provides an incomplete and somewhat misleading impression of the material environment in which family life took place and is more skeptical about the use that may be made of the Athenian dramatists' treatment of myth than I am. Hence there is still room for the study I undertake here.

The emotional relations among those who shared the household were important constituents of the environment in which the child's consciousness developed. In my discussion of those relations, I will begin with the members of the nuclear family, devoting this chapter to parents and children and the next to siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren. I will then move on, in Chapter 6, to newcomers who enter the household from parts of the community outside it (stepparents, adopted children, friends) and to those outsiders who might, paradoxically, have been part of the household since its formation, slaves.

My aim is to sketch what was expected of, or at least desired in, each relationship in question. But the discussion will not be restricted to ideals: conflict, too, will play a part, especially that which developed as children grew into roles outside the household. I will endeavor to identify some sources of tension, some methods taken to alleviate it, and some of the consequences of each.[4] Finally, I hope throughout to make necessary but often ignored distinctions between the sexes: between fathers and mothers and between sons and daughters. Diachronic differences, on the contrary, will play a less prominent part than might be expected in a historical essay, simply because I think changes in this area within the classical period have often been exaggerated and explanations for them accepted too readily. I will reserve the subject for a separate examination, in the last chapter of this book.

Much of the interaction between children and others took place within the Athenian home, now undergoing extensive scholarly renovation in light of recent archaeological research. We have no evidence for playpens, nurseries, or separate bedrooms for children, something to keep in mind when we consider

suggestions that some ancient practices may represent strategies to distance parents from their children. However, texts often refer to a *gynaikōn* or *gynaikōnitis,* generally translated as "women's quarters" or something similar and long understood as a discrete area for the confinement of the household's women. Since child care was primarily women's work, it was logical to conclude that children too shared this sector of the home. However, the material remains of Athenian houses do not reveal any such rigid structural demarcation of gendered space. Instead, it now seems likely that any restrictions that existed were designed to control the movements of male visitors, that they were practicable only in the grandest domiciles, and that even then such restrictions were in effect only when the head of the household was entertaining guests.[5] As a result, we should assume that there were normally no permanent physical barriers to the interrelations of children and the household's other members.

At the same time, the space thus freed up for children has grown larger. The trend toward crediting the Greeks with more wealth—larger animals, more productive farms—and more equal access to it than the people in, say, Engels's England has affected our notions of Athenian housing as well.[6] Rather than the hovels of working-class Manchester, many, even most Athenians probably enjoyed domestic environments more comparable to those of eighteenth-century Boston or middle-class Winnipeg—well-made buildings with stone socles, walls of stone or sun-dried brick, and tiled roofs; as Ian Morris puts it, "fourth-century Greek houses were large and quite comfortable, even by the standards of developed countries in the early twenty-first century."[7] And affordable too: one estimate puts the proportion of home-owners in late classical Athens at one in three and perhaps as many as three in four.[8] Certainly many smaller houses have left no mark in the material record or have been beneath the notice or beyond the pocketbooks of excavators. Furthermore, some Athenians lived in apartments or shared houses, and we cannot be sure how many people dwellings housed or say much about their furnishings or other amenities. All in all, however, I incline to the view that domestic environments at Athens were more pleasant than earlier students of the family have assumed; at the very least, we should not be too quick to blame those environments for the conflicts we will discover.

Parents and Children

I begin with a query: Did the Athenians care when their children died?[9] Here, as often, M. I. Finley provides a cautious and seemingly compelling response: "Any Greek or Roman who reached the age of marriage could look forward to burying one or more children, often very small ones. . . . I do not suggest that Greeks

and Romans buried their children and spouses without a sense of loss. . . . What I do suggest is that in a world in which such early deaths and burials were routine, so to speak, the intensity and duration of the emotional responses were unlike modern reactions, though I confess that I know no way to measure or even to identify the differences."[10] Finley's remarks come from an article that begins with an outline of ancient demographics; despite his diffidence, they amount to a suggestion that demography largely governs emotional responses. Other historians have asserted this demographic determinism much more confidently. Philippe Ariès, Ivy Pinchbeck, Margaret Hewitt, Edward Shorter, and Lawrence Stone all have argued that affection and love were not expected in preindustrial populations, because high mortality made emotional commitment, especially to children, too dangerous for individuals and insupportable for their societies.[11] (As the governess Mary Poppins asks in taking leave of young Jane and Michael, "And what would happen to me, may I ask, if I loved all the children I said goodbye to?") Stone's expression of this view has been the most influential.

Writing on early modern England, Stone (1977) argues, "The omnipresence of death coloured affective relations at all levels of society, by reducing the amount of emotional capital available for prudent investment in any single individual, especially in such ephemeral creatures as infants" (651–652). In other words, "to preserve their mental stability, parents were obliged to limit the degree of their psychological involvement with their infant children" (70). As a result, the children suffered neglect, "caused in part by the high mortality rate, since there was small reward for lavishing time and care on such ephemeral objects as small babies" (81). As Stone notes, it was a vicious circle. Even Nancy Scheper-Hughes, a more sympathetic observer of a contemporary high-mortality population—and a vocal critic of the government policies that did so much to create it—describes mothers' understanding of a child's death in the slums of northeast Brazil as "a predictable and relatively minor misfortune, one to be accepted with equanimity and resignation as an unalterable fact of human existence."[12] Others have identified as one aspect of parental neglect the practice of putting children into the hands of wet nurses, usually outside the household, even far away in the countryside; out of sight, out of mind.

Much in Greek (and Roman) society appears consistent with this view. Infant mortality was high—how high we can only estimate, but perhaps 25–35 percent in the first year of life.[13] Infant deaths were to be expected; it is noteworthy that on extant epitaphs from all over the Greek world, children under the age of two are never (or hardly ever) said to have died *ahôros,* "untimely," though the term is so widely used that it can be applied to a woman of seventy-three.[14] In death as (allegedly) in life, children made little impact; they were rarely commemorated and were often allowed burial within the boundaries of cities, even

within the confines of houses.[15] Their (relatively scarce) epitaphs are rarely fulsome. Some adults said straight out that they were not much of a concern. "Most men treat their private business in a careless manner," says Plato's Laches, "that concerning children and other things too."[16] Parents who lose children must be satisfied with the cold comfort that they can have new ones.[17] Finally, among the elite at least, it was customary to entrust children to the care of slave nurses and *paidagōgoi;* and children were sent out to be raised in the households of others.[18] No wonder, then, that Stone's thesis attracted even so skeptical a scholar as Finley.[19] And yet it cannot be applied to many high-mortality populations studied by modern anthropologists; furthermore, it may be misleading even for the society with which Stone himself is most concerned.

Far from being indifferent, members of cultures in which children are at risk often make sure that their infants are in almost constant contact with a caregiver, quickly see to them when they cry, and feed them whenever they suspect they are hungry—precisely because they know the danger that they will die if they are not attended to. So, among the Kalahari Desert San, infants are frequently held, looked at, smiled at, and spoken to, and their demands are generally indulged. In fact, to quote one student of this society, "The natural environment . . . resembles . . . a well-designed infant stimulation program."[20] If that sounds too idealized, we may think of this pattern of child rearing as another observer does, as a kind of "constant medical alert."[21] Either way, it is clear that children receive a good deal of attention from adults. Concern for children is at a similarly high level among a group whose cultural practices may be thought more directly relevant to the ancient Mediterranean, the Sarakatsan shepherds of central and northern Greece. "Children from the day of their birth are the centre of attention and interest in the family. The needs of the infant take priority over all others."[22] This care must itself increase the value put on children; "rearing children often proves a stronger elixir of love (*philtron*) than giving birth," in the words of a tragic fragment of uncertain date (?Biotus 205 F 1 Snell).

Of course, this care cannot guarantee health and survival. Why are such attentive parents not devastated by the death of their children? I leave aside the validity of metaphors such as "emotional capital," which imply that humans can love (or experience any other feeling) only to the limits of some imaginary budget. One important reason is that parents believe that they are following customary and well-accepted child-rearing practices, and they therefore feel relatively little insecurity or guilt about their behavior at any given stage of the process.[23] Another is that child rearing in high-mortality societies is often diffused, not the responsibility of parents alone, but shared to some extent with other adults and with older children; as a result, the burden of loss also is distributed more

widely than in some cultures. A third reason is related to this (and is the most relevant to ancient Athens): many traditional cultures have more-or-less elaborate ritual practices and eschatological beliefs that help parents come to terms with their grief.[24] A real sense of loss exists;[25] but it is vented by following a set series of actions, often over an extended period of time, not by individual, self-expressive outpourings of emotion.[26] These actions are often shared by others in the family and outside it, who thus provide personal support and social validation during the grieving process. Furthermore, these individuals are perhaps more likely to provide comfort because they too have so often suffered similar experiences.[27] Of course, much of this mourning is left to mothers and other women; men are expected to return as soon as possible to their regular routine and to repair the outward fabric of the community.[28] Finally, a child's death may be rationalized by appeal to beliefs such as that there are "repeater children," who are destined to be born over and over again.[29] Something similar is supplied by the pessimistic reflection expressed movingly in Sophocles's *Oedipus at Colonus:* not to be born is best, next best to die soon after.[30]

The funerary rites and burial customs followed for the death of a child in such cultures are often quite different from those for an adult (as they typically were in ancient Athens). Since Robert Hertz's brilliant article (1960), it is almost a cliché to argue that rites for children are less elaborate, the pollution caused by their death less powerful, simply because they have played a less important social role; they have not fully entered into the community and so can make the transition out of it more easily.[31] More may be involved, however. The burial of children within the house, for example, need not be regarded only as a sign that a child is too unimportant to receive a more elaborate burial. It may also be a form of sympathetic magic, a statement that the household welcomes children, or a mark of the parents' unwillingness to give up a treasured child completely.[32] It is likely significant in this context that there is virtually no evidence that Greeks believed that babies who died soon after birth were malevolent, a source of danger for their families or communities.[33] Similarly, the burial of newborns in pots seems meaningful but enigmatic. Does it matter which pot is chosen? After all, as Susan Langdon points out, "The so-called Polyphemus amphora from Eleusis occupies a coveted spot in most major textbooks used in Western art survey courses, yet rarely has it been noted to have served as a child's coffin."[34]

Children were buried with pots as well as in them, and a detailed study of Athens's Ceramicus cemetery in the fifth century concludes that the number of goods in children's graves roughly equals that in adults'.[35] In any case, the variation in the treatment of the remains of children, changing as it did with their age, over time, and from site to site (all presumably sharing the same demographic characteristics), makes any broad hypothesis vulnerable.[36] (Indeed,

one study concludes that variability itself is the defining characteristic of the funerary treatment of infants in antiquity.)[37] As for epitaphs, these are shaped by convention in many societies; even today, parents who feel moved to express their grief in an atypical way may find themselves advised by funeral directors to show restraint or even find their sentiments forbidden by cemetery rules.[38]

It seems, then, that more than demography governs the reaction to a child's death in high-mortality populations in general. How does Stone's account stand up as a description of attitudes in early modern Europe specifically? Research on individual parts of the thesis may give rise to skepticism. On wet nursing outside the household, for example, it has been stressed that the practice was not universal but was subject to local fads and fashions. Where it existed, it was primarily a response to economic necessity among young mothers who had to work and could not care for their children (often to their considerable regret). These children might well be mistreated; their mortality was higher than the norm. But the neglect was on the part of their nurses, who often preferred to provide their milk to their own children first.[39] On fosterage, it has been emphasized that this complex institution served the interests of the children as well as those of the adults in the two households concerned. Elizabethan parents who placed their children in better-off homes secured for them valuable patrons and an opportunity to achieve a place in society they themselves could not obtain; contemporary immigrants from West Africa place their children in English foster homes for similar motives.[40] Indeed, the many English parents who send their own children away to boarding schools likely imagine that they do so for the children's benefit. As Aristotle observed long ago, mothers may love their children even as (and after) they give them up.[41] Linda A. Pollock reviewed the thesis of parental indifference in an important book-length study (1983). After summarizing evidence against it from evolutionary theory and ethnology, Pollock examines primary sources, especially the diaries of children and adults and autobiographies, from the sixteenth through the nineteenth century in England (and the United States). She turns up many examples of parents who seem to have cared deeply for their children, tried conscientiously to understand and adapt to them, and grieved painfully when they died. She concludes: "Most parents were only too clearly anxious and upset by the ill-health of a child. In fact, it appears that the high rate of infant mortality operated to increase their anxiety" (127, cf. 140). Once again, the argument that adults in high-mortality populations did not care that their children died fails to convince.[42] A recent contribution to the debate, by Robert Woods, reexamines the sentiments of Montaigne—one of those Philippe Ariès used as an example of an unfeeling father—and finds that what may appear to be flippancy is in fact a form of disguise for the deep emotions of a man who treated his surviving daughter

with care, consideration, even indulgence. Woods concludes, "The notion that parental indifference was demographically determined is unsound."[43]

It is to the credit of scholars such as Keith Bradley, Robert Garland, and Keith Hopkins that they know Stone's work, have considered it carefully, and have argued against applying it to the ancient world, without the benefit of much of the research I have referred to.[44] But Garland and Hopkins (and other commentators such as Donna Kurtz and John Boardman) are troubled by a seeming contradiction, the practice of exposure of newborns, sometimes called infanticide. In his book on the Greek way of death, Garland (1985) outlines Stone's thesis and then immediately adduces the practice of exposure as "evidence in its support" (80). Hopkins (1983) affirms that the Roman parent did not passively tolerate and pretend "not to care about the death of babies and young children" but then continues: "Nagging doubts remain. Even rich and educated Romans killed or exposed new-born babies" (225).[45]

Now, it is likely (though not beyond reasonable doubt) that the exposure of newborns, especially newborn girls, was widespread and even common at Athens. But (and this merits emphasis) this tells us nothing—at least nothing negative—about the Athenians' response to the death of the children they did decide to raise. Once again, studies of more recent populations are helpful. Infanticide is known to coexist with care of and affection for children both in societies studied by anthropologists—for a second time we may point to the Kalahari Desert San—and in preindustrial Europe.[46] The key question is whether a child was wanted or not. Writing from a theoretical perspective quite different from Pollock's, Sheila Johansson (1987a, 1987b) draws attention to the widely varying rates of infant mortality from different places and periods in early modern Europe. Her explanation for these significant variations gives pride of place to social, economic, and ideological factors that influenced standards of parenting. One constant lies behind this complex of local conditions: the fact that infanticide was illegal (and harshly punished), which led parents to neglect or even mistreat unwanted children so that some or many more died than would otherwise have been the case.[47] One implication of her argument (though Johansson does not bring it out) is that in societies that permit infanticide, children who are accepted into the family are less likely to be neglected or mistreated (at least to this extent) and are more likely to be mourned deeply when they die.[48]

Perhaps the motives and experiences of contemporary women who choose to abort their pregnancies can provide some insight here. "Every child a wanted child" is a slogan of pro-choice activists; it also reflects a reality for many women who decide not to carry a pregnancy to term. Thus, a study of more than three thousand Belgian women who had induced abortions in 1979 found that a "desire to have no children at all is rare, as 91 percent of the women claimed to

want children. . . . In most cases they desired two or three."[49] That dislike of or indifference toward children is seldom a motive for abortion is borne out by other reports. For example, in a group of sixty-two women undergoing abortion in an urban center in the U.S. South in the late 1970s, 65 percent indicated they wanted children in the future, while only 11 percent said lack of desire for any children at all led them to seek abortion.[50] Significantly, follow-up studies seem to show that many women who abort do in fact have children later and care for those children as other mothers do. An account of 312 women who had induced abortions in Hawaii in the early 1980s concludes: "Their subsequent births have been overwhelmingly intended and wanted and have occurred in a positive emotional atmosphere. At the time of these subsequent pregnancies, they are indistinguishable from the control sample [of women who have not had abortions] in attitudes and emotions, albeit slightly higher in socio-economic status."[51] The thrust of this research is that contemporary women who seek abortion do not normally do so out of dislike of or indifference toward children and that the experience of abortion does not affect their attitudes toward other children, either already living or yet to be born, in any negative way. On the contrary, it is arguable that many of these women choose to abort when they do largely in order to provide a better environment for other children they have or will have in the future; they postpone childbirth until they are better able, financially or emotionally, to raise a child.

Of course, no such surveys are available for classical Athens, nor is there any other Athenian evidence that seems directly relevant to this argument (though poverty was one of the dangers that advocates of population control such as Plato wished to avert; e.g., Pl. *Resp.* 2.372BC). But a few scattered comments indicate that such considerations influenced parents in other parts of the ancient Greek and Roman world, and so those ideas may not have been utterly foreign at Athens. Polybius's famous remark on the depopulation of Greece charges that "many parents wish to have just one or two children so as to leave them in affluence and bring them up to waste their substance" (36.17.5–7). A hostile witness; but what he denounces could be described as prudence on the part of parents who care for their children's well-being. The Stoic Musonius Rufus's diatribe against rich parents who do not want to raise all their children so that they may leave all their wealth to their firstborn points in the same direction (fr. 15). Among some Greeks and Romans, exposure of newborns could coexist with, and even be caused by, care for other children.

Thus, recent research renders doubtful the hypothesis that children have not been deeply mourned in high-mortality populations; and evidence from contemporary Western society controverts the assumption that the decision not to rear some babies stems from indifference or hostility toward children as a whole.

Neither line of argument can prove that the Athenians did care that their children died, but each removes a reason for believing that they did not.

In fact, the weight of the evidence seems overwhelmingly to favor the proposition that the Athenians loved their children and grieved for them deeply when they died.[52] The death of the infant Astyanax is a staple of Athenian art as early as a geometric shard from the Agora that dates from the late eighth century.[53] Nor is pathos aroused by the death of mythical children only. Both Herodotus and Thucydides choose the death of schoolchildren as an example of a crushing calamity; the incident recounted by Thucydides, the slaughter of the children of Mycalessus by Thracians, is called the most complete, most sudden, most horrible disaster that ever struck the city.[54] Seeking sympathy from an Athenian jury, a defendant tells of a similar loss: Parmenon's house collapsed and his wife and children died in the ruins. One would expect even a cruel arbitrator or an opponent to postpone a case in such circumstances ([Dem.] 33.20, 33–34).

Parents' concern may be judged by the precautions they took to prevent more foreseeable fatalities. Antiphon's comment is only one example of a sentiment that became a commonplace: "Suppose children are born; then all is full of anxiety, and the youthful spring goes out of the mind, and the countenance is no longer the same."[55] This anxiety found expression in many forms, from the amulets that were thought to avert disease and the evil eye, to the dedications made to healing deities on behalf of children, to the myths and cults of child heroes who fell victim to the dangers that loomed over all.[56] When all precautions failed, parents' sorrow was often great. Xenocleia died of grief for her eight-year-old son.[57] Other bereaved parents are said to have wished they'd never had children at all.[58]

One of the most striking statements of a deep attachment to children comes from tragedy, part of a lament for a son killed in the Argive expedition against Thebes. "Seeing others who had children, I had a passion for children and was lost in longing," says Iphis (Eur. *Supp.* 1087–1088). The Greek is *paidōn erastēs,* the first a common word for the younger member of a homosexual couple, the second for his older lover; Iphis describes himself as in the grip of an overpowering desire for children, an emotion akin to sexual passion. The phrase is bold but not unparalleled in Euripides.[59] Childless both, Xuthus and Temenus journey to oracles of Apollo and of Zeus because of a passionate desire for children.[60] Similar reflections, if not such highly charged vocabulary, are common elsewhere in his tragedies. Heracles's comments in the play dealing with his mad murder of his own children may stand for many others: "Both the best of mortals and those who are nobodies love children; they differ in material things; some have property and some do not; but the whole race is child-loving."[61] His own tragedy would be much diminished if it were not; as it is, it is deepened by

his abandonment by his own father, Zeus, a betrayal of a parent's role criticized both in this play and in Sophocles's *Trachiniae*.[62]

Of course, Euripides's characters can be quoted as evidence for almost every attitude.[63] But these sentiments are not confined to them, nor are they restricted to contexts of childlessness and loss. Socrates speaks of the common case of a man who values his son above all other things (Pl. *Lys.* 219D). Aristophanes provides a glimpse of a new father's joy, which is so intense that it makes him easy to deceive, and of tired veterans half-bragging, half-complaining about their sons' birdbrained enthusiasms like late-night stand-up comics; take my son—please.[64] Another father commandeers his son from a nurse, feeds him from his own mouth, makes kissing sounds, and calls him a pet name, "daddy's little rascal."[65] This is Theophrastus's Ill-Bred Man—it was unseemly for a father to take on a slave woman's work. Nor does Theophrastus approve of the flatterer who buys a man's little children fruit and says, as he kisses them, that they're chips off their father's block.[66] But the behaviors, testifying as they do to fondness for children, are as significant as (and perhaps more widespread than) the philosopher's reaction. Writing as a rhetorician, Aristotle lists both *euteknia,* "having good children," and *polyteknia,* "having many children," as among the components of happiness, an idea reflected already in the archaic Athenian poet and politician Solon.[67] He is more original and no less revealing when he writes as a scientist.[68] Here we are told that nature herself wishes to provide for the care of the young of all species. In lower animals, the feeling she implants lasts only until birth; in others (such as birds), until the baby reaches its complete development. In more intelligent animals, the concern instilled by nature lasts until rearing is completed. However, in the most intelligent species, humans among them, there is intimacy and attachment (*synētheia kai philia*) between parent and child even after offspring are fully grown. Finally, though it is always easy to read too much into a work of art with no text or context, it is pleasant to think that a bearded figure tenderly observing the birth of Erichthonius on a red-figure stamnos is Hephaestus, as close to a father as the baby has.[69] Those who find this far-fetched will perhaps be more convinced by the many moving depictions of parents and children on Attic gravestones.[70]

It is the orators who supply the most reliable evidence for Athenian attitudes. Defendants swear oaths on their children's heads and bring them into court to win the jury's sympathy.[71] Concern for children is appealed to as a common bond.[72] Apollodorus began to get letters about problems at home, which led to a longing to see his small children and wife and mother again. Very likely he did not feel this emotion at all; this is the same mother whose chastity he impugns in another speech (mentioned in Chapter 5). Clearly, however, he thinks his audience will judge the sentiment appropriate and credible. "What is sweeter

than these?" he asks. "Why would anyone want to live deprived of them?"[73] Mantitheus tells another jury that his father brought him up and loved him (*ēgapa*), "as all of you love your children" ([Dem.] 40.8). Another Apollodorus, adoptive father of one of Isaeus's clients, had a son whom he trained and cared for, "as was fitting" (Isae. 7.14). On the other side, it is a strike against Lampis that he was little concerned about his wife and children, and Aristotle advises likely lawyers to discredit opponents by claiming that they had used the rejoinder the Egyptian soldier made to King Psammetichus: he pointed to his genitals and said, "Wherever these go, I can get children and wives."[74] Perhaps the most interesting passage does not come from a forensic context at all, but from the funeral oration ascribed to Lysias (2.75). To show gratitude to the dead, the author instructs what is to be thought of as an Athenian audience to esteem the deceased's parents as they did, embrace their children (*aspazoimetha*) as if they (the audience) were their fathers, and help their wives as they did when alive. This is more than just a reference to behavioral norms or a compliment to a particular audience. Funeral speeches were advertisements for the community as a whole, a compendium of the achievements and moral standards it liked to claim as its own. Affection for children must therefore be regarded as one of its values. It was one even slaves were thought to share: the *Oeconomica,* a Peripatetic work that goes under Aristotle's name, speaks of children as hostages for slaves' good behavior, as they fear they may lose them through sale (*Oec.* 1.1344b17).

A general comment is in order at this point. It might be objected that at least some of the evidence I have adduced need not testify to meaningful emotive feelings toward children, but may merely signify a realization of their practical value. A law sometimes ascribed to Solon (and therefore regarded as old and venerable) required Athenians to provide food and lodging for their parents when they were alive and proper burial when they died.[75] It was open to anyone to bring a prosecution under this law, and those who did so were exempt from the usual penalties imposed on plaintiffs who withdrew their case or failed to win one-fifth of the votes and from the usual limitation on speaking time. Law has a greater claim to represent popular attitudes in a direct democracy like Athens than in most societies; the impression that care of parents was of special importance to the community is confirmed by the inclusion of a question on the treatment of parents in the scrutiny those selected as archons had to undergo.[76] Children were a prudent investment in a society that knew no pension plans and in which burial and tendance of the grave were important responsibilities of one's descendants; and individual Athenians were well aware of it.[77] This line of thought has led to such observations as the comment that *anagkaioi,* "relatives," a derivative of *anagkē,* "necessity," implies duty, not affection, as the basis of kin relations.[78]

How to respond? It may be instructive to return to our evidence for child labor, reviewed above in Chapter 3. Should we think of children's work as exploitative, an index of Athenian parents' concern for children's utility rather than their well-being? Even today this question sparks controversy.[79] From one point of view, children's work is a form of child abuse, the theft of a precious and pleasurable stage of life. So the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 32 (1989) affirms the right of children to be protected from economic exploitation, from work that is dangerous or compromises their education or health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or mental development. From another point of view, however, work allows children to take a more meaningful part in family and community life. From this perspective, it is exclusion from work that puts children at risk, enhancing as it does their representation as passive and dependent. Some contemporary children have in fact demanded the right to work: when children's labor was outlawed in the Bangladeshi garment industry in the 1990s, most (many of them girls in their early teens) did not pursue an education, as policymakers had hoped, but instead joined the informal economy, sometimes as prostitutes, where they were even more poorly paid and protected than before. Some petitioned to be permitted to do factory work again, for a few hours a day, in order to pay for school fees and other expenses. One estimate suggests that four out of five British children and youths break the child labor laws passed for their protection.[80] Some of these issues arise in the role played by James Murray's children in his great editorial achievement, the *Oxford English Dictionary.* They sorted the slips sent in by the project's many volunteers and were paid pocket money—on a sliding scale adjusted according to age—but received no public acknowledgment of their efforts. In later life, the children proved to be very good at crosswords. A happy ending. Yet one of the children's friends—Cyril Joad, later a BBC radio celebrity—apparently vandalized Murray's workshop, destroying enough material that he forced a delay in the next volume's publication.[81] Perhaps the young workers were crosser about their father's words than it seems.

On a more abstract level, it is not always easy to maintain a rigorous dichotomy between practicality and sentiment. That they were closely intertwined for the ancient Athenians is indicated by the word *tokos* itself, which means both "child" and "interest on a loan or investment."[82] This should not rule out an attempt to apply our own understanding to ancient phenomena, here as elsewhere, but it does suggest how difficult the task can be. And perhaps how futile, too. How could we tell if many or most Athenians did in fact care for their children only because they brought them certain benefits? To quote E. P. Thompson: "Feelings may be *more,* rather than less, tender or intense *because* relations are 'economic' and critical to mutual survival."[83] The more parents need

and depend on children, in other words, the more they will care for them, like them or not. It is certainly theoretically possible to differentiate this care from what some have come to consider the real thing, concern for children as unique human individuals, though many parents do not find it so simple. But I do not know how a historian would make such a distinction with any confidence, and I suspect an Athenian could not help.

Some distinctions can be made in this discussion, however. For example, Robert Garland suggests that "only" children, the last-born, and those born to elderly parents—all were especially prized.[84] Fathers may not feel what mothers do, sons may not be regarded the way daughters are. There are, for example, some signs that daughters were devalued by their fathers. As I have already indicated, they were probably refused admission to the family and exposed (an action based on the father's decision) more frequently than sons;[85] differential exposure of females is generally associated with a higher valuation of males in other cultures.[86] A proverb, apparently derived from an Athenian prayer on the occasion of marriage, expresses the wish for a firstborn child to be a son; the traditional midwife's gift may have been less when she helped deliver a daughter.[87] Girls were apparently fed less well than boys—not only another sign of diminished concern but a potential cause of what has been called passive or deferred infanticide in societies in which all children are supposed to be reared.[88] Archaic and early classical Athenian tombs that identify themselves as sons' outnumber those for daughters by about five to one.[89] Relationships are explicitly recorded in fewer than one-third of Athenian epitaphs from this period; those so singled out may therefore be regarded as of special importance to the dedicants (usually fathers). The birth of a daughter could increase friction between husband and wife; at least it does so in one comedy.[90] Better to pretend it hasn't happened; one of women's tricks, says Mnesilochus in another, is to smuggle in a slave's newborn son in exchange for a legitimate baby daughter (Ar. *Thesm.* 564–565). The daughter's fate, to become a slave, is apparently of no moment even to her mother. (It is left to a slave in New Comedy to provide caustic comment. "Could you see your master's baby brought up as a slave?" asks Habrotonon the harpist and *hetaira*. "You'd deserve death for that" [Men. *Epitr.* 468–470].)[91] The birth of a son, on the other hand, was a relief. "Don't worry," Praxagora inventively informs her husband, "the neighbor's had a boy" (Ar. *Eccl.* 549).

Again, this is not to say that men could not care for the daughters they did decide to raise. Girls might be named Aspasia, "welcome," or Boulete, "wanted."[92] While about 60 percent of the Greek votive statues that can be identified by gender are of boys—and this is probably an underestimate of their original predominance—those of girls are of the same quality.[93] On tombstones, boys and girls appear in equal numbers.[94] Aeschines attacks his political opponent De-

mosthenes because he took part in a public sacrifice on the seventh day after his daughter's death, before the full period of mourning was up (3.77–78). How will such a base and child-hating (*misoteknos*) man, who cared so little for his only daughter, have any concern for the citizens of Athens, he asks. Aeschines counts on his audience to recognize some emotional tie between father and daughter, as well as the niceties of religious observance. That with girls the tie might be especially tender is suggested by Iphis in Euripides's *Suppliant Women:* "There is nothing more joyful to an aged father than a daughter. Boys have greater courage, but are less given to sweet endearments" (1101–1103).[95] Creon refers to the joy another tragic father, Oedipus, takes in his daughters, and Oedipus's last thoughts in this play are for them (Soph. *OT* 1476–1477, 1522).

But fathers did not care for daughters in just the same way they did for sons (though we need not subscribe to the formula that Plutarch attributes to Epicurus: a father loves a son, a mother a daughter).[96] One comic prayer, which neatly sums up the difference in attitudes, is all the more interesting because it is presented as a woman's, from the disguised Mnesilochus again. "May my sexy (*euchoiron*) daughter meet up with a rich husband, especially if he's silly and good-for-nothing. And may my little pecker (*posthaliskon*) have brains and sense."[97] It will be noticed that both wishes are really for males. The boy's is for himself: he is to be an intelligent man. The girl's is for a certain kind of husband—she is to get a stupid one. The essential fact of an Athenian woman's life, that it is defined by her relationship with a man (or men), could hardly be clearer. Compare Apollodorus's summing up for the jury in the case of Neaera ([Dem.] 59.122). We introduce sons to our phraters and fellow demesmen, he says; we give daughters to husbands. Men engage in civic life directly, women for the most part only through their menfolk.

Sexual innuendo is an undercurrent in another comic passage, from Aristophanes's *Wasps* (605–609). Philocleon, enumerating the benefits of the juror's life, comes to the sweetest of all. When he comes home with his pay, everyone comes to greet him. First is his daughter, who washes his feet and rubs them with oil and then bends down to kiss him, calling him "pappa" (*pappizous'*) and fishing all the while with her tongue for his money, which he carries for safekeeping in his mouth. This is kiddie porn; there is no mistaking the ribald image of the little girl French-kissing her old man.[98] An additional theme in this scene is the depiction of the daughter as a gold digger, a characteristic charge in a culture in which money was controlled mostly by men and was usually accessible to women only through them.

Aristophanes's scenes of fathers and daughters do not all have this edge. Trygaeus's daughters also use pet names for him because they want something—they're hungry—but he is portrayed as genuinely disturbed by their plight (Ar.

Pax 110–149). Nor do the close ties between fathers and daughters we sometimes see in New Comedy. I have already mentioned (in Chapter 2 above) the unusual circumstances of Menander's *Dyscolus,* in which the misanthropic Cnemon works in the fields in the company of his daughter. I explained this as a sign of the old man's miserly nature: he chooses not to buy or hire help. But the girl's presence might also serve to show affection; she is described as very distressed when her "dearest dad" (*pappan philtaton,* 648–649) falls down a well (673–674). Among other fathers, Cichesias cries in recalling his daughter's kidnapping many years earlier, and he faints (with joy?) when he learns that she is alive (Men. *Sic.* 354–364). It is true that some notorious denigrations of daughters (in favor of sons) also come from New Comedy.[99] But even these few passages showing fathers' affection for their daughters should be enough to indicate that the difference in attitude toward daughters is not simply to be summed up as a consequence of male hostility toward women. Nor is there animosity in a remark made by Xenophon's Socrates: "We wouldn't think a loose-liver worthy of trust, if at the end of our lives we wanted to appoint a guardian to educate our sons or protect our girls" (*Mem.* 1.5.2). There is, however, a clear sense that girls were not to be allowed an equal share in the broad range of activities the Athenians described as education or in the community life for which it was in part a preparation.

Since, in its political and legal structure, Athens was a community of adult males, it is not surprising that Athenian fathers tended to reinforce and reproduce the prejudices that diminished daughters' roles. It is worth wondering, however, whether individual fathers didn't occasionally wish more for their girls than the *polis* provided. Some stories staged by the Athenian dramatists seem relevant. A number of kings are bidden to sacrifice their daughters for the public good.[100] Agamemnon chooses to slay his daughter Iphigenia, "the adornment of his house," at the altar as a charm against the winds that hold his Trojan expedition in the harbor at Aulis.[101] His bargain brings a usurper to power in the city and, for himself, death on his return. Contrast Demophon. Though aware that the death of a young girl is necessary to save the descendants of Heracles from Eurystheus's army, this king of Athens refuses; no one would willingly be so senseless as to give up children, who are very dear (Eur. *Hcld.* 408–414). In the end, the Heraclids are saved by the self-sacrifice of Heracles's daughter, an element likely invented by Euripides; it is her death that ensures Athens's victory in battle against the invaders. The Athenians of the classical period prided themselves on having provided refuge for the Heraclids.[102] Euripides's introduction of the girl (elsewhere called Macaria) would contribute to their self-esteem, in that it allowed their king to fulfill an obligation to outsiders without harming any of his own household or people. Both stories imply that heading a house-

hold and belonging to, even ruling, a community imposed different demands, which were hard to reconcile. Paradoxically, the point is made more strongly by the story with a happy ending, Euripides's, since the resolution it provides for the dilemma is so obviously exceptional and unexpected.

That mothers are especially close to their children was almost a cliché, found in law-court speeches, in treatises on household management, in tragedy, and in scientific accounts of procreation.[103] As a mother expresses it in a fragment of a comedy by Menander, it was part of the natural way of things: "I conceived, I gave birth, I'm raising [him/her], I love" (Men. fr. 456K.-A.). Lycurgus exploits this expectation in his prosecution of Leocrates. In Euripides's *Erechtheus,* another Athenian king is called upon to give up his daughter to save his country from invasion, and he does so, at her mother's urging. "All women are fond of children (*philoteknōn*) by nature," comments Lycurgus. If this one could love her homeland more than her daughter, surely Leocrates should not have forsaken it (*Leocr.* 99–101).[104] Of particular interest is a portion of the important passage in which Aristotle discusses affection (*philia*) within the family (*NE* 8.1161b16). This is said to stem from the affection of parents for their children, for parents love (*stergousi*) children as being part of themselves, whereas children love parents as the source of their being; we would expect progenitor to be more attached than progeny, on the analogy of the relation between a hair or a tooth and the person it is part of. Moreover, parents know children better than children know parents. Finally, a parent's affection, which begins at birth, is of longer duration than a child's, which starts only when some time has passed and the child develops understanding or at least perception. For all these reasons, Aristotle concludes, parents love children more than children love them—and this is all the more true of mothers.[105]

The assumption leaves a trace in the epigraphic record too. Mothers are as prominent as fathers among those making dedications on behalf of children in the archaic and classical periods.[106] The gap in the conventional ages of marriage for men (about thirty) and women (in the mid to late teens) guaranteed that there would be many more women surviving as single parents than men.[107] This would tend to increase the proportion of women making dedications of this kind; the one or two dedications on behalf of a woman (or man) and her (or his) children probably come from such households. But there is no reason to believe that this is so for most of the dedications. More likely, though they were planned by both parents (and perhaps paid for by the father), it was frequently felt appropriate that the mother be identified as the parent especially concerned with children's well-being. One of Lysias's clients, opposing Philon's election to the Council of 500 at the required scrutiny of his eligibility to serve, shows how an enemy could use the expectation of a mother's ongoing love and loyalty for

an adult son (31.20–23). While she was alive, Philon's mother made accusations against him. When she was reaching the end of her life, she didn't commit herself to his care, but as she had confidence in Antiphanes, who wasn't even a relative, she gave him the money for her burial. (Nicostratus's mother, on the contrary, helped him out of a legal jam by laying claim to some of his property: [Dem.] 53.28.) The link was recognized in Athenian law, for adoption severed only a man's tie with his father, not that with his mother, and brothers and sisters who had the same mother could not marry, though homopatric siblings could.[108]

Mother love is an important motif in drama, too. Both Megara, Heracles's wife, and Andromache, who was Hector's, deliver touching farewells to their young children. Megara recalls the inheritance Heracles playfully bestowed on each son in turn and mourns the marriage plans she made for them. "Which shall I take first, which last," she concludes, "to lift up, embrace and kiss?" (Eur. *HF* 462–489). Her last words have been condemned as rhetorical artifice;[109] yet they do express a difference between a father, who apportions his gifts according to set principles, and a mother, whose love is less logical. Andromache vividly describes her child's distress but also lingers on the sweet scent of his skin.[110] This detail is an echo of the most moving of maternal farewells, Medea's (Eur. *Med.* 1021–1077). The central difference in her case, of course, is that Megara and Andromache seek to protect their children from others, while Medea intends to kill hers by her own hand.[111] This is a step even Clytemnestra feared to take; according to Electra's farmer husband, she killed her husband but spared her children against Aegisthus's will, lest she stir up bad feeling (Eur. *El.* 30).[112] That Medea braves it is a sign of both strength and weakness. A hero's act of daring, it is also a mark of her vulnerability as a woman and mother. Her most crushing blow against her husband Jason must hurt herself as well. It is also a final irony in a play that sees men and women reverse their roles; Medea gets her way with Creon and Aegeus in succession by playing on their affection and desire for children, while the chorus of Corinthian women declares it is best not to have children at all (Eur. *Med.* 1090–1115).

In the more homely vein of comedy, one of the women who plots to take over the Athenian Assembly intends to card wool for her scantily clad children as its meeting place fills up (Ar. *Eccl.* 88–92). Preparing wool was prototypically women's work, an association already used to good effect in an earlier comedy, *Lysistrata,* where women's expertise in this area is presented as a qualification for engaging in politics. The audiences for both plays, male or predominantly male, must have found the notion of wool-working as a claim to political participation ridiculous. As was often the case, however, Aristophanes's humor is double-edged here. Women's presumptions are not more absurd than men's

complacency. There were indeed poor families in the postwar Athens of *Ecclesiazusae,* and, insofar as it was apportioned by gender, the blame for the hardships of the times must have fallen to the male citizens who made public policy. Simpleminded though she may be, this woman is not only concerned about her children's comfort (as a mother should be); she is doing something about it (as fathers ought as well).

When we turn to the attitudes of children themselves, we might well expect to find that their feelings for their mothers were more intense than those for their fathers, the product of more constant and more intimate contact and of closeness in age (or at least fostered by these factors). This seems to have been the Athenian assumption. It is the mother for whom children in a fragment of Euripides's *Erechtheus* are urged to feel a loverlike passion (*erate:* Eur. fr. 358K.). The orators' use of the law requiring sons to provide *tropheia* (support) when they grow up is consistent with this. Not only was the legal obligation met, but the necessity to meet it could carry weight with a jury. Apollodorus notes approvingly that Lysias forbore to bring his girlfriends into the house out of respect for his wife and for his aged mother, who lived with him ([Dem.] 59.22).[113] Other speakers ask for acquittal on the grounds that they will otherwise be unable to support their mothers when alive or bury them properly after their death.[114] Why are mothers so prominent in such contexts? Again, one reason is simply that more mothers than fathers survived into their sons' maturity.[115] But in addition it looks as if speakers felt that an approach based on a mother's plight was particularly effective. However cynical a ploy, it must have been based on a considered judgment about a jury's sentiments. Moreover, it must often have met with success, if the feelings expressed in the epitaph of Telemachus, buried in the first half of the fourth century, were at all common (*IG* 2^2 7711). Telemachus is very much missed by his children and dear wife, yet it is his mother the inscription addresses. He is buried at her right side, not deprived of her love (*sēs philias*). Of course, the law, enacted by adult males, demanded *tropheia* for fathers too, and those who ignored them were rebuked,[116] but the obligation only rarely figures in emotive appeals (as in Aeschin. 2.179). Instead we find sons who court sympathy on the grounds that they must take their fathers' part, though it would be more natural for their fathers to protect them.[117] This is not merely a reflection of the legal capacities of men and women. There is a quite different emphasis: the son is to be pitied, not the father. Similarly, in funeral speeches and other contexts, both parents are said to suffer when their children cannot support them; fathers are rarely singled out for sympathy, here or elsewhere.[118]

An interesting motif involving fathers and sons in particular suggests that proper filial behavior was often thought to pass down from one generation to

another. This golden rule is expressed most explicitly in Isocrates's advice to Demonicus: "Behave toward your parents as you would wish your children to behave toward you."[119] Demosthenes provides a variant. Conon's actions, and those of his sons, are proof that he does not respect his own father, for if he did honor and fear him, he would make sure his sons treated him likewise (Dem. 54.23). Bad behavior breeds. This is a recurrent motif of comedy, where Pheidippides justifies his assault on his father, Strepsiades, by recalling the beatings the older man gave him as a child (Ar. *Nub.* 1399–1451), and his whipping his chariot horses is mirrored by his father's flogging of a creditor. Not only there: a man charged with beating his father (according to a story told by Aristotle) defended himself by saying his father and his father's father had done the same, and his little son would carry on the family tradition (*NE* 7.1149b8). We need not believe this story, or even believe that Aristotle did. What is of interest is that the relationship of son to father is treated as an object of inheritance, like any family possession; this is not the realm of sentiment, however conventional. A fair presumption, even on the basis of this impressionistic presentation, is that emotional feelings between sons and mothers were thought to be warmer than those involving sons and fathers, both as children and as adults.

The value the Athenians put on a proper attitude toward parents is reflected in the interest in the subject they attributed to the gods. Lycurgus, prosecuting Leocrates for leaving the city during the crisis brought on by the battle of Chaeronea, notes that the gods preside over all human affairs, but most of all over duties to parents, the dead, and themselves (*Leocr.* 94). The gods are said to love whoever reverences his parents. If a man does not love them (continues the speaker in a passage from tragedy), let him not sacrifice together with me nor sail with me at sea (Eur. fr. 852K.). It was possible to speak of disrespect to parents as an attack on the gods, to lump those who were guilty with men convicted of impiety, even to exalt parents to the level of the gods.[120]

Respect, loyalty, obedience. These recur frequently among the qualities expected of children, especially toward fathers.[121] The speaker of a tragic fragment assures his mother that she will always be dear to him (*prosphilē*) for the sake of what is right and her birth pangs, but adds, "I love my father above all other mortals" (Eur. fr. 1064K.). The concluding lines of the fragment, though obscure, seem to explain this preference by asserting that no man should be called a woman's, but a father's. The logic may be similar to that lying behind Apollo's famous denigration of the woman's role in procreation in Aeschylus's *Eumenides* (657–666). The sentiment is not altogether surprising in a male-dominated society, but the formulation is extreme. More characteristically, the prime importance of respect for the father is left implicit, expressed through the prominence he is given in discussions of family relations. So in Aristotle's

Politics we are told that the father rules his wife *politikōs,* like a magistrate rules a fellow citizen (except that he has no set term), and his children *basilikōs,* like a king (1.1259a38-b18). Nothing, we gather, needs be said about a mother's authority.[122] In another work, Aristotle focuses on the proper relations between father and son, arguing that they are not those of a friendship between equals. He stresses the obligations of a son to his father—they far outweigh any claims the son may have—and says that no one can ever render his father the honor he deserves (*NE* 8.1158b11, 1163b15).

The subject was significant enough, and the view expressed by Aristotle sufficiently influential, to inform the comedy of Menander. In both *Samia* and *Adelphoi,* sons relate to a father (or foster father) on terms of equality, and as a result the relationship between them is endangered or even irreconcilably disrupted.[123] In another public forum, respect for a father did a litigant credit, as disrespect disgraced him. "I am now thirty," Lysias has a client claim, "but I have never yet had a dispute with my father, nor been subject of complaint from any citizen" (19.55). Mantitheus tries to persuade a jury that Boeotus's case amounts to slander against his father's reputation—a crime no true son would commit ([Dem.] 40.45–47). More than respect alone, loyalty and obedience also were demanded, notably by Creon in an angry exchange with his son Haemon. "Put everything second to a father's opinion. It is for this that men pray to have obedient children in their homes, to pay back evil to their father's enemy and honor his friend as he does" (Soph. *Ant.* 639–644). Mantitheus is relevant again: "While my father was alive, I thought it wrong to oppose any of his wishes" ([Dem.] 40.13; cf. 58.2, 58).[124]

These passages should not mislead us into thinking that regard and respect were not a mother's due as well. Among the noble and reverend qualities that adorn and preserve the city (according to a speech modeled on Demosthenes) are sobriety, orderliness, and respect of the young for their parents and elders ([Dem.] 25.24). Not just fathers alone. Lycurgus tells an exemplary tale about the eruption of Mount Etna. One of the younger men stopped to help an aged father, though he could have made his escape; overtaken by fire, they were nonetheless the only two saved by the gods, while others who left their parents to their fate all died (*Leocr.* 95–97). A father provides a specific instance, but the moral includes both parents (as Lycurgus makes clear elsewhere in the speech, e.g., *Leocr.* 15). General reflections in tragedy and comedy also regularly refer to both parents.[125] For both as well, respect and obedience were enforced by physical punishment.[126] But it was perhaps more often the father who imposed it, especially on older boys; it is fathers from whom Socrates imagines truant boys fleeing, and, according to one view of the division of labor nature imposes on parents, it is fathers who train or educate, while mothers nurture.[127] This might

be a consequence of a mother's indulgence of her sons, or perhaps a cause. On an archaic-period lekythos by the Sandal Painter, a boy beaten by a man runs for refuge toward a woman, whom we are tempted to take as his mother.[128]

This mother might merit a son's gratitude. Others too. It is somewhat startling—a mark of the unconventionality of the Socratic circle?—to find that one of Xenophon's reminiscences of his teacher deals with the proper regard of Socrates's eldest son, Lamprocles, for his mother (Xen. *Mem.* 2.2). This short conversation begins in the Socratic manner with an inquiry about those who are ungrateful (*acharistous*). It has been observed that the Athenians, in conformity with the importance assigned to attitudes toward parents, usually labeled what we would call ingratitude toward them as something quite different, impiety, and that Xenophon in this passage "comes far nearer the modern emphasis on gratitude than does anyone before him, or for many years after him."[129] We should not exaggerate the unique character of this vignette; Socrates's closing remarks are conventional enough, urging Lamprocles to pray to the gods to forgive his mistreatment of his mother and making clear that his is just a special case of the neglect of parents. But the insistence on gratitude to a mother remains remarkable and is not (in my view) simply a case of an *a fortiori* argument. Also noteworthy, and surely related, is the emphasis placed on a mother's distinctive gifts: she conceives and carries the child at risk to her life, feeds it from her own body, gives birth with much labor, and rears and cares for it, guessing what is to its advantage and what pleases it, without knowing what thanks she will get. (We are a long way from Apollo!) Many of these are processes governed by nature and specific to women; none involves close calculation. Precisely for such acts, Xenophon implies, repayment in kind is impossible for a young man (any man), and reckoning of the extent of obligation is out of place. Again, special recognition for the mother.

Good relations between the generations were highly valued. "How sweet is concord between parents and children!"[130] Lest harmony prove hard to arrange, advice was available. Some snippets from Euripides are typical indications of the importance of moderation and an even temper. "A father who is mean to his children heavily weighs down his old age": the Greek pops with *p* sounds, regarded as unpleasant by some rhetorical theorists.[131] "It is sweet for children to find a mild father and not to be hateful to him"; the reverse is a great misfortune.[132] Two success stories: Asked if his victory in the boys' *pankration* at the Panathenaea is his main mark of distinction, Autolycus blushes and says no, it is his father he is proudest of (Xen. *Symp.* 3.12–13). If imitation is really the sincerest form of admiration, the young Alcibiades tops even this, supposedly taking over his father's lisp, carriage, and clothes.[133] Unfortunately, as in the other relationships that are the subject of these chapters, bad feeling and con-

flict could not always be avoided, despite good advice and better intentions.[134] "The world is divided between kids who grow up wanting to be their parents and those like us, who grow up wanting to be anything but," reflects one of Richard Russo's characters. "Neither group ever succeeds."[135] As Plato's Athenian stranger puts it, "A child in his present helplessness loves and is loved by his parents, and always seeks refuge in his relatives, his only allies—even though he is likely to be at odds with them at some future time" (Pl. *Leg.* 6.754B). In treating parent-child tensions, I will continue to concentrate, as do our sources, on conflict between fathers and sons, especially as these, too, reached manhood.[136] It is instructive that the series of rebellions in which the gods Uranus and Cronus are overthrown by their sons comes to an end when Zeus swallows Metis and gives birth to a daughter, Athens's patron deity, Athena.[137]

In other ways, however, myth (or our impression of it) may mislead. The importance of the Oedipus story on the Athenian stage and its vibrant afterlife in the Western tradition almost demand a consideration of sexual rivalry as a main source of friction between fathers and sons. Another myth of special relevance to Athens, the story of Hippolytus, his father, King Theseus, and his father's wife, Phaedra, appears to confirm the centrality of this issue. In addition, the structure of the Athenian family, in which the mother (married in her mid to late teens) might be as close in age to some of her sons as to her husband, seems likely to have exacerbated such antagonism. But crucial qualifications intervene. Oedipus's is an atypical tale in more than its impact: sex between mother and son is otherwise rare in myth, usually situated on the periphery of the Greek world, often presented as the revenge of Aphrodite for a slight, or as unintentional, or both.[138] Moreover, its combination of father-killing and mother-incest is unique, and even in Oedipus's case, rivalry over Jocasta is not the motive for Laius's murder.[139] Similarly, is it pedantic to point out that Hippolytus is not in fact guilty of a sexual attack on his stepmother?

Sexuality and aggression are certainly linked in these stories of fathers and sons, but it is important for their interpretation to note that both sexual advances and hostile acts are initiated by the older generation. Hippolytus spurns his stepmother, Oedipus literally goes to great lengths to avoid killing the man he thinks is his father and arguably marries his mother, quite unwittingly, only because she comes with the territory, the city of Thebes. *In Praise of Older Women* this isn't. Achilles's mentor Phoenix provides only an apparent counterexample. Though he seduces his father's concubine, his motive is not (explicitly at least) lust but the desire to take his mother's side in a family feud (*Il.* 9.447–451). Even that most sexually charged of unfilial acts, Cronus's gory castration of Uranus, is only partly explained by hatred of his father (Hes. *Theog.* 138); his action is undertaken at the behest of his mother, who masterminds the plot and even

supplies the weaponry (159–168). Likewise, Zeus's mother, Rhea, is the brains behind his own coup against Cronus (453–506). Significantly, classical Athenian references to these stories never isolate the sexual element; in fact Agathon is made to say that they were the work of Necessity, not of the god Eros.[140] To summarize, then, sexual desire in these stories primarily characterizes fathers, mothers, and others of their senior status, and the sexual conflict that exists is between them as well; sons figure mainly as allies or adversaries of the parental protagonists (on which more will be said in Chapter 6), and their sexuality is, if anything, understressed (as in the case of Hippolytus).

It is more productive to consider another common cause of conflict—money.[141] This time, bad feeling arises on both sides of the generation gap. At its simplest, money trouble amounts to grousing about the costs of raising children. It involves "no small expense" to bring up a child, educate him from childhood, and introduce him to the phraters;[142] introduction to the phratry, like many other ritual acts, would involve an outlay for a sacrificial victim and perhaps other fees, and the phraters could expect a feast, as they did on the occasion of a marriage. Property owners could owe money on their taxes on account of child-rearing (*paidotrophia*) and other household and civic expenses (Dem. 22.65). By way of contrast, Gorgias was reputed to be the wealthiest of the Sophists because he had no wife or children and was therefore free of "this most unremitting and expensive of liturgies."[143] It was a relief when children became self-supporting, "pleasant to have a son who lives on his own means" (Anaxandrides fr. 25K.-A.). We cannot do much more than guess how considerable these expenses really were. Theophrastus's Grumbler, when told he has had a son, retorts, "If you add that I've lost half my property, you'd be speaking the truth" (*Char.* 17.7). Diogeiton, trying to exculpate himself from the charge of embezzling his grandchildren's inheritance, apparently claimed to have spent five obols a day on food for two boys and a girl and seven silver talents and 7,000 drachmas all told over eight years (Lys. 32.20); his prosecutor allows him costs of 1,000 drachmas a year for the children, a *paidagōgos,* and a slave woman, but says this is more than anyone else in the city has ever spent (28–29). A generation later, Demosthenes says that Therippides remitted 700 drachmas a year from the profits of the slave workshop he held in trust as support (*trophēn:* Dem. 27.36). This is too small a sum to provide for thirty-two or thirty-three slaves, and so it must have been meant for Demosthenes and his little sister. These are certainly ample sums in some circles—more than 300 drachmas a year for each child, say, twice what it would cost to feed a family of four[144]—though it is less easy to calculate the drain they involve for Athenian propertied families. One indication: Mantitheus's mother died when he was still young, and the interest on her dowry was sufficient to rear and educate him ([Dem.] 40.50). More sig-

nificant than any objective reckoning, anyway, is the acceptance of the idea that children were a financial burden by jurors and other fathers or potential fathers.

In his autobiographical seventh letter, Plato offers insight into a son's point of view (*Ep.* 7.324B). "When I was a young man (*neos*)," he recalls, "I had the same experience many do. I thought that if I were to take control of my property soon, I would straightway play a part in community affairs." A number of issues, logically and legally distinct though they are, are intertwined here. *Neos* is a vague word, but it is normally appropriate for a man up to the age of thirty or so; this is how Plato uses it himself.[145] Thirty was the minimum age set for a number of important offices in the Athenian democracy (such as serving on the Council of 500 and on juries), some administrative functions in public festivals, and positions of responsibility in the phratry of the Demotionidae.[146] As mentioned above, thirty or so was also probably the most common age of first marriage for Athenian males in the time Plato describes, the end of the fifth century or the beginning of the fourth. Nothing would be more natural, then, than to regard leaving the ranks of the *neoi* at thirty as an important step. But Plato has in mind more than simply reaching a chronological milestone; his political ambitions seem to have depended, to some degree at least, on coming into his inheritance, perhaps as much because this economic indicator of maturity and responsibility would validate his involvement in decisions affecting others' welfare as because the money was needed to win influence.[147]

The more adventurous would look for ways to make money on their own, especially warfare, its economic importance never to be underestimated. A *neos* like Plato might be content simply to wait until his father died to get his inheritance. But it was also possible for a father to divide up his property while he was still alive, with one son agreeing to take him (and his wife) into his own household, often now to be based in the original family home.[148] A prudent father who took this route might decide to distribute only some of his property, not all. Outlining the dispositions Conon and Nicophemus made of their goods, one of Lysias's clients reflects that even if a man gave his sons what he himself had inherited from his father (and had not acquired by his own efforts), he would save a sizable portion for himself; "everyone wishes to have money and be courted by his children rather than to be without and beg from them" (Lys. 19.36–37). There was certainly no definite age at which such a full or partial handover of property had to take place. Here too, however, thirty or so seems a likely modal age for the recipient; the father of a man of thirty would probably be at least sixty, the age at which he would retire from the last of Athens's formal civic duties, service as an arbitrator (Arist. *AthPol* 53.4).[149] We seem to be dealing with a complex of social expectations, perceived biological restraints—the

philosophers and their friends at least were convinced that marrying and having children at ages that were too young or too old had serious consequences for the health of parent and child and the well-being of the family[150]—and political regulations: a man becomes fit for a wide but interconnected range of social and political rights and responsibilities in his late twenties or early thirties. Ever since he was nineteen or twenty, the age of leaving the ephebate or some less formal equivalent, the *neos* has been on all fours legally with his father. When he takes on the additional roles of progenitor of children, participant in the deliberative bodies of the democracy, and manager of the household's property, he can be said to supplant him.[151]

Of course, this is very abstract and only loosely accurate even as a model. "Retired" citizens often served as jurors. Sons married at many different ages, much younger than thirty in a few cases known to us from the orators.[152] Perhaps some lived with their parents, as an imitator of Demosthenes envisages.[153] Others might still depend on their fathers for support, especially among the elite; though the story that Pericles's sons and their wives resented his tight hold on a drachma is found in no source more reliable than Plutarch (*Per.* 16.4). In any event, since property at Athens seems invariably to have been shared out to all sons at the same time, and not, for example, to each as he married, the age proposed in my sketch could be accurate for only one son in each family at best. And of course we know too little of the day-to-day details of Athenian life to flesh out this speculation with any confidence. Where, to take up only one point, did adult sons with surviving fathers live between the ephebate and marriage? The poorer *neoi,* those without property or expectations, are the most likely to have left home early; their ties with their parents probably remained weakest. The sons of smallholders and craftsmen probably stayed at home, working in the family's fields or taking a hand in its workshop or hiring out as skilled or unskilled labor, a continuation of their lives since leaving school early in their teens. Among their better-off fellows, some must have done the same, like Pheidippides and Bdelycleon in comedy. Others moved out, as perhaps Callicles and Philostratus did.[154] What might have been the consequences of pursuing these different paths? Sharing a roof would likely exacerbate tensions at the same time that contributing to the household economy diminished them.

Much must be left to the imagination. But if the picture I've outlined gives roughly the correct impression, we may at least presume that tension between father and son over inheritance was accentuated by the links with a son's prospects in other areas, and we can guess that it was greatest in the well-to-do social circles where fathers had something to leave and sons had political ambitions. Naturally, we would expect these tensions to be reduced when a father gave

up financial control of his household's property sooner rather than later. If a father was unwilling, his sons' resentment would increase to the extent that this recalcitrance posed a barrier to marriage or political activity, and all the more if the father's own powers were thought to be failing. (This was a danger Aristotle identified, though he set the optimum age for transfer of property and the time at which a man begins to lose vigor at about seventy, consistent with the later age of marriage he recommended.)[155] In extreme cases a son (or someone acting on his behalf) could seek to protect his interests through a *graphē paranoias,* a lawsuit asserting that the father was no longer competent to manage his affairs.[156] There is a story (alas, unlikely) that his son or sons brought such an action against the playwright Sophocles, who defended himself successfully by reading passages of his last tragedy, *Oedipus at Colonus.*[157] It is possible (one can hardly say more) that some cases were brought on by the conflict between traditional relationships of authority and respect imposed on children within the family and the impetus to play a more active role in the political life of the *polis.* But an impatient son would have to calculate whether success in such a lawsuit would outweigh the stigma he would likely incur in bringing it.[158] This must go some way toward explaining why examples are so rare—Sophocles's is the only one we hear of. Fathers, too, had a legal recourse, disowning an adult son (*apokēryxis*), but again little is known of this.[159]

The passage from Lysias quoted above (19.36–37) indicates that Athenian fathers were well aware of the financial risks involved in giving up control of property to their sons. Psychologically, too, such a retirement might give grounds for unease, not necessarily restricted to fathers alone. Sons might also find that the passing of the old order inspired intimations of mortality. To quote Saul Bellow's Wallace Gruner: "What I'm finding out is that when the parents are living, they stand between you and death. They have to go first, so you feel pretty safe. But when they die, you're next, and there's nobody ahead of you in line."[160]

Conflicts of this kind must have been of great importance to those involved, but how significant were they in the community as a whole? One valuable approach is to establish the demographic realities of the situation. In a series of important studies, Richard Saller has de-emphasized the practical effect of the Roman institution of *patria potestas,* demonstrating that at the age of thirty, only 19 percent of Roman men outside the elite would have had a father living, and at thirty-five, only 12 percent.[161] Saller's results are based on a computer simulation for which an age at first marriage of thirty was assumed for this stratum. These figures should therefore be roughly valid for Athens, which most likely was not very different in demographic character; there, too, only one or two of every ten men reaching the age of marriage would still have a father alive. This

would seem to set the upper limit for the number of sons involved in the particular conflict I have been concerned to trace.

Yet even these demographic realities allow some room for interpretation. Much depends on the point of view. While relatively few sons would still have a father when they reached the age of marriage, more fathers—still a minority, but quite a substantial one—would live to see at least one son married. Using the same life-table that underlies Saller's calculations, we may conclude that about one-third (33%) of men reaching thirty could expect to survive until sixty, and more than one-fifth (22%) until sixty-five.[162] The number of families affected would be fewer, since some would have no sons at all, others no sons who reached maturity. But adoption, a customary recourse, would supply sons in many instances. Two additional thoughts: First, since property was divided among all sons at the same time, that division (and concern about it) would affect not only the oldest son (the one most likely to reach the age of marriage while the father was alive) but younger ones as well. Second, and more important, despite elaborate methodologies, the future was no easier for the Athenians to predict than it is for us. Many fathers, many sons, died younger than they anticipated. Their expectation of what life had in store would have included the possibility of tensions over property as both parties aged; examples of disputes were surely known to them in so small a community. Even this potential for disagreement would presumably have colored the relationship between father and son, though it is hard to know just how.

Once again, subjective impressions are a necessary supplement to the quantitative approach. The early hand-over of property and its consequences are among the themes of Aristophanes's *Wasps,* staged in 422.[163] The two main characters in this comedy are Philocleon ("Cleon-lover"), an old man who has given up control of his property, and his son Bdelycleon ("Cleon-hater"), with whom he lives. This father and son are dissimilar not only in their opinions of Cleon, the most famous Athenian proponent of a vigorous prosecution of the Peloponnesian War, but also in their natures. Bdelycleon is a sober, even straight-laced, young man; his father is a rascal, a self-described thief and coward (easier to like than to admire) who spends his time serving as a juror in the Athenian courts. He prides himself on the godlike powers the position gives him (619–627) and on the way he is free to abuse it, by doing harm (320–324, 340), awarding *epiklēroi* to whomever he likes (583–586), and convicting every defendant who comes before him (158–160).

As the play begins, Philocleon is under virtual house arrest at his son's orders, and the early action is taken up with his attempts to escape so that he can present himself for jury duty; he is aided by a chorus of old men, his fellow jurors

and the wasps of the play's title. Unsuccessful, he accedes to his son's suggestion to satisfy his need to sit in judgment by hearing an unusual form of domestic dispute, the case of a dog that has stolen some cheese (a thinly disguised reference to recent events in Sicily). Overcome by pity and fooled by Bdelycleon, he votes for the first time in his career for acquittal. "I'm finished!" he exclaims (997). Indeed the rest of the play, episodic after the *parabasis* (the chorus leader's address to the audience) like many of Aristophanes's comedies, features a rather different Philocleon, a new man. His rebirth is symbolized by a change of costume. After swearing that he will never give up his trusty old cloak while he is alive (1122–1124), Philocleon does in the end don the new Persian garment proffered by his son (1133–1153). He is still unquestionably an old man, as the text often reminds us.[164] But he has given up the severity of the elderly juror in favor of the sprightliness (and silliness) of youth and has exchanged the pleasures of passing judgment for the role of student, being instructed in the ways of polite society by his son. Not very effectively, though; acting out of turn at a posh party, he incurs the wrath of a fellow guest, who threatens him with a lawsuit. "You'll pay for this, and you would even if you were a young man."[165] Philocleon, no longer so enamored of the law, is content to act as young as he feels. "You're out of date!" is his response.[166]

The reversal of roles becomes still more explicit when Philocleon turns to chatting up a slave girl:[167] "If you're a good girl now, I'll have you freed and keep you as my mistress, piglet—when my son dies. But now I'm not yet in control of my property, for I'm young (*neos*) and under a close guard. My kid watches me, and he's a bad-tempered skinflint.[168] He has no father except me, so he's afraid I'll be corrupted. There he is. . . . Take this torch, and I'll make a fool of him like a young man, just as he did to me once before [my initiation in] the Eleusinian Mysteries."[169] A little later, Philocleon is threatened with a charge characteristically brought against a young man, *hybris;*[170] and in the finale he displays his new youth again by dancing the comedy off stage.

We should not be too hasty in generalizing from this or any other set of personages in Aristophanes. There is no reason to think that the other elderly jurors, Philocleon's allies, also have given up control of their properties; their sons are apparently younger than his, and their keen awareness of the cost of oil confirms that they still pay for such things themselves (251–253, cf. 293–313). Nor is Philocleon's behavior to be attributed to his present position alone; accounts of earlier escapades indicate that he was never a solid citizen (354–357, 1200–1201). Nevertheless, the contrast between his attitudes and his son's is unmistakable, as is the link between control of property and responsibility (or irresponsibility) in other areas.

Wasps thus provides a dramatic illustration of the way household relations

established early in life could change as children took on more of the roles and attributes of citizens. Of course, the case of fathers and sons was particularly apt to be treated in terms of reversals, precisely because the shifts in their relative legal, economic, and political power were in fact the greatest. Tensions and transformations in other household relationships were less extreme, but, as we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, still significant.

Five

Brothers, Sisters, and Grandparents

Brothers

Close and cordial relations between brothers was a widely recognized ideal at Athens. A fragment of Menander even speaks of a "passion (*erōs*) for concord" among brothers (Men. fr. 833K.-A.). We may suspect that this was fostered in childhood. Certainly numerous *choes* portray boys playing together or otherwise sharing a scene, and though we cannot be sure that these represent brothers, it seems likely enough, especially in the depictions of children of different ages.[1] Nor can we tell whether the activities depicted on these *choes* were meant to reflect everyday life, the festival of the Anthesteria itself, or some ideal, but in any case the notion that brothers belong together is obvious. Ties with brothers also find more public and more formalized expression on tombstones and in dedications.[2] But the best evidence comes from speeches before Athenian courts, in which affective ties often carry as much weight as legal arguments.[3] Indeed, they may involve misrepresentation of the law, as a recently discovered fragment of Hyperides's speech *Against Timandrus* does in stating that Athenian law required that orphaned siblings be brought up together.[4] Though apparently untrue, the claim clearly chimed with its audience's ideals.

A speaker makes a point of saying that he and his half brother by the same mother were brought up together from childhood, were very affectionate, never quarreled;[5] it was a kind of character reference (Isae. 9.30).[6] Another claims a man wouldn't conceal a mother's misconduct from his brother (Dem. 36.20).

It was expected that brothers support each other in court, as Callicrates, for example, does in bringing suit on behalf of his brother Callicles.[7] This assistance might extend to more dubious maneuvering to avoid penalty and to interpersonal policy by other means, illegal acts such as breaking and entering and theft.[8] So strong was this expectation that a speaker could dismiss a brother's testimony as unreliable or, conversely, argue that an incriminating statement by one brother against another must be true; one could also say that an opponent's guilt was so manifest that even his own brothers and sons would convict him.[9] When brothers on the other side are at odds, it is presented as *prima facie* evidence of guilt or at least moral depravity. Aristogeiton has so little to recommend him that his own brother, a twin at that, once brought a charge against him; Theocrines is so heartless that he took a bribe rather than prosecute his brother's murderer.[10] To take sides against your own brother, therefore, requires apology—even if he is only a half brother (Antiph. 1.1, 5). Nor would one want to be blamed for setting brothers against each other (Isae. 2.29). Even a brother's neutrality demands explanation: Apollodorus astonishingly alleges that his brother Pasicles has failed to join him in prosecuting Phormion because he is in fact not his father's son and should be called "adversary," not "brother" (Dem. 45.83–84). That Apollodorus should publicly insult his mother in this way is an indication of the persuasive force of the idea that brothers should stick together and of the danger it poses to his case.[11] Yet the very fact that Aristogeiton, Theocrines, and Apollodorus at one time or another fail or are failed by their brothers testifies to the fragility of this ideal.

This is nicely illustrated by Xenophon's Cyrus, who, in his deathbed advice to his sons, praises the power of the bond between brothers at some length, stressing the effects of growing up in the same household (*Cyr.* 8.7.14–19). He then rather spoils the effect by remarking that brothers are friends as a rule—but sometimes they aren't (8.7.24, cf. *Hiero* 3.7). Mythology supplies further indication of the range of fraternal relations, including memorable types of concord and discord both. The Spartan princes Castor and Polydeuces were so close that Polydeuces killed a man who slandered his brother (Plut. *Mor.* 483C). In a fight against Idas and Lynceus, Castor was killed and Polydeuces wounded. Rescued by Zeus, Polydeuces refused to accept immortality, and the two brothers were allowed to alternate every day among gods and mortals.[12] Their fraternal solidarity is stressed by comparison with their sisters, Helen (herself associated with divinity) and Clytemnestra. Both sisters betray their husbands and so lack the loyalty their brothers demonstrate. They are forces of disunity within the new family they've established by marriage, just as Castor and Polydeuces are examples of how the original family of birth can be maintained. A second story,

Brothers on a *chous*. Athens, National Archaeological Museum 14509. Photograph by Demetrios Gialouris.

featuring rival brothers, also is set outside Athens, but it was presented on stage by each of the city's three great tragedians. Oedipus's sons Eteocles and Polyneices fall out over their inheritance and each dies by the other's hand.

This pattern, in which ideals of solidarity and cooperation are frequently tested by fraternal rivalry, is perhaps characteristic of the Mediterranean culture area. Peristiany suggests that both the affection between brothers and the ill-feeling that results when the ideal is transgressed are particularly strong in this region.[13] He quotes a proverbial question, "Who but your brother would have gouged out your eye?" Aristotle cites a tragic tag with similar implications,

"Difficult are the wars of brothers," and elsewhere notes that some oligarchies, concerned about such family feuds, forbid brothers (and other family members) to hold office together.[14]

A convenient compendium of sources of conflict is given in Plutarch's essay *On Brotherly Love* (*Mor.* 478A–492D). Though written in or just before the second century of our era, this work draws on examples from the whole range of Greek history down to Plutarch's own day. Enmity between brothers, according to Plutarch, may arise from rivalry for parents' affection, differences in ability or achievement, competition for honors or office, the instigation of wives and other intimates, the roles of younger and older, or childhood squabbles. (These are presented in an interesting progression: over care of animals, over quails or cocks, over contests in the palaestra, in the hunt or in horse races, and then over "more important matters.") Some of these factors were perceived to be at play by writers of the classical period as well. Even within the same household, Plato notes, some sons of the same mother and father may be unjust, others just (*Leg.* 1.627C). As for roles related to birth order, older brothers were expected to look out for their younger siblings, an obligation on which Eurydice relied when she entrusted her small sons (one Philip, the future king of Macedon) to the Athenian general Iphicrates and reminded him that he was their adopted brother (Aeschin. 2.28).[15] But insisting on the prerogatives of age, like challenging its authority, could give grounds for conflict. Sophocles's Polyneices regards it as shameful to give in to a younger brother (*OC* 1422–1423). In Menander's *Aspis,* Smicrines insists on the priority owed to his age (172, 255). When he addresses his younger brother as *pai,* "my boy," Chaerecrates throws the word in his face, referring to his slave girlfriend as *paida* to stress her youth and unsuitability (257–258).[16] This issue was interesting enough to figure in one of Xenophon's Socratic anecdotes. Socrates, stressing the importance of brothers, scandalizes an associate by recommending that he take the initiative in improving relations with his older brother (*Mem.* 2.3.15–16). But there is one other important root of dissension—Plutarch says most commentators make it their starting point—the division of the inheritance.[17] Socrates (in Xenophon's story) firmly asserts that a brother is more valuable than property—but he admits that there are those who think otherwise (*Mem.* 2.3.1).

Inheritance at Athens was partible. Though the firstborn son had certain privileges—*presbeia*—involving such things as claims to a family name or first choice in the division of property, in principle all sons shared equally in the estate. (Of course, this could not guarantee that all would remain equally prosperous.)[18] A small plot of land, therefore, might not only be inadequate to support more than the smallest family, but its subdivision into two or more parts might impoverish all heirs.

That this was perceived to be a problem, and that solutions were not straightforward, is evident from a passage in the *Works and Days* of Hesiod, a poet living in Boeotia, just north of Attica, in the archaic period. Hesiod presents himself as a relatively poor farmer, offering advice to others like him. "There should be one son to feed his father's household," he says. "In this way wealth will increase in the house." But, he continues, "May you die old, leaving a second son. Zeus may easily provide limitless wealth for more" (376–379). It is hard not to feel that Hesiod is expressing a somewhat confused attitude toward what we would now call a family-planning strategy.[19] The depth of his concerns, though not necessarily their precise content, comes through more clearly in his less explicitly didactic poem *The Theogony.* Here we learn of Cronus and Zeus, both youngest sons, both put out to die, who survive to overthrow their fathers (37–182, 453–506); of Ceto's youngest, a terrible snake (333–335); of Gaea's, Typhoeus, who has (among other horrors) one hundred snake heads (820–835). With these frightening figures we may contrast Nereus, eldest son of Pontus, who was gentle, kind, and just (233–236). The extra son represents a risk; his birth may have extraordinary impact, for good or for ill.[20]

Such traditional tales appear to reflect the concerns of parents. What of the brothers themselves? It is common for anthropologists and social historians to associate partible inheritance and fraternal discord.[21] Ancient examples abound. Hesiod himself was at odds with his brother over an inheritance, Histiaea suffered a civil war because of a brothers' quarrel about land (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1303b33), and Athenian disputes, sometimes very bitter ones, are mentioned in the law-court speeches. It is alleged, for example, that Thudippus assaulted his brother Euthycrates over the division of an estate; Euthycrates died a few days later (Isae. 9.17). Pantaleon is said to have deprived his brother of his patrimony (Lys. 10.5). But it is also important to recognize that the members of societies in which partible inheritance is practiced may take steps to minimize such strains. It has been suggested that enmity among brothers is likely to be greater when shares are given out at their marriages, largely because changes in the family's wealth or in the number of heirs over time may result in inequality. In this case, a father may mediate, watching over his sons to see that they do nothing foolish, as Democritus suggests, perhaps thinking of customs in his native Abdera (68 B 279D.-K.). Conversely, harmony among brothers is fostered by postponing division of the estate until the father dies—but this in turn increases bad feelings across the generations.[22] In other words, the consequences of partible inheritance are not inevitable, but resolution of conflicts among one group may exacerbate other conflicts.

Athenian brothers often went to some lengths to avoid conflict over division of property, one dividing the property and the other choosing his por-

tion ([Dem.] 48.12), one agreeing to take a smaller share (as a speaker prides himself on doing: Lys. 16.10).[23] Still more striking is the reluctance of some brothers to dissolve the original household.[24] Some land might be left undivided; capital might be apportioned, but the land held in common; properties might not be divided at all.[25] It is not easy to estimate how common this was; Aristotle seems to regard it as old-fashioned.[26] In the first of the cases just mentioned, we are explicitly told that the property remained undivided because one brother wished to remain unmarried; in the second it is probable that one of the three brothers involved died before he could marry and that another, who was blind, never wed. This need not mean, however, that properties remained undivided only when brothers did not marry. In [Demosthenes] 44, Meidylides offers his daughter to his brother, and it is possible that the estate would have remained intact if his brother had agreed to marry her. Furthermore, there may have been an economic inducement to leave estates undivided. In his speech *On the Symmories,* Demosthenes lists those holding property in common among the citizens exempted from paying for the costs of a warship (14.16). The lexicographer Harpocration's comment on this passage indicates that the excluded property might previously have been liable for liturgies (s. *koinōnikōn*). Whether joint ownership brought freedom only from the trierarchy or from liturgies in general (the strict construction of Harpocration's note) is not known. It would be surprising, however, if the burden shifted to other property owners in this way was not resented, and the problem of supplying warships (or funds for other public expenditures) for the community was not made more severe. Thus, just as the division of the inheritance to establish separate households might involve strains on fraternal solidarity, so, too, maintenance of an undivided estate might lead to tension with the community as a whole, or with some part of it. Thus Eucrates's son makes a point of telling jurors that he and his brothers have each performed liturgies for the *polis,* which therefore benefits as much as possible from their property (Lys. 18.21, cf. Isae. 7.5).

Brothers and Sisters

The relationship of brothers and sisters is of course a special case of that between men and women in general. At Athens, very special indeed. Relations between adult men and women were generally characterized by difference and distance. Government and politics, the law courts, and large-scale trade were reserved for men; women did not vote or hold office, represent themselves in court, control significant amounts of property, or even (among the elite at least) do the shopping. Furthermore, husbands and wives were so separated by age—men marrying at about thirty, women in their mid or late teens—that they might

almost be said to belong to distinct generations. But Athenian childhood presents a contrast, a time when boys and girls of the same family, more or less of an age, were often together, especially within the home and its environs. More surprising, perhaps, the close links established between brothers and sisters in childhood were often maintained in later life and were protected by Athenian patterns in the devolution of property. These bonds must be part of any complete picture of the relations between men and women at Athens.[27]

Most of the interaction between brothers and sisters took place within the household. Our sources (exclusively male) betray a strong preference for women to stay at home.[28] This was especially so for young women. "A woman who travels outside the house must be of such an age that onlookers might ask, not whose wife she is, but whose mother": Athenian etiquette according to a lost speech of Hyperides (fr. 205 Jensen). For an unmarried girl to go out in public was perhaps particularly unseemly. The speaker of Lysias 3 accuses Simon of breaking into his house and alarming his sister and nieces, who had lived such a respectable life that they would be ashamed to be seen even by their relatives.[29] It does not sound as if an Athenian jury would have found it incredible for girls to be so sheltered. Nor would an Athenian audience: Oedipus rebukes his sons for staying home like girls while his girls work to support him; Helen refuses to send Hermione to Clytemnestra's tomb because "it is not nice for girls to creep through the crowd."[30] We may count on some exaggeration here: Lysias's client is motivated by the desire to contrast his own control over his domestic environment with Simon's unbridled recklessness. In other circumstances, the speaker of Isaeus 6 claims that Euctemon's daughters—their ages are not given—are well known (presumably by sight) to most of his fellow demesmen (Isae. 6.10). Poorer women—the great majority—needed to go out to work or do errands for their family.[31] Even among the elite, the seclusion of women may have been an ideal, an expression (among men at any rate) of a clear demarcation of community space that was meant to mirror the male monopoly on political power.[32] However, it is not without significance on that account.

Women's exclusion from public places, notional or not, did not have negative connotations only. Their domestic domain provided the opportunity to make significant contributions to the household's well-being, child care among them. This was generally regarded as women's work. We may take Xenophon's Ischomachus as a spokesman for a widely held opinion: "Knowing he had created the woman and had imposed on her the nourishment of infants, the god gave to her a larger portion of affection for newborns than to the man" (*Oec.* 7.24).[33] Women must have loved children, runs the argument, they've made so many of them; and they look after them too. In contrast, says Aristotle, "No male creatures take trouble over their young" (*Gen. An.* 3.759b7). There is a similar,

A boy and a woman in a domestic scene. Dallas, Museum of Art 1968.28. A gift of the Junior League of Dallas.

more-or-less unconscious, and thus revealing assumption in Plato's *Laws.* The Athenian stranger—who regards child rearing as one of women's three functions, along with domestic service and household management (7.806A)—speaks of children as under the care of *paidagōgoi* and teachers after they have left their nurses and mothers (7.808E). The implication is that children, including boys, are in the hands of women until they are old enough to require more serious attention. Much of the child care assumed here would surely take place in the home.

Vases and grave reliefs occasionally show boys and women together in domestic contexts. A red-figure cup by the Sabouroff Painter bears several such scenes.[34] A red-figure pyxis, perhaps by the Aberdeen Painter, shows a large

wool-basket, in a setting where women play with birds and carry a dish and jewel boxes; a naked boy stands nearby and reaches toward one of the women.[35] A grave relief from the fourth century depicts a woman working wool while a girl stands at the right with a cat and a young boy plays with a dog at her feet.[36] It is of course quite impossible to establish how long boys shared women's space in this way; no doubt there was a good deal of variation within the community, and not just along the lines of the divisions between richer and poorer. One intriguing piece of evidence suggests that in some cases boys might be quite grown up. Plutarch's account of the liberation of Thebes from Spartan domination in 379 includes a pretty story about Charon and his son. Summoned to a feast by the *tyrannos* Archias, Charon brought his son from the *gynaikōnitis* and entrusted him to Pelopidas (*Pel.* 9.5). Elsewhere in Plutarch we learn that the boy was about fifteen (*Mor.* 595B). Though the story has no direct reference to Athens, it does give some idea of what later Greeks thought was possible in a classical city-state.[37] Most significant for my purpose here are scenes in which both boys and girls are present. An example is another red-figure pyxis, by the Leningrad Painter, on which one woman spins, others too are busy with wool-working, a baby boy sits on the ground, and another is carried piggyback by a girl.[38] A few *choes* also feature boys and girls together; these may be brothers and sisters or other close relatives, but we cannot be sure. At any rate, these vase paintings do show that boys and girls could be closely linked when they were still young. A girl shakes a rattle for a baby boy; two boys and a girl lean with both hands on a tortoise, which crawls toward a boy holding out a branch; a girl stoops to a little boy; a girl and a boy hold a hoop for a dog to jump through; a girl shows a chous to a baby boy (who is larger than she is).[39]

Grave reliefs also show the association of male and female children.[40] Here we may be more certain that brothers and sisters are shown. A memorial for Chaerestrate and Lysandrus shows a girl giving a bird to a standing boy.[41] On another stele from the later fifth century, a boy and a girl face each other and clasp hands; a small child sits between them and puts his hands on the boy's knees.[42] The bearded Euempolus displays a bird to a boy and a girl—probably his children.[43] Demonice's fourth-century gravestone shows a girl with a bird and a ball, and a boy behind her.[44] On the stele of Nicandrus, a young boy holds a bird in his left hand and gives his right to a girl, a little smaller, who stands in front of him.[45]

Two gravestones deserve special mention. One, which predates the classical period, is the grave stele parents erected for a son around 540–535.[46] It shows a naked youth standing with a smaller female figure. The inscription on the stele is too mutilated to be helpful, but it seems likely (given the examples mentioned above and others) that the pair are brother and sister (*IG* 1^3 1241).[47] The youth

A girl shakes a rattle for a baby boy. Athens, National Archaeological Museum 1268. Photograph by Athanasios Miliarakis.

has an aryballos, a small oil flask associated with sport, hanging from his left wrist. It is not likely that young athletes were in the habit of parading about naked with their little sisters. The representation, then, is not naturalistic, and the great disparity in the height of the two figures may well indicate their relative importance rather than a great difference in age. It is interesting, therefore, that the youth's left arm is held over his sister's head. His arm is bent and his hand holds a ball; it is possible that the pose is merely the sculptor's solution to a problem of composition. But the effect of the position of the arm is to portray the youth as his sister's protector.[48] A reciprocal ideal is expressed in the second gravestone, the memorial for Mnesagora and Nicochares, who died one after the other, perhaps in an epidemic, about one hundred years later.[49] Here a chubby little boy reaches out for a bird in the left hand of a young woman. She looks old enough to be his mother, but the inscription assures us that the pair are brother and sister. The stone may have been bought off the shelf, ready-made rather than commissioned, and so may in fact have been intended to commemorate a mother. But Mnesagora's and Nicochares's "dear father and mother they left in great sorrow" must have thought that maternal concern was suitable for an older sister too.

Grave stele of a youth and his little sister. New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 11.185 (Hewitt Fund 1911, Rogers Fund 1921, Munsey Fund 1936 and 1938, Anonymous Gift 1951). © The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Photograph: Art Resource, NY.

Many of the scenes I have referred to seem to show boys and girls at play, but the real explanation may not be so simple. Research on a large number of modern cultures has brought out the important role traditionally played by siblings in child care. According to the broadest survey, of 186 societies, "non-parental care-taking is either the norm or a significant form of caretaking in most."[50] In more than 50 percent of the societies sampled, the mother's role is supplemented to a significant extent by others; in about one-quarter, it is older children (mostly siblings) who look after infants, and their role becomes still more important as their brothers and sisters grow. For example, girls in two villages in Java and Nepal have been found to spend an average of 1.7 hours a day doing child care from as early an age as six, more than any other group except for women of ages thirty to thirty-nine.[51] Most of this child care is decidedly informal, and it is supervised (at a distance) by one or more adults; it may well take the form of play. But it is play that has a purpose, to distribute some of the burden of child-minding and so to give adults freedom to pursue other tasks. Naturally, much of it is set where these tasks are performed.

The wide distribution of sibling care of this kind raises the presumption that it was important at Athens too, with slaves often acting in the supervisory role. We can say no more than that this presumption is consistent with the iconographic evidence cited here. Our texts are mostly mute. One exception: Sophocles's Electra says she raised her brother Orestes herself. "You were never more dear to your mother than you were to me," she cries when she learns of his death, "nor did the household raise you: I was your nurse" (*El.* 1143–1148, cf. 603–604). Of course, this outburst, Electra's claim to have been the mother Clytemnestra was not, can tell us nothing about the child-care strategies of Sophocles's audience. But the warm emotions Electra recalls for her baby brother are not so irrelevant.[52]

The close relations established in childhood continued when Athenian brothers and sisters grew up. Aristodemus and Philophron set up a statue in honor of their sister Charippe, a priestess of Demeter; the base bears the signature of no less an artist than Praxiteles (*SEG* 51.215). To return to gravestones, Archedice, daughter of the exiled tyrant Hippias, was honored by a famous epigram commissioned by her brothers (Thuc. 6.59.3).[53] Gnathon died despite the care of his sister, who nursed him when he was sick and set up his memorial when he died (*IG* 1^3 1210). Mnesarete's death left grief to her husband, mother, and brothers, a good reputation to her child; Archestrate's brought grief to her mother, brother, husband, and son.[54] But the brother of Callisto and Phile—they may have erected the monument—left them honor.[55] Again, the impression of consideration and concern is confirmed and supplemented by other sources. The expectation that brothers would assist sisters is exploited by Euripides for pur-

poses of pathos. Iphigenia, begging her father, Agamemnon, for her life, asks the baby Orestes to join her in her plea by crying along with her (*IA* 1241–1248). Though small, she says, he is a help to those dear to him. The appeal underlines the desperate position Iphigenia is in. Neither of those she would otherwise have counted on can help her here: her father is an enemy, her brother still a nestling (*neossos*), a word used elsewhere in Euripides for children in peril.[56]

Brothers were not always so powerless. Sibling relationships are a feature of Aeschylus's *Oresteia;* indeed, "there is hardly a character in the trilogy without a brother or sister who will also have a role to play."[57] The brothers Menelaus and Agamemnon and the sisters Clytemnestra and Helen figure (though not on stage) in the opening play, the sister Erinyes in the trilogy's conclusion. *Choephori* presents a brother and sister, Electra and Orestes, united in the goal of revenging their father. The siblings are like enough in looks that a lock of hair and a footprint alert Electra to her long-absent brother's return; one seemingly can substitute for the other. (We see only Electra until Orestes's first appearance at line 212 and only Orestes after he sends her into the palace at line 579.) A real-life Athenian brother set on vengeance, the tyrannicide Harmodius was partly motivated by an insult to his sister (Thuc. 6.54–56). Hipparchus, angered by the youth's rejection of a sexual advance, invited his sister to be a *kanēphoros* in a procession and then turned her away. The implication was that she was unworthy because of some sexual misconduct, a slur against her and her whole family that her brother was determined to avenge.[58] This attitude was not characteristic of the archaic period alone. "It is alleged that I followed Charippus's wife at their wedding procession and urged her to leave him," reports the speaker of Hyperides's speech *In Defense of Lycophron* (3–8). "Ridiculous! Her brother was there too. Would anyone listen to such remarks about his sister and not kill the speaker?"[59] Brothers provided assistance in more mundane material respects as well, serving as their sisters' *kyrioi* in the absence of a father, finding a husband for them, or taking them in when their marriages ended in divorce or death. A speaker says that the loss of property in dispute means that he and his family, though poor, will have to look after his widowed sister and her many children (Lys. 19.33). Ensuring that a fatherless sister married well, with an appropriate dowry, was an especially pressing concern, equal in importance, perhaps, to protecting her honor (itself important in guaranteeing a good match); each might be regarded as a test of male competence.[60] Anyone would choose to borrow rather than fail to pay the dowry to a sister's husband, we are told in one speech in the Demosthenic corpus (30.12);[61] it is unlikely that a rich man would defraud a sister of her dowry, we read in another (40.25). In Menander, Cleostratus goes on campaign to Lycia to find booty for his sister's dowry; Gorgias, urged to look after his half sister and keep her safe, is prepared to sell off his

holdings to provide her dowry (until Callippides's kindness makes this unnecessary).[62] As he says, "It isn't possible to escape a relationship (*oikeiotēta*) with a sister" (Men. *Dysc.* 239–240).[63]

As in relations between brothers, the reality did not always match the ideal. But those who failed to meet such standards could expect abuse. It is to Diocles's discredit that he didn't try to find a husband for his sister, though she was of marriageable age; Olympiodorus ought not to let his sister and niece live in poverty.[64] Timocrates shouldn't have "sold his sister into export"—married her to a Corcyraean (Dem. 24.202–203, cf. [Dem.] 25.55). Are these attitudes and activities merely dutiful responses to social pressures? To an extent, of course they are. But a few passages suggest that sisters could count on influence based on an intimate personal relationship. It is said to have been Apollodorus's great regard for his half sister that led him to adopt her son as his heir (Isae. 7.14). Similarly, Plangon could promise Mantias that she would induce her brothers to adopt his son Boeotus ([Dem.] 40.10).[65] Emotion played a part in such relationships in Menander too: a brother in the fragmentary *Phasma* seems concerned that his sister may be depressed at marrying a man who doesn't love her (91–92).

Sisters were more restricted in their activities, but they reciprocated as they could. Elpinice is said to have persuaded Pericles to drop bribery charges against her brother Cimon.[66] The story, like others about Elpinice, is a vehicle for sexual innuendo and therefore suspect; but it might be argued in its defense that it is precisely such able and aggressive women who attract slanders in male-dominant societies. Theotime made a dedication to Athena on the Acropolis that her brother had vowed.[67] Onetor's sister colluded with him to defraud Demosthenes; Diocles's sister pretended she was pregnant in an attempt to further his designs on her husband's estate; the sisters of others visited them in jail.[68] After the battle of Chaeronea, women are said to have crouched in the doorways of Athens, inquiring for the safety of their husbands, fathers, or brothers—"a spectacle degrading to them and to the city" (Lyc. *Leocr.* 40). To show less regard, once again, was unusual, even suspicious. Euphiletus's first clue that his wife was unfaithful came when she powdered her face before her brother had been dead thirty days (Lys. 1.14).[69] Her insouciance could be set against exceptional behavior at the other extreme, a woman who killed herself in grief at her brother's death (Lys. fr. 22 Thalheim). Sisters could help their brothers less directly as well, notably in the involvement of their husbands in the business transactions and lawsuits from which they themselves were normally excluded.[70]

This capacity of sisters to come to their brothers' aid is a fundamental aspect of Sophocles's dramatic treatment of the story of Oedipus. The theme is present in *Oedipus at Colonus,* in which the blind Oedipus refers to Antigone and Ismene, his sole supporters, as his sisters (535) and says that Creon is a bad

brother because he brings up his sister Jocasta's shameful marriage (978–980), and Polyneices appeals to the bond between himself and his sisters (1275, 1405). It is central to *Antigone*. The heroine is equally loyal to both of her dead brothers, to the extent that she disobeys Creon, her uncle and king, and ignores his order to leave the traitor Polyneices unburied, and then she justifies her act in a strange and often-criticized speech valuing her ties with him over any others, including those with a husband or a child (904–920).[71] It is, I think, clear that Sophocles means for his audience to find both Creon, who insists on the rights of the community, and Antigone, who exalts family feeling while rejecting a woman's traditional role within it, extreme in their views. The equivalence of the duties owed to the *polis* and the regard a brother demands, each presented as problematic when pushed too far, serves to stress how important the tie between brother and sister could appear.

There are enough references here to bickering and betrayal to prevent us from taking too rosy a view of this relationship. The dissolution of the household at a sister's marriage raised the question of her loyalty, a question that is a constant undercurrent in Greek myth. Althaea, who killed her son Meleager to avenge her brothers, shared the male mind with Medea, whose marriage to Jason was made possible by the murder of her brother.[72] The solution followed by Zeus, to take his full sister Hera as his wife, was an ideal, producing as it did children who were all female (Eileithyia and Hebe, associated with childbirth and youthful beauty) or all male (Ares, god of war), but it was a solution forbidden to mere mortals.[73] A more practical consideration was involved as well, since as a rule a sister took some of the family's property with her in the form of a dowry when she married: division of the inheritance again. In this case, however, brothers' resentment would tend to be reduced by two factors. First, sisters married young, usually well before their brothers.[74] The dowry they took with them was compensated for materially by the fact that they no longer had to be supported from the household itself from an early age, and socially by their importance in forming links with other households, from which brothers might later benefit. Second, the amount of the dowry was relatively modest, an issue that deserves some attention.

Richard Saller has argued that Roman dowries were neither very large (as dowries often were in early modern Europe) nor merely minimal, a trousseau. They were "not intended to contribute substantially to the production or wealth" of a daughter's new household, but rather served to "maintain the daughter in a style appropriate to her new position."[75] Saller does not commit himself on the size of Athenian dowries, but the introduction to his discussion leaves the impression that they were proportionately larger.

A dowry may be considered large or small in any or all of three ways: in

relation to living costs, as a proportion of the estate from which it is paid, and in respect to the shares of the estate that go to others. According to all these criteria, dowries at Athens were moderate, comparable to those at Rome. We have information on some forty-odd dowries for daughters and other members of the family's junior generation such as sisters, granddaughters, and nieces from Athens or areas under Athenian influence in or just after the classical period.[76] Our sources are varied: speeches written for litigants in lawsuits, *horoi* (boundary stones recording liens on property pledged to guarantee all or part of a dowry), documents from the islands of Mykonos and Tenos, a few passages of New Comedy (all or nearly all from plays by Menander), and scattered references in other literary genres.[77] The sources, different and often difficult though they are, produce quite a consistent picture.[78]

In seven instances, we are told or can calculate both a daughter's or a sister's dowry and the value of the estate from which it is paid.[79] Two of these dowries, involving the estate of Ciron (Isaeus 8) and that of Philostratus ([Demosthenes] 42), do indeed come to a substantial amount, perhaps as much as one-quarter of the whole. But in neither case are calculations or conclusions straightforward. The dowry paid for Ciron's daughter amounted to 2,500 drachmas. Unluckily, the size of the estate itself is indeterminate. The minimum value, as given by the list of its component parts supplied by Isaeus, is 9,600 drachmas; however, it is evidently underestimated—perhaps significantly, depending on just how much money was out on loan. The case of [Demosthenes] 42 is still more complex. Here we may calculate (though without complete confidence) that Phaenippus holds property worth 4½ talents, and probably more, and that his mother's dowry was more than one talent. Since Phaenippus apparently inherited two estates, one from his father and the other from his mother's father, Philostratus, it follows that Philostratus's estate, which supplied his mother's dowry, was less than the total sum of his holdings. How much less it is impossible to say. In none of the other five instances does the dowry amount to as much as 15 percent of the estate, and in three it is well under 10 percent. Similarly, only in the case of the estate of Ciron does a daughter's share seem at all comparable to that left for sons. Among other examples, Diodotus (in Lysias 32) has two sons when he provides for his daughter; he is generous, but the estate is so large that even the relatively large dowry leaves plenty for male members of the family. Philostratus's generosity, on the other hand, may have been prompted by the fact that his daughter was (almost certainly) an only child. One of Isaeus's clients enunciates the general principle: a father should endow his daughter well but see to it that his son is not less wealthy as a result (Isae. 11.39).[80]

The question of the relation of dowries to living costs is more problematic. We can only estimate the expenses of a young woman of the elite. But it is clear

at any rate that our calculations must include more than mere food and lodging; they must allow for suitable clothes, cosmetics, attendants—what we might call "social subsistence"—and perhaps, too, for the upkeep of children. Some indication of the costs involved may be derived from the difference in the dowries left by the elder Demosthenes for his wife (8,000 drachmas) and his five-year-old daughter (12,000 drachmas, Dem. 27.4–5): the extra 4,000 drachmas may have been meant to support the girl for the ten years until her marriage, at something like 400 drachmas a year. Similarly, one of Lysias's clients says it's impossible to spend more than 1,000 drachmas a year on the maintenance and education of two boys and a girl (Lys. 32.28–29). Something like 500 drachmas a year thus sounds sufficient to support a wife. The next question is, what capital would yield 500 drachmas a year? Interest rates also are uncertain. But a husband who was unable or unwilling to return his wife's dowry on divorce had to pay interest on it at 18 percent—clearly a punitive rate (Dem. 27.17, [Dem.] 59.52). At the other extreme, a passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* sets 10 percent as a low rate of interest (Arist. *Rh.* 3.1411a18). A prudent investment must have brought in something between these extremes, perhaps the 12 percent mentioned several times in our sources and generally accepted as the "normal" rate.[81] If we accept that figure, we can calculate that a young wife could be supported on the income from a dowry of about 4,000 drachmas. Fifteen of the dowries we know of from the orators are at or below this level, only seven certainly above. Of the nine dowries from Tenos and Mykonos, only two are more than 4,000 drachmas (though two more may be). As for the *horoi,* of sixteen for daughters' dowries, thirteen record dowries of less than 4,000 drachmas, one records more, and two perhaps more.[82] It is true that some dowries are much higher than this; Alcibiades's wife brought 60,000 drachmas (and another 60,000 when a son was born), and (outside Athens) Alexander is said to have given a friend's daughter 300,000.[83] But most are between 2,000 and 6,000 drachmas: again moderate, and unlikely to be a source of bad feeling.

Sisters

Unfortunately, little can be said about the relations of sisters. But though selective exposure likely assured that sisters were fewer than brothers, it would be wrong to assume that Athenians had only one daughter. Our ignorance, once again, is the consequence of our sources' systematic scanting of women.

Slim pickings: the heroic sisters of tragedy, Electra and Antigone, have in Chrysothemis and Ismene more male-defined foils; in the fragmentary *Tereus,* however, "Sophocles placed a bond of sisterhood at the core of his dramatic plot," and Procne's desire to avenge her sister Philomela takes precedence over

her obligations to male family members.[84] *Appha,* one of a family of pet terms for siblings, fathers, girlfriends, and (by slaves) young mistresses in Greek, was apparently reserved at Athens for use between sisters (Eustath. *Il.* 565.20). A fifth-century inscription may record that two daughters of a citizen of Argos jointly made a dedication on the Acropolis (*IG* 1^3 858). Another inscription, perhaps our single most informative text, is a portion of the epitaph of two sisters (*IG* 2^2 5673). Written in the middle of the fourth century, it says that they enjoyed the same share of their father's wealth and regarded both their love (*philia*) and their property as common possessions.

The same share of the family's wealth: an unexpected commemoration. A student of the modern Mediterranean family observes that sisters rarely squabble over property and adduces a number of explanations; of these, most relevant to Athens are the effects of patrilocal marriage, which may isolate sisters in different (not necessarily distant) parts of the community, and their exclusion as active participants from public competition.[85] Once again, however, we should recognize the role of conscious choice: Athenian fathers and brothers clearly thought it of some importance to dower daughters and sisters equally. "Polyeuctus could have given one daughter a larger dowry than the other one," says his son-in-law. "However, that isn't what he did" (Dem. 41.26). Similarly, when Mantitheus tells the Council of 500 that he gave each of his sisters the same dowry, he hopes to win their good will as a man who does what is proper (Lys. 16.10). Other examples, too, attest to the prevalence of this practice.[86] It was perhaps the sensibilities of the girls' husbands that *kyrioi* had most in mind, but the intention is clear enough in any case: the avoidance of rivalry and bad feeling.[87]

Grandparents and Grandchildren

We can make rough calculations of the chances of having a grandchild in classical Athens by using, once again, the life-table derived by Bruce Frier and estimating an age of marriage of thirty for men and between fifteen and twenty for women.[88] Under these conditions, about 65 percent of the mothers of firstborn daughters and about one-half of their fathers could expect to see at least one grandchild by them. The odds for a firstborn son's parents, who had to wait so much longer for his marriage, were worse. About 40 percent of mothers and about 22 percent of fathers could expect to see a son's child.[89] This disparity goes some way toward accounting for the greater prominence of the mother's father in our sources, though as usual it would be wrong to see demographics as the sole explanation.[90] Even fewer grandparents would survive to establish a reciprocal relationship with their grandchildren. For example, fewer than six in

every ten men who became grandfathers at sixty-five would still be alive when their grandchild reached five years of age. Of course, it was possible for individuals to improve their odds. Mantias urged his son to marry exceptionally early so that he could see his grandchildren, and he did in fact live until his granddaughter's birth ([Dem.] 40.12).[91]

This example underscores the value placed on grandchildren. Solon annoys the Lydian ruler Croesus by identifying as the most fortunate of men Tellus the Athenian, who had fine sons, lived to see children born and survive from each, and then went on to die a glorious death in battle (Hdt. 1.30). Several Attic tombstones of the classical period proclaim that a man or a woman had lived to see grandchildren, *paides paidōn,* a sentiment presumably prompted in part by the relative rarity of the experience, especially for men.[92] According to her moving grave epigram, Ampharete regarded her daughter's boy as the light of the sun while she was alive, and she holds him on her knees now that they both are dead; this scene is depicted on her stele.[93] Another late-fifth-century grave stele shows an old man with a beard leaning on a staff, and a small girl; their hands clasp, their eyes meet—probably grandfather and granddaughter.[94]

The birth of a grandson in particular was as good a guarantee as one could expect of the continuation of the family (and maintenance of the family cult);[95] a daughter's son could make up for her father's lack of male offspring by being adopted into his grandfather's household, even posthumously.[96] It therefore deepens the tragedy of King Priam that Troy's war against the Greeks led not only to his own death and the loss of all his sons (*Il.* 24.255–260, 751–753) but also to the murder of his son Hector's child Astyanax. Most poignant is the version followed by the Attic vase painters, whose depictions of the sack of Priam's city include the horrific vignette of the old man being clubbed to death with his grandson's body.[97] Peleus, another king of legend, loses his only son, Achilles, in the same war and his only grandson, Neoptolemus, shortly after it. Euripides's play on the subject includes a vain attempt by Peleus to save Neoptolemus and then a lament over his torn corpse in which the heartbroken old man, struck down by the same fate that overwhelmed his grandson, pores over "the fingers I loved so! These cheeks! And these lips!"[98] But Peleus has a great-grandson too, the infant son of Neoptolemus and his concubine Andromache; he is more successful in providing him with protection and so in saving his line from extinction (722–726, 746–748). In a typically Euripidean irony, this elite Greek family will survive through an illegitimate son whose mother was once wed to Troy's greatest hero.

In the relations of grandparents and grandchildren, as in those of parents and children, we find sentiment and utility mixed, though not perhaps in the same proportions. Grandparents' maintenance was enjoined by the same laws

that provided for parents.[99] In tragedy, old Cadmus, mourning Pentheus, his daughter's son, remembers how the young king (whom he calls "the dearest of men") protected him from insult (Eur. *Ba.* 1302–1325). "No longer will you touch this chin with your hand, no longer call me your mother's father and embrace me, saying 'Who wrongs you, who dishonors you, old man? Who troubles your heart?' " Now, says Cadmus, he will be driven out from his home without respect—a prediction fulfilled at the end of the play. But few grandparents could expect to benefit in these ways. In most cases, active assistance would flow in the other direction. Isocrates, anxious to please his grandsons, appeals to the rulers of Mytilene on behalf of their teacher of *mousikē* (Isoc. *Ep.* 8.1–2, 10). Many of the heroes of myth were reared outside their parental homes by their mothers' fathers—Athens's Theseus among them;[100] we may include here Cyrus the Great, whose legend in Athenian sources includes a stay with King Astyages in which the boy proves his mettle by his wisdom and moderation (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.3–4).[101] Such attentions were supposed to be appreciated by the recipients. Euripides's Orestes recalls the nurture he received from his mother's parents, Tyndareus and Leda (Eur. *Or.* 462–465): "He raised me when I was small, and often kissed me as he carried me about in his arms, the son of Agamemnon; and Leda too. They valued me no less than their own sons, Castor and Polydeuces."

We cannot miss the emotive coloring here. Similarly, a historical Athenian, the speaker of Isaeus 8, recalls that Ciron, allegedly his mother's father, "naturally" never performed a sacrifice unless he and his brother were there. The boys went with him into the countryside for the Rural Dionysia, sat at his side at public spectacles, and visited his house for festivals, especially that for Zeus Ktesios. The speaker himself claims to have visited Ciron, attended on him (*therapeuein*), and passed time with him (Isae. 8.15–16, 37). These are important passages, valuable evidence on just what a grandfather and his grandsons might do together. But they are not as straightforward as they may seem. The speaker's relationship with Ciron is itself one of the issues in this lawsuit, as is the strength of a grandson's claim in relation to those of other family members. Detail and tone are therefore chosen to convince a jury. So the mention of Zeus Ktesios, the deity who safeguarded a household's goods, is apposite in a court case over an inheritance, the reference to the Rural Dionysia an appeal to the importance of keeping a family's land in the proper hands. Whatever the merits of the speaker's case, however, these details must have sounded plausible; and the picture of affectionate relations he paints must have been expected to evoke similar images among the jurors. Such considerations pose a problem for Lysias, hired by Diogeiton's grandchildren when they prosecute him, their mother's father and their guardian, for defrauding them of much of their inheritance and throwing them out of the house they shared.[102] The speech begins with an elaborate apology for

bringing this family squabble into a public court, and in particular for having to accuse a grandfather of shameful conduct (Lys. 32.1–3).

Was there a distinctive quality to the relations of grandparents and grandchildren? Many years ago, the British social anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown suggested that grandparents and grandchildren made up a common case of a "joking relationship," a mixture of respect and raillery, often reciprocal, marking relations that incorporate both "social conjunction and disjunction."[103] Grandparents and grandchildren are very different in age and experience but are also closely linked by birth and perhaps by a kind of natural alliance against the generation in the middle, which is likely to be in conflict with each. There is little trace of such a pattern of interaction in our sources, in which grandfathers so often replace fathers rather than supplement them. Grandmothers, however, do seem to have had a special reputation for indulging their grandchildren. Socrates says the Spartans make use of Hippias as children do of old women, "to tell stories in a pleasant way" (Pl. *Hipp. Ma.* 285E–286A).[104] Ancient scholars explain the words *tēthalladous,* "granny's boy" (found in Attic comedy) and *mammothreptos,* "reared by a grandmother" (known only from late sources) as referring to spoiled children.[105] Many wives survived their husbands (one estimate suggests there were 20 percent more widows than widowers), and many widows moved in with a child and his or her family; grandmothers may therefore have had a significant impact on the lives of children, though the bias of our informants characteristically slights them in favor of grandfathers.[106] This, like brother-sister ties, is an often overlooked element in the complex relationship of male and female at Athens.

Six

Outsiders and Alliances

Outsiders

I move on to those I have termed outsiders in the household, members who were not part of the family by birth, such as adopted children, stepparents, *xenoi,* and slaves. This principle of organization may seem to slight central issues. Definitions of the family and the household—indeed, their utility as analytical categories—have been subjects of vigorous debate among anthropologists and social historians alike; the latest edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary,* a standard work of reference, goes so far as to direct inquiries on the Greek family to an article on "household, Greek." Scholars have argued that defining the family in terms of kinship necessarily stresses reproduction at the expense of other important areas—production, exchange, power—and that households are often very fluid, losing, gaining, and regaining members seasonally or through the course of the life cycle, with much mobility among them.[1] Furthermore, the realities these terms represent interact in crucial (and unpredictable) ways. The boundaries of the household, the residential location, may vary in permeability with the availability of kin in the immediate neighborhood; and accidents of geographical location may be as important as genealogical propinquity in determining which kin matter from day to day.[2]

Such factors are certainly significant for classical Athens. Households had occasional members, regular visitors, and perhaps apprentices, and they also experienced the seasonal out-migration attested by the rural shelters referred to in leases.[3] Death and remarriage caused frequent changes too, bringing in new parents and children and more distant kin whose households had dissolved; some-

times the same forces would result in the return of those who had left home, daughters whose marriages had ended, for instance.[4] And residence could in some contexts carry no less emotional resonance than kinship; not surprising, perhaps, since *synoikein,* "to live together," is as close as ancient Greek comes to a word meaning "to be married." Mantitheus complains that he was driven out of the house of his fathers, in which he was born and brought up—a cruel wrong ([Dem.] 40.2). Stephanus is attacked for ejecting his own uncle from the ancestral *oikia,* Dicaeogenes for buying up the house his aunts had inherited from their father and demolishing it.[5] Part of the outrage Evergus and his accomplice provoke results from the fact that the home they invaded is one their prosecutor has lived in from his youth ([Dem.] 47.53). Thus kinship and place of residence are often intertwined; so those guilty of political crimes against the *polis* (or its rulers) had their houses razed, a punishment both practical and symbolic.[6]

Such complexities must bring into question the assumption implied by my plan of presentation, that the household's "outsiders" were particularly likely to introduce tensions. Yet our sources are unequivocal. Despite the incidence of adoption, and indeed its vital role in a high-mortality population that put much stress on the continuity of the family line, the loyalty and affection of adopted children were open to doubt, and not only by those who saw such children supplanting them as heirs.[7] "After Menecles adopted me," a litigant says, "he showed the same concern on my behalf as a father would on a son's; and I cared for and respected him as if he were my father by birth" (Isae. 2.18). Not an outcome to be taken for granted; rather, a success worth stressing. The difference between ties stemming from birth and from adoption allows Demosthenes to ring a change on the familiar theme of the Athenians' unique autochthony (*Epit.* 4). Immigrants are adopted children of their countries, while the Athenian dead are legitimate sons of their native land. The implications are made explicit in Lycurgus's prosecution of Leocrates: men do not hold adoptive parents in the same regard as real parents, and they feel less loyalty to countries they have adopted as well (*Leocr.* 48). A provision of Plato's *Laws* is noteworthy (*Leg.* 9.878E). Judges of children who have wounded their parents are to have children of their own—not adopted, but *alēthinoi.* The sense required here, "true, genuine," is unusual when *alēthinos* refers to persons, and the more common meaning in that context, "trusty," must be present as well.[8]

As for stepmothers, they were pervasive, products of the prevalence of remarriage after death and divorce, and faced pervasive prejudice.[9] A proverb terms good and bad days "mothers" and "stepmothers" respectively; according to metaphor, a dangerous place to sail is a "stepmother of ships"; a second wife proves herself "a real stepmother" by plotting against her husband's daughter;

a dying mother in tragedy asks her husband not to bring in a stepmother for their children lest she beat them; and a law that comedy fathers on Charondas levies political liabilities against the man who does.[10] One of Isaeus's clients claims that differences between a stepmother and a daughter are common; Diogeiton's daughter provides an illustration, alleging that her father is generous to his children by his new wife while she and hers go in need.[11] Among stepfathers, conflict between Phormion and his stepson Apollodorus spawned a series of lawsuits.[12]

Quite different problems were posed by the outsiders who were probably most interesting to the children born into the household: the free children who came to it for protection or nurture. Some had been sent away from their own homes in times of crisis, as many Athenians evacuated their wives and children to Aegina, Salamis, and Troezen when the Persians invaded Attica, Mantitheus's father entrusted his children to the court of Satyrus of Pontus in the last years of the Peloponnesian War, and the democratic opposition found refuge abroad for theirs in the war's aftermath.[13] In other cases, their presence does not seem to have been prompted by peril at home; Andocides's cousin and contemporary Charmides, raised in his household from boyhood, is an example (Andoc. 1.48). In a famous study of mythical instances—Orestes, spirited out of Argos and raised at Strophius's house in Phocis; Achilles, entrusted first to the centaur Chiron and then to King Lycomedes on Scyrus—Louis Gernet (1955) stressed the elements of passage rites in such stories. Now Gabriel Herman (1987) has furnished another context. This is the institution of *xenia,* or "ritualized friendship," a bond of solidarity involving an exchange of goods or services between individuals (including boys) from separate social units, governed by a set of customary observances, which lasted for the lives of the friends (*xenoi*) and was often carried on by their descendants.[14] The practice of raising others' children in the household may be regarded as one facet of *xenia.*

The circulation of children has been studied in many other cultures, where it typically (though by no means always) takes the form of the absorption of the children of the poor into wealthier households.[15] Thus, David Herlihy, writing on medieval Florence, estimates that the richest quarter of all households contained more than 40 percent of all children, quite apart from young servants.[16] At Athens, however, we are dealing with movement between households of the same social station, as *xenoi* normally were. There may have been an element of seasoning intended; it is pleasant to think of children as yet another of the raw materials taken into the household and then treated and transformed into something of social value.[17] More obviously, to place one's child in another's household was a striking symbol of trust. Not always justified. In Euripides's play, Hecuba asks if her son Polydorus, sent for safekeeping to King Polymestor

of Thrace, still remembers her—a hint that this practice might not be free from tension (Eur. *Hec.* 992). Worse fears still are to be realized, for she soon learns of his murder. The circulation of children was also a means of encouraging the maintenance of ties of *xenia* in the next generation.

Certainly children raised together in this way, whatever the circumstances of their introduction, did form lasting bonds, attested in myth—where Strophius's son Pylades becomes "dearest of the dear" to Orestes, "like a brother"[18]—historical romance (in which the boyhood friends of Alexander the Great grow up to become his closest counselors), and history. Andocides explains his decision to give evidence on the profanation of the Mysteries in 415 by saying that he was persuaded by the appeal of Charmides. "I have never in all my life hurt you at all and have been most enthusiastic in doing everything possible on your behalf," said his boyhood housemate (Andoc. 1.49–50). As often, we must recognize the force of such an appeal to an Athenian jury, even though we may doubt that it was ever made. Another example may be afforded by Demosthenes's Samian friend Aristion; the orator's boyhood companion (*hetairos*) lived in his house for a long time and served him as an emissary to Macedon.[19] Aeschines implies that the relationship was sexual; probably innuendo, no more, but indicative of the way such personal links, especially with foreign friends, could be used against those involved. To whom would a citizen be loyal—to his *xenos* or his *polis*? Herman has persuasively sketched the impact of such concerns on the behavior of two important *xenoi,* Pericles and King Archidamus of Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War.[20]

It is tempting to speculate on the effects of such constant changes on the psychological and social development of children. Did they tend to diminish the intensity of emotional ties? To increase levels of insecurity? One group is so pervasive in its presence and so important for our understanding of the dynamics of ancient society as a whole that the temptation becomes undesirable (or at least impossible) to resist. Slaves were closely associated with children. The word *pais* is commonly used for both child and slave, and the two groups shared a number of social characteristics, liability to physical abuse in particular.[21] Their identification posed a potential problem when boys reached the age at which they took on the status and roles of citizens; as I remarked in Chapter 3, certain conventions of male homosexuality at Athens therefore marked young males off from the slaves to whom they were previously so closely linked.[22] But little has been written recently on Athenian concerns about this relationship and its effects on individual Athenians, subjects that are no less crucial than they are challenging.[23] I take them up now. The context, once again, is the interplay of continuity and change in children's links with others as they reach maturity and after.[24]

I begin with a few preliminary remarks on the dimensions of the problem. Most who have treated the influence of slaves on children have focused on those most particularly and most intimately involved with them—female nurses, male *paidagōgoi.*[25] This is somewhat misleading. For one thing, it ignores young slaves, children born in the household or brought into it very young (few though these may have been).[26] There is no evidence that the Greeks of the archaic and classical periods valued such slaves as playmates for their own children, as the Romans and later Greeks certainly did.[27] Indeed, conventions guiding the iconography of slaves, who are usually shown smaller than free men and women, make it impossible to be sure whether slaves and their masters and mistresses on vases and grave reliefs are even close in age.[28] But friendship of a sort cannot be ruled out. And judging by a famous grave stele (from Aegina) that depicts a young boy mourning an athletic youth, his master, a slave's affection (however imaginary) was worth advertising.[29] Equally important, such specialized slaves were not found in every household, and some nurses and *paidagōgoi* were not slaves at all.[30] To consider only wet nurses: Even among the relatively well-to-do, many mothers breast-fed their own children. Euphiletus, though he presents himself as merely the owner of a modest *oikidion,* is a friend of Harmodius, a member of the prominent *genos* of the Gephyraei, and can afford the services of the speechwriter Lysias; yet his wife suckles their son herself (though it is Euphiletus she plays for a sucker).[31] Cinesias, who is not portrayed as particularly poor, implies that his son has missed Myrrhine's breasts as much as he has since she joined the other Athenian women on the Acropolis (Ar. *Lys.* 881). Others had the help of family members or hired a fellow citizen; Euxitheus's mother was only one Athenian woman forced by poverty to work as a wet nurse (Dem. 57.35). Still others will have kept a wet nurse only until their child was weaned—say, until the age of two—and then sold her off.[32] This evidence warns us not to exaggerate the prevalence of slave nurses and *paidagōgoi.* But it would be equally wrong to underestimate the extent of the interaction between adult slaves and children. Let us take another look at the evidence I've cited. First, it is significant that Euxitheus's enemies could accuse him of being the son of a slave: his mother did a slave's work. Hired citizen wet nurses were probably not very numerous. There is more to say about the examples of Euphiletus and Cinesias too. Euphiletus owns a slave girl, who teases the baby, and Cinesias brings along a slave to whom he can hand over the baby when Myrrhine leads him on.[33] These may not be slaves for whom child care is the sole responsibility, but they are clearly involved with children nonetheless. The relative rarity of what we may call professional wet nurses and other specialized slaves should not lead us to conclude that there were in fact few adult slaves in constant contact with children or that such contact characterized only a few households.

Slaves participated in almost every aspect of Athenian life—as domestic servants, farmworkers, craftsmen, laborers, miners, civil servants, and police. In terms of their cost, distribution, and pervasive effect on society as a whole, they were rather like another necessary luxury, the automobile.[34] No Athenian child could have escaped contact with them at some time.[35] And the effects of slaves within the household must have been magnified by the form of the Athenian family.[36] Athenian men married late and directed much of their energy outside the home. Many died while their children were still young; some probably spent little time with them. As a result, it must often have been slaves who provided a stable and continuous adult presence, especially a male presence, in the household.[37]

It is domestic slaves in general with whom I am concerned here. Some were born into the household they served; others were given a name when they joined it (like children) and met at its threshold by *katachysmata,* the shower of dried figs, raisins and roasted grains which greeted another group of newcomers—wives.[38] They might be represented at times as one(s) of the family; so slaves in Menander's *Dyscolus* offer advice on family matters—"Gorgias treats Daos like a family member rather than a family slave"—and in the end find that Cnemon, the grouch of the title, is their *oikeios,* "relative."[39] Within this group, there is one very good reason for stressing the role played by nurses and *paidagōgoi,* notwithstanding the need for caution in making generalizations: the ancient authorities do the same. These slaves were special as well as specialized, because they occupied positions of extraordinary trust. It is a *paidagōgos,* Sicinnus, who is chosen by Themistocles to lure the Persians at Salamis; Panthea, about to commit suicide on the death of her husband, gives her last instructions to her nurse.[40] And Plato can include the nurse and the *paidagōgos* with the mother and the father as members of the family who do their utmost to raise the child as well as possible (*Prot.* 325C).

Such slaves might be regarded with affection; the baby Perseus greets Silenus with friendly (or, infant) sounds "like a respected nurse" (Aesch. fr. 47a. 770–771R.). Their services were often repaid. The household of the speaker of Demosthenes 47 includes his old wet nurse, who had been set free by his father. "I could not see my nurse living in want nor my *paidagōgos,*" he explains ([Dem.] 47.56). Other nurses, too, were freed.[41] A number of gravestones commemorate this class of slaves, most presumably erected by their owners or their charges.[42] In fact nurses and *paidagōgoi* seem to have expected some return for their care, just like parents themselves. To cite only instances from tragedy, Hypsipyle says she had no motive to wish the baby Opheltes dead; on the contrary, he would have been a "great help" to her, his nurse (Eur. *Hyps.* fr. 60.8–12 Bond = fr.

757.839–843K.). Orestes's nurse calls her pain "useless" when she learns of his death; Agamemnon's *paidagōgos* expresses similar disappointment.[43] Creon says Oedipus owes more to Thebes (although it exiled him) than to Athens because it was his nurse (Soph. *OC* 760).

Thus, emotional ties could arise between slave and child and continue between slave and adult. But, though *paidagōgoi* and nurses were privileged, they were still slaves. Moreover, they were not necessarily slaves with special qualifications for their work. Pericles (so the story goes) watched a slave break a leg and observed, "There's a new *paidagōgos*."[44] More reliably perhaps, we are told that Alcibiades's tutor Zopyrus was chosen because he was old and unfit for other work (Pl. *Alcib. I* 122B). Therefore, like other slaves, even nurses and *paidagōgoi* would generally be regarded as intellectually and morally inferior to free citizens.[45] A curious contradiction: the Athenians, who believed that association and imitation were essential elements of upbringing and education, entrusted their children to the care of individuals who were apparently quite unsuited to be models or mentors.[46] Two questions arise. Were the Athenians themselves aware of this contradiction? What were its effects on individuals and on Athenian society as a whole?

The answer to the first question is yes. Several sources decry the role played by slaves in the upbringing of children. Plato criticizes parents for being careless in choosing those to whom they entrust this task.[47] No doubt those selected were often whoever happened to be available when the time came—when a child was born (nurses), when the child was able to understand what was said (*paidagōgoi;* Xen. *Lac.* 2.1, cf. Plut. *Mor.* 439F). But more than the selection of a suitable slave is at issue. The practice itself comes under attack, sometimes in quite general terms. Xenophon praises the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus for not resorting to slave *paidagōgoi,* as is the custom in other cities.[48] Xenophon is also critical of others for giving their children sandals (they soften the feet), changes of clothing (they pamper the body), and as much food as their stomachs will hold; the implication is that slave *paidagōgoi* also are likely to lead to weakness and dependence. Socrates remarks that it is a terrible thing (*deinon*) for a free boy to be ruled by a slave (Pl. *Lys.* 208C).[49] Menander's Sostratus says it would be best for a girl not to be raised by some aunt or *maia* but "freely" (*eleutheriōs*) with her rustic father (Men. *Dysc.* 384–389); the collocation with *eleutheriōs* suggests that *maia* here refers to a female slave.[50] Aristotle's *paidonomoi* are to see to it that children—who will be raised in the home up to age seven—have as little contact as possible with slaves and so avoid seeing and hearing things unfit for free citizens (*Pol.* 7.1336a4). Sometimes, too, we hear more specific charges against these slaves. House slaves (*oiketai*) may undercut a father's authority and

example (Pl. *Resp.* 8.549E).[51] *Paidagōgoi* have no more taste and judgment than children themselves (Pl. *Resp.* 3.397D). Nurses may refuse to follow orders, tell unsuitable stories, eat children's food, pass on alcohol through their milk.[52]

Now, there is nothing new in this list of references regarding the role played by slaves in raising and regulating children. What is perhaps surprising is that I should bother to recite it. After all, the late Professor M. I. Finley, the most insightful and influential authority on ancient slavery, dismissed such evidence as "anecdotal in the extreme, ranging from exemplary tales . . . to the persistent grumbling by moralists from Plato to Plutarch."[53] I think, however, that Finley underestimates the extent of the concern about slaves in the household; in particular, he ignores interesting and important evidence from a major focus for public concerns, Athenian tragedy. Some of the evidence is well known.[54] In Euripides's *Hippolytus,* Phaedra trusts her old nurse and is counseled to disaster.[55] In his *Ion,* the *paidagōgos,* the old attendant of Creusa's father, takes a leading role in an intrigue that endangers her when it fails and would have cost her her husband and her child if it had succeeded.[56] These slaves mean well; their masters' interests are their own; yet the result is ruin. I suggest that this theme is an unrecognized element—perhaps the only unrecognized element—in one of the most famous works of Greek tragedy, Aeschylus's *Oresteia.* The trilogy may be read (among many other ways) as a critique of the influence of slaves, especially household slaves.

Agamemnon opens with the watchman on the roof of the palace.[57] We do not know whether he is a free dependent of the house of Atreus (as seems likely) or a slave; but he is certainly a man of low social status (as his use of homely language may perhaps be meant to stress, 36–37). Yet his station is exalted, both literally and figuratively: he appears high up in a position most often used for the epiphanies of the gods.[58] A striking paradox, this *coup de théâtre* introduces us to a world where other inversions and contradictions abound. Clytemnestra is a woman with a man's will (10–11). The herald must mix together fair and foul (648): fire and sea, bitterest of foes, joined in alliance to destroy the Greek fleet (650–651). And so on.[59] Of course, this kind of language, ironic and riddling, is not unique to *Agamemnon;* it is characteristic of tragedy in general. But here it seems especially appropriate and resonant, used as it is to develop a plot in which decisive actions lead to their opposites, in which seeming solutions cause new problems. Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter and is himself cut down; Troy's conqueror is conquered. Perhaps the most telling example comes at the close of the play. Clytemnestra has killed the king; she hopes that she has swept away murder, guilt, the fury from the house (1567–1576). But no sooner has she spoken than Aegisthus enters, with his own motives and claims, and it is

at once clear that the murder of Agamemnon has solved nothing; the play ends in dissonance and discord.

The figure of Clytemnestra, who kills her husband and king while her lover Aegisthus plays a woman's role (1625, 1643–1645), is the clearest symbol of the extent to which the social and moral order of Argos is disturbed. But Cassandra, given a new prominence in the story by Aeschylus, also is important in this regard.[60] The long scene of which she is the center has a number of functions. Most important for the trilogy as a whole, she is an outsider who dies as an innocent victim of the murderous history of the house of Atreus, and so her fate stresses that the story Aeschylus tells has import beyond the royal house itself; like the watchman and the herald, Cassandra helps us see that *Oresteia* deals with a set of problems that affect the community as a whole and all those who come into contact with it.

For my purposes, however, what needs stressing is that Cassandra is a slave (emphasized at 953, 1035–1046, 1065–1067, 1226, 1326), destined to be one of "many slaves by the household altar" of Zeus Ktesios.[61] Of course, she is a very unusual slave, one who still has a god's gift of prophecy (1083). And unlike all those around her, unlike Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, and the chorus, she has a reliable (if sometimes cryptic) knowledge of past, present, and future: Cassandra's visions include insights into the terrible feast of Thyestes, the impending murder of Agamemnon, the revenge of Orestes. Yet, no matter how divinely inspired, no matter how accurate, Cassandra's words have no effect; she can't change the course of events herself or persuade others to do so. That a woman, a foreigner and a slave, has more and more accurate understanding than others is of course a paradox, another indication that the time is out of joint; but that her wisdom leads nowhere is no more than we would expect. Announced in this way in *Agamemnon,* this theme is more prominent in *Choephori.* Much of our attention in *Choephori* is directed downward under the earth, where the libations carried by the chorus are poured for the dead Agamemnon; its first line is addressed to Hermes, lord of the dead, and its first half takes place at the king's tomb.[62] The social status of the play's characters has moved downward as well. Compare the makeup of the choruses: in *Agamemnon,* its members are elderly but free male citizens of Argos; in *Choephori,* captives, female domestic servants (76–77, 84). There is another important difference, too. The Argive citizens in *Agamemnon* are slow to understand what has happened and is about to happen in their city. The slaves of *Choephori,* in striking contrast, take a leading and decisive role in the action of the play.[63] In this they are joined by other household slaves, by Orestes's old nurse in particular. Yet their actions are in the end as futile as the hesitation and indecision of the citizens of Argos, their deeds

as profitless as the words of the slave Cassandra—they cannot end the house's troubles.

Let us move quickly through the play, noting the prominent part played by slaves. Electra asks the chorus to advise her how to perform the rite for her father (87, cf. 100), since it shares her hatred of the house (101); fate awaits the free man and the one who is ruled by another's hand alike (103–104). When the chorus then instructs her to remember Orestes (115), Electra continues to ask for advice, on the form of the prayer she must use (118–122). The chorus is later as quick as Electra to guess that the lock of hair may be Orestes's (178). After the recognition scene, it warns Orestes and Electra not to talk too loudly, lest someone overhear them (264–268), and later urges them to turn from lamentation to action (510–513). Orestes duly makes a plan. He knocks on the door of the palace and calls on a slave to let him enter (652–656).

This scene is curious and has perhaps not received the discussion it deserves. Orestes's language is unusual: this is the first use of *pais* in the sense "slave" in Greek and in fact the only use of the word in this meaning in tragedy.[64] That is remarkable enough. Still more so is the fact that the slave called on so conspicuously is given a line of dialogue to answer the summons.[65] Much has been made of the lines that Pylades, silent until then, speaks just before Orestes kills Clytemnestra. But the slave's reply is no less unexpected and also requires explanation. I suggest that both the unusual use of *pais* and the slave's short speech are meant at least in part to stress that, just as the chorus of slaves has replaced the chorus of Argive citizens, Argos as a whole has lost its freedom and been enslaved; slaves, it seems, are to be seen and heard everywhere. It is significant in this regard that Electra refers to herself as *antidoulos,* "like a slave" (135), and that Orestes charges that he was sold to Strophius though born of a free father (915).

To return to this rapid survey of the play, the chorus, "dear slaves of the house" (719), wonders when it will be able to do Orestes some service with the power of speech. Soon another slave enters, Orestes's nurse.[66] Here, too, I would argue, Aeschylus is concerned to stress that a particular character is a slave (and thus that Argos is now a community in servitude). The nurse is a feature of the tradition, but no other authority, as far as we know, explicitly made her a slave.[67] Stesichorus and Pherecydes called her Laodameia, and Pindar called her Arsinoe; either is a name a free woman, even a heroine of myth, could bear.[68] The chorus in *Choephori,* however, addresses the nurse as Cilissa (732)—though it is uncommon for slaves to be identified in this way in tragedy; the name, indicating as it does her ethnic origin, clearly shows the nurse's slave status. Cilissa has been sent by Clytemnestra to summon Aegisthus and his bodyguard. Here the chorus makes a critical contribution to Orestes's cause. "If you hate our

master," it says, "tell him to come unattended" (770–773). As a result, Aegisthus is easy prey, and Clytemnestra is soon dead beside him. The help of these slave domestics, the chorus and the nurse, has made revenge possible for Electra and Orestes. Once again, there is the hope that the bloodshed has come to an end, expressed this time by the chorus (931–971). But once again, this hope is soon dashed, as Orestes spies the Furies, who demand vengeance for his mother's murder (1048–1058). The slave women (*dmōai gynaikes,* 1048) take one last initiative: Orestes must go to Apollo at Delphi for help (1059–1060).

In *Agamemnon,* a slave outsider sees the truth but cannot act to prevent disaster. In *Choephori,* slave domestics, one intimately linked with Orestes, the others Electra's associates, take it upon themselves to act vigorously; but again the play ends with no resolution, the curse unbroken, Orestes in flight. Only in *Eumenides* is a solution found, and in *Eumenides* there are no slaves.

At its outset, *Eumenides* is set at the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. There is much to remind us of the earlier plays. The Pythia scurries from the temple in terror, on her hands and knees; an aged woman whom fear has made childlike (*antipais,* 38), she recalls the Argive elders, childlike in their weakness (*Ag.* 72–82). Figures from the underworld, mentioned or invoked in *Choephori,* now appear on stage: Hermes, the ghost of Clytemnestra, the Furies themselves.[69] But at 235, the scene shifts to Athens, and we find ourselves in a different atmosphere; there are still important links with *Agamemnon* and *Choephori,* but now they involve contrast and change more than likeness. Whereas in *Agamemnon* the watchman was raised to the level of the gods, in *Eumenides* the Olympian gods Apollo and Athena have come down to earth and mingle with men. Whereas in *Choephori* our attention was focused downward, to the earth and beneath it, in *Eumenides* even men may rise above it in a fashion, as the great trial of Orestes takes place on a hill, the Areopagus. And unlike the murders of revenge, that trial does finally lay to rest the curse on the house of Atreus and provide a model for the settlement of other similar disputes in the community.

It is important for my reading of the trilogy to consider the social status of those who are party to this resolution. Apollo and Athena are gods, Orestes an Argive prince. The jurors are free citizens of Athens: their status is stressed—forms of *politēs* and *astos* abound.[70] The Furies become *metoikoi,* free foreign members of the Athenian community (1011, cf. 1018). Thus, what the words and actions of slaves could not accomplish, free men and women, citizens and metics, bring to fulfillment. And slaves are not excluded only from the process through which the problems of the house are solved. They are absent even from the language of the play: there is not a single reference to slaves or slavery.[71] Even where a mention might be expected, such as in the chorus's recollection of Apollo's stay at Pherae, nothing is said (723–724). In the two earlier plays, Aes-

chylus has shown that the influence of slaves is inadequate to resolve conflicts within the *oikos* and may even help to keep them alive. Now, order and justice are reestablished quite apart from slaves, in a world where they have no part. This is not an argument against slavery. Rather, it is a recognition that the house of Atreus, like other households, is a complex of relationships; for domestic slaves to know and do as much or more than the masters of the house is a sign of disturbance and disorder similar to (if not as serious as) women ruling men and parents and children murdering each other.

Aeschylus's trilogy, then, reveals that concern for the influence of the household's slaves was not as limited as Finley thought; and the son and daughter of the royal house of Argos are among those shown to suffer from its ill effects. I move on to my second question. How were the Athenians in Aeschylus's audience marked by the association of slaves and children in their own households? Here again Finley holds out little hope: "There are too many variables that we cannot control. Modern psychology has been unable to reach any agreement in this field, and I remain a complete skeptic about the easy generalizations and causal statements of historians writing about a society that has long been dead and cannot be observed directly."[72]

No one will deny the difficulties. Yet the answer proposed by the eminent sociologist A. W. Gouldner (1965) is worth considering.[73] Gouldner makes two major points. First, he argues that "it makes a difference whether a child is reared, educated, and disciplined by those who feel they embody the standards that the child is expected to obey, or whether the socializing agent's authority is only a delegated moral competence, requiring and allowing him to speak on behalf of values manifestly not possessed by him" (1:86). The authority of the Athenian's slave *paidagōgos* or nurse, says Gouldner, is of the second kind. This has important consequences. Since the slave's control is not absolute, but is subject to "review and revision" by parents, he must be prepared to bend and compromise and so protect himself from appeals to his masters and possible punishment. For the child, the task is harder because less clear-cut: "The child . . . must adjust to demands that are communicated indirectly and known only uncertainly" (ibid.). The result is that the slave exerts discipline only for flagrant—and public—misbehavior. And the child soon learns that it is public actions, not private convictions, that matter. Gouldner concludes (1:87): "It may be in some part through such early experiences that a child first comes to develop a special sensitivity to the responses of others and is first socialized to be a member of a shame culture."

Second, Gouldner notes that the slave may resent his position and that his recalcitrance and hostility may be apparent to the child. The child is too young to understand the slave's position intellectually. Instead, he experiences the slave's

conduct as "disorderliness," and this impression is reinforced by the pattern outlined above, the slave's willingness to conciliate and change to avoid appeals to his masters. The slave explains or excuses his conduct—especially if he is emotionally close to the child—by reference to parental authority. And so the child learns, verbally, of an idealized standard of conduct apart from what he sees around him every day. As a result, says Gouldner, he compares his own thoughts and actions with that ideal and finds them wanting, or "disorderly." He thus finds himself associated with the slave and—Gouldner's major point here—learns "to define his own spontaneous impulses as evil and unruly . . . to equate the natural with the disorderly" (2:194).

Gouldner's "conjecture on socialization and metaphysics" (2:191) has attracted little notice.[74] Yet, though it is presented with little reference to the ancient sources, there are passages that could be used to support it. Plato's concern (mentioned above) that slaves explicitly or implicitly undermine parental authority might reflect an awareness of the kind of compromise Gouldner refers to. At least one fictional nurse—Hecuba in Euripides's *Trojan Women*—expresses real resentment that she must raise the children of her captors (191–196). And some slaves in comedy object to being ordered about by a young master (a beardless *meirakyllion,* not a toddler), though meanness with leftover food, and not youth, is their main cause of complaint (Epicrates fr. 5K.-A.).

Inevitably, however, so stimulating a hypothesis is as fertile in questions as in answers. Those concerning values are at the same time the most important and the most complex. The commonsense assumption is that most slaves shared some values with their masters, though those values did not necessarily play the same roles in their lives and the slaves rejected or resented other values.[75] It is of crucial importance for an evaluation of Gouldner's theory to identify the values in question and to estimate the depth of divergence in every case, but for ancient Athens, at least, this is impossible. However, some relevant distinctions can be made on the basis of the origins of household slaves. Some were house-reared, brought up in the same society as Athenian citizens, though in different circumstances. These, we would imagine, shared their masters' values most completely, just as British nannies, though working-class in origin, identified with the elite they served.[76] (And so they might react the more strongly if they believed these values had been betrayed.) Of the others, some (perhaps most) were Greek and probably not too dissimilar from Athenians in their outlook.[77] But their very similarity with their masters may have accentuated resentment at their position and so magnified the impact of minor disagreements. It is the slaves from outside the Greek world whom we would expect to have very different values. Yet, though Gouldner's account seems most appropriate to these, it is far from straightforward even here. The first part of his argument demands

that children be aware of the differences, either through observation (unlikely to be a widespread phenomenon, I think, though not to be discounted altogether) or through a slave's attempt to exculpate himself from some unpopular directive in order to curry favor with or prevent trouble from his charge. Such a tactic involves obvious risks—parents would expect better service than that—and slaves would do well to think twice before entrusting their safety to a young child's discretion.[78] Plato (in the passages noted above) seems likely to be more worried about faults of stupidity and orneriness than about any principled or even conscious disagreements over values. In sum, I suspect that the values of parents and slaves differed less often and less markedly than Gouldner supposes and (more confidently) that differences which did exist relatively rarely came to the attention of children.

Oddly, perhaps, Gouldner makes no mention of material from another much-studied slave society, the antebellum American South. Not that the use of such comparative material is straightforward. Questions arise. Is our comparative evidence reliable? To cite an example relevant to our present subject, the role of the black slave woman as a wet nurse for white children may have been exaggerated; something like 85 percent of mothers in the middle and upper classes breastfed their children themselves.[79] Are similar social institutions really comparable? That U.S. domestic slaves normally reproduced themselves, especially in the nineteenth century, while many Athenian household slaves were brought in from abroad and bought on the open market, might indeed cause crucial differences in their relations with their masters' children. What about the social formations of which similar institutions form a part? Capitalism and racism, so important for our understanding of the South, have nothing or relatively little to do with slavery in Athenian society. Finally, if our facts are reliable, if institutions and the societies they belong to correspond—just what can we use our comparative evidence *for*? It can of course refute generalizations, especially rash remarks to the effect that something is implausible or even impossible. But positive contributions? Data from one society cannot replace evidence missing from another; they can only and at best lead to hypotheses that may make sense of scanty or unsatisfactory sources or provide a connection with evidence that might otherwise appear irrelevant.

But even such contributions should not be despised. Paul Cartledge has shown how valuable a careful consideration of the antebellum South can be to a discussion of one facet of ancient slavery, the infrequency of revolt.[80] The possibility exists, therefore, that we may learn something from the South about the relationships of slaves and children and their effects. In what follows, I will discuss an argument developed by students of American antebellum slavery, only to conclude that it should not be applied to ancient Athens. I will then

move beyond the evidence provided by comparative material to put forward a hypothesis of my own.

As early as Benjamin Franklin, there were complaints about the baneful influence of slavery.[81] Many came from abolitionists, slaves and ex-slaves, and travelers such as de Tocqueville or Fanny Kemble, and may perhaps be discounted.[82] But critics included masters too, such as a Virginia judge: "A slave population exercises the most pernicious influence upon the manners, habits and character of those among whom it exists. Lisping infancy learns the vocabulary of abusive epithets and struts the embryo tyrant in its little domain."[83] The judge, like many others, was troubled to observe young children giving orders to adults, even slave adults; it was a natural enough development, however, when even a newborn white baby was to be called "young massa."[84]

What happened to lisping infancy when its voice changed? It turned to violence, thought Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the first to ascribe to the influence of slavery the quick temper of those who lived south of what has been called the Smith & Wesson line. Not the last. The link between slavery and violence has become something of a staple of scholarship on the Old South.[85] Put most simply, the argument is that arbitrary and casual brutality toward slaves in the southern household conditioned children to use violence not only against slaves but in their relations with one another and to pursue this pattern of behavior as adults. As Jefferson says, "The parent storms, the child looks on, catches the lineaments of wrath, puts on the same airs in the circle of smaller slaves, gives a loose rein to the worst passions; and, thus nursed, educated, and daily exercised in tyranny, cannot but be stamped by it with odious peculiarities."[86] A more elaborate formulation has been put forward by D. D. Bruce Jr.[87] He suggests that the southern family was regarded as an ordered and stable place of refuge in a society based on a fragile foundation. Southern children were treated with moderation and restraint; corporal punishment was relatively unusual. And they were taught to express their needs and wishes with similar self-control. But the presence of outsiders in the household, the same slaves whose resentments threatened the equilibrium and the very survival of the South's social institutions, introduced a sense of insecurity into this idyll. This insecurity could only be heightened by the frequent arbitrary and cruel punishments to which slaves were subjected. Such punishments brought violence into the house; they reinforced the notion that there were dangers within it; and they demonstrated to the children that violence was sometimes not just acceptable but even necessary. "To the extent that aggression and frustration are closely connected, Southern parents encouraged a resignation to violence by virtually building frustration into their children's view of the world" (66). Insecure, confused, the children felt anger and hostility; since there were few other means of expressing these

emotions, the children (and then the adults) turned to a response that had some legitimacy, violence.

Did the presence of slaves in the Athenian household make its young citizen men more violent? Certainly some aspects of slave-child relations at Athens seem to parallel the southern pattern. We hear of boys refusing to go when fetched by their *paidagōgoi,* even beating them up.[88] Of particular interest is Aeschines's explanation of the law forbidding *hybris* against another man's slave: it is to prevent citizens from getting used to violence and so acting violently against each other (1.17, cf. Dem. 21.46). And that they did act violently nonetheless is certain from any reading of the corpus of law-court speeches from the fourth century. Athenians, one feels, were full of anger, litigious, quick-tempered—yes, violent. Athenian culture was "not only face-to-face but scowling."[89]

But of course we know much less of Athenian slavery and Athenian violence than we do about such things even in the slave South. Speculation on Athenian society depends to a great extent on the strength of the link between the relationship of slave and child and violence in the comparative material. And it must be admitted that the link is far from sure: *violence* is a vague term, levels of violence are hard to quantify, factors other than slavery are numerous, and their influence is hard to evaluate. It is not surprising, then, that some authorities on Southern violence ignore the impact of slavery or reject it altogether.[90]

We seem to have reached an *aporia,* one of those dead ends into which Socrates so loved to lure his companions. Mindful of his fate, however, I would like to propose a way forward, though it involves leaving the relatively well-marked path we have been traveling. Though I hesitate to insist that the relationship of children with slaves led to a higher incidence of violence within the citizen body itself, I suggest that slaves and children were bound together in a sinister irony that did indeed result in intensified violence.[91] The positive aspects of this relationship, the warm emotional ties between household slaves and children that I have referred to in the first part of this chapter, had two paradoxical results: abuse of slaves as a source of humor on stage, and extraordinary brutality toward slaves in everyday life. Here again my argument will require a reconsideration of Athenian drama, not tragedy this time but Aristophanic comedy.

That Athenians could ill-treat their slaves needs little demonstration. The Athenian could not harm another man's slave—just as he could not harm any portion of another man's property—but it seems he was free to do as he liked with his own, short of murder.[92] Furthermore, torture of slave witnesses was allowed and even required in Athenian courts.[93] This is perhaps not very surprising. It is striking, however, that harsh treatment of slaves is a not uncommon feature of comedy. Aristophanes criticizes this form of humor in *Peace* (743–

747). But he is not above using it himself. Some examples: the slave Xanthias envies tortoises their shells after his beating by Philocleon (*Vesp.* 1292–1296). Manes is pecked by the chorus's beaks in *Birds* (1313–1336).[94] The humor of one scene in *Lysistrata* (1216–1224) "lies entirely in the bullying and threatening of slaves by tipsy citizens and in the exaggerated manifestations of fear on the part of the slaves."[95] A list of tortures highlights Xanthias's turning the tables on his master Dionysus in *Frogs* (616–624); Carion is threatened more briefly in *Plutus* (874–876).

These passages presumably mirror a part of everyday life. But they are also supposed to be funny. Certainly slapstick—knockabout humor—is one possible source of amusement in such scenes. But consideration of another class of characters that sometimes comes in for rough handling provides an indication that there is more to them than that. Fathers too make up a group whose beatings were fit subjects for comedy. Pheidippides not only beats his father (*Nub.* 1374–1375); he shows how he has profited from Socrates's school by convincing the old man that he was right to do so (1399–1451)—this is the natural way of birds and other animals (1425–1429). We are given a glimpse of such customs in *Birds*. The chorus invites the audience to join it in Cloud-cuckoo-land, where it is a fine thing to beat your father (756–759); and we later (1337–1370) meet a parricide who takes the chorus up on its offer and is welcomed and decked out as a war orphan (though given some gentle words of rebuke for his crime).

There is an element of wish fulfillment here. Pheidippides is repaying his father for past beatings (1409–1429). It seems that these scenes could titillate and amuse because they evoked and released a complex of emotions on the part of the audience. Social norms insisted that a father was owed respect; yet for many Athenians, feelings of respect probably coexisted with resentment or hostility, whether because of real or imagined conflict or neglect in childhood, disagreements about the disposal of family property, or simply generalized discontent that found a convenient focus in the father. Thus, depictions of and references to father-beating provided a safe outlet for personal emotions that came into conflict with the community's customary and conventional attitudes, all the more so in that they took place at a public religious festival.

My suggestion is that the beatings of slaves should be regarded as involving a similar mix of emotions. There is no reason to believe that all slaves in comedy were meant to be recognized as domestics, still less as *paidagōgoi* or nurses, so we cannot argue that they would arouse a conflict of attitudes in their capacity as individual characters. But they were certainly representatives of a social group among which, as we have seen, some members were regarded with sentiment and affection at the same time that most were despised and held in contempt. So: to laugh at the mistreatment of a father is to indulge deep-seated feelings at

the expense of social expectations; to laugh at the mistreatment of slaves is to follow social norms (which are to apply to all slaves) despite personal inclinations (which suggest that the norms do *not* apply to some slaves). In each case, the tension between individual emotional responses and community values can be exploited for humorous effect.

What has this exercise in literary criticism to do with social history? Simply this: the same complex of conflicting attitudes may in part explain the casual and consistent cruelty to which slaves were subject—a cruelty in which elements of repression and social control seem to be reinforced by psychological processes. I have emphasized the contradictions involved in the Athenian use of slaves in child rearing and have stressed that one of their forms is to oppose emotive feelings about individuals to socially approved general principles. It is important to recognize that these emotional feelings for slaves, arising from personal experiences in childhood, must to some extent be overcome or denied as the child gradually joins the community and learns to accept the prevailing rationalizations of the existing order, involving as they do contempt and hostility toward slaves as a group. Acceptance of the dominant ideology requires a break with the child's own feelings and perceptions.

Such denials are by no means rare in any society. But they do not come without a price. In this case, I suspect that many Athenians were able to counteract their own feelings of affection and gratitude toward particular slaves only at the expense of doing violence to those feelings—by overdoing violence to slaves with whom they had had no early positive contact. They tortured and beat some slaves, degrading them to a level far beneath themselves and their fellow citizens. In a sense this compensated for the consideration given other slaves as if to equals—or even as if to parents. The closeness of childhood attachments to the household's slaves might pose problems for a society based on the dehumanization of slaves in general. Modes and models of behavior that stressed slaves' low status and lack of worth would have an obvious utility in counteracting attitudes of affection and esteem. For individual adolescents and adults, the denial of early positive associations with slaves would be more convincing when shouted—when slaves were treated with especial cruelty and brutality—than when merely expressed by more moderate discipline and control. Both sociologically and psychologically, this seems plausible; more it is impossible to claim.

Alliances

In one respect, at least, the discussion of affective relations within the household has so far been simple, even simplistic. As anyone who has spent as much time in a family as in a library knows, the relations of one group of persons within a

household have consequences for all the others. Households are not made up of neatly defined reciprocal pairs relating only to each other in a precisely choreographed slow waltz; rather, household members engage in more of a square dance, with alliances constantly shifting, groups forming and reforming in response to the actions of others. I have already alluded (in the previous chapter) to the dialectic that may affect relations among fathers and sons, brothers and brothers, with respect to the inheritance of property and to the impact of spouses' relations on sibling solidarity. A quite different interconnection, relevant to the main subject of this chapter, has been posited by Richard Saller; he suggests that the important role played by slaves in child care in the ancient Roman household contributed to the distance between husbands and wives, who no longer shared this practical day-to-day area of interaction, and to the willingness of wives to leave their children behind in their husbands' households upon divorce.[96] In an attempt to nuance the account of emotional life within the family given here so far, I will now briefly take up a further example of the complexities involved in a family's interactions, the interweaving of marriage ties with those between parents and children.[97]

Relations between husband and wife were thought to be cemented by the birth of children. Marriage at Athens was often spoken of as being contracted specifically "for the birth of legitimate children."[98] And just as marriages were made for children, children made marriages. As a proverbial verse ascribed to Menander puts it, "The greatest link of *philia* is the birth of children" (Men. *Monos.* 736). Euphiletus says he began to trust his wife and put all his affairs in her hands when she gave birth to a *paidion,* considering this the greatest tie of intimacy (*oikeiotēta* [Lys. 1.6]).[99] His wife did not perhaps warrant his faith in her—he is on trial for killing her lover—but the implication is clear nevertheless: a marriage might be considered fully consummated only when a child was born. One of the many slanders spread by Alcibiades's enemies has him playing unscrupulously on this perception to claim (and get) ten extra talents on top of an extraordinary dowry when his wife had a baby ([Andoc] 4.13). Even a quarreling couple might be reconciled through their children. According to Mantitheus, it is much more common for a husband and wife who are at odds to come to an agreement because of the children than for them to hate their children on account of the wrongs they have done each other.[100] This provided an incentive for even those who had children already to have more if they married a second time.[101]

On the other hand, childless marriages were likely to end in divorce, quite apart from the relations between the spouses. As Menecles grew older, relates his adopted son, he became progressively more concerned that he had no children, so he approached his wife and finally succeeded in persuading her to end

their marriage. He took the responsibility for their childlessness on himself and, considerate as he was, made sure she remarried someone who wasn't sterile (Isae. 2.6–9). Menecles's portrayal as a kind of fourth-century sensitive male may strike us as too flattering to him and too favorable to the speaker's case to be true, but there was good reason for him to behave tactfully, at least in public. A divorce in which a wife's fertility was in question might cause dishonor for her and difficulties for her family, reducing as it no doubt would her value on the marriage market. In an extreme case, from a part of the Greek world the Athenians regarded as less than civilized, Alexander of Pherae was killed by his wife and her brothers precisely because (on one account at least) he planned to divorce her on the grounds that she had borne him no children.[102] Aristotle provides a summary: childless marriages are the more easily dissolved; children are a benefit possessed in common by both parents, and common property holds people together (*NE* 8.1162a27). This tells against the hypothesis that "the harshness of child mortality" made women likely to put their husbands before their children.[103]

But it would be naive to suppose that the presence of children in the family always served to minimize conflict. They might be involved on one side or the other as well, often as passive participants in what E. M. Forster called "that curious duel which is fought over every baby."[104] Pulls in one direction include the Athenian preference for reckoning descent through males, which resulted in men inheriting ahead of women of the same degree of kinship and in children staying in their father's family in cases of death and (probably) divorce.[105] Pulls in the other include the fact that the mother's kin were more likely than the father's to survive as a child grew older, and they were in addition likely to be closer in age and so more intimate. Naturally, special circumstances must weigh heavily in individual cases. So Pericles could claim membership in the influential family of the Alcmaeonidae only through his mother,[106] and Pheidippides, the young wastrel in the *Clouds,* is more influenced by the horsey—(*h*)*ippides*—part of his name, his inheritance from his wealthy mother, than by the peasant virtues his father tried to instill with the prefix *pheid-,* "frugal."

As they grew older, however, children might play a more active role. Regrettable. Another count in the indictment against Alcibiades was that he bought one of the women enslaved in the Athenian sack of Melos and had a son by her; the child's birth was "more unnatural than Aegisthus's," because his parents were such bitter enemies ([Andoc] 4.22–23). Even in unions less ill-starred from the start, children were drawn into family feuds. Can we generalize about the likely lines of alliance? Myth, though it has been imaginatively exploited, is an unsatisfactory source of evidence, if only because it allows no clear conclusions.[107]

Alongside the stories of Cronus and Zeus and their fathers, we may cite other tales that pit children against their mothers. Alcmaeon is mentioned by Aristotle as someone who appears ridiculous because he is compelled by threats to act in a way that is not credible: he kills his mother (*NE* 3.1110a25). Yet his dilemma seemed real enough to others in Athens, being staged by both Sophocles and Euripides.[108] Amphiaraus, betrayed to his death by his wife, Eriphyle, cursed his sons with famine and childlessness if they did not avenge him. One did, Alcmaeon, who was hounded by the Furies until he found purification at the mouth of the river Achelous. His story recalls (once again) Aeschylus's *Oresteia,* still more relevant here because one of Clytemnestra's motives for the murder of her husband is his sacrifice of their daughter, Iphigenia, "dearest product of my labor pains."[109] A detailed study of the forensic speeches, our richest body of real-life material, is only a little more conclusive: "There is perhaps a slight tendency for matrikin to appear as more supportive than patrikin, although the difference is certainly not statistically significant."[110]

There may, however, be something to learn from a genre that takes its subject matter from everyday life: New Comedy is more one-sided. A few Roman plays based on Athenian originals merit mention here. The slave Syrus states that mothers usually help their sons when they are at fault and back them up when their fathers treat them harshly; the young Clitopho, an Athenian, agrees (Ter. *Haut.* 991–993). There are other examples in New Comedy of cooperation between mothers and unmarried sons in conflicts with fathers; consider Terence's *Phormio,* in which Nausistrata leaves it to her son Phaedria to decide how to deal with Chremes, her husband and his father, over an old affair she's just discovered. Stage fathers and sons only rarely join forces against mothers in this way, arguably because conflict between mothers and sons was felt to be an unseemly subject.[111] Plautus's *Asinaria* is a telling exception. Demaenetus and Argyrippus are in cahoots in opposition to their wife and mother, Artemona. The joke, however, is that this is a family in which the woman wears the toga. Demaenetus wants to indulge his son in order to buy his affection, while Artemona (as he says) holds a tight rein and plays a father's part (64–83). The one character who most nearly measures up to Artemona as an authority figure is another woman, the mother of Argyrippus's girlfriend. In other words, *Asinaria* is a play in which women take over the role a man has abandoned. Demaenetus's interest in his son's girlfriend—like Argyrippus's discomfiture—is a signpost to the unhappy end such reversals can lead to. A son's marriage brought new sources of tension into the family (though not necessarily into the household). This is a theme of Terence's *Hecyra,* "The Mother-in-Law." But although the old Athenian Laches opines that mothers- and daughters-in-law are agreed on only one thing—

hating each other and opposing their husbands (198–204)—in fact the two women are not really rivals in the play, and young Pamphilus, when he believes himself forced to choose, opts for his mother over his wife.

How can we be sure that these attitudes and alliances are features of family life at Athens rather than Rome? True, the plays of Plautus and Terence are in large measure adaptations of Athenian drama. But the few instances in which we can compare their contents with the originals (e.g., Plautus's *Bacchides* with Menander's *Dis Exapatōn*) reveal that treatments could be very free; and in a number of relevant aspects—the economic position of women, the father's legal powers—the Roman family differed markedly from the Athenian. Yet, paradoxically, it is just this distinction that may lead us to believe that the family situations envisaged in the Roman plays I have mentioned are indeed taken from Athenian exemplars. In her persuasive portrait of the Roman mother (1988), Suzanne Dixon argues that discipline and the inculcation of traditional morality were as much the province of mothers as of fathers among the Roman elite. She explains the sharing of this role largely by reference to the control over property that distinguished the Roman woman from the Athenian. Since the Roman mother, as an authority figure, was comparable (in fact, if not in law) to the father, we would expect Roman mothers and sons to find themselves in conflict; and, indeed, Dixon discusses some examples. It is the Athenian mother, "the object of patronising affection common to Greek New Comedy and Dagwood comics" (7), whom we find in these plays (except *Asinaria*). Such a mother would give a son no reason to rebel against her. And her willingness to take his side would be enhanced by demographic and economic realities: as we have seen, she could expect to outlive her husband and would then be dependent for support on her son.

But we have moved a long way from classical Athens and ought to return. It is perhaps best to leave the last word to a Clytemnestra less fierce than Aeschylus's, the weary matron of Euripides's *Electra.* These are, in fact, virtually her last words as well, addressed to her daughter Electra moments before her death, in response to the charge that she killed her husband and so must die. "My child, you always liked [*stergein*] your father. That's the way it is. Some favor the male side, others love [*philousi*] their mothers more than their fathers" (Eur. *El.* 1102–1104). Once again, we should leave a lot of room for individual preference, unpredictable as it is.[112]

Seven

Change over Time

Test Case: Hellenistic Childhood

As the story goes, Mao Zedong, no stranger to times of transition, was once asked to outline the long-term effects of the French Revolution. "A good question," replied Mao. "But it's too early to tell."

Though Mao has fallen out of favor, not least among Maoists, this book reflects some of his caution in commenting on historical change. It covers some two hundred years, from roughly 500 to 300 B.C. Yet that period, six or eight generations, has been treated as a homogeneous unit; evidence from the early fifth century is pieced together with data from the late fourth to produce a picture that may resemble in its fidelity to real life some Cubist bravura—a still life in which apples are added to oranges—more than the most grime-dusky Old Master. In short, my neglect of change over time (however convenient for a small book on a big topic) may mislead. It is certainly unfashionable in the history of childhood in antiquity.

It is instructive here to contrast attitudes toward change over time in the study of ancient childhood with the vigorous debate about adult-child relations in early modern Europe that was raging in the 1970s and 1980s, in the wake of the work of Philippe Ariès.[1] There were three main positions within that debate. The first stressed change and development and took two rather different forms. Some scholars espoused a big-bang theory, focusing on one big change,

to be situated at almost any time between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries of our era. The most popular tack was to connect this change with the rise of capitalism and the ideology of bourgeois individualism among the elite and with the industrial revolution among the working class, to whom change came later. So, for example, Edward Shorter asserted that "good mothering is an invention of modernization" and that children first became a prime priority of mothers in the sixteenth century.[2] Other experts, however, preferred to imagine a sequence of changes rather than one dramatic shift. The most nuanced (or at least complicated) among these was the psychohistorian Lloyd deMause, whose six modes of parent-child relations extended from the "infanticidal mode," which characterized antiquity, to the "helping mode" found in some few contemporary families.[3] This helping mode, one was glad to learn, was the method deMause himself practiced as a parent; it results in children who are gentle, sincere, strong-willed, and never depressed, imitative, group-oriented, or intimidated. Admirably unintimidated, a second group of researchers took a position very different from either Shorter's or deMause's. These stressed continuity over change; they were steady-state theorists. The most prominent proponent of this view, Linda Pollock, concluded that parental investment in and concern for children—generally at a pretty high level—did not vary significantly over time or from one society to another from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century in England and the United States.[4]

Continuity or change? The third position declined to approach adult-child relations so abstractly. Instead, scholars of this disposition insisted on diversity, even within similar social strata living at the same time in the same parts of the world, and ascribed much of the variation to more or less localized cultural and ideological factors. So Sheila Ryan Johansson argued that the English elite of the eighteenth century invested less in their daughters than did their peers elsewhere in Europe, largely because Protestant England had no nunneries for unmarried girls.[5] As a result, the infant mortality rate for English girls was markedly higher than for French girls. However, the infant mortality rates in preindustrial villages with Catholic populations were higher than in those where Protestants lived: Catholics, more fatalistic, did not practice birth control, gave birth to more children, invested less in each, and allowed more to die young. Along the same lines, other studies revealed a much higher rate of unnatural death among Christian children in thirteenth-century England than among Jews and differences in mortality between French Canadian and Protestant or Irish Catholic children in nineteenth-century Montreal.[6]

Now, there were both important similarities among these views and differences within each tendency. For example, both Pollock and Johansson stressed

the role of human choice in affecting the rate of child mortality; and while some of those who argued for a major shift in adult-child relations approved of its direction, others (such as Eli Zaretsky and Shulamith Firestone) did not. The most important point for my purposes, however, is that there *was* a debate on the issue of change, a debate that was methodologically productive and valuable in spurring new empirical work designed to test one hypothesis or another. Meanwhile, there was no such diversity in the contemporary study of ancient attitudes to and behaviors toward children. One outlook prevailed: meaningful change did occur in antiquity.

As to when that change occurred, however, there was anything but agreement. I present a brief and incomplete catalog of scholars and their suggestions:

- Sourvinou-Inwood: In the eighth century, Greek children came to be newly valued as members of families, a status marked by their burial alongside other family members.[7]
- Manson: The invention of articulated dolls marked a turning point in Greek feelings for children.[8]
- Raepsaet and Decocq: There was a new interest in children in the later fifth century at Athens, in response to the devastation of the Peloponnesian War.[9]
- Bertier, Deissmann-Merten, Green, Lane Fox, Rühfel, Zahn: Children became more interesting and more valuable in the Hellenistic period.[10]
- Manson: The late Roman Republic saw the invention of childhood at Rome.[11]
- Eyben, Néraudau: There was heightened interest in children in the early Roman empire.[12]
- Wiedemann: During the third and fourth centuries of our era, children moved from the community's margins to center stage and became equal with adults before God.[13]

The conclusions in this sample are based on a rich array of evidence: burial customs, jointed dolls, Attic *choes,* Hellenistic poems and terracottas, Catullus, Roman coins, Augustan propaganda. However, it is intuitively unlikely that all the changes these authors identify actually happened. It is also apparent that the more of them that did in fact occur, the less significant each is likely to be. Most disquieting, however, is a number of features these pieces of work have in common. First, it seems that investigators found a major shift in adult attitudes toward children in every era they examined. Second, they found one change and one change only. Third, the change they discovered was almost always in the

same direction, toward greater interest in and/or concern for children.[14] Rather than inspiring confidence, this unanimity persuades me that we are dealing with a kind of secular faith, not scholarship alone.

The theory that has attracted the most adherents over the years dates large-scale change to the Hellenistic period. Since this popular case should be the easiest to make, it is worth a digression here in order to underline how difficult it can in fact be to establish the existence of change in this area, to go beyond raising possibility to establishing probability—a necessary step—let alone to move on to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.[15] What follows is necessarily superficial. Ideally, we would recognize that there were many childhoods at any one place and time in ancient Greece, childhoods that varied according to whether the children lived in urban areas or the countryside and whether they were boys or girls; rich or poor; citizens, metics or slaves; infants, toddlers, or older. Moreover, as any parent knows, feelings for individual children may swing from anger to adoration in a matter of moments; and broader social attitudes are especially complex, since children themselves undergo visible changes and, whatever their present appearance, always link us to our own past and to the future, in which they will have as much and then more share than ourselves. However, the evidence will rarely allow such fine-tuning.

The classic statement on the new attitude toward children in the Hellenistic period is Herter's from 1927 (251): "The Hellenistic poets were the first to put children at center stage as they actually are and for their own sakes . . . and the art of that period swims with true depictions of real children, from whose amusing conduct Greeks of that time must have taken special pleasure." This statement's echoes could be heard decades after. We may read, in handbooks and surveys that appeared throughout the twentieth century, that the great poetry of the period "delighted in scenes of emotion which it found in odd episodes of myth, in the child and the old, the housewife as well as the heroine" or that "sculpture (and, we may infer, painting) displays a preoccupation with children."[16] Moreover, this new interest in children is said not to be restricted to literature and the visual arts. Hellenistic medicine (we are told) developed a distinctive therapeutic regime for children—something absent from the Hippocratic Corpus.[17] Very young children were admitted to Dionysiac mysteries because of the "sentimental love of children which begins in the Hellenistic Age and persists in the following centuries."[18] At the same time, according to Marieluise Deissmann-Merten, the exposure of newborns became morally troubling, as a belief grew up in the child's right to live.[19] In fact, we appear to be engaged with just one symptom of a fundamental shift in *mentalité,* the result of profound social and political transformations. Herter himself appealed to a culture-weariness, a longing for simplicity and quiet amid the unrest of the great

Hellenistic metropolises; this, joined to the new political realities of an era when ministers ruled and mercenaries waged war, provoked a retreat to domestic life and a sentimental image of childhood.[20]

Individual items in this list invite debate, for example, on the relevance of depictions of the infant Dionysus for children's initiations into his mysteries or on the continuing pull of civic involvement on individuals among the elite. (The abolition of pay for officeholders and the expectation that magistrates provide public expenses from their own purse guaranteed that those who chose to compete for status in this way did so only with their wealthy peers; success was all the more honorable.) Perhaps the most instructive disagreement for the history of childhood concerns the exposure of newborns. Others have shared the view that the Hellenistic period marked a watershed but have disagreed on the direction and import of the change. LaRue van Hook thought that Hellenistic Greeks exposed their children more often than before rather than less and termed this the repugnant practice of a decadent society.[21] Robert Sallares, too, accepts that there was a change, insists that its magnitude was greater still, but denies that it can be linked to decadence: instead, the Greek population overshot the carrying capacity of the land in the late fourth century and the early Hellenistic period and, as a consequence, the Greeks resorted to exposure as a regular practice for the first time.[22] Others, however, see no sign of such an increase.[23]

Now, it is certainly within the power of academic ingenuity to reconcile some of these views at any rate: faced with the challenge of feeding a growing population in a time of scarcity (Sallares), the Greeks at first resisted ideologically (Deissmann-Merten) and then gave in to and even embraced exigency (van Hook). Moreover (as I argued above in Chapter 4), the conclusion that exposure became more frequent does not necessarily contradict the general impression that children were valued more highly. After all, we have the historian Polybius's word for it (36.17.5) that his contemporaries limited the size of their families in order to guarantee prosperity for the children they chose to rear. I regard it as more useful, however, to ponder some of the reasons that agreement on this issue (among others) is unlikely.

First, the nature of the evidence. There is no series of textual or iconographic data that permits any reasonably reliable conclusion about levels of exposure during the classical or Hellenistic periods. Arguments need to be based on the distribution of the evidence over time, on quantitative data from particular locales and times, which then need to be generalized, and on scattered statements of uncertain validity. But no one will feel sure that the preponderance of evidence on exposure from Hellenistic (and Roman) Greece corresponds to the occurrence of the practice in real life. (Similarly, the use of the incidence of inscriptions to track change must take into account that they cluster at certain

periods.)[24] Deissmann-Merten's case rests principally on the prominence of exposure in New Comedy, especially a passage in Menander's *Samia* (130ff.). But while New Comedy is in the main trustworthy in its presentation of Athenian law concerning marriage, inheritance, and so on—its plots often hang on such details—it is less reliable as an indicator of the frequency with which exposure (and failures to recognize sexual partners, supposititious children, and kidnapping) figured in Athenian life; it is precisely such out-of-the-ordinary occurrences that spiced up the stage, just as they do in television sitcoms today. With regard to the passage in *Samia* itself, the lines do not make an explicit statement about a child's right to live (and neither does a scene in *Pericíromene* in which grown-up foundlings ask their father why he exposed them: 774–776, 801). Rather, they involve a variation of a theme also found in tragedy, the irrelevance of the distinction between legitimate children and others in a world where no social criterion is of much significance, given the gulf between the gods and ourselves.[25] The denial of the claims of birth is fittingly (and perhaps ironically) put into the mouth of Moschion, himself an adopted son.

As for quantitative data, they consist of lists of new citizens of Hellenistic towns such as Miletus and Ilion that show severely skewed sex ratios.[26] These have been accounted for by a high rate of exposure of girls, and their particular circumstances have been made to stand for the Greek world in general. But even if this is so—and sex ratios may vary significantly because of such factors as coital frequency and the relationship of gender-based lifestyles to endemic diseases—it reflects the treatment of one (admittedly large) group of newborns only.[27] It might therefore point to a change in gender relations rather than a new attitude toward children: the number of girls who were exposed may have increased at the same time as the overall rate of exposure remained constant (or even dropped).

Finally, there is the well-known passage of Polybius I mentioned a moment ago. This is a statement about the historian's own time, intended to apply to all of Greece, to the effect that unwillingness to raise children was a significant cause of a decrease in population. A class phenomenon? Perhaps: who outside the elite had wealth they could spend on children? But even accepting as a fact that Polybius is accurately describing something that affected Greeks of every economic status everywhere, he is evidence for his own portion of the Hellenistic period only, around 150—in other words, for a time about 150 years after the New Comedies that provide evidence for a child's right to live. We should be nervous about assuming consistency over a period as long as this; a century and a half is plenty long enough for more than one shift in direction. (It's worth mentioning here that Anna Lagia's study of burial practices involving children in two Attic cemeteries finds a change at about the end of the third century;

that study also groups the late classical period with the early Hellenistic and the late Hellenistic with the early Roman.)[28] Polybius himself describes a state of disorder in the late third and early second centuries, when a sort of mania overtook the Boeotians (20.6.5–6). The childless wasted their wealth on parties and left their relatives nothing; even those who had descendants (*geneas*) gave much of their possessions to their dinner companions. There is no trace here of the concern to preserve property for posterity that led so soon afterward, in Polybius's opinion, to depopulation throughout Greece. Perhaps it is safer, if not very exciting, to suppose that the practice and the rate of exposure differed with circumstances from place to place and over time.[29]

The lack of consistent—or any—quantitative data for the frequency of exposure is paralleled by a more general discontinuity in our evidence for ancient childhood. Many of the scholars who identify the Hellenistic period with a significant shift in attitudes toward children also note that the literary and artistic evidence they adduce has earlier analogues (much as Lagia does in regard to archaeology). Rühfel observes that the characteristically Hellenistic portraits actually start about 340 or 330 with the earliest freestanding statues and terracotta types of children; Fowler finds real babies still earlier, on the Attic *choes;* for Zahn, the innocent children of *Medea* and *OT* are already focuses of adult pity and sentimentality.[30] Herter's last pronouncement on the subject, in an encyclopedia article that appeared only after his death, also recognizes "Vorläufer" such as *choes,* Tanagra figurines, the vase-painter Pausias, and Euripides.[31] Of course, no one really imagines that the attitudes of the classical era simply vanished with the deaths of Alexander, Aristotle, and Demosthenes, and no one should be surprised to learn that allegedly Hellenistic particularities were found earlier as well. The differences between periods will often be matters of emphasis and degree, in the earlier years of a new epoch above all, rather than of sharp shifts and cleavages. As Margaret Atwood, one of the Canadian writers who hasn't won the Nobel Prize for Literature, puts it: "Time is not a solid, like wood, but a fluid, like water or the wind. It doesn't come neatly cut into even-sized lengths, into decades and centuries. Nevertheless, for our purposes we have to pretend it does. The end of any history is a lie in which we all agree to conspire."[32]

Much of the impression of a change in attitudes toward children and childhood results precisely from gaps in our evidence. To return to the comments of Rühfel, Fowler, and Zahn: we have no Hellenistic tragedies, and small *choes* showing children were apparently a fashion that did not continue much past the end of the fifth century. On the other hand, the genres of literature that supply much of the evidence for the new Hellenistic outlook—the hymns of Callimachus, Theocritean idylls—are unknown, or nearly so, in the classical period. Consequently, what appears to be a shift in *mentalité* may be mostly or

even entirely an effect of genre. To be sure, genres themselves are the products of history. To quote Peter Rose: "The formal trajectory from epic formulas to choral lyric, trilogy, single play, philosophical dialogue is . . . not intelligible on the basis of a purely Hegelian logic of forms."[33] Rose himself sees the genres he examines as effects of class struggle. Other views flourish. But none proposes to regard literary genres as a consequence of conceptions of children and childhood, or even to single out new attitudes toward children and childhood as among their most salient effects. The link between epyllion, say, and childhood is not thought to be so strong that the development of one need implicate the other; the art forms that display an interest in children focus as well on other marginalized figures—old women and dwarfs. More dispiriting still, on the relatively rare occasions when we can trace types of evidence from one period to another, continuity is more prominent than change, the changes we perceive are difficult to understand or they contradict our expectations. Polybius is no more interested in or sympathetic toward children than his classical predecessors in the writing of history; epigrams lamenting a girl's death before marriage, a common motif in the archaic period, are found for boys only in Hellenistic times—again, a finding that tells us more about gender than about childhood in general; in the third century, "the new reliefs mostly abandon the intimate family emphasis—the seated women, the children in laps. . . . Children, if they are not the deceased, are accorded 'miniature' status and are often indistinguishable from slaves"; images of children are both more sentimental and idealized and more realistic—a sign, it may be, that the Hellenistic world was so diverse that no swift summary is likely to capture it entire.[34]

Change in Athenian Childhood

Given this preamble, it may surprise readers that I have no doubt that there were changes, even many changes, relevant to the history of Athenian childhood during the classical period. I have referred to one already: the raising of the minimum age of choragi from thirty to forty at some time in the late fifth or early fourth century. Elsewhere I have demonstrated change in another, very different area too, the proportion of sons' names that share a semantic element with their fathers'. These linked names became progressively more frequent at the end of the sixth century and again during the last third of the fifth.[35] Funerary practices shifted as well. Burials of infants and small children, which had increased dramatically three hundred years before, began to drop at the beginning of the fourth century. At the same time, "the traditional formal infant and small-child cemeteries almost disappeared as part of a major change in the distribution of burials."[36] As for iconography, Lesley Beaumont singles out no fewer

than six significant developments in the representation of the child between the late sixth and early fourth centuries: more images, in more pictorial contexts, with increasing care to show "a sub-adult body ideal" and to delineate its stages, in more media, all to present the child as worthy of depiction in its own right rather than merely as a symbol of the *oikos* or of paternal responsibility within it.[37]

What caused these changes? The usual approach is to correlate them with major events in Athens's political history, especially the development of Athenian democracy and its generation-long conflict with Sparta and its allies, the Peloponnesian War. (So I ascribed the upsurge in linked names to the need to assert family solidarity in the face of the challenge of Cleisthenes's reforms and the crises of wartime.) For the most ambitious account, we are once again indebted to Lesley Beaumont, in a publication that appeared a decade before her valuable book.[38] Here we may read that school scenes, newly popular from 500 to 450, reflect the spread of schooling and of literacy after Cleisthenes's reforms. The adolescent *kouroi* in carved stone now gave way to younger children on much cheaper vases, another sign of the new democratic ethos as artists sought to supply a broader base of buyers. Pericles's citizenship law of 451/0, requiring as it did that Athenians have citizen mothers as well as fathers, had an impact as well: infants and young children, already present in domestic contexts in the earlier fifth century, became still more prominent afterward; "the painted image of mother and child must therefore have assumed renewed significance" (72). From 435 or 430, Athenian children began to appear on grave stelai, another more expensive medium, as well as on white-ground lekythoi, on the miniature *choes* connected to the Anthesteria, and (so literary sources inform us) on now lost wall paintings, and a distinctive infant body type became established. Here the cause is the plague that affected Athens in the early years of the Peloponnesian War; the heightened mortality of children, which was one of its consequences, led Athenians to new ways to express the grief so many felt.[39] Beaumont does not discuss funerary practices in this piece. However, Houby-Nielsen offers a similar kind of explanation when she ascribes the remarkable increase in the number of visible burials of infants and small children in the Ceramicus around 500 to an ideology of democratization of which Cleisthenes's reforms made up an element.[40]

There is nothing implausible in any of this, sensitive and well-informed as it is. But neither should it be accepted without question. Do we have enough data to determine that a scene becomes increasingly popular from one quarter of a century to another, especially when such dates (500–475, 475–450) for painted pottery can only be estimates? How much lag should we allow between a political event and its effects on iconography or mortuary practices? Both questions come

into play when we consider the domestic scenes that include young children, where Beaumont credits the Cleisthenic revolution with their introduction and Pericles's law with their rise in popularity. Is the sketch too Athenocentric? After all (as Beaumont scrupulously notes), the Athenian stelai that commemorate children are not the first Greek examples; one, from Paros, is as early as 450. Funerary practices too may reflect broader trends. I have said (in Chapter 4) that these varied so considerably throughout the Greek world that they do not support far-reaching conclusions. But some scholars are less timid.[41] Houby-Nielsen herself notes that the new concern to bury infants and small children in cemeteries is evident at Corinth and Olynthus as well as Athens; Anna Lagia, too, suggests that Greek-speaking communities in many parts of the Mediterranean shared similar burial practices.[42] If they are right, it may be futile to search for the origins of the shifts we can identify in anything distinctively Athenian, though of course local contingencies and conditions may have encouraged or accelerated the adoption of widespread Hellenic tendencies. Indeed, if Jaś Elsner is correct in seeing a series of paradigm shifts in classical Athens that included the creation of tragedy, comedy, and philosophy as we have come to know them, and a reformation of subjectivity that transformed the visual arts as well, then to look for anything revelatory of attitudes to children or of their lives in our evidence for change may be akin to expecting the Great Vowel Shift in English to tell us something special about the letter *a*.[43]

Let us accept that changes occurred—as I certainly do. Let us further agree that we can date them more or less accurately, at least establishing their chronological relationship with known political developments; I'm willing to suspend disbelief here. Let us conclude that the variations we have singled out are neither accidental consequences of vast and far-reaching disturbances nor so frequent that they are the inevitable play of alternation and flux, traces of fads and fashions that belong to the province of what Roland Barthes termed diachrony rather than indicators of historical change with a lasting impact. (We may compare shifts in erotic imagery at Athens: single couples have sex from 520 to 470, rarely later; erotic pursuits are in vogue for some seventy years after 500; homosexual courtship gives way to nuptial images; female nudes go in and out of style.)[44] Can we say what those changes mean?

It is attractive to regard the increased visibility of children—especially the more and better differentiated images in more artistic genres and the more and more prominent tombs and memorials—as signs of enhanced status.[45] But what exactly are we to understand by this? Did more visibility and status lead to any change in adult behaviors toward children or to any change in children's roles in the community, for example, to less corporal punishment or more child priests? So far as we can tell, the answer is no. A modern analogy may be instructive

here. Children are seen—and heard—everywhere in Canada today, from pop songs, television shows, and films (many directed toward them, principally or solely) to advertising campaigns for almost any imaginable product except contraceptives. This may well reflect a higher degree of sensitivity toward children and their needs. Certainly (to mention an issue relevant to ancient Athens too) corporal punishment of children is now prohibited in public schools and is controversial (and sometimes actionable) even in the privacy of the home. On the other hand, in 1989 all parties in our House of Commons voted to end child poverty in ten years and, despite one of the longest sustained economic booms in history, then made no measurable progress toward this goal. Nor has children's visibility led to any formal role in Canadian democracy for those under the voting age of eighteen. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, one of the most important parts of the Constitution Act of 1982, guarantees all individuals equality before and under the law unless the state can show that limits are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society; unlike, say, the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Charter explicitly extends its rights and freedoms to persons of any age. This would seem to be an invitation for children to take part in the democratic process. After all, studies of child development show that the transition to the highest stage of reasoning, involving formal operations, begins at about age twelve and is consolidated during adolescence.[46] Some children, of course, mature more rapidly—Fred Greenstein found that 6 percent of eighth graders (about thirteen years old) made the same kinds of statements as his most politically astute adults, referring to ideological differences among parties and the class composition of their constituencies—and (as any father of boys knows) some less so.[47] Moreover, appeals to adult electors are based largely on image and emotion, not the use of cognitive skills, and voters who do cast their ballots on the basis of rational evaluations of policies and programs soon learn that parties in power need not keep their promises. Yet Canadian commentators continue to regard the exclusion of children from our democracy as self-evident, much as Athenians did.[48] Without some such payoff, I'm inclined to think that the public currency of children today has as much to do with their importance—and that of their parents—as consumers as with any elevation in their status (though the ways their market is approached and exploited reflect and even produce particular understandings of childhood). In this respect, I am sympathetic to a suggestion Lesley Beaumont puts forward in regard to ancient Athens: democracy fostered the ambitions and prosperity of those outside the old aristocratic elite, and their children became "vehicles of middle-class aspirations . . . a focus of competitive display and concern . . . giving rise to the erection of costly grave markers and votive statues."[49]

A related question: Does any reduction in the visibility of children reflect

a loss of status? Houby-Nielsen comes close to reaching this conclusion: the marked decrease in the number of burials of children that begins about 400 is to be accounted for by the replacement of the model of the dutiful, childbearing mother by new ideals of luxury, leisure, and care of the female body, which "may well have induced women to lose interest in the traditional burial customs for small children."[50] But it is only burials of infants in their first year that become scarce; older children's burials are met with as often as before, and in fact funerary stelai for them become more common.[51] In addition, after 400 many women's graves begin to show a female figure mothering a child. Whatever explains the change in babies' burials—a return to intramural burial in the wake of the plague?—it is unlikely to have anything to do with status.

Let us return to the miniature *choes,* as such discussions often do. Painted with charming and varied representations of the children for whom they were meant, these enjoyed a brief heyday from the start of the last quarter of the fifth century to the beginning of the fourth. Many have linked them to the plague that broke out at the outset of the Peloponnesian War in the early 420s. So Raepsaet and Decocq assert that the *choes* demonstrate a new pleasure in observing children, stemming from a desire to imagine childhood as a sort of paradise lost amid the brutal reality of war; Greta Ham sees in them a response to the social crisis of the war years and an expression of anxiety about Athens's loss of population, especially of the boys, on whom the city's survival in war would depend.[52] Fine—but were such emotions new? I have already argued (in Chapter 4) that Athenian parents loved their children and mourned them deeply when they died. Euripides's most affecting uses of children, in *Alcestis* and *Medea,* predate the Peloponnesian War; there is nothing in his work to match the nurse's account of baby Orestes in *Choephori,* a generation before. Nor are the feelings the *choes* express and evoke characteristic of the classical period or distinctively Athenian. Parental care and the poignancy of its failure are recurrent themes in *The Iliad,* both beacons of humanity's best amid the waste of war and an ever-present reminder of its mortality.[53] The playfulness of the children of the *choes* is prefigured by Hermes, the infant trickster, in his *Homeric Hymn.* The contrast between the ignorance and innocence of childhood and the world's dangers, a staple of *The Iliad,* recurs to good effect in Simonides's lines on Danaë and baby Perseus (543P.). Certainly feelings grew stronger or weaker at times, in response to events we know about and others we don't. We should be wary, however, of claiming too much.

Speaking of emotions, I reach the end of this book feeling (once again) a little like the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogs (though I'm much better looking): questioning, ready with a riposte, only to end up in an *aporia,* a dead end with no way forward. In real life, however, I'm much more like the Socrates of

The Republic, a Utopian, convinced of the need for change and the possibility of bringing it about. This is more than Gramsci's opposition between the pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of the will: I am convinced by the arguments of nonlinear dynamics, of chaos theory, nonequilibrium thermodynamics, and other approaches to modeling and understanding complex natural and social processes. In the words of Charles Dyke: "It turns out that the world as a whole is far from in equilibrium, as are most regions of the world. . . . The picture that must emerge to recommend itself to our intuitions is one of the world in a constant flux, with change the norm, and any lasting sameness the result of very special local conditions maintained at cost. . . . The strong presumption is that [this] is also true of social systems."[54]

Change and decay in all around we see—and if not, *why* not? My skeptical side comes to the fore when I consider the children of classical Athens. Change there must have been—but it is sometimes hard to see and even more difficult to understand. I welcome others' efforts to help me see and understand it more clearly. I hope, however, that they will spare some energy for the changes we can make today, starting perhaps with those Canadian children who are still in poverty and many more whose lives we can improve now.

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Abbreviations

ABSA	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
ABV	J. D. Beazley, *Attic Black-Figure Vase-Painters* (Oxford 1956)
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
AntCl	*L'Antiquité classique*
AntK	*Antike Kunst*
AntW	*Antike Welt*
ARV^2	J. D. Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters,* 2nd ed. (Oxford 1963)
AthMitt	*Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* (*Athen. Abt.*)
BAGB	*Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*
BMCR	*Bryn Mawr Classical Review*
CB	*Classical Bulletin*
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
CW	*Classical World*
DHA	*Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*
EMC	*Classical Views/Echos du monde classique*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*
GVI	W Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften,* vol. 1, *Grab-Epigramme* (Berlin 1955)
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
JDAI	*Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts*
JFH	*Journal of Family History*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JRS	*Journal of Roman Studies*
MEFRA	*Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome: Antiquité*

Abbreviations

MH	*Museum Helveticum*
Paralipomena	J. D. Beazley, *Paralipomena: Additions to "Attic Black-Figure Vase-Painters" and to "Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters,"* 2nd ed. (Oxford 1971)
PCPS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
QUCC	*Quaderni urbinati di cultura classica*
REA	*Revue des études anciennes*
REG	*Revue des études grecques*
RhM	*Rheinisches Museum*
RPh	*Revue de philologie*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*
SIFC	*Studi italiani di filologia classica*
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
WS	*Wiener Studien*
ZPE	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

Notes

Preface to the Second Edition

1. Alice McDermott, *After This* (New York, 2006) 240.
2. Vuolanto (2014), last updated in January 2014, includes 1,771 items on childhood from the eighth century B.C. to the eighth century A.D., listed in alphabetical order by author's surname. It supplants Karras and Wiesehöfer (1981). Golden (2014) is an annotated bibliography of the most important contributions, organized by subject. Dasen's contribution to Dasen et al. (2001) 6–17, which discusses the previous ten years' work on ancient childhood, is also arranged by subject. Beaumont (2012) provides a summary of scholarship on Greece (3–11) as well as very full references to earlier work in her endnotes and bibliography. See also Laes (2011) 13–18 (on Greece and Rome) and Harlow, Laurence, and Vuolanto (2007) (on Rome).
3. For an entertaining account of one example and its possible lessons, see John Henderson (2002) on R. G. Austin's editions of Cicero, *Pro Caelio*.
4. Otis (1970) viii. For another example of *Metamorphoses*'s capacity to induce scholars to change, compare Galinsky (1967) and Galinsky (1974) 251–261.
5. For these three strands, see Cunningham (1998) 1199.
6. On these currents, see Goodman (1971) 1–8, Golden (1994) 372.
7. Boli-Bennett and Meyer (1978).
8. See, e.g., James and Prout (1990), James, Jenks, and Prout (1998) 3–21, 67–70; and cf. Laurence (2008) 411–415.
9. Scott (1999) 127.
10. Leifsen (2009) 206–210.
11. Sjöqvist and Åström (1991) 25–28, 30–33, Killen (2001) 8; A. Cohen (2007) 10.
12. Huntley (2011).
13. Laes (2011) 153–155.
14. Jordan (2000), E. M. Harris (2006) 271–279, Harvey (2007).
15. Beaumont (2012) 81, 129, 134.
16. Houby-Nielsen (2000) 164.
17. Reviews of the literature: Kamp (2001), Baxter (2008), Lillehammer (2010).

18. Lillehammer (2010) 22.
19. Early America: Calvert (1992); the Byzantines: Pitarakis (2009); medieval period: Orme (1995), Hadley and Hemer (2014); ancient childhood: Dasen (2010), Bourbou (2013).
20. McNiven (2007).
21. Beaumont (2012) 36, 26, 76–77.
22. E.g., Beaumont (2012) 96.
23. E.g., Beaumont (2012) 116, 199.

Chapter 1. Characteristics of Childhood and Children

1. A history of the motif: Most (2008).
2. See Pelling (1990).
3. Pind. *Nem.* 3.43–52; Hdt. 1.114–115, Xen. *Cyr.* 1.4.16–20 (and compare the boasts of the ten-year-old Cambyses, Hdt. 3.3); Plut. *Alcib.* 2.3 (Duff [2003, 2005]); cf. Plut. *Them.* 2.1–2. Golden (1979) 25–28 provides a discussion of Greek idiom for designating age in years.
4. Hdt. 5.92γ; Arist. *HA* 7.587b5, Hippoc. *Septim.* 7.450L.
5. See especially Pl. *Leg.* 7.788D–790A, Arist. *Pol.* 7.1334b29–1335b20. A political enemy's nature is explained by the allegation that he was raised in an *ergastērion,* a brothel or workshop (Dem. *Ep.* 4.1).
6. Pl. *Tim.* 26B, cf. *Ap.* 18B, *Leg.* 6.753E, 765E, *Resp.* 2.377AB, Eur. *Supp.* 913–917, fr. 1027K., Antiph. 87 B 60D.-K.
7. Pl. *Lys.* 211D; Xen. *Ages.* 10.4.
8. Lys. 2.13, 14.17, 20.34–35, Isae. 7.33–34, Dem. 38.20, cf. Eur. *Med.* 1101–1105, Ter. *Andr.* 51–59. Athenian adoptions looked to the interests of the adopter and were not primarily a means to provide for children in need of care; see Rubinstein (1993) 13–14 and, for motivations for adoption in general, 62–80. However, some infants were adopted (Isae. 5.6–7, 11.8ff., 41, [Dem.] 43.12, 58.31, ?[Dem.] 43.77).
9. The fullest discussion is Boll (1913); see also Vílchez (1983), Laes (2011) 75–99.
10. Eur. *El.* 541–544, cf. 283–284, *Or.* 377–379.
11. Pl. *Alcib. I* 123D, 127E, cf. *Leg.* 11.929C, Hyper. *Lycoph.* 15.
12. Kassel (1951) gives a valuable account of the literary sources down to the end of the fifth century. See also Herter (1961) 146–158, Mette (1982), Sier (2002), Pratt (2013) (who stresses the three *p*'s: play, pathos, and precocity).
13. Arist. *HA* 7.584a23, 581b9; Aen. Tact. 40.
14. Cf. (for Plato) Sprague (1984).
15. Athenian boys were enrolled in a deme, the local, hereditary body that recognized them as citizens, in the eighteenth archon-year after their birth. I have elsewhere argued that since all boys born in the same archon-year were enrolled together, most were eighteen, but some, born late in the year, were still seventeen; see Golden (1979), especially 35–38. B. Robertson (2000) argues that demesmen were concerned with physical maturity rather than chronological age or birth years and so admitted a cohort of brothers and others as much as two years apart in age—they were close enough for government work; cf. Montana (1996) 225–233 (on the process).
16. For such expressions of envy, see Soph. *Ajax* 552–555, *OC* 1229–1232, *Trach.* 141–152, fr. 583R., Eur. *Med.* 46–48; Herter (1961) 146–152.
17. Eur. *IT* 1249–1282; *Hym. Merc.* 17–396, cf. Soph. fr. 314.277–282R.; Pind. *Nem.* 1.33–59; see Beaumont (1995, 1998), Motte (1996), Poulkou (2007), Stark (2012), Cusset (1999) (on Heracles) and Castrucci (2012) (on the treatment of this theme in satyr plays).
18. Hes. *Op.* 127–131.
19. E.g., [Arist.] *Probl.* 34.10.964a33, cf. Arist. *Gen. An.* 2.733b2.

20. For a suggestion that *sōphrōn,* "with a sound/firm midriff," the adjective on which *sōphrosynē* is based, refers in the first instance to a child who has learned to curb his appetite for food and drink, see Levin (2005).
21. Arist. *EE* 7.1240b33 (cf. 2.1226b23), *Mag. Mor.* 1.1185a3, *NE* 1.1100a1, 3.1111a26, 1111b8, *Phys.* 2.197b7.
22. Aeschin. 1.18, cf. 1.39, *Trag. Adesp.* fr. 515aK.-S.
23. Aesch. *Eum.* 38, Soph. fr. 314.161R., Astydamas II 60 F 2 Snell, Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.7, Pl. *Gorg.* 479A, *Leg.* 7.790C–791A, 11.933B, *Phd.* 77DE, *Resp.* 1.330E, *Tht.* 166A, 168D.
24. Pl. *Lach.* 197AB, Arist. *EE* 3.1229a18. But see also Pl. *Leg.* 12.963E.
25. E.g., Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.17, Pl. *Cri.* 46C, *Phd.* 77E, *Resp.* 2.381E; Johnston (1995), (1999) 161–199. Is the lamp mentioned at Lys. 1.14 perhaps a night light to comfort the baby? Winkler (1982) argues that two other female figures, Akko and Alphito, were not bogies but flibbertigibbets in tales told to rouse children from idleness.
26. E.g., a stamnos by Painter of Munich 2413, about 450, Munich 2413, *ARV*^{2} 495.1, 1656, *Paralipomena* 380; Schefold (1981) 51–55. A *chous* may show a boy running away from a silen's mask (van Hoorn [1951] no. 918 pl. 84).
27. Brown (1983) 26.
28. *Dis paides hoi gerontes:* see especially Ar. *Nub.* 1410–1419, Pl. *Leg.* 1.646A, [Pl.] *Ax.* 367B, Theopompus fr. 70K.-A., *Suda* s. *dis paides,* Diogen. 4.18. For full references see Parkin (2011). The motif of the *pais teleios,* puer senex, common in later consolatory epigrams, has a different force. It is meant to assure grieving parents that their child had transcended his or her tender years and enjoyed the wisdom of one much older; Kleijwegt (1991) 123–131, Strubbe (1998) 50–51.
29. Aesch. *PV* 987–988, cf. *Ag.* 277, 479.
30. Ar. *Nub.* 537–539, Eupolis fr. 261K.-A., cf. Ar. fr. 604K.-A., Arist. *Pol* 7.1336b20 (disapproving).
31. For children's complaints, see also Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.8, Pl. *Resp.* 10.604CD.
32. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.3.10, cf. Pl. *Leg.* 1.645E–646A; Xen. *Ages.* 1.17.
33. Know little: Pl. *Clit.* 408E, *Tht.* 197E, *Tim.* 23B, cf. *Euthd.* 294E. Gullible: Pl. *Gorg.* 499C, 502E, *Leg.* 2.664A, *Resp.* 10.598C, *Soph.* 234BC (cf. *Leg.* 2.663B), 242C; similarly, the Peripatetic Clearchus thought children especially susceptible to hypnosis (fr. 7 Wehrli). Lack understanding: Pl. *Euthd.* 279D, cf. *Ep.* 8.355C, *Leg.* 11.929E, *Phlb.* 65C, *Symp.* 204B, [Pl.] *Ax.* 365B. Talk nonsense: Pl. *Cri.* 46D, 49B, *Phlb.* 14D. Lack judgment: Pl. *Gorg.* 464D, cf. *Epin.* 974A, *Leg.* 4.720A, *Resp.* 2.377B–378E, 8.557C, 9.577A.
34. Pl. *Ep.* 4.320C, *Phdr.* 279A, *Prot.* 342E, *Tht.* 177B; *Gorg.* 470C, cf. 471D; *Euthd.* 301C, cf. 279D, *Symp.* 204B.
35. Pl. *Clit.* 409DE, *Ep.* 8.355C, *Leg.* 4.710A, 7.808DE, 12.963E, *Resp.* 4.431C, 441AB, *Tht.* 171E.
36. Arist. *Gen. An.* 1.728a17; Arist. *EE* 2.1224a29, 7.1236a1, 1238a33, 1240b33, *HA* 7.588a31, cf. *NE* 1.1100a1, 3.1111a26, 1111b8, 6.1144b9, 7.1152b20, 1153a30, *Part. An.* 4.686b24, *Phys.* 2.197b7, [Arist.] *Probl.* 10.39.895a13, 11.30.902b10, 30.14.957a43; Arist. *Rh.* 1.1371a15, 2.1384b24. See Coles (1997).
37. Arist. *Aud.* 801b5, *EE* 1.1214b30, 7.1238a33, *NE* 7.1154b10, *Pol.* 7.1323a33, *Protr.* fr. 55 Rose, [Arist.] *Probl.* 30.14.957a43.
38. Arist. *NE* 10.1174a1; *EE* 1.1215b24.
39. Arist. *Mem.* 453b5, [Arist.] *Probl.* 15.3.911a3.
40. Arist. *EE* 2.1219b5, cf. *Pol.* 1.1260a14, 8.1339a30, [Arist.] *Probl.* 10.46.896a19.
41. *Il.* 15.362–364, cf. Arist. *Phil.* fr. 26 Rose (19c Ross).
42. Aesch. *Ag.* 394–395, Eur. fr. 271K., Pl. *Euthd.* 291B; Rabel (1987). Later, Plutarch mentions children trying vainly to hold the rainbow in their hands (*Mor.* 766A).

43. Soph. fr. 149R., cf. Plut. *Mor.* 508C; Apost. 12.93, Diogen. 7.11, *Ep. Diogen.* 3.47, Zenob. 5.58; Carson (1986) 111–116.
44. Eur. *Med.* 1071–1075, 1402–1403, *Tro.* 757–758, cf. Pind. *Ol.* 6.55–56.
45. [Arist]. *Probl.* 4.12.877b20, 4.24.879a22.
46. Pl. *Leg.* 7.789E, *Resp.* 2.377A, cf. Arist. *Pol.* 7.1336a10.
47. Pl. *Leg.* 7.791E, cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 751, Eur. *Alc.* 189–190, *HF* 98–99, *Tro.* 749, Lys. 1.10–11, Arist. *HA* 7.587a28, Men. *Sam.* 239; Pl. *Leg.* 7.792A, *Resp.* 10.604C, Arist. *Pol.* 7.1336a35.
48. Aesch. *Sept.* 348, Ar. *Vesp.* 570, Eupolis fr. 112K.-A.; Men. fr. 668K.-A. Cf. Hdt. 2.2, where *bekos* is the first word spoken by children who are raised among goats.
49. Arist. *Gen. An.* 5.786b16, cf. *Aud.* 803b19, *HA* 7.581b9, [Arist.] *Probl.* 11.14.900a33, 11.24.901b25. Higher-pitched pipes were called *paidikoi,* "childish" (Ath. 4.182C).
50. [Arist.] *Probl.* 11.30.902b16–29; O. Thomas (2010) 199–204.
51. Pl. *Gorg.* 485B, cf. Ar. *Nub.* 862, 1381, Arist. *HA* 4.536b5.
52. E.g., *bau* (Ar. fr. 971K.-A.); *bry, mamma,* and *kakka* (Ar. *Nub.* 1382–1385, cf. *Eq.* 1126 with Schol., Callias fr. 36K.-A.); *lollō* (?) (Hermippus fr. 86K.-A.); *tata* (Theophr. *Char.* 7.9[?]); Golden (1995), Kotzia (2007). The odd circumflex accents at the end of *mamman* and *kakkan* may also reflect childish pronunciation; O. Thomas (2010) 205. But the words may be infinitives rather than feminine nouns—Hesychius (s. *mamman*) and the *Suda* (s. *mamman*) seem to understand *mamman* in this way.
53. [Arist.] *Probl.* 10.4.891a27; 33.18.963b10; 4.28.880a20; Arist. *HA* 5.557a7, [Arist.] *Probl.* 1.16.861a16; Pl. *Leg.* 2.663B.
54. Ath. 10.453CD (perhaps from a comedy), cf. Diphilus fr. 73K.-A, *Hym. Merc.* 294–298.
55. [Arist.] *Probl.* 1.19.861b3, 3.7.872a2, 3.34.876a15, 4.4.877a1, 30.14.957a43.
56. [Arist.] *Probl.* 8.20.889a15, 10.45.895b30. For children's anger—and ways to deal with it—see Hanson (2003).
57. Arist. *EE* 3.1229a29, *Pol.* 7.1334b25; *NE* 3.1119b8, cf. 2.1105a1.
58. Pl. *Leg.* 2.664E; Pl. *Resp.* 4.431C, cf. 4.441A, *Leg.* 2.653A.
59. Ar. *Thesm.* 505–506 (the honeycomb) with Schol., cf. Pl. *Ep.* 13.361A; Arist. *Pol.* 8.1341a16.
60. Pl. *Leg.* 2.664E, 672C, cf. Arist. *Pol.* 8.1340b29.
61. Pl. *Leg.* 7.808D, cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 2.3.9–10.
62. Fr. 35 Wehrli.
63. Ar. *Vesp.* 1183–1185; Pl. *Menex.* 236C, cf. *Leg.* 3.685A, *Tht.* 168E.
64. Lys. 14.25, Pherecrates fr. 164K.-A., Plut. *Alcib.* 3 (= Antiph. fr. 66 Thalheim); on the dangers of acting older than one's age, cf. Eur. fr. 603K., Men. *Monos.* 690, where the contexts are uncertain.
65. I follow Herter (1961); contra, Dover (1974) 104.
66. Pl. *Symp.* 217E, cf. Phot. s. *oinos aneu paideutōn.*
67. Their innocence (and suggestibility) led to their use as mediums, a practice attested only for late antiquity but possibly existing earlier; Johnston 2001.
68. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, sheep farmers offered to buy the land of The Chisholm, head of a Scottish clan, with the intention of driving off the tenants who worked it. He was wavering when his only child, his daughter Mary, protested angrily. He sent her out of the room, but in the end The Chisholm (unlike most chieftains) did not sell; Prebble (1969) 130.
69. See O. Thomas (2010) 207–211, who also remarks on Cyrus's frequent use of the vocative to gain adult attention.
70. So *paidion,* "little child," was felt to be suitable for classical prose, *teknon* was basically poetic, and *pais* is found in all genres. Dickey (2004) provides a helpful survey of determinants for the use of words for children in later Greek in particular.
71. Cf. Golden (1985b) 91–97, Dickey (2004) 119–120.

72. Gomme and Sandbach (1973) 213–214 on *Dysc.* 500.
73. Thus, LSJ s. *pais* and *teknon,* Chantraine (1968–1980) 848.
74. Aesch. *Pers.* 177, 189, 197, etc.; *Cho.* 896; *Supp.* 600, 739, 753, 980.
75. Eur. *Hec.* 171; *Ba.* 1305, *Andr.* 714; cf. Thury (1988b) 305 n. 9. The orators seldom use *teknon,* reserving it for highly emotive contexts; but *pais* can be substituted for it even there, as at Aeschin. 3.156–57.
76. See Schol. and Stanford (1983) 91.
77. For alliteration, see, e.g., Soph. *OC* 1140, Eur. *IA* 690. For puns on *pais* and *paiō,* "I strike," see Aesch. *Eum.* 496, Ar. *Eq.* 451, 453, *Vesp.* 1297–1298, 1307, and Golden (1985b) 102–104; for *pais* and Paris, perhaps Aesch. *Ag.* 394, 399, and Bollack in Bollack and Judet de La Combe (n.d.) 1.2.413 *ad loc.*
78. For examples of words for children used with unusual force in *Agamemnon,* see Rabel (1984), Golden (1985b) 95, (1994) 378–383.
79. Ariès (1973) 1–22. For Ariès's ideas and their influence, see Hutton (2004) 92–112.
80. Manson (1983) 152, cf. Manson (1978) 264–275, Néraudau (1984) 19–61.
81. See Saller (1984a) and (1987b) 67, against Herlihy (1985) 3–4; Saller and Shaw (1984), Shaw (1984).
82. Ar. Byz. fr. 37–66 Slater. In late-fourth-century Athens (and perhaps earlier), an *ephēbos,* "ephebe," was a young man who had reached majority and then underwent two years of military service, during which his civic rights were restricted.
83. Hippoc. in Philo, *Opif. Mundi* 36.105. The division into units of seven is a recurring theme; see, e.g., Solon 27W. and Boll (1913). It is noteworthy that Solon's terminology is much less precise than that in the passage attributed to Hippocrates, another indication that that is a late addition to the Hippocratic corpus; Hanson (2003) 189–190.
84. Antiph. *Tetr.* 2.4.6, Pl. *Leg.* 10.904E, *Lys.* 204E–205B (where Lysis is still known by his father's name); Lys. 32.19, Aeschin. 3.154, Reinmuth (1971) nos. 1, 9; Ar. *Ach.* 680, Thuc. 8.69.4, Isae. 4.26, Aeschin. 3.161, Pl. *Symp.* 198A; Sacco (1979), Cantarella (1990).
85. *Meirakion* and *neaniskos:* Ar. *Eq.* 556, 731, *Plut.* 975, 1016, Antiph. *Tetr.* 2.4.5–6, Lys. 3.10, 32.9, 19, Pl. *Euthd.* 277CD, Men. *Georg.* 67, 69. *Pais* and *paidion:* Isae. 11.37, Pl. *Crat.* 392BD, Arist. *NE* 3.1119b6. *Paidion* and *paidarion:* Pl. *Gorg.* 485B. Note, too, that *paides* are younger than *paidiskoi* at Sparta: Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.32, *Lac.* 3.5.
86. Cf. Bryant (1907) 74–76 and Roesch (1982) 307–354.
87. Arist. *AthPol* 42.1, 56.7, cf. Dem. 21.154, Aeschin. 2.99, 167, Pl. *Menex.* 249A. An exception: at Soph. *Trach.* 557, Deianira describes herself as *pais et' ousa,* "still a *pais,*" at a time when she was already (though very recently) married to Heracles, apparently to bring out her youth and vulnerability.
88. Pl. *Symp.* 222B (reflecting a Homeric adage), [Pl.] *Ax.* 365B, 366D, 367A, Arist. *NE* 2.1105a2, *Pol.* 8.1340b30, [Arist.] *Probl.* 11.24.901b27. It is used of an older boy at Antiph. *Tetr.* 2.2.11 for pathos and to emphasize that he was the unwitting agent of harm. For the Homeric use, see Briand (2011).
89. Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.5, *Oec.* 7.24; cf. Hdt. 1.111, 3.153.
90. *IG* 12.5 677.2, Syros, ?second century A.D.
91. Men. *Sam.* 254; Aesch. fr. 47a.787, 813R., cf. Theoc. 15.12, 42.
92. Pl. *Phd.* 116B, cf. *Ap.* 34D. Gorgo, a girl of eight or nine, is called *paidion* in Herodotus's Ionic dialect (5.51). Children old enough to be in school are *paidia* at Hyper. *Euxen.* 22.
93. *Meirakion* and *meirakiskos:* Pl. *Thg.* 122D, 131A. *Neanias* and *neaniskos:* Pl. *Charm.* 154D–155A. Note, too, that some manuscripts read *neaniais* and others *neaniskois* at Pl. *Resp.* 1.328D.
94. E.g., [Dem.] 53.19, 59.18.
95. Pl. *Pol.* 270E; Arist. *Gen. An.* 2.744a26.

96. Aesch. *Cho.* 750–760, cf. Pl. *Resp.* 5.460D and, for a list of a baby boy's material needs, Plaut. *Truc.* 902–908.
97. Arist. *Col.* 798a30, *Gen. An.* 5.779a27, 780b1. But note that their hair is said to be reddish at *Col.* 797b24. Most imperfect: Arist. *Gen. An.* 5.779a25.
98. Arist. *Gen. An.* 5.778b21, *Somn.* 457a4, cf. *EE* 1.1216a6.
99. Arist. *Gen. An.* 5.779a13, *HA* 5.537b13, *Insomn.* 3.461a13, 462b5, [Arist.] *Probl.* 3.34.876a20.
100. Arist. *Part. An.* 4.686b10, cf. *HA* 2.500b34, *Inc. An.* 710b10; Dasen (2008).
101. For feeding bottles, see Herter (1964), Beaumont (2012) 54–56; potty-highchairs: K. M. Lynch and Papadopoulos (2006), who compare the animals that decorate an archaic period black-figure example by the Gorgon Painter (Athens Agora P 18010, 575–560) to modern goods for children emblazoned with images of Winnie the Pooh; cradles: van Hoorn (1909) 17–21; walkers are mentioned by Soranus, *Gyn.* 2.45.114, and perhaps depicted on a *chous,* van Hoorn (1951) no. 855 pl. 42.
102. For the translation "swaddling clothes," see Hsch. s. *spargana,* Phot. s. *sparganōmata,* LSJ s.v., Deissmann-Merten (1984) 290–291.
103. Pl. *Leg.* 7.789E; Soran. *Gyn.* 2.14–15.83–84, 42.111; Garland (1990) 81–83, Hanson (2003) 196–198, Beaumont (2012) 50–52.
104. E.g., Etienne (1977) pl. 1–4; Plut. *Lyc.* 16.3.
105. Eucharides Painter, 490–480, New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art L.1982.27.8, Beazley Archive 9025040.
106. Cf. van Hoorn (1909) 6–16.
107. See Beaumont (2012) 51 fig. 3.4, 5.
108. Whatever their purpose, such strictures appear to have no measurable long-term effect on physiological or psychological development; Chisholm (1983) 71–91; cf. Doumanis (1983) 52–53 (on the five months of swaddling practiced in rural villages of modern Epirus) and (for a more pessimistic view) Frenken (2011).
109. Cf. Rühfel (1984b) 9–16. Rühfel's two volumes (1984a, 1984b) remain valuable and have now been joined by substantial contributions from Crelier (2008), Seifert (2011), and Beaumont (2012). See also Vollkommer (2000), Neils and Oakley (2003), Grossman (2007), Oakley (2009b), Seifert (2009), Bobou (2010).
110. Beaumont (2012) 37–42; cf. Beaumont (2003) 75–76 (infants, up to the third year; young children, until the seventh year; older children, until puberty around the thirteenth year; there follows a transitional period of adolescence before legal maturity at eighteen, less clearly demarcated for males).
111. Crelier (2008) 101–110.
112. Bobou (2010) 35. Late-fourth-century inventories of bronze statues dedicated by private citizens on the Athenian Acropolis refer to three as depicting a *pais* and two, a *paidiskos.* However, the designations may refer to the sizes of the statues rather than the ages of the boys they depict; *IG* $2^2$1498–1501A, D. Harris (1992) 643.
113. Grossman (2007) 310.
114. London, BM 1805.7–3.183, about 420; Beaumont (2012) 115–116 and fig. 4.10.
115. Slaves: Wrenhaven (2012) 80. Dwarfs: Neils (2007) 66–70.
116. Athens, Kerameikos Museum P 1169, 430–420, Clairmont (1993) 1.235–237; Turner (2012) 226.
117. Athens, NM 993, about 350; Beaumont (2012) 101 and fig. 3.39.
118. Houby-Nielsen (1995, 2000); cf. Crelier (2008) 26–94.
119. Soph. *Ajax* 558–559, 1409–1411; Mills (1980–1981) 134. The newborn Ion would have been unlikely to reach out pathetically to the mother who abandoned him, and as a boy he reveals a rather mature grasp of Athenian political realities (Eur. *Ion* 961, 585–632). See also Eur. *Andr.* 722–723, *Tro.* 749 with 1180–1184; Kassel (1951) 66–69.

120. See the convenient table in French (1977) 18.
121. Cf. Pl. *Crat.* 414B, Arist. *Mem.* 453b6.
122. Hippoc. in Philo, *Opif. Mundi* 36.105, Solon 27.1–2W., cf. Ar. *Ran.* 422, *Com. Adesp.* fr. 201, 202K.-A., Plaut. *Men.* 1116. Pollux, writing about horses, says that the tooth was called *gnōma* and the period itself *gnōristikos,* "capable of knowing" (1.182); cf. Quint. 1.1.15 (quoting Greek authorities).
123. Rogoff et al. (1975).
124. Arist. *HA* 5.544b20, 7.581a9; Eyben (1972), Durling (1986).
125. Lys. 10.4–5, cf. 26.21, 30.7.
126. Pl. *Resp.* 5.450C. The series *genesis, trophē, paideia:* cf. Pl. *Alcib. I* 122B, *Cri.* 50E, 51C.
127. Arist. *Aud.* 801b5, *HA* 4.536b5, [Arist.] *Probl.* 11.1.898b33. Exceptions: [Arist.] *Probl.* 11.27.902a5.

Chapter 2. The Child in the Household and the Community

1. See Golden (1981) and, among many later contributions, Patterson (1985), Oldenziel (1987), Garland (1990) 84–93, Sallares (1991) 129–160, Golden (1992b) 325–331, Gottschall (2008) 119–139, Evans Grubbs (2013). Ingalls (2002) argues against the belief that Athenian girls were exposed more often than boys.
2. Golden (1986) 252–256, Paradiso (1988), Garland (1990) 93–96, Brulé (2007) 405–428, Gherchanoc (2012) 36–48, Laes (2014) 366–369.
3. Hsch. s. *stephanon ekpherein.* Hippias is said to have raised revenue by requiring new fathers to give measures of wheat and barley and a silver coin to the priestess of Athena on the Acropolis ([Arist.] *Oec.* 2.1347a17). The practice may be historical, whatever its origins.
4. This paragraph draws on Golden (1986) 246–252, B. Robertson (1998) 96–112.
5. See Golden (1986) 249–252.
6. Young children might be identified by the name of the father alone; e.g., Pl. *Lys.* 204E, *IG* 2^2 2345.73 ("child of Euphronius"), cf. Pl. *Parm.* 126B. Identification by the mother's name was usually an insult, a slur on one's legitimacy or one's father's worth; see, in tragedy, Soph, fr. 564R. (reading *mētros*), Eur. *El.* 933–935, fr. 1064K., cf. Soph. *El.* 365–367 (note the play on *aristou/kalou*). A few classical gravestones for women bear only the mother's name (*IG* 2^2 10205, 10892, 11568, 11793, 12138, 12575); it is possible that these are unmarried girls whose fathers died before them, but more likely those not recognized by their fathers. (Skinner [1987] suggests that women referred to each other by their mothers' names in private life, but there is no evidence for this from classical Athens.) Exceptional instances occur in Plato's *Alcibiades I,* where Socrates addresses Alcibiades as "son of Cleinias and Deinomache" (105D) and later refers to him as "Deinomache's son" (123C). The contexts may be sufficient cause: a reference to the nobility of Deinomache's family, a challenge to Xerxes's mother and wife. See also Pl. *Ep.* 2.313A, where Dionysius is addressed as "son of Dionysius and Doris."
7. What follows is a summary of Golden (1986) 257–267; cf. Pomeroy (1995) 115–116.
8. On the nature of the *genos,* see Bourriot (1976) and D. Roussel (1976), summarized in R. C. Smith (1985).
9. Andoc. 1.125–127, [Dem.] 59.55–61.
10. On phratry membership, see Golden (1985a), Lambert (1993) 25–57, 178–188.
11. The one known exception is Thrasyllus, introduced by his adoptive father, Apollodorus, at the spring Thargelia (Isae. 7.15). There was a special reason for haste in this case: Apollodorus was a sick man who feared that he would die without an heir.
12. See Lambert (1993) 161–178.
13. Very young: Andoc. 1.125–126, Isae. 8.19, *IG* 2^2 1237.118, *Etym. Mag.* s. *Apatouria,* Dem.

57.54. Three or four: *Pap. Oxy.* 2538 fr. 1+2 col. iii.25–28 (with Carey [2005]), Schol. Pl. *Tim.* 2IB. Seven: Ar. *Ran.* 422. Late: Isae. 6.21–22, cf. Lys. 30.2.

14. *IG* 2^2 1237.5–8, 28–29, 53–54, 60–61; Hedrick (1990).
15. It is possible that this practice was peculiar to the Deceleieis, but the references to the introduction of both older and younger children suggest that it was widespread.
16. Shares from each sacrifice were given to the priest (slightly smaller in the case of the *meion*) and to (?some of) the phraters, who might make up a fairly sizable group; *IG* 2^2 1237.5–8, Schol. Ar. *Ran.* 798, Harpoc. s. *meion kai meiagōgos.* Phrastor, a *genētēs* but a poor man, introduced his son at an early age, but he was sick and probably afraid of dying childless; besides, his father-in-law, Stephanus, may have paid his bills ([Dem.] 59.50). A decree of a group of *orgeōnes,* likely part of a phratry, requires that children receive half shares in an annual sacrifice (*LSS* 20.17–23); Parker (2005) 167–168.
17. Hsch., *Suda* s. *Koureōtis;* van Hoorn (1909) 38–51, Cole (1984). Boys entering the ephebate dedicated a lock of hair as well; Phot. s. *oinistēria* (on the authority of Eupolis, fr. 146K.-A.), Eustath. *Il.* 907.18, Hsch. s. *oinistēria,* Ath. 11.494F, cf. Theophr. *Char.* 21.3, Plut. *Thes.* 5.1, Eustath. *Il.* 165.4, 1292.66.
18. Crete: Koehl (1986). Thera: Davis (1986). Sparta: Xen. *Lac.* 11.3, Plut. *Lyc.* 22.1. For these and other occasions for hair-cutting (and -styling), see now Leitao (2003).
19. Davies (1969) makes a strong but not conclusive case for 366/5; cf. Brun (1985) 312–314, and, contra, Cawkwell (1973).
20. Labarbe (1953) asserts that the historical present in Isae. 6.22, 27 is meant to emphasize just how soon after the rejection of Alce's son Euctemon threatened to marry and the very short time between the boy's final acceptance and Philoctemon's death (388). But the tense may simply highlight an important point—Euctemon's outrageous threat and Philoctemon's untimely death—an expressive and vivid use much like the common forensic use of deictic iota; cf. Lys. 1.6, Dem. 32.5.
21. Hippoc. in Philo, *Opif. Mundi* 36.105, Solon 27.2–3W., Arist. *HA* 5.544b26, 7.581a11; Hopfner (1938) 225–232, Eyben (1972), Durling (1986).
22. Cratinus fr. 183K.-A., Thuc. 2.46.1 with Schol., Lys. fr. 6.35–40 Gernet (*Theoz.*), Aeschin. 3.154, cf. Pl. *Menex.* 249A. Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21 may be an informal example of this usage.
23. Isae. 8.31, 10.12, fr. 25 Thalheim, [Dem.] 46.20, 24, Hyper. fr. 192 Jensen.
24. *Anecd. Bekk.* 255.15; *Etym. Mag.,* Harpoc. s. *epi dietes hēbēsai,* Schol. Aeschin. 3.122, cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.26.
25. See Hopfner (1938) 228–229, Eyben (1972) 695–696.
26. Cf. Labarbe (1957) 66–67.
27. See, e.g., Rhodes (1981) 69.
28. Pelike, Eucharides Painter, 500/490, Oxford Ashmolean Museum 563, *ABV* 396.21, *Paralipomena* 173, Rühfel (1984b) no. 13; Theophr. *Char.* 9.5, 30.6, cf. Men. *Dysc.* 967.
29. Rawson (1986) 30–31.
30. Children and religion: Neils (2003), Seifert (2006), Beaumont (2012) 64–86, 152–186, Garland (2013).
31. Religion and the Athenian family: Morgan (2011).
32. [Dem.] 43.82; for depictions of boys and young men assisting at sacrifices, see Rühfel (1984b) 84–91, Beaumont (2012) 156–160.
33. See Oepke (1934), Rühfel (1984b) 107–114, Beaumont (2012) 106–110, 162–165. For children in general as wedding guests, see Ar. *Av.* 128–134, *Pax* 1265–1304, and the nuptial lebes by the Marsyas Painter, about 340, Leningrad Hermitage inv. 15592, *ARV*^{2} 1475.1, *Paralipomena* 495, Rühfel (1984b) no. 62.
34. Apostol. 8.16, Eustath. *Od.* 1726.18, Hsch., *Suda* s. *ephygon kakon . . . ,* Zenob. 3.98.

35. See, e.g., the lekythos by the Amasis Painter, 550–540, New York Metropolitan Museum 56.11.1, *Paralipomena* 66, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.41, and cf. *Suda* s. *epaulia.* The *pais amphithalēs* may also have been present at the bride's unveiling; Oakley (1982).
36. See, e.g., the late-sixth-century pinax, Paris Louvre L4, *AthMitt* 53 (1928) no. 37 pl. 11; and the loutrophoros by the Kleophrades Painter, about 480, Paris Louvre CA 453, *ARV*^{2} 184.22, *Paralipomena* 340. For funerals and family solidarity, see Humphreys (1983) 104–118.
37. Brauron: Rühfel (1984b) no. 66A; cf. Brauron Museum 1153, Kahil (1983) pl. 15.17, Lawton (2007) fig. 2.10.
38. Athens NM 1402, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.35.
39. Lawton (2007) 42.
40. Thucydides says that the Ionians took their wives and children abroad to certain festivals but implies that this was unusual (Thuc. 3.104.3). For a comic account of a family sacrifice, see Ar. *Ach.* 241–262.
41. Cf. Pl. *Lach.* 187E. A fourth-century votive relief shows a father introducing his son to Heracles; Athens NM 2723, Lawton (2007) fig. 2.15, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.9. On another, a woman and her five children sacrifice to Heracles; Athens EM 8793 = *IG* 2^2 4613. A "child of Euphronius" appears on a mid-fourth-century list of *thiasōtai* of Heracles (*IG* 2^2 2345); Lambert (1999).
42. See Backe-Dahmen (2010) 23–24, Bobou (2010).
43. For a survey, see Fischer (2012) and, for a more thorough account of children's work—broadly defined—in the Roman Empire, Laes (2011) 148–221.
44. See Zeller (1987) 541–548 and Kamp (2001) 14–18 for reviews of the anthropological literature. Women whose public movements are restricted (as at Athens) often use children as their agents.
45. Amphora, Princeton Painter, 540/530, Stuttgart Württembergisches Landesmuseum inv. 65/1, Rühfel (1984b) nos. 9A, 9B.
46. Votive tablet, about 560, Athens Acropolis Museum 2525, Rühfel (1984b) no. 8.
47. Szemerényi (1977) 388. A Boeotian terracotta shows a woman teaching a girl to cook; ca. 500, Boston Museum of Fine Arts 01.7788, Rühfel (1984b) no. 20.
48. Pl. *Resp.* 5.467A, cf. *Leg.* 6.769B, *Prot.* 328A. Note also (1) the older boys working in a bronze sculptor's foundry, cup, Foundry Painter, 480/470, Berlin Staatliche Museen 2294, *ARV*^{2} 400.1, Boardman (1975) pl. 262.2, 3; and (2) the boy and youths working on metal vases, hydria, Leningrad Painter, 475–450, Milan Torno C 278, *ARV*^{2} 571.73, 1659, *Paralipomena* 390. And cooks in New Comedy are said to learn their trade *ek paidos* (Sosipater fr. 1.7K.-A.). In each case, these may be apprentices or wage workers outside the home. The young apprentice whose fourth-century letter laments his mistreatment in a foundry was likely a metic or a slave; Jordan (2000), E. M. Harris (2006) 271–279, Harvey (2007).
49. White (1975) 144–145, Nag, White, and Peet (1978) 297.
50. Lys. 20.11. For boys looking after chickens, see the *chous,* van Hoorn (1951) no. 66, Klein (1932) pl. 10C (Athens NM 1654), cf. (?) Plato Com. fr. 293K.-A.
51. Dem. 18.258–259. Aeschines is said to have helped his mother administer Oriental rites as well, but Demosthenes inconsistently refers to him as both boy and adult (18.259, 19.199).
52. For women in ancient agriculture—and our sources' silence about them—see Scheidel (1995, 1996). The text says that Cnemon works alone. But it also says that he sees no one, and since he obviously sees his daughter, his working alone may exclude only the help of those outside his family, not his daughter's. Perhaps social strictures against girls working outside operated less rigorously out on Attica's margins.
53. Hdt. 6.137.3, Arist. *Pol.* 6.1323a5, cf. Timaeus 566 F 11 in Ath. 6.264D; Paradiso 1993. Menon was put to death for keeping a free boy from Pallene at work in his mill (Din. *Demos.* 23).

Was the charge *hybris*—in this case, treating a free boy like a slave? Or was this a simple case of kidnapping, as perhaps in Men. fr. 148K.-A.? Many vases show young women fetching water from fountain-houses; see Pfisterer-Haas (2002), Nevett (2011) 582–585. Though citizen girls likely did this chore occasionally at least, it is noteworthy that the citizen women who do it in comedy (Ar. *Lys.* 327–329) are old, and so are freed from many of the usual restrictions, and that they complain of being jostled by slaves.

54. Though Solon forbade securing loans on the person at Athens (Arist. *AthPol* 6.1, 9.1, Plut. *Sol.* 15.3, cf. 13.2), some evidence may be thought to show that Athenians, including children, were sometimes sold into slavery in the classical period in order to pay off family debts. However, of the passages usually cited, Lys. 12.98 refers to children sent abroad and living outside Athens (those at Athens faced *hybris,* not sale); Isoc. 14.48 (whether genuine or not) refers to Plataean children whose parents have not yet taken up residence at Athens; Men. *Heros* involves a boy and a girl who are thought to be the children of a manumitted slave, and so not citizens (hyp., 20, 36, Gomme and Sandbach [1973] 390–391); Ter. *Haut.* concerns a young girl who, though the daughter of Athenian parents, is given up for exposure and reared by a Corinthian woman, and pledged by her as security as any slave foundling might be (603, 793–795).
55. Cf. Jameson (1977–1978) 129–130.
56. Murray (1983a, 1983b).
57. *IG* 1^3 131, Isae. 5.47, Dem. 23.130, 136, 58.30, Aeschin. 2.80, Lyc. *Leocr.* 87, Din. *Demos.* 101, Pl. *Ap.* 36DE; Arist. *AthPol* 24.3, 43.3, 62.2; Schmitt-Pantel (1980).
58. D'Arms (1984).
59. K. M. Lynch (2011) 92. For other possibilities, that small cups were used in the initiation of boys into phratries or as *philotēsia,* loving cups given to young *erōmenoi,* see Böhr (2009). Note that sets of small vessels are found in adult graves as well as children's; Dasen (2012) 11.
60. Xen. *Symp.* 1.8; cf. the young man on the cup, Painter of Würzburg 487, about 470, Vienna Kunsthistorisches Museum 2152, *ARV*^{2} 836.15.
61. Arist. *Pol.* 7.1336b22, cf. Pl. *Leg.* 2.666A.
62. Ar. *Eccl.* 678–680, cf. *Pax* 1265–1304 and the paroemiographers' explanation of the proverb *Abydēnon epiphorēma* (Zenob. 1.1, Diogen. 1.1; for a different explanation, see Ath. 14.641A). Iphigenia joined in the paean with her father's guests (Aesch. *Ag.* 243–245), but the presence of a girl may reflect the heroic age (or what was believed about it) rather than classical Athens; cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.26.66. A similar explanation may account for Oedipus's claim that he never ate apart from his daughters (Soph. *OT* 1462–1465).
63. Isae. 3.14, cf. [Dem.] 59.24, 33, 48, Pl. *Symp.* 176E, Nep. *Praef.* 6–7. Wives might join husbands at (or after) dinner in their own home if no guests were present (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.7, Thebes). A family dinner in New Comedy includes a father, mother, aunt, aunt's father, and an old woman; a young man is apparently present as well, but no children are referred to (Men. fr. 186K.-A.).
64. One version of the anecdote in which Themistocles, prosperous in exile, tells his children that they would have been ruined if they had not been ruined (by being forced out of Athens), is set at a meal; Plut. *Them.* 29.7, cf. *Mor.* 185F, 328F, 602A (where Themistocles's wife is present too), Ael. Arist. *Or.* 20.9.
65. Contracts: see Harrison (1968) 61–81, Simantiras (1975). Women could not make agreements for more than the price of a *medimnos* of barley, enough to feed a family for about two weeks; the classical text that mentions this restriction may mean it to apply to children as well, but it may also be read as excluding children from any contracts whatever (Isae. 10.10, cf. Dio Chrys. 74.9, Harpoc. s. *hoti paidi*). In either case, there will have been nothing to prevent children from shopping. In Alexis fr. 130.9K.-A., the grouping "old man, old woman, *paidion*" suggests

that a child may be envisaged as buying fish in the market. The economic interests of fatherless boys were entrusted to guardians; for their legal position, see now Cudjoe (2010) 163–281.

66. Generally considered unfit for war (e.g., Lyc. *Leocr.* 53) and sent away (see Chapter 6) or behind the city's walls (Thuc. 2.14.1, Dem. 19.125, cf. Plut. *Mor.* 849A) in times of crisis, Greek children might serve as hostages along with adult citizens (Thuc. 1.115.2–4, 2.72.2, Isoc. 8.92, cf. Hdt. 1.64.1–2). On one fourth-century occasion, the Mantineans left boys and old men in the fields to supervise agricultural work while the other males were at war (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.14–15); a reference to the tithe extracted from the sale or ransom of Athenian children and women seized when the Spartans occupied Decelea in Attica during the Peloponnesian War indicates the risks (Dem. 24.128). Women and older children were routinely rounded up and enslaved (or sold into slavery) in the wake of warfare; Gaca (2010) stresses the brutality and sexual violence involved. Children too young to walk and feed themselves were simply abandoned; the Spartan king Agesilaus was exceptional in taking them (and the elderly) along; Xen. *Ages.* 1.20–22. There were times when some Greek children were more active—for example, in providing supplies, including ammunition, during the Carthaginian siege of Selinus and later throwing stones and roof tiles at the enemy (Diod. Sic. 13.55.4–5, 56.7, cf. 15.83.3 [Sparta]). At Athens itself, children and women joined in rebuilding walls immediately after the Persian Wars (Thuc. 1.90.3, Diod. Sic. 11.40.1). Plato recommends that children go on campaign as soon as they are old enough to understand what is in store for them as adults, fetching and carrying to make themselves useful and winning prizes for valor (Pl. *Resp.* 5.466E–468B). However, the young men "below the age of service" who served with over-age citizens in Myronides's campaign in the Megarid in 459/8, though described in the funeral speech ascribed to Lysias in terms appropriate to boys, were probably ephebes or the fifth-century equivalent (Lys. 2.50–53, cf. Thuc. 1.105.4).
67. Arist. *Pol.* 3.1278a4 (or, reading *ek prostheseōs,* they are citizens "with a qualification"); cf. *Pol.* 1.1260b20, 3.1275a14.
68. Hyper. *Euxen.* 22, cf. Andoc. 1.130.
69. Arist. *Protr.* fr. 57 Rose (= 3 Ross), Plut. fr. 131 Sandbach, Diogen. 6.46, cf. Callim. fr. 75.9 Pfeiffer; Macar. 5.94, cf. Dio Cass. 52.14.2. Related proverbs: Apost. 1.60, 11.48, 12.48, Macar. 1.57, Zenob. 3.52, etc. Occasionally, others are said to be at risk (Plut. *Mor.* 714E, Ath. 5.214A).
70. Antiphanes fr. 194K.-A.; Golden (1994) 376–378. For the political harm children might do because of their innocence, see Plut. *Mor.* 296DE (an aetiological legend tells how children of Chalcis were tricked into handing over some of Euboea to newcomers).
71. Jurors: Arist. *AthPol* 63.3, Dem. 24.150, Poll. 8.122. Councillors: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.35, cf. *1G* 1^3 14.9–11, Arist. *AthPol* 30.2; Hansen (1980) 167–169, Develin (1985). A red-figure cup shows a beardless youth, clearly under thirty, among jurors about to cast ballots into a voting urn while older men gesture in surprise or alarm; cup, Stieglitz Painter, 470–460, Dijon Musée des Beaux-Arts 1301, *ARV*^{2} 829.37, *Paralipomena* 422, Neer (2002) 138–146 and figs. 59, 60.
72. Cf. Patterson (1981) 164–166 (on the use of *metechein* to express membership in both family and *polis*).
73. Land: Eur. *Hcld.* 826–827, Dem. *Epit.* 5, Pl. *Menex.* 237E–238B, cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 16 (Thebes). *Dēmos, polis, patris:* Lys. 13.91, Dem. 18.205, Pl. *Cri.* 50E, cf. Pl. *Ep.* 7.331CD, Isoc. 6.108 (Sparta).
74. Children: Thuc. 2.44.3, Arist. *Rh.* 1.1361a1. War orphans: Cratinus fr. 183K.-A., Thuc. 2.46.1, Aeschin. 3.154, Pl. *Menex.* 248E, Arist. *AthPol* 24.3, *Pol.* 2.1268a11, Goldhill (1987) 63–76. Orphans of the democrats: *SEG* 28.46, Stroud (1971). Dowries: Aeschin. 3.258, Plut. *Arist.* 27. *Tropheia:* Lys. 2.70, 6.49, Pl. *Resp.* 7.520B, Lyc. *Leocr.* 53.
75. Revolution or counterrevolution: Lys. 20.4, Thuc. 8.74.3, and note Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.19 (a Byzan-

tine successfully defends himself at Sparta on a charge of betraying his city by pleading that he could not bear to see children and women starve). Invocations: Dem. 19.240, [Dem.] 25.101, Aeschin. 2.23, 152, Lyc. *Leocr.* 2, 141, Din. *Demos.* 65, 99, 109, *Phil.* 2. Oaths: Dem. 19.292, Aeschin. 3.120. Exhortations: Thuc. 7.69.2, cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 403–405, Xen. *An.* 3.4.46, *Cyr.* 4.1.17.

76. [Dem.] 59.110–111, Aeschin. 1.187, Lyc. *Leocr.* 141. (Daughters are invoked in the first instance, as the case of Neaera is said to concern their status; sons in the second, which involves allegations that Timarchus prostituted himself as a boy.) For children's familiarity with political figures, see Arist. *Rh.* 3.1408b24.
77. Antiph. 2.2.9, cf. 2.3.7, 2.4.10. A Spartan boy was exiled for accidentally killing another boy with a dagger: Xen. *An.* 4.8.25.
78. Cf. E. M. Harris (2006) 355–357.
79. Antiph. 6.19, 22, [Dem.] 47.70 (cf. 73), cf. Pl. *Leg.* 11.937AB. MacDowell (1963) 102–109 is skeptical even as to homicide cases. Unfortunately, we cannot determine the age or status of the *paidion* (perhaps) called to testify at Din. fr. E21.
80. Most of the evidence is post-classical. See, however, the early-fourth-century votive relief dedicated to Apollo, Rome, Barracco Museum 41, Rühfel (1984b) no. 67.
81. Heroized children: Pache (2004). Boy priests elsewhere: Paus. 8.47.3 (Tegea), 9.10.4 (Thebes), 10.34.8 (Phocis). For a suggestion that children at the Mouseia, festivals of the Muses in schools, "could be said to sacrifice on their own account," see Parker (2005) 251–252.
82. Ar. *Nub.* 861–864; 400–350, Berlin Staatliche Museen K92, Rühfel (1984b) no. 46, cf. Athens NM 3329 (man, woman, and child), Athens NM 1408, van Straten (1987) 169 pl. 17A, 17B (a fourth-century family group).
83. Quotation: Parke (1977) 107; cf. Raepsaet and Decocq (1987), Garland (1990) 122, Houby-Nielsen (1995) 149, Collin-Bouffier (1999), Ham (1999) 202–209, Hillard (2006–2007) 163–164, Beaumont (2012) 70–76. More skeptical: Hamilton (1992) 71–73, Crelier (2008) 164–165 (rejecting the tie to the age of three or four but accepting that the *choes* were meant as souvenirs of the initiation of boys into the community).
84. Philostratus and Athens: Bowersock (1969) 4–6. Age: *IG* 2^2 1368.130, 13139.
85. See Garland (1992) for examples of new cults.
86. Wreathed crawlers: van Hoorn (1951) no. 248 *undecies* pl. 388i, ?no. 278 pl. 13, ?no. 367 pl. 504, no. 669 pl. 17a, 17b, no. 851 pl. 438, cf. no. 640 pl. 93; Rühfel (1984b) 163–168. Satyrs: Dickmann (2006). The notion that *choes* were used as grave goods for those who had died before the age of two (or three) should also be rejected; Green (1971) 189 n. 4.
87. For differences in the depictions of boys and girls, see Dasen (2005) 62–66.
88. Karouzou (1946) 136; e.g., Keuls (1985) 303, van Hoorn (1951) 33–35.
89. Hesychius (s. *limnomachai*) refers to boys boxing in the precinct of Dionysus in the Marshes at an unspecified date and Rühfel (1984b) 147 connects this notice with a *chous* to argue for boxing competitions at the Anthesteria. But the older boys in the *chous* in question face each other with their hands open and do not wear boxing thongs; they must be wrestlers (van Hoorn [1951] no. 368 pl. 132).
90. Cf. Rumpf (1961), Green (1971) 189, Kyle (1987) 45–46.
91. Hani (1978); Deubner (1932) 118–121.
92. Aristodemus 383 F 9 in Ath. 11.495E, Proclus *Chrest.* 92, cf. Plut. *Thes.* 23.2–3. Schol. Nic. *Alex.* 109, who calls the participants *paides amphithaleis,* does not necessarily contradict this; the youths may have been chosen from those with both parents alive. See Kadletz (1980), Rutherford and Irvine (1988). A red-figure cup in Munich may show a boy in his mid-teens at the Oschophoria, but the context is too uncertain—and the cup too poorly painted—to be sure; Böhr 2007.

93. Cf. Vidal-Naquet (1981) 156–162.
94. Ar. *Eq.* 729 with Schol., Plut. *Thes.* 22.5, Eustath. *Il.* 1283.7, *Suda* s. *eiresiōnē;* Merkelbach (1952), N. Robertson (1984) 388–395. In some cases, the branch was too large for so small a child and a father did the heavy lifting. The frieze: Rühfel (1984b) no. 48. Inscriptions: *IG* 2^2 1039.82, 11674. Chirassi Colombo (1979) discusses the Pyanopsia, Oschophoria, and Apaturia in the context of rites for another marginal group—women—in the same month.
95. Steiner (2006).
96. Loutrophoros, Eleusis, about 520, Beazley Archive 5955. For the possibility of boys (or youths) being initiates in Corybantic mysteries, see Pl. *Euthd.* 277D; in the cult of Sabazius, Rühfel (1984b) 118–120.
97. The only classical references are Harpoc. s. *aph' hestias myeisthai* (cited from Isaeus) and (probably) *IG* 1^3 6 C 25–26 and *Hesperia* 49 (1980) 264 lines 41–42. Statues of boys found at Eleusis probably depict *paides aph' hestias* rather than ordinary initiates; Beaumont (2012) 160–161.
98. See now Neils (2001) 168–171 (boy). Fehr agrees that the figure is a boy but reads the scene as domestic—a depiction of a model Athenian family—and the cloth as a father's *himation* rather than the Panathenaic peplos; Fehr (2011) 104–111.
99. Puppet shows: Pl. *Leg.* 2.658C. Musical contests: Pl. *Leg.* 3.700C. Spectacles: Pl. *Leg.* 10.887D. Spur on competitors: Pl. *Ep.* 4.321A. Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 7.817C, Theophr. *Char.* 9.5, 30.6.
100. Pl. *Gorg.* 502BD, *Leg.* 2.658BD; Ar. *Eccl.* 1146, *Pax* 50–53, 765–766, Men. *Dysc.* 965–967, *Sam.* 733–734, cf. Ar. *Nub.* 537–539, Eupolis fr. 261K.-A., Plato Com. fr. 206K.-A., Arist. *Pol.* 7.1336b20, Plaut. *Pseud.* 1081–1083.
101. Sutton (1981). To say no more, postponement of introductory material to the end of the day seems most impractical pedagogically. For a different (and more plausible) account of the function of satyr plays, see Seaford (1984) 26–33.
102. Jory (1967), with the corrections of J. and L. Robert, *REG* 81 (1968) 462–463, Prosperi Valenti (1985); Sifakis (1979a).
103. *Peace:* Carrière (1977) 31–36 (but see D. Bain, *CR* 29 [1979] 138). *Frogs:* Sommerstein (1980) 15. See Chapter 3 of this book for boys in festival choruses.
104. Aside from *choes,* we may cite the skyphos by the Brygos Painter, about 480, Boston Museum of Fine Arts 10.176, *ARV*^{2} 381.173, Rühfel (1984b) no. 37, which shows "one of the first, one of the only, real children in vase painting" (Beazley [1918] 90).
105. See, e.g., Dale (1954) xx, Stanley-Porter (1973) 69.
106. Griffiths (1999) 23–51 (quotation at 28). Dolls, likely unmasked, probably did duty for babies; Heap (2002–2003) 93, 113.
107. Cf. W. M. Calder III, *CP* 78 (1983) 87, and, for theatrical families, Sutton (1987).
108. Goldhill (1987) 71–75, Brillet-Dubois (2010).
109. I reserve discussion of another function of these cults—as a locus for the interaction of girls—for Chapter 3. Dillon (2002) 37–72 provides an excellent overview. See also Garland (1990) 187–196, Parker (2005) 218–248.
110. I translate the text printed by Stinton (1976) and Jeffrey Henderson (1987a), but take Artemis (not Athena) to be the foundress, with Sourvinou (1971) and Walbank (1981); contra: Grebe (1999).
111. Brelich (1969) 229–311.
112. *Arrhēphoroi:* Paus. 1.27.3, Harpoc. s. *arrhēphorein* (perhaps reflecting Dinarchus), *Anecd. Bekk.* 202.3, *Etym. Mag.* s. *arrhēphorein,* cf. *Suda* s. *epiōpsato. Aletrides:* Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 643, Eustath. *Od.* 1885.15, cf. Hsch. s. *aletrides. Arktoi:* Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 645 (L.) (*epilegomenai;* but see further discussion in Chapter 3). *Kanēphoroi:* Philochorus 328 F 8, Hsch., Phot. s. *kanēphoroi, Anecd. Bekk.* 270.31, Schol. Ar. *Ach.* 242.
113. Thuc. 6.56.1, Arist. *AthPol* 18.2, cf. Pl. *Hipparch.* 229C, Arist. *Pol.* 5.1311a36; Lavelle (1986b).

114. Cf. M. Piérart, *AntCl* 40 (1971) 784–785, Loraux (1981) 177, Lloyd-Jones (1983) 92, and, for another example, Ar. *Lys.* 567–586.
115. Harpoc., Hsch. s. *dekateuein, Anecd. Bekk.* 235.1, say the *arktoi* were about 10; *Suda* s. *arktos ē Braurōniois* and Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 645 (L.) say, in almost the same words, that they were no older than 10 and no younger than 5. Kahil estimates the age of the *arktoi* shown on *krateriskoi* of distinctive shape found at the sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron to be from 7 to 10 or a little more ([1965] 22) or from 8 to 13 ([1977] 86). Perlman (1983 argues that *arktoi* were from 10 to 14 or 15 years of age; cf. Grebe 1999. Beaumont accepts the literary evidence that service as an *arktos* ended at age 10 and regards the contradictory depictions on the *krateriskoi* as indications that the young "bears" had now begun the transition toward marriage (Beaumont [2012] 174–186; cf. Parker [2005] 234–235). All such interpretations of the material evidence must remain provisional until it is (finally) fully published; for some problems, see Lundgreen (2009).
116. Cf. *Anecd. Bekk.* 202.3, *Etym. Mag.* s. *arrhēphorein.* However, Van Sichelen (1987) argues that *arrhēphoroi* were chosen annually.
117. Lloyd-Jones (1983) 92–93.
118. See Walbank (1981) 279–280 for examples of *kanēphoroi* in different rites.
119. Cf. C. Sourvinou, *JHS* 91 (1971) 174–177, Walbank (1981) 276, N. Robertson (1983) 280, Cole (1984) 238.
120. N. Robertson (1983) 241, 265–276, Brulé (1987) 79–98, Van Sichelen (1987), Pirenne-Delforge (1994) 48–59, Donnay (1997), Neils (2007) 64–66, Beaumont (2012) 170–174, Boutsikas and Hannah (2012). On the possibility that an *arrhēphoros* appears on the Parthenon frieze, see Ricarda Schmidt (2010) 226–227 (skeptical).
121. *Suda* s. *chalkeia, Etym. Mag.* s. *arrhēphorein* and *chalkeia;* N. Robertson (1983) 276–280.
122. Kahil (1983) 240, Cole (1984) 239–240.
123. Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 643, Hsch. s. *aletrides;* Neils (2007) 59–64.
124. Hsch. s. *ergastinai, IG* 2^2 1034 (98/7).
125. Philochorus 328 F 183, Plut. *Thes.* 23.3.
126. Redfield (1982), Jenkins (1983), Rehm (1994).
127. Eur. *Med.* 231, 238–240, cf. Soph. *Trach* 141–150, 529–530, fr. 583R. Sourvinou-Inwood (1987) 136–147 argues that girls fleeing amorous pursuers on Attic vases reflect a panic associated with marriage.
128. Cf. Parker (1983) 79–81, who stresses that children's cult roles are to be explained as often by social status as by purity.

Chapter 3. The Child and His or Her Peers

1. Arist. *EE* 7.1236a38, *NE* 8.1156a31, 1157a28, 1158a6, 9.1165b25.
2. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.3.14, 4.2.10, cf. 5.1.2. Others had hunted with him in their youth; cf. Xen. *An.* 5.3.10, *Cyn.* 2.1.
3. Isoc. 15.93 (*ek meirakiōn*), cf. Apollodorus fr. 13K.-A. (but the text is uncertain); Dem. 29.23.
4. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20, cf. Isoc. 15.207 (for the assumption that schoolmates kept tabs on one another in later life), *Pap. Oxy.* 2538 fr. 1+2 col. iv.1–20 (for schoolmates as witnesses), and Arist. *Pol.* 5.1313b1 (where tyrants are said to be concerned lest schoolfellows' familiarity and trust pose a threat to their regimes).
5. See E. Schmidt (1971), Beck (1975), Regine Schmidt (1977), Mühlbauer and Miller (1988), May et al. (1991), De' Siena (2009), Beaumont (2012) 128–134, Dasen (2012). On the classification of children's games, see now Whittaker (2012).

6. *Paidia,* "childish pastime," was often contrasted with *spoudē,* "serious business"; e.g., Xen. *Symp.* 1.1, Pl. *Leg.* 1.647D, 5.732D, 7.796D, *Pol.* 288C, *Resp.* 10.602B.
7. Herondas 3.5–6, 65, Poll. 9.113–114, 125, Hsch., *Suda* s. *chytrinda.*
8. Ar. *Av.* 388–392; Lambin (1977).
9. Plato Com. fr. 168K.-A.; Pl. *Phdr.* 241B with Schol., *Resp.* 7.521C, Poll. 9.111–112; Taillardat (1967) 168–169.
10. Pl. *Phd.* 110BC; *Leg.* 1.644D, 7.803BC, cf. already Heraclitus 22 B 52D.-K.; Sprague (1984).
11. Eur. fr. 272K.; Theophr. *Char.* 5.5, and cf. 14.10—the stupid man forces children to wrestle and run about.
12. Ael. *VH* 12.15, Plut. *Ages.* 25.5, Val. Max. 8.8 *ext.* 1, Sen. *Tranq.* 17.4; Diog. Laert. 9.3.
13. In addition to the passages already mentioned, see, e.g., Ar. *Nub.* 763, *Plut.* 816, 1056–1057, Telecleides fr. IK.-A.
14. Pl. *Resp.* 4.424E–425A; *Leg.* 7.797A–798C.
15. Pl. *Leg.* 1.643BC, *Pol.* 308D, *Resp.* 7.536D–537A. Egyptians: *Leg.* 7.819BC.
16. Anon., *Anth. Pal.* 6.280, Theodorus, *Anth. Pal.* 6.282, Leonidas, *Anth. Pal.* 6.309; Daux (1973) 225–229, Neri (1998) 172–174 (on the text of 6.280).
17. See Schädler (1996).
18. E.g., Plut. *Mor.* 229B (Lysander), 330F (Dionysius), Ael. *VH* 7.12 (Lysander and Philip of Macedon).
19. Pliny, *NH* 34.19.55; Beschi (1978). School scenes include the famous "school cup" by Douris about 490–480, Berlin Staatliche Museen F2285, *ARV*² 431.48, 1653, *Paralipomena* 374, *Add*² 237, Rühfel (1984b) nos. 24a and 24b, Beaumont (2012) fig. 2c, and another cup by the Akestorides Painter, about 460, New York Metropolitan Museum 22.139.72, *ARV*² 781.1, Rühfel (1984b) no. 26, cf. Pl. *Lys.* 206E.
20. Pl. *Resp.* 2.374C (*ek paidos*); on the games, see Poll. 9.94–98, Taillardat (1967) 149–161.
21. *Helkystinda* and *ephelkystinda:* Eustath. *Il.* 1111.24, Poll. 9.112, cf. Pl. *Tht.* 181A, [Arist.] *Probl.* 8.9.888a19. Cockfighting: Pl. *Leg.* 7.789B.
22. Xen. *Eq. mag.* 5.10; cf. *Cyr.* 1.6.32, and, for children's arguments about cheating, Pl. *Alcib. I* 110B; for guessing games, see also Ar. *Plut.* 816, 1056–1057, Pl. *Lys.* 206E, Beck (1975) 22. *Polis,* a board game involving the capture of an opponent's pieces, would also be a good preparation for interstate warfare if played by children; Hansen (2002).
23. Cup, Painter of Munich 2660, about 460, New York Metropolitan Museum 17.230.10, *ARV*² 784.25, *Paralipomena* 417, Rühfel (1984b) no. 28.
24. Van Hoorn (1951) no. 108 pl. 200; cf. no. 244 pl. 197a, no. 402 pl. 199, no. 629 pl. 196.
25. Van Hoorn (1951) no. 854 pl. 147.
26. Schwartzman (1978) 104–105, Kamp (2001) 19.
27. Lambin (1975) 173–175, Jārvinen (1997), *Etym. Mag.,* Hsch. *S. drapetinda.*
28. Schwartzman (1978) 25, 124–133.
29. Ar. *Pax* 1300, *Thesm.* 291; Jeffrey Henderson (1975) 109, and, for the reading *posthaliskon,* Taillardat (1961).
30. Aesch. fr. 47a.805–814R.; other male infants were fetching enough to pique the gods' erotic interest in early Greek myth—Pelops (Pind. *Ol.* 1.25–27), Adonis (Panyassis fr. 27 Bernabé).
31. Arist. *Gen. An.* 1.728a10, cf. [Arist.] *Probl.* 4.26.879b19, 30.1.953b36.
32. For boys' use of "the finger," a vulgar sexual gesture, see Ar. *Nub.* 653–654, and cf. *Ach.* 444, *Eq.* 1381 with Schol., *Pax* 549, Phot. s. *hatapygōn,* Poll. 2.184.
33. Ar. *Thesm.* 478–480. Solon's law: Lys. 1.30–32, 49, Dem. 23.53–55, Plut. *Sol.* 23.1.
34. Some prostitutes (male and female) were themselves children; see [Dem.] 59.18–19, A. Thomas (2012).

35. Lys. 1.12–13, and, for a young man and a slave girl, (?) Xenophanes 21 B 42D.-K.
36. See, e.g., Ar. *Plut.* 242–244, [Andoc.] 4.31, Lys. 19.10, Isae. 10.25, Aeschin. 1.42, 94, Diphilus fr. 42.26–27K.-A., and, for the phrase, Phryn. *Praep. Soph.* p. 44.3 (= *Com. Adesp.* fr. 578K.-A.).
37. Hydria, Harrow Painter, about 470, Tampa Museum of Art 1986.070, *ARV*² 276.70, Neils and Oakley (2003) Catalogue 257–258 no. 62, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.5.
38. See especially Dover (1978). For refinements and additions, see Buffière (1980), Golden (1984), Cohen (1991) 171–202. For objections: Davidson (2007).
39. Boys: Aeschin. 1.13–16. Adults: Ar. *Eq.* 876–880, Aeschin. 1.29–32; Dover (1978) 23–39.
40. D. Cohen (1991) 176–180; cf. the criticisms of Cantarella (1992) 42–44. For some issues raised by applying contemporary judgments on sexual relations between adults and legal minors to the ancient world, see Laes (2010). For an example of such an application, finding an explanation for actions attributed to Alcibiades by our sources in Athenian pederasty—"child abuse"—and raising the possibility that his incest with his mother was one of the inspirations for Sophocles's *Oedipus,* see Vickers and Briggs (2007). Moreno (2007) provides a corrective.
41. Dover (1978) 84.
42. E.g., Xen. *Mem.* 4.1.2, *Symp.* 8.23–41, Pl. *Euthd.* 282B, *Hipparch.* 229CD, *Lys.* 205B, *Symp.* 184DE, Dem. 61.2, 6, 34–57; Dover (1978) 91, 153–164. A cup by the Akestorides Painter (about 460, Munich, Bareiss, *ARV*² 1670) may show a boy reciting before an older male admirer; Immerwahr (1973) 144; cf. Immerwahr (1964) 21, 23.
43. For the association of homosexuality with public life, see, e.g., Eupolis fr. 104K.-A., Ar. *Eccl.* 112–113, *Nub.* 1093–1094, Plato Com. fr. 202K.-A., Pl. *Symp.* 192A. A cup by the Splanchnopt Painter, about 470, Würzburg Martin von Wagner Museum der Universität 488, *ARV*² 893.25, which depicts two boys of similar ages and (?) a money pouch, may refer to a difference in social and economic standing; cf. Keuls (1983) 226–229, and note 37 above.
44. Cf. Golden (1984) 318–319.
45. Dover (1978) 137–148.
46. The Aristotelian *Problems* regards adult fondness for passive homosexuality as the consequence of indulgence around the time of puberty (and not before it) and seems neutral in its tone ([Arist.] *Probl.* 4.26.879b37).
47. Two Greek words, *gymnasion* and *palaistra,* were applied to locales for physical exercise, sometimes without obvious distinction. In general, however, palaestrae (often privately owned) were less elaborate—they lacked a running track—and gymnasia (usually public) were larger; Glass (1988).
48. For sexual advances in gymnasia and palaestrae, see, e.g., Ar. *Vesp.* 1023–1028, Aeschin. 1.135, Pl. *Charm.* 153A, 154AC, cf. Theophr. *Char.* 27.14; Scanlon (2002) 87–93. For the law, see Aeschin. 1.138, cf. Plut. *Sol.* 1.3, *Mor.* 152D, 751B, Hermias Alex. *in Pl. Phdr.* 231E; Kyle (1984) 99–102. Some Greek cities had palaestrae (and possibly gymnasia) for boys alone, perhaps another measure to hinder unsupervised sexual liaisons with older males, but there is no evidence for this at Athens.
49. Ar. *Nub.* 961–983; Aeschin. 1.187, Pl. *Lys.* 208C, 223A, *Symp.* 183CD, Alexis fr. 290K.-A., cf. Pl. *Leg.* 7.808CD, the vases listed in Beck (1975) 65 (under "literary and humane education"), and those discussed in *AntK* 23 (1980) 40–43. An unusual variant shows Heracles being led to school by a tattooed Thracian woman; skyphos, Pistoxenos Painter, 470–460, Schwerin Staatliches Museum 708, *ARV*² 862.30, *Paralipomena* 425, Beck (1975) no. I.37 pl. 25. We may compare the grown-up hero's subjection to Omphale.
50. Pl. *Phdr.* 255A; *Symp.* 183CD. Another example of children's capacity for exerting peer pressure is the saying "Pigs follow their mother," applied to mamma's boys and misfits (Schol. Ar. *Plut.* 314).
51. Pl. *Charm.* 161D. The enemies Plato mentions may be family foes. However, a child's ditty

aimed at those with weak eyesight—"look up a dog's bum and three foxes' bums too"—indicates that Athenian children could make enemies on their own (Schol. Ar. *Eccl.* 255, cf. Ar. *Ach.* 863).

52. Much of the evidence is presented in Beck (1964), especially 72–141. Beck (1975) provides an excellent portfolio of illustrations from vases and other media, and Joyal, McDougall, and Yardley (2009) provide a collection of translated texts with useful commentary.
53. Encouragement and regulation: e.g., Plut. *Sol.* 22, cf. Pl. *Cri.* 50D, Alexis fr. 305K.-A. (= Vitruv. 6 *praef.* 3), Aeschin. 1.9–12.
54. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.2–3, Arist. *NE* 10.1180a24, *Pol.* 8.1337a24, cf. Isoc. 7.37.
55. *Pap. Oxy.* 2538 fr. 1+2 col. iv. 1–5, with Carey (2005).
56. Niceratus: Xen. *Symp.* 3.5, cf. 4.6. Apaturia: Pl. *Tim.* 21B, cf. *Trag. Adesp.* fr. 515aK.-S. Of course, this does not mean that everyone thought they paid *enough* attention: Pl. *Euthd.* 306DE, cf. *Theag.* 122B.
57. Cup, Sabouroff Painter, about 460, Amsterdam Allard Pierson Museum 8210, *ARV*² 838.27, Beck (1975) no. X.1 pl. 349 (where the boy is identified as a girl), Immerwahr (1973) 144. Xenocrateia: *IG* 2² 4548, Athens National Archaeological Museum 2756, Lawton (2007) fig. 2.6, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.23 (but different interpretations are possible; e.g., Guarducci [1974] 58–59).
58. Plut. *Them.* 10.3, cf. (elsewhere in Greece) Hdt. 6.27.2, Thuc. 7.29.5, Ael. *VH* 7.15; Immerwahr (1964) 17.
59. Pl. *Leg.* 7.794C, Arist. *Pol.* 7.1336b36, cf. [Pl.] *Ax.* 366D, Plaut. *Bacch.* 440, *Merc.* 289–304, Quint. 1.1.15–16.
60. Arist. *Pol.* 8.1337b22, cf. Xen. *Lac.* 2.1, Pl. *Clit.* 407BC, *Theag.* 122E, and, for vases showing all three aspects of education, Webster (1972) 57–59. *Grammata* probably included basic arithmetic, the Greek letters doing double duty as numerals.
61. Pl. *Leg.* 7.809E–810B; Booth (1985).
62. Cf. Beck (1964) 80–83.
63. Dem. 18.257; Arist. *Pol.* 4.1294b21 (on Sparta).
64. Pl. *Prot.* 326C, cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.15, 8.3.37, Lys. 20.11, Isoc. 7.44–45, Dem. 18.265. *Mousikē:* Ar. *Eq.* 188–189, cf. *Ran.* 727–730, *Vesp.* 959, 989, Men. fr. 387K.-A. (= Quint. 1.10.18), and, for concerns about the cost of schooling, Theophr. *Char.* 22.6, 30.14 (contemptuous). Better-off boys took lessons in horsemanship (expensive: Xen. *Eq. mag. Hipparch.* 1.11–12) and dancing (Sophocles, Ath. 1.20F). For *mousikē* and *gymnastikē* as pursuits of the elite, see Pritchard (2013) 66–82.
65. Ar. *Eq.* 188–189, cf. *Vesp.* 960–961; Pl. *Leg.* 3.689D, cf. Apost. 11.53, Diogen. 3.18, 6.56, *Suda* s. *mēte nein mēte grammata.* Pritchard doubts that the Sausage-Seller or the proverb testify to more than familiarity with the alphabet but accepts that the classes of the *grammatistēs* included many poorer Athenians (Pritchard [2013] 58–66).
66. Pl. *Resp.* 8.562C–563A; Arist. *Rh.* 2.1398b26, cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.20.
67. Beatings: Ar. *Nub.* 972, Xen. *An.* 5.8.18 (cf. 2.6.11–15), *Cyr.* 1.3.16–17, 2.2.14, Pl. *Leg.* 3.700C; cup, Splanchnopt Painter, about 450, Melbourne 1644.4, *ARV*² 892.7, *Add*² 303, Beck (1975) no. VI.15 pl. 273, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.30. *Paideuō:* Soph. *Ajax* 595, Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.5.
68. Apollod. 2.4.9, Diod. Sic. 3.67.2, Paus. 9.29.9, and, for depictions on Attic vases, Beck (1975) nos. I.38–41 pl. 26–29. See Xen. *An.* 2.6.12 for an indication of such hostility.
69. Herondas 3.59–61; gem, Berlin Staatliche Museen 6918, Beck (1975) no. VI.18 pl. 275.
70. See skyphos, Bari R 150, Beck (1975) no. VI.19 pl. 276a (*paidagōgos* with stick threatens boy).
71. Paus. 6.9.6 (Astypalaea), Hdt. 6.27.2 (Chios).
72. Hyper. *Epit.* 8, cf. Isoc. 12.198, 15.289–290, and Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.6 (where it is implied that Athens's schools do not live up to this ideal).

73. E.g., Soph. *OC* 919, Eur. *Cycl.* 276, cf. Thuc. 1.84.4, 2.41.1, Pind. fr. 198a.
74. Writing: Muir (1984). Memorization: Xen. *Symp.* 3.5 (cf. 4.6), Pl. *Leg.* 7.810E–811A, *Prot.* 325E, cf. Aeschin. 3.135; Cribiore (1996).
75. Asclepiades, *Anth. Pal.* 6.308.
76. Nolan amphora, Ethiop Painter, about 450, Boulogne-sur-Mer 667, *ARV*^{2} 666.15, *Add*^{2} 278, Beck (1975) no. V.10 pl. 228, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.29; lekythos, Klügmann Painter, about 430, Salonika University, *ARV*^{2} 1199.20, Beck (1975) no. V.11 pl. 229; cup, Splanchnopt Painter, about 450, Melbourne 1644.4, *ARV*^{2} 892.7, *Add*^{2} 303, Beck (1975) no. VI.15 pl. 273, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.30; cf. Queyrel (1988) 97–101.
77. *IG* 12.9 189, about 340; Rotstein (2012) 102–116.
78. *IG* 2^2 1138.6, 11, cf. 2318.320–324 (restored), 3061, Dem. 21.10, 64, Arist. *AthPol* 56.3.
79. Antiph. 6.11, *IG* 2^2 1138.6, 11, 3063, 3065–3068, 3070, Arist. *AthPol* 56.3.
80. Aeschin. 1.11, Arist. *AthPol* 56.3, cf. Pl. *Leg.* 6.764E.
81. Lys. 21.1–5; [Andoc.] 4.20–21. The authenticity of Lysias's speech is not assured, and the year in question was an unusual one. But the story of Alcibiades's outrage recurs in another near-contemporary source, and it must have seemed plausible to a fourth-century audience (Dem. 21.147, cf. Plut. *Alcib.* 16.4).
82. Choragi commemorated victories with tripods, statues, and so on; see Isae. 7.40, Harpoc. s. *katatomē, IG* 1^3 961; P. Wilson (2000) 198–262.
83. P. Cartledge, *Hermathena* 134 (1983) 84.
84. Pl. *Leg.* 8.836A. For quarrels involving the love of boys or young men and their private and public ramifications, see, e.g., Lys. 3, Thuc. 6.54–59, Arist. *AthPol* 18.2.
85. See the different views of Pritchard (2004)—who sees the choruses as an elite monopoly—and Fisher (2011).
86. Cf. P. Wilson (2000) 55–57.
87. Kyle (1987) provides a general account of athletics in archaic and classical Athens. For children and sport in Athenian art, see Rühfel (1984b) 53–61.
88. On age classes and the roles of children in sport, see Golden (1998) 104–116, Kratzmueller (2004), Petermandl (2012).
89. H. Jacobson, *Kalooki Nights* (New York 2006) 116.
90. For Olympic victors running and fighting in families, see Pomeroy (1997) 85–95, Golden (1998) 108–109.
91. Paus. 6.2.10–11. Other very young Olympic victors (in boxing): Paus. 6.3.1, 6.7.9. Robbins (1987) suggests that Pytheas of Aegina won the *pankration* at Nemea at the age of twelve.
92. *IG* 7 1765, Thespiae, first century A.D. (where these age classes must be based on only the lower limit for *paides* at Delphi and Isthmia); Phot., *Suda* s. *Panathenaia* (but both texts are corrupt).
93. Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.40, Plut. *Ages.* 13.3, and cf. (for size as an indicator of age in an official context) Arist. *Rh.* 2.1399a35.
94. Diog. Laert. 8.47–48, cf. Paus. 6.14.2–3 and 6.2.2 (where a similar story is told of foals). Sogenes of Aegina may have won the pentathlon (presumably for *ageneioi*) at Nemea while still a boy in the early fifth century (Miller [1975]); that the Athenian *pais* Leagrus won the Olympic pentathlon for men in 480 is unlikely, despite Francis and Vickers (1981). Boy jockeys had a weight advantage but were slaves, not citizens; Golden (2008) 44–45.
95. For an argument that boys' events preceded the men's equivalents during the classical period, see Lee (2001) 22–25.
96. Kyle (1987) 40–48 provides a brief account of these and other festivals.
97. Aeschin. 1.10–12, Pl. *Lys.* 206DE with Schol.; *IG* 2^2 2980 (early second century, torch race), cf. 2971 (late fourth century, chariot race, but perhaps not at the Athenian Hermaea).

Adult men were excluded from the Hermaea, once again to discourage sexual advances (Aeschin. 1.12).

98. Bugh (1990), Kennell (1999).
99. Robert (1939) 238–244.
100. The stone and its reconstruction: Shear (2003).
101. A fifth-century fragment of a list of victors at an unidentified Athenian festival includes first- and second-place finishers from three age classes, *paides, ageneioi,* and *andres* (*IG* 1^3 1386). Runners-up among *paides* and *ageneioi* in boxing seem to have received equal prizes, smaller than men's.
102. See, e.g., Paus. 6.7.8 (classical period), 3.11, 4.11, 6.3, 8.1 and 5 (undated).
103. Paus. 6.17.2. See also Ebert (1972) no. 53 (a statue of a boy victor set up by the people of Magnesia on the Maeander, fourth or third century) and no. 54 (from the people of Phocis for a boy athlete, about 300).
104. Cf. Ebert (1972) no. 31, for Mycon (the "only one of the Ionians to defeat the boys at the Pythian Games in boxing," about 400).
105. See the catalog in Kyle (1987) 195–216 (nos. A17, A18, A23, A41, A67).
106. [Dem.] 58.66. For the phrase "a wreath for the city," cf. Ebert (1972) no. 12 (Theognetus of Aegina, boys' wrestling champion at Olympia, early fifth century) and no. 19 (restored; Pherias of Aegina, boys' wrestling champion at Olympia, early fifth century).
107. Meals: *IG* 1^3 131.11–18 (about 440–432), Pl. *Ap.* 36DE. Money: Plut. *Sol.* 23.3, Diog. Laert. 1.55 (where the money prizes are said to be reductions from previous levels [cf. Diod. Sic. 9.2.5]). But though some form of award may go back to Solon (or even earlier), it is generally accepted that Athens did not issue coinage until after his term of office; thus, these money prizes cannot date back that far. Cf. Kyle (1984) 94–98, Mann (2001) 70–81.
108. Young (1984) 133–162.
109. See most recently Pritchard (2013) 34–83, responding to Fisher (2011) among others.
110. Pind. *Ol.* 8.54–59 with Schol. A similar case might be built on *IG* 2^2 3125, which on one reading commemorates a winner in the *pankration* for *ageneioi* at Isthmia about 430 and his grandson, who repeated the feat, but neither the interpretation of this inscription nor the social status of the family is known for sure.
111. Hirsch-Dyczek (1983) 13, Dasen (2012) 12–20.
112. Pl. *Leg.* 6.771E–772A; Eur. *Andr.* 595–600, Plut. *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 3.3–4.
113. Women sponsored winning entries in equestrian events at the Panathenaea in the Hellenistic period. None of the known victors was an Athenian. For the athletic activities of Spartan girls, see Scanlon (2002) 121–138.
114. Lys. 32.14–15, cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 857–859, *IA* 115–123, Theophr. fr. 662 Fortenbaugh. Literacy: Glazebrook (2005). Dancing and *mousikē:* Beck (1975) 58–60, Beaumont (2012) 147–152.
115. Cup, Painter of Bologna 417, 460–450, New York Metropolitan Museum 06.1021.167, *ARV*^{2} 908.13, *Paralipomena* 430, *Add*^{2} 304, Beck (1975) no. X.3 pl. 350, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.32; for a discussion of the social status of these figures, see Beaumont (2012) 148–149 (noncommittal).
116. Phiale, Phiale Painter, 440–430, Boston Museum of Fine Arts 97.371, *ARV*^{2} 1023.146, *Paralipomena* 441, *Add*^{2} 316, Beck (1975) no. X.56 pl. 391a, Beaumont (2012) fig. 4.34 (unconvinced on their identity).
117. Amphora, Andokides Painter, about 530, Paris Louvre F203, *ARV*^{2} 4.13, Arrigoni (1985) pl. 21a; amphora, Priam Painter, 515–500, Rome Villa Giulia, *Paralipomena* 146.8 *ter,* Arrigoni (1985) pl. 22. See Arrigoni (1985) 105–107 (citizen girls), and, for another view of the Priam Painter's vase, Moon (1983) 110–113 (nymphs).
118. Plut. *Mor.* 142D, 381E, 982B, Pliny, *NH* 9.12.37; Pomeroy (1978) 19, Arthur (1980) 58–59.

For tortoises and girls at Athens, see the *choes,* van Hoorn (1951) no. 653, Klein (1932) pl. 15C (London BM F101) and no. 482 pl. 338.

119. Poll. 9.125, Eustath. *Od.* 1914.56 (cf. *Carm. Min.* 876cP.).
120. Text: Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (1983) 401. I accept the identification of Erinna as a woman poet (though not necessarily a young one).
121. Bowra (1936) 326–330; Reilly (1997), Dasen (2005) 66–71, Papaikonomou (2008) 697–706, Dasen (2010) 25–30, (2012) 16–20.
122. Cf. West (1977) 105, Neri (1998), Levaniouk (2008).
123. Osborne (1985b) 130–138.
124. Lefkowitz (1986) 45–46 discusses the place of friends in such stories; Sourvinou-Inwood (1987) 137, 144, notes that girls who are the objects of erotic pursuit on Attic vases often have companions. Similarly, girls in myth are commonly carried off at festivals of Artemis precisely because these are female affairs; the intrusion of men is therefore more shocking and the break with girlhood more abrupt. For examples, see Perlman (1983) 126–127 (who believes, however, that the stories perhaps arise "from the custom of initiating matches during public festivals").
125. Aesch. fr. 43R.; Lambin (1986) 66–71, Seaford (1987) 115.
126. See Calame (1997), Stehle (1997), Ingalls (2000).
127. Eur. *Hcld.* 777–783, cf. *Erechtheus* fr. 60.80 Austin (= fr. 270K.) (dances for the daughters of Erechtheus). Other possible festivals: Callynteria, Oschophoria, Plynteria. Whether choruses of Athenian girls took part in the festival for Apollo that the Athenians reorganized on Delos is uncertain (Thuc. 3.104, cf. Callim. *Hymn.* 4.278–282); silence concerning girls at Arist. *AthPol* 56.3, Xen. *Mem.* 3.3.12, tells against it. Choruses of unmarried girls in tragedy were presumably made up of males, just as males played other female roles.
128. Plut. *Mor.* 839C; hydria, Kleophon Painter, about 430, Tübingen University E112, *ARV*^{2} 1147.61, Rühfel (1984b) no. 56. That the girl holding a ball is an *arrhēphoros* is doubted by Neils (2007) 64.
129. E.g., Chirassi Colombo (1979) 39.
130. Ar. *Thesm.* 690–691, 733–734, Schol. Luc. *Dial. Mer.* 7.4 Rabe, Schol. Theocr. 4.25c Wendel, cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.45.99. See Golden (1988c) 5–8.
131. For a thorough and up-to-date account of the Arkteia and the Brauronia, see Parker (2005) 228–248. All girls: Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 645 (R.), *Suda* s. *arktos ē Braurōniois,* cf. *Anecd. Bekk.* 444.30, *Suda* s. *arkteusai.*
132. Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 645 (L.); Papadimitriou (1963) 118–120.
133. Ritual tasks: *Suda* s. *proteleia;* for other prenuptial rites, see Burkert (1983) 63 n. 20. Identification of the stoa: Kahil (1977) 96 n. 59, Lloyd-Jones (1983) 93 n. 34. Widespread participation: cf. Simon (1983) 86, Perlman (1983) 128, Osborne (1985b) 165 (but note that nothing can be concluded on the basis of the numbers of dedications, which need not be by "bears"); more cautious are Dillon (2002) 221–222, Parker (2005) 233–234.
134. Races: especially Perlman (1983)—but running girls may instead be engaged in a ritual chase; Scanlon (2002) 139–174; cf. Kratzmueller (2008) (a ritual run without winners or losers). Note here that there were both a gymnasium and a palaestra at Brauron. Spinning: Cole (1984) 239–240. Iconography: Kahil (1965, 1977, 1983), Sourvinou-Inwood (1988), Beaumont (2012) 174–186.
135. My comments on the Brauronia necessarily go beyond the evidence. Even the four-year sacrifice (Arist. *AthPol* 54.7, Poll. 8.107) and the procession (Ar. *Pax* 872–876 [misunderstood by Schol.]) with the "bears" are suppositions.

Chapter 4. Parents and Children

1. For the meanings of *oikos* and *oikia* and their implications, see MacDowell (1989), Cox (1998) 130–167, Ferrucci (2006) 186–192.
2. Bastardy: Ogden (1996); adoption: Rubinstein (1993); fathers and sons: Strauss (1993); birth and motherhood: Demand (1994); weddings: Oakley and Sinos (1993); tragic stage: Belfiore (2000); household: Cox (1998).
3. Review: Golden (1996).
4. For an exhaustive account of family conflict at Athens, see Damet (2012).
5. See most recently Trümper (2011).
6. Cf. Golden (2012) 186–187.
7. Morris (2005) 123.
8. Kron (2014).
9. The answer that follows incorporates portions of Golden (1988a, 2004, 2011), despite the opinion Chief of Police Vickery voices to the reporter Camille Preaker in Gillian Flynn's novel *Sharp Objects* (New York 2006): "A decent person would have quit before writing about dead children" (44).
10. Finley (1981) 159.
11. Ariès (1973) especially 29, Pinchbeck and Hewitt (1969) especially 301–302, Shorter (1975), Stone (1977).
12. Scheper-Hughes (1992) 275.
13. See, e.g., Frier (1982), especially the life-table at 245, and Frier (1983). Note, however, that the relation between infant and adult mortality may vary considerably even among high-mortality populations; Woods (1993).
14. Woman of seventy-three: *SEG* 20.621 (Egypt). The only exception I know of is *SEG* 26.1555 (Commagene), for a child of one, but neither the reading nor its reliability is certain; see Wagner (1976) 212 no. 67, cf. *REG* 90 (1977) 429–430 no. 531.
15. For summaries and citations of evidence, see Morris (1987) 57–71 (emphasizing variation over time).
16. Pl. *Lach.* 180B, cf. *Resp.* 10.615C, Arist. *EE* 7.1240a31.
17. Thuc. 2.44.3, cf. Hdt. 3.119, Soph. *Ant.* 909–912, Eur. *Alc.* 290–294, *Hyps.* fr. 60.90–96 Bond (= fr. 757.921–927K.); Beekes (1986).
18. See the discussion in Chapter 6.
19. Cf. also Manson (1975) 147, Pomeroy (1975) 101.
20. Konner (1977) 315.
21. LeVine (1977) 23. Cf. Segalen (1986) 174 (on preindustrial France): "A whole range of popular prophylactics and remedies surrounded the most dangerous moments of the infant's life. . . . Such practices bear witness to the loving anxiety of women who were powerless in the face of catastrophe."
22. Campbell (1964) 154; cf. Doumanis (1983) 52–57 (on rural Epirus).
23. LeVine (1977) 23, Scheper-Hughes (1987a).
24. On funerary rites in the Greek world, see Garland (1985) 21–37, 104–120.
25. For example, the Sarakatsani "will sometimes agree that the measure of God's punishment is hard, particularly when the life of a small child is taken" (Campbell [1964] 323); cf. Danforth (1982) 54.
26. On weeping and lamentation as ritual, see Alexiou (1974), Huntingdon and Metcalf (1979) 24–28.
27. Cf. Schiff (1978) xii, Scheper-Hughes (1987a) 148.
28. For an argument that the funerary practices followed by Roman women mirror birth rituals

(and so may count as a kind of reproductive labor), see Corbeill (2004) 67–106. The suggestion is especially persuasive in the case of children who died not long after birth.

29. See Barrett (1984) 179.
30. Soph. *OC* 1224–1228, cf. Theog. 425–428, Hdt. 5.4.2, Eur. fr. 449K., Alexis fr. 145.14–16K.-A., Arist. *Eudemus* fr. 44 Rose (6 Ross); Easterling (2013).
31. Hertz (1960), cf., e.g., Parker (1983) 41.
32. For such explanations, see Binford (1972) 219, Scott (1999) 115–117, Moore (2009).
33. See Baills-Talbi and Dasen (2008), Dasen (2010) 23–24. Murdered children (like other victims of violence) make up a class of exceptions; see Holland (2008) 420–422 (on Medea's children).
34. Langdon (2001) 579. Cf. Houby-Nielsen (2000) 151: "It is something of a paradox that despite the silence regarding child mortality and childhood in early Greek art and literature, infants and small children were among the most carefully buried individuals in ancient Athens." On the care taken to bury infants and small children and to provide them with grave goods, see too Haentjens (2006), Dubois (2012).
35. Houby-Nielsen (1995) 147–148.
36. It is twenty-five years since J. Musgrave noted (apropos of the burial of infants with adults) that "burial customs in Geometric times were far from uniform throughout Greece" (Musgrave [1990] 284), and the evidence has become no more consistent in the intervening years; see, e.g., Morris (1989) 316, Dasen (2010) 22, the collection of material in the chapters in Guimier-Sorbets and Morizot (2010), and, for Athens in particular, Chapter 7 below. For the wide variation in the proportion of infants found in the cemeteries of Roman Italy, see Carroll (2011).
37. Blaizot, Alix, and Ferber (2003).
38. See King (2000) 129–140.
39. On wet nursing, see Sussman (1982). It is worth observing here that there is little evidence that Athenians of the classical period sent their children away to nurse; Wiesehöfer (2008) 515. However, in a fragmentary passage of Menander's *Samia,* Chrysis seems to express concern that a baby may be nursed by a *titthē* in a tenement (*en synoikiai tini*) (Men. *Sam.* 84–85).
40. McCracken (1983); Goody (1984); cf. Sanford (1975). Basing herself on studies of hunter-gatherers, Sarah Hrdy writes, "New information suggests that in environments with high levels of child mortality, alloparental care and provisioning is more than helpful; it is *essential* for child survival"; Hrdy (2005) 67.
41. Arist. *NE* 8.1159a28, cf. *EE* 7.1239a38.
42. Similar conclusions result from a study of nineteenth-century American diaries (Rosenblatt [1983] 58): "The classical literature [on grief] seems to say that child deaths increase the intensity with which parents invest in surviving children. . . . And the diary data seem inconsistent with the idea that high death rates lead to less parental valuing of young children." A study of the practice of a seventeenth-century English doctor reveals numerous cases of extreme grief and depression among bereaved parents, especially mothers (MacDonald [1981] 80–85). Herlihy (1985) 125–127 stresses the care for children in medieval families. Some of Pollock's arguments are put forward, apparently independently, in a well-documented article by S. Wilson (1984); her use of sources is criticized by Johansson (1987a) 345–347 (who, however, does not make what seems to be a significant distinction between memoirs and diaries), Pleck (1987) 44, 205, 237, deMause (1988) 161. Bellingham (1988) 349–350 offers an even-handed critique.
43. Woods (2003) 441. Woods (2006) provides the fullest recent examination—and rebuttal—of Ariès's hypothesis on parental indifference, noting (among other criticisms) that he was misled by an exceptionally harsh demographic regime in early modern France and unwilling to take account of local (and other forms of) variation.
44. Bradley (1986) especially 216–220, Garland (1985) 80–86, Hopkins (1983) 222–226.

45. Cf. deMause (1974) especially 25–32, Sagan (1979) 210.
46. Howell (1979) 62, 119–120, Scott (1999) 80; e.g., S. Wilson (1988) 783 (on nineteenth-century Corsica). On Rome, Dixon writes, "Parents who possibly exposed unwanted babies . . . became attached to those children they did rear" ([1988] 26); cf. Néraudau (1987) 195 n. 1.
47. Note here that other scholars reject the suggestion that parental neglect of children was a *conscious* strategy for regulating the size of the household; K. A. Lynch (2000).
48. Cf. Scheper-Hughes (1987b) 14: "What is altogether rare in preindustrialized, 'infanticide-tolerant' societies is the 'classic' pattern of child abuse found in near endemic proportions in the industrialized world: the so-called battered child syndrome."
49. Vekemans and Dohmen (1982) 359.
50. Moseley et al. (1981).
51. Steinhoff (1985) 127; cf. also Bracken, Klerman, and Bracken (1978).
52. Cf. Garland (1990) 147–157.
53. The shard was first published by Brann (1959). The identification of the figure shown on this and other early pots with Astyanax is not secure; see Laurens (1984), especially 206–219. But this does not affect the point made in the text, that the death of a young child as a result of warfare evoked pathos.
54. Hdt. 6.27.2, Thuc. 7.29.5 (for the rhetoric of this passage, see Golden [2011] 264–265). Taking place as they do in schools, these deaths threaten the cultural continuity of the community as well as its simple survival; Longo (1980–1981) 143.
55. Antiphon 87 B 49D.-K. Cf. Eur. *Alc.* 882–888, *Med.* 1090–1115, fr. 543K., Men. fr. 313, 798K.-A., *Monos.* 641, *Comp. Men. et Philist.* 99, Plut. *Sol.* 6.1–3, Plaut. *Mil. Glor.* 719–722 (from a Greek original of the early third century).
56. Amulets: Dasen (2003). Dedications: see *IG* 2^2 4351, 4400, 4403, 4412, 4429, fourth-century dedications to Asclepius; Lawton (2007), Beaumont (2012) 154–156. Erichthonius was said to have established an Athenian custom of making an offering to Kourotrophos, "the child-rearer," before sacrifices to any other divinity, and in fact our evidence suggests that this was the regular (if not quite invariable) practice (*Suda* s. *Kourotrophos* 2193); Parker (2005) 426–433. Child heroes: Pache (2004).
57. *IG* 2^2 12335, about 360. A luckier mother boasts that she died "without having grieved for any of her children" (*IG* 2^2 5673, mid fourth century).
58. Pl. *Alcib. II* 142BC, Eur. *Rh.* 982, *Supp.* 786–793, 1087–1091.
59. Cf. Dover (1980) 1: "The word [*erōs*] is not used, except rhetorically or humorously, of the relations between parents and children."
60. Eur. *Ion* 67 (*erōti paidōn*) (cf. 1227 [*paidōn . . . eis eron*] [Creusa]), *Archel,* fr. 2.19–21 Austin (= fr. 228aK.) (*tekōn erōti*); cf. Eur. *Med.* 714–715 (Aegeus). There may be a similar usage at Aesch. *PV* 865 (*paidōn himeros),* but *paidōn* here is probably partitive with *mian.* Sacrifices to Aphrodite at Sicyon included a leaf of *paiderōs,* "hawthorn," a word perhaps to be linked to the desire for children rather than pederasty; Paus. 2.10.4–6, Pirenne-Delforge (1994) 150.
61. Eur. *HF* 634–636, cf., e.g., *Andr.* 418–420, *Pho.* 965–966, *Supp.* 506–508, fr. 103, 316, 346, 518, 652K.
62. Mikalson (1986).
63. Masqueray (1906), especially 85. On Euripides and children, see also Menu (1992), Zeitlin (2008), Yoon (2012) 31–38.
64. Ar. *Thesm.* 502–519; Ar. *Av.* 1439–1445. For "Aristophanes' doting dads," see French (1999). Rousselle ([2005] 73), minimizing fathers' contact with their children in their first seven years of life, denies that such comic passages represent Athenian reality.
65. Theophr. *Char.* 20.5–6, cf. 7.10, Ar. *Nub.* 1380–1390 (for other involved fathers). For other pet names, see Aeschin. 1.126, Men. *Sam.* 240–244, Plut. *Thes.* 14.2, and cf. Ar. *Plut.* 1011, where

the affectionate diminutives are probably taken, as often, from language used with children (Ferguson [1964] 111).

66. Theophr. *Char.* 2.6, cf. 5.5.
67. Arist. *Rh.* 1.1360b20; Solon 23W.
68. Arist. *Gen. An.* 3.753a8, cf. *NE* 8.1155a17.
69. Painter of Munich 2413, about 460, Munich 2413, *ARV*^{2} 495.1, 1656, *Paralipomena* 380, *Add*^{2} 250, Beaumont (1995) 345 fig. 4.
70. Collected by Hirsch-Dyczek (1983); cf. Grossman (2007).
71. Oaths: Dem. 29.26, 52, 54; 54.38, 40 (where this is called too dramatic to be trustworthy), cf. Lys. 32.13, Andoc. 1.31. Children in court: Ar. *Vesp.* 568–573, 976–978, Lys. 20.34–36, Dem. 19.310, 21.99, 186–188, [Dem.] 25.84, Aeschin. 2.152, 179, Isoc. 15.321, Pl. *Ap.* 34C, Hyper. *Phil.* 9, *Euxen.* 41.
72. E.g., Lys. 4.20, Dem. 28.20.
73. [Dem.] 50.62. Similarly, Euxitheus of Mytilene tells an Athenian jury that it was hard for his father to leave his native city because there were strong ties that bound him there: children and property (Antiph. 5.76, cf. Dem. 23.136).
74. [Dem.] 34.37; Arist. *Rh.* 3.1417a5 (on Hdt. 2.30.4).
75. Arist. *AthPol* 56.6, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.13, Lys. 13.91, Isae. 8.32, Aeschin. 1.13 (cf. 28), Dem. 10.40, 24.105–107, Hyper. *Euxen.* 6, Harpoc. s. *kakōseōs*. Solon: Dem. 24.103, Aeschin. 1.6, 13, Plut. *Sol.* 22.1, 4, Diog. Laert. 1.55, cf. Ar. *Av.* 1353–1357. Legally, at least, this responsibility fell to sons; cf. Hdt. 2.35.4.
76. Arist. *AthPol* 55.3–4, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.13, Dem. 57.70, Din. *Aristog.* 17–18.
77. See, e.g., Xen. *Oec.* 7.12, 19, cf. [Arist.] *Oec.* 1.1343b20.
78. Stanford (1983) 39.
79. See Nieuwenhuys (1996), James, Jenks, and Prout (1998), Invernizzi (2002).
80. Cunningham (1996) 33.
81. Murray's children: Winchester (2003) 118–119. Joad's sabotage: T. Judge, "Letters," *London Review of Books* 35.6 (21 March 2013).
82. For puns on the word *tokos,* "offspring" and "interest," see, e.g., Ar. *Nub.* 1156 (cf. 34), *Thesm.* 845, Pl. *Resp.* 6.506C–507A, 8.555E, Arist. *Pol.* 1.1258b6, cf. Plaut. *Men.* 59 (from a third-century Greek original). The relationship between interest and affection was an issue in antiquity too; see Democr. 68 B 278D.-K., Plutarch's essay *On Affection for Offspring* (*Mor.* 493A–497E), and the comments by Lambert (1982) 11–14.
83. E. P. Thompson, *New Society* 41 (1977) 501.
84. Garland (1990) 147–148. Only children: Aesch. *Ag.* 898.
85. It may be that some mothers resented the father's prerogative, especially when exercised against their firstborn; see Pl. *Tht.* 151C, cf. Ter. *Haut.* 633–643, 664–665; M. Schmidt (1983–1984) 136–137, K. J. Dover, *CR* 34 (1984) 342.
86. See, e.g., Peterson (1975) 205.
87. Proverb: Schol. Hom. *Il.* 8.39, *Suda* s. *Tritogeneia*; Taillardat (1995). Midwife's gift: Ar. *Eccl.* 549 with Müller (1998).
88. Xen. *Lac.* 1.3, cf. *Oec.* 7.6, Arist. *HA* 9.608b15; Scrimshaw (1984) 450–452, Johansson (1984).
89. Humphreys (1983) 126 n. 18.
90. Men. *Dysc.* 17–20. For a more neutral response to a daughter's birth, see Men. fr. 630K.-A.
91. The remark characterizes Habrotonon sympathetically, perhaps contrary to the audience's expectations; Heap (2002–2003) 102–108. See Chapter 6 for more on slaves and children.
92. *IG* 2^2 10891, 10892, both 400–300; 10660, 390–365. None is certainly the daughter of an Athenian citizen. Among post-classical writers, Plutarch says that fathers prefer daughters to

sons (because the daughters need them), but mothers prefer sons (*Mor.* 143B). Cf. the discussion of alliances within the household in Chapter 6.

93. Vorster (1983) 249–251 (on statues of children).
94. Grossman (2007) 314.
95. I follow Collard's text and interpretation of these lines (1975). For "sweet endearments," note the statements in *Anecd. Bekk.* 855.29, *Anecd. Ox.* 4.273 Cramer, that girls were especially fond of diminutives.
96. Plut. *Mor.* 495A = Usener, *Epicurea* p. 320 fr. 527.
97. Ar. *Thesm.* 289–291. For the reading *posthaliskon,* see Taillardat (1961). For an extended series of puns involving forms of *choiros,* "pig" and "vagina," applied by a father to young daughters, see Ar. *Ach.* 729–835; Golden (1988c).
98. For the sexual content of such kisses, cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 130–133. According to a fragment of the comic poet Diphilus, an ugly girl is one even a father won't kiss (fr. 91K.-A.).
99. Men. fr. 58K.-A., Posidippus fr. 12K.-A.
100. For such stories in tragedy, see Foley (1985) 65–105, Lefkowitz (1986) 95–103, Loraux (1987) 31–48.
101. *Domōn agalma:* Aesch. *Ag.* 208. In Euripides, the war deprives Agamemnon and the other Greeks of the pleasures (*hēdonai*) of their children (Eur. *Tro.* 371–372, 392–393).
102. E.g., Lys. 2.11, Pl. *Menex.* 239B, Isoc. 4.56–60, Dem. 18.186, *Epit.* 8.
103. Isae. 11.17; Xen. *Oec.* 7.24, cf. *Mem.* 1.4.7; Eur. *Pho.* 355–356, fr. 1015K.; Arist. *Gen. An.* 3.759b7; cf. *Com. Adesp.* fr. 1014 col. ii. 40–42K.-A.; for a wide-ranging discussion of maternal affection in antiquity, see Weiler (2012).
104. This must not be thought of as evidence for mothers' disregard of their daughters. See, e.g., the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Demeter searches for Persephone; Arthur [1977]); Aesch. *Ag.* 1417–1418 (cf. 1432), Soph. *El.* 530–581 (Clytemnestra's love for Iphigenia); Ar. *Thesm.* 689–761 (a frantic mother tries to recover her abducted baby daughter); Men. *Sam.* 37–40, perhaps fr. 337, 461K.-A. (mothers and daughters go together to festivals). See Foley (2003).
105. Cf. Arist. *EE* 7.1241b1, *NE* 9.1166a8, 1168a23.
106. By mothers: *IG* 1^3 573, 857, 2^2 4588, 4593, 4613, 4671, 4883, ?4891. By fathers: *IG* 1^3 735, 745, ?659, ?831, 2^2 4351, 4400, 4412, ?4429, cf. 4319. By mother and father: *IG* 2^2 4403.
107. Men: Solon 27W. (twenty-eight to thirty-five), Pl. *Resp.* 5.460E (twenty-five), *Leg.* 4.721B (thirty), 6.772D (twenty-five to thirty-five), 6.785B (thirty to thirty-five), Arist. *Pol.* 7.1335a29 (thirty-seven or a little before, apparently an older age than usual, cf. Hsch. s. *ekshēbos*); cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.1390b9, [Arist.] *Probl.* 20.7.923a37. Women: Xen. *Oec.* 7.5 (fourteen), Dem. 27.4, 29.43 (fifteen), cf. Arist. *AthPol* 56.7 (fourteen, but the text is uncertain). Plato sets the earliest acceptable age at sixteen (*Leg.* 6.785B) or eighteen (*Leg.* 8.833D), Aristotle at about eighteen (*Pol.* 7.1335a28), apparently correcting contemporary Greek custom. See Ingalls (2001), who argues that only girls among the elite married as young as fourteen. As in most preindustrial populations, women's life expectancy was probably lower than men's; Golden (1981) 322–326.
108. Isae. 7.25; Nep. *Cimon* 1.2, Philo, *Spec. Leg.* 3.22, Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 1371, and, for examples, Dem. 57.20, Plut. *Them.* 32.2.
109. Bond (1981) 190 on 485–489.
110. Eur. *Tro.* 740–763; for moving descriptions of children's distress at being parted from their mothers, see, e.g., Eur. *Tro.* 557–559, 1089–1099.
111. For Medea's origins as a "reproductive demon," a bogey like Mormo or Lamia, see Johnston (1997), Harrauer (1999) 27–28. For the possibility that Euripides's invention (or use) of Medea's murder of her children was inspired by Sophocles's *Tereus,* see March (2003). For a sociobiological explanation of her motive—she is afraid her children will stand in the way of getting

a new man and children better placed to transmit her genes—see Sommerville (1999). For other murderous mothers in Athenian drama and art, see Klockner (2005), McHardy (2005), Räuchle (2012).

112. Sophocles's Clytemnestra is made to show some sorrow at the report of her son Orestes's death and to explain it by commenting that not even those who suffer at their hands can hate the children they bear (Soph. *El.* 770–771).
113. For other mothers living with their sons, see Hunter (1989) 47 n. 43, who lists twelve examples.
114. Lys. 7.41, Dem. 57.70, [Dem.] 53.29, cf. Lys. 24.6, Dem. 19.283, [Dem.] 25.84. A speaker in comedy notes a mother's right to benefit from those she bears: Philemon fr. 143K.-A.
115. So the mothers mentioned at Lys. 24.6, Dem. 57.70, are certainly widows.
116. [Dem.] 25.54, Din. *Aristog.* 8, 14, 18, 20.
117. Antiph. 5.74, [Dem.] 58.60, cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 275DE.
118. E.g., Lys. 2.72–73, 13.45, Dem. *Epit.* 36. The fathers of the dead are specifically mentioned as needing the city's support at Pl. *Menex.* 248D, apparently in order to provide a rhetorical balance to their sons; in other portions of the passage, which purports to be a funeral oration composed by Aspasia, mothers and fathers are referred to together in the customary fashion (247C, 248B, 249A).
119. Isoc. 1.14, cf. 2.38, Alexis fr. 282K.-A. and the proverb ascribed to Pittacus, Apost. 12.42a. Similarly, a fragment of Euripides enjoins parents to recall that they were young once themselves (951K.). Arnott has some perceptive comments on Menander's propensity to show sons repeating their father's youthful peccadilloes ([1979] xxxix–xlii).
120. E.g., Aesch. *Supp.* 707–709, Dicaeogenes 52 F 5 Snell, Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.20, Dem. 24.60, [Dem.] 25.66, Aeschin. 1.28, Pl. *Leg.* 4.717B–718A, Antiphanes fr. 319K.-A., *Comp. Men. et Philist.* 366, Arist. *NE* 9.1164b5, 1165a24.
121. Many passages are collected in Stob. *Flor.* 4.25; see also Richardson (1933) 48–58, Dover (1974) 273–275.
122. Aristotle is more forthcoming elsewhere, urging that the father not monopolize respect even if he is better (*beltiōn*) than the mother; "even Zeus doesn't get all the sacrifices" (*EE* 7.1244a14, *NE* 9.1165a15).
123. Grant (1986); cf. too Aristotle's remarks at *EE* 7.1239a6, 1242a33, and Pl. *Resp.* 8.562D–563A. Menander and Terence also provide evidence for fathers' concern for their young sons; see Sommerstein (2012).
124. We may compare Dr. Johnson's opinion, as recorded by Boswell: "Sir, a father and a son should part at a certain time of life. I never believed what my father said. I always thought that he spoke *ex officio,* as a priest does" (Pottle [1950] 284, from Boswell's journal entry for 25 June 1763).
125. E.g., Eur. fr. 853K., Chaeremon 71 F 32 Snell, Antiphanes fr. 261K.-A., Men. fr. 823K.-A., *Com. Adesp.* fr. 901K.-A.
126. Ar. *Nub.* 1399–1451, *Pax* 123, Pl. *Lys.* 208E, *Prot.* 325D, Arist. *NE* 7.1149b8, cf. Ar. *Eq.* 412, Xen. *An.* 5.8.18, *Cyr.* 2.2.14, Men. *Monos.* 422. Daughters are not explicitly mentioned in any of these passages (note especially Xen. *An.* 5.8.18, which speaks only of sons); in two, mothers may administer beatings (Pl. *Lys.* 208E, *Prot.* 325D). Both parents might discipline babies (Pl. *Lys.* 212E).
127. Pl. *Resp.* 8.548B; [Arist.] *Oec.* 1.1344a6. Xenophon's Ischomachus regards methods of training as something for husband and wife to determine together (Xen. *Oec.* 7.12), but there is reason to think this portrayal owes more to Xenophon's political purposes than to popular opinion at Athens; Murnaghan (1988).
128. Lekythos, Sandal Painter, about 550, Bologna PU 204, *ABV* 70.7, *Paralipomena* 28, Boardman

(1974) pl. 43. For similar scenes, along with some problems of interpretation (Is the boy a slave? Were such pots designed for export to Etruria only?), see Beaumont (2012) 119–120.

129. Hewitt (1931) 35.
130. Men. *Monos.* 765, cf. 767. A speech attributed to Demosthenes (but likely later in date) compares the mutual kindness among citizens to the tact and discretion required to maintain friendly relations in a family including a father, grown-up sons, and perhaps a grandfather ([Dem.] 25.87–88).
131. Eur. fr. 952K.; Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 14 *ad fin.*
132. Eur. fr. 950K., cf. Philemon fr. 169K.-A.; Eur. fr. 500K.
133. Archippus fr. 48K.-A., Plut. *Alcib.* 1.4. A victorious choragus set up a monument to inspire his children to follow his example (*IG* 2^2 3022).
134. A number of studies of conflict between parents and children are collected in Bertman (1976). Most valuable is the overview by Reinhold (1976).
135. R. Russo, *Straight Man* (New York 1997) 371.
136. Fathers and sons: De Schutter (1991), Handley (1993), Shapiro (2003), and above all Strauss (1993), arguing that father-son relations shaped classical Athenian perceptions of and responses to social and political developments.
137. Cf. Reinhold (1976) 21.
138. See the survey by Rudhardt (1982), especially 749–757.
139. Rumpf (1985) 57–81, 93–107.
140. Pl. *Symp.* 195BC. One or both stories are referred to at Aesch. *Eum.* 640–643, Ar. *Nub.* 904b–906, Eur. *HF* 1317–1318, Pl. *Euthyphro* 5E–6A, *Resp.* 2.377E–378B, and Isoc. 11.38 as well.
141. Some issues are treated by P. Roussel (1951) 215–227, Longo (1980–1981), Maffi (1983) 10–16.
142. Isae. 12.3, cf. Lys. 19.9.
143. Isoc. 15.155–156, cf. Din. *Phil.* 18.
144. I accept the estimate of Markle (1985) 277–281, that a family of four could be fed for about 150 drachmas a year in the fourth century.
145. Pl. *Leg.* 11.932B; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.33–35.
146. Councillors: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.35, cf. *IG* 1^3 14.9–11, Arist. *AthPol* 30.2. Jurors: Arist. *AthPol* 63.3, Dem. 24.150, Poll. 8.122. Administrators of the Herakleia and the Eleusinian Mysteries: *IG* 1^3 3, *SEG* 30.61.A.30–31 (restored). Demotionidae: *IG* 2^2 1237.33–34; Hansen (1980) 167–169, Develin (1985).
147. For the importance of wealth in public life at this time, see Davies (1981) 88–131. Rhodes (1986) discusses the political options open to young men.
148. So probably [Dem.] 47.34–35, 80; cf. Pl. *Leg.* 11.931A.
149. Cf. Lacey (1968) 106–107.
150. Xen. *Lac.* 1.6–7, *Mem.* 4.4.23, Pl. *Resp.* 5.459B, Arist. *Pol.* 7.1334b29–1335a6, cf. Eur. fr. 317K.
151. Cf. Strauss (1993) 67–72. Some societies (mainly in Africa) rely on more elaborate and formalized age grades to control population growth and access to power, but there is no good evidence that classical Athens was such an age-class society (Kennell [2013]).
152. [Dem.] 40.4 (eighteen: regarded as exceptional), Lys. fr. 24 Thalheim. Menestheus, the son of Iphicrates, may have married in his midtwenties or even younger: [Dem.] 49.66 with Davies (1971) 250–251, E. M. Harris (2006) 362 (but if in fact he was born in 386, the marriage cannot be as early as 370/69).
153. [Dem.] 25.87–88, cf. Plaut. *Most.* 755–761 (based on an early-third-century comedy by Philemon): an old man wants to add a *gynaeceum* onto his house for a son and his bride. Plato views this as a recipe for conflict and legislates against it (Pl. *Leg.* 6.776AB).
154. Dem. 55.3, [Dem.] 59.22, cf. Arist. *Gen. An.* 2.740a6, *NE* 5.1134b8. Saller (1988) 403–407

provides a useful discussion of the dynamics of father-son relations among different economic strata at Rome.

155. Arist. *Pol.* 7.1335a36, cf. *HA* 5.545b27.
156. Arist. *AthPol* 56.6, cf. Ar. *Nub.* 844–846, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.49, Aeschin. 3.251, Pl. *Leg.* 11.928E–929E.
157. Apul. *Apol.* 37.1–2, Luc. *Macr.* 24, Plut. *Mor.* 785A, Cic. *Sen.* 7.22, cf. *Vita Soph.* 13. Not all who have struggled through the last few hundred lines of this play will find their opinion of Athenian justice improved by the verdict.
158. Note here Men. fr. 824K.-A.: "You're crazy to bring a lawsuit against parents"; cf. Pl. *Leg.* 11.928DE.
159. See Piccirilli (1982).
160. S. Bellow, *Mr. Sammler's Planet* (New York 1971 [1969]) 92–93.
161. Saller (1987a); cf. Saller (1986), (1994) 12–69. A recent review of the evidence concludes that Saller's projections are fairly robust; Scheidel (2009) 36. For an account of the various factors contributing to the relatively high number of fatherless children at Athens, see Cudjoe (2010) 17–26.
162. Frier (1982) 245.
163. Thury (1988a) 199–202 outlines the place of this practice in the structure of a tragedy produced about fifteen years before, Euripides's *Alcestis.*
164. For example, Ar. *Vesp.* 1167, 1299, 1309–1310, 1316, 1417.
165. *Neanias:* Ar. *Vesp.* 1332–1334. Cf. the use of *neanikōs* (Ar. *Vesp.* 1307), *neoploutoi trygi* (1309), to describe Philocleon.
166. *Archaia g' hymōn:* Ar. *Vesp.* 1336. The same joke, an old man calling a younger one old-fashioned, recurs at Ar. *Nub.* 820–821.
167. An ancient commentator spells out the joke: "He's imitating young men who say, 'If my father dies I'll give you everything'" (Schol. 1353[R.], cf. 1359).
168. By "kid" I translate a diminutive (*hyidion*), presumably used to stress the absurdity of the reversal.
169. Ar. *Vesp.* 1351–1363. The last comment has been variously explained; see MacDowell (1971) 309 on 1363, Rusten (1977). Perhaps it should be taken as Philocleon's claim to have found not just renewed youth but a new life, though not quite in the form usually promised to initiates.
170. See especially Lys. 24.16 and other references in Dover (1974) 103.

Chapter 5. Brothers, Sisters, and Grandparents

1. See van Hoorn (1951) nos. 53, 100 (Athens NM 14509), 218, 253, 270, 381, 405, 463, 746, 765, 812, 838, 839, 849, 987, 1007.
2. Tombstones: *IG* 1^3 1271, *IG* 2^2 7839a, 11169. Dedications: *IG* 1^3 597, 731, 751, 873, 954, ?655c, *IG* 2^2 4147, Raubitschek (1949) 243 no. 212, ?251 no. 221, *SEG* 21.192. Diophanes's dedication in honor of his victory in the *pankration* for *ageneioi* at Isthmia commemorates his brother Progonus's triumph too (*IG* 2^2 3125 with *SEG* 46.255).
3. See Hardcastle (1980), Humphreys (1986), and above all Cox (1998) 108–114.
4. See Rubinstein (2009).
5. Patrilineal half brothers were apparently less likely to get along, because they would split the patrimony (Isae. 12.4). See also Eur. fr. 338K., Dem. 39, [Dem.] 40 and 48, and the story, told of both Pisistratus and Cato, in which sons express concerns about a father's remarriage (Plut. *Mor.* 189D, 480D, *Cato maior* 24.4–5); Humphreys (1986) 75–76, Cox (1998) 112–113.

6. Similarly, Sositheus boasts that he showed his family feeling by giving his daughter in marriage to his brother's son ([Dem.] 43.74, cf. 44.10, Lys. 32.4–6); Thompson (1967).
7. Dem. 55.2, cf. Antiph. 6.21, Andoc. 1.148, Lys. 13.39–42, Aeschin. 2.179, Arist. *NE* 8.1159b35.
8. [Dem.] 53.28; Dem. 21.78–79, [Dem.] 47.53.
9. [Dem.] 47.11, 46; Dem. 29.15, 23; Lys. 12.34.
10. [Dem.] 25.55, 79; [Dem.] 58.28, cf. Isae 2.1 (it is shameful to deprive a dead brother of descendants).
11. For this troubled relationship, "an exaggerated case-study of the perversion of traditional sentiments," see Pomeroy (1997) 183–192 (quotation: 183).
12. Apollod. 3.11.2. The story is an old one: see already Hom. *Od.* 11.298–304.
13. Peristiany (1976) 8.
14. Arist. *Pol.* 7.1328a15 = Eur. fr. 975K., cf. *IA* 376–377; Arist. *Pol.* 5.1305b1.
15. In another passage, Aeschines urges jurors to recall that his prosecution of Timarchus protected their sons' and brothers' chastity (Aeschin. 2.180).
16. On difference in age as a point of contention, see also Arist. *EE* 7.1242a4, 36, *NE* 8.1160b25, 1161b27.
17. Plutarch alludes only gingerly to sexual competition between brothers as a source of strife; cf. Hes. *Op.* 328–330.
18. Dem. 36.11, 34, 39.27, 29; see especially Isae. 6.26, [Dem.] 43.19; Xen. *Symp.* 4.35; Harrison (1968) 122–132.
19. West (1978) 252 on 378 removes the contradiction by taking the "second son" as a reference to a grandson, but his parallels are either ambiguous (*GVI* 961.4) or inapposite.
20. For an extended discussion of such stories with a different emphasis, see Jackson (1978).
21. Foster (1960–1961), Campbell (1964) 81, Segalen (1984).
22. See Davis (1977) 176–197.
23. For an interesting account of the lack of trust involved in the partition of the inheritance in a modern Greek village, and the elaborate precautions deemed necessary to ensure fairness, see Friedl (1962) 60–64; cf. Davis (1977) 193–194.
24. See Harrison (1968) 239–244, Lane Fox (1985) 211–214.
25. Dem. 36.9; Lys. 32.4–6; [Dem.] 44.10, 18, Aeschin. 1.102, cf. Dem. 57.19–21, Isoc. 18.60.
26. Arist. *Pol.* 1.1257a22. Elsewhere, he exhibits some inconsistency about the effectiveness of holding property in common as a strategy for avoiding quarrels: *NE* 8.1162a27, *Pol.* 2.1263b24.
27. For an extended account, drawn largely from Athenian law-court speeches and emphasizing property relations, see Cox (1998) 115–128.
28. The exclusion of women from the community's public space is most clearly enunciated in tragedy (e.g., Aesch. *Cho.* 919–921, Soph. *Ant.* 578–579, Eur. *IA* 821–834, *Tro.* 647–653) but not unknown in other sources (e.g., Xen. *Oec.* 7.30, Isoc. *Ep.* 9.10, Pl. *Resp.* 9.579B, cf. Hdt. 2.35.2—a reversal). Plato's description of women as a "race accustomed to an underground and shadowy life" is especially interesting (*Leg.* 6.781C). In what follows, I leave aside consideration of the *gynaikōnitis,* usually translated as "women's quarters" or something similar, and a (likely) tragic equivalent, the *parthenōn.* Our texts guarantee that there was some gendered space within more elaborate homes (at least), but neither they nor the evidence of archaeology allow us to establish the nature, let alone the location and temporal continuity, of that space; see Nevett (1995), Stähli (2005).
29. Lys. 3.6, cf. Dem. 21.78–79, 37.46.
30. Soph. *OC* 343; Eur. *Or.* 108, cf. *Pho.* 93–94, 1276.
31. See Arist. *Pol.* 4.1300a4, 6.1323a3 and Herfst (1922).

32. For insightful accounts of women's presence in Athenian civic space, see D. Cohen (1991) 148–163, Nevett (2011).
33. Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 9.19, Pl. *Leg.* 5.740A, [Arist.] *Oec* 1.1344a7, and, on the close ties of mothers with their children, Chapter 4 above.
34. About 450, Amsterdam Allard Pierson Museum 8210, *ARV*^{2} 838.27, Beaumont (2012) 109 fig. 4.4.
35. About 450–440, Dallas Museum of Art 1968.28A, Beaumont (2012) 107 fig. 4.1; cf. the red-figure hydria, Munich 476, Keuls (1983) pl. 14.17.
36. Clairmont (1993) 1.894, Hirsch-Dyczek (1983) illus. 78.
37. It is curious that Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.2) portrays Socrates's son Lamprocles, a *neaniskos,* as still so intimately involved with his mother; they squabble, she nurses him. Cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 8.85, Theocr. 12.33. Note that older boys might be less welcome where women worked: Pl. *Lys.* 208D.
38. About 460, Athens T.E. 1623, *Paralipomena* 391.88 *bis.*
39. Van Hoorn (1951) no. 38 pl. 295 (Athens NM 1268), no. 184 pl. 522, no. 482 pl. 338, no. 564, no. 659, no. 832 pl. 437.
40. Other brothers and sisters also were buried together, e.g., *SEG* 10.452a, about 550; Humphreys (1983) 111–115. In tragedy, Polydorus and Polyxena share one funeral pyre (Eur. *Hec.* 895–897).
41. *IG* 2^2 13037, Clairmont (1993) 1.575; cf. 1.770, 1.867, perhaps 1.743.
42. Clairmont (1993) 0.837.
43. *IG* 2^2 11379, Clairmont (1993) 1.690.
44. *IG* 2^2 11121, Clairmont (1993) 0.881.
45. Clairmont (1993) 0.910.
46. New York Metropolitan Museum 11.185, Richter (1961) no. 37 pl. 99, 107–109.
47. For other examples, see Beaumont (2012) 187–190, 244 n. 187.
48. For a boy and a girl (not necessarily brother and sister) outside the immediate environment of the home, see the fountain scene on a hydria by the A.D. Painter, Naples Stg. 12, *ABV* 334.3, *Paralipomena* 147, Keuls (1985) pl. 210.
49. *IG* 2^2 12147, Clairmont (1993) 1.610, Hörling (2007), Beaumont (2012) 53 fig. 3.6, 95–96. A late archaic funerary plaque shows a young girl joining other family members mourning for her brother (Sappho Painter, 500–490, Paris Louvre MNB 905, Beazley Archive 463, Beaumont [2012] 27 fig. 2.1).
50. Weisner and Gallimore (1977) 169; cf. Weisner (1982) 305–315, especially 307, Munroe, Munroe, and Shimmin (1984), especially 369–370.
51. Nag, White, and Peet (1978) 294–296.
52. For Electra as in effect her brother's mother in this play, see McClure (2012) 371–375. Another tragic sister who takes on a maternal role is Heracles's daughter (Macaria); she asks Iolaus to raise the brothers in whose interest she intends to die (Eur. *Hcld.* 574–580).
53. See Lavelle (1986a). *IG* 1^3 1136 was apparently set up for Glyce, "from Marathon living in the city," by her brother. The description suggests a metic but does not follow the usual form, and Glyce's brother, Eschation son of Callias, sounds like a citizen.
54. *1G* 2^2 12151; *IG* 2^2 7227.
55. *1G* 2^2 11813; cf. 13095, 13102a, and the gravestone of Apollonia (Rühfel [1984a] no. 36), apparently dedicated by her brothers.
56. Eur. *Alc.* 402–403, *Andr.* 441 (cf. 504–505), *Hcld.* 239, *HF* 71–72, *Tro.* 750–751. In Euripides's *Alcestis,* a rather older boy sings a lament on behalf of his sister and himself (Eur. *Alc.* 393–416; Dyson [1988] 17–18).
57. M. Jones (2012) 136.

58. See Lavelle (1986b).
59. For brothers as protectors of sisters' interests, see also Ar. *Plut.* 984–985, Isae. 3.36, 39, 71, [Dem.] 59.1, 6, 12.
60. See on this point Friedl (1963), on modern Greece.
61. Cf. Lys. 13.45, Isae. 10.25, Dem. 27.66, Hyper. *Epit.* 27.
62. Men. *Asp.* 8–10; Men. *Dysc.* 226–228, 846–847. Men. fr. 407K.-A. may refer to a brother acting as a sister's guarantor in some unknown money matter. Mind you, closeness might not always be desirable: both brothers and sisters are mentioned (without explanation) as annoyances in a fragment on the joys of having no relatives (Men. fr. 187K.-A.).
63. Roman adaptations of New Comedy show similar ties between brothers and sisters. See especially Eunomia's speech to her brother Megadorus in *Aulularia:* "I say this to you out of loyalty, as a sister should. . . . Remember, we're closer to each other than anyone else, so we ought to give advice and confide freely" (Plaut. *Aulul.* 120–132, cf. 682–687).
64. Isae. 8.36, cf. 41–43; [Dem.] 48.54–55.
65. According to one reckoning, "of thirty-one instances of adoption, ten certainly involve the adoption of a son or descendant of the testator's sister or his father's sister" (Cox [1998] 126).
66. Plut. *Per.* 10.4–5. Walcot (1987) 32–33 suggests that solidarity between brother and sister increased when parents had problems and wonders "whether the fall from grace of their father Miltiades" reinforced the ties of Cimon and Elpinice.
67. Raubitschek (1949) 304 no. 284, early fifth century.
68. Dem. 31.11–12; Isae. 8.36; Andoc. 1.48, Lys. 13.39. The philosopher Pyrrho lived in his sister's home, presumably at Athens, of which he was an honorary citizen (Diog. Laert. 9.66).
69. In a speech written by the Athenian Isocrates (but involving Siphnians and delivered in an Aeginetan court), a half sister who came to visit her dying brother is contrasted with the speaker's opponent, another half sister who calls the dead man brother yet not only neglected him when sick but failed even to attend his funeral (Isoc. 19.26, 30). Two Athenian sisters are criticized in court on the grounds that they didn't give their brother a son by adoption (Isae. 7.31–32).
70. Humphreys (1986) 76–78, Cox (1998) 120–125.
71. For the debate on the authorship and interpretation of this speech, see Griffith (1999) 277–279. For Athenian sisters who (unlike Antigone) allied with one brother (or his descendants) against another, see Cox (1998) 111.
72. For discussions of such stories, see Visser (1986), stressing the necessity of a woman to choose between her natal family and the family she joins through marriage—with disastrous effects—and Lyons (2012) 91–109, who regards brother-sister relationships as an exception to the norm of male-female hostility and ruinous exchanges of gifts.
73. Cf. Rudhardt (1982) 733–739.
74. For examples, see Cox (1998) 120–121. She adduces only one instance in which a brother definitely married before a sister, and in that case there may have been no money for either dowry or inheritance (Isae. 10.5–6, 15).
75. Saller (1984b) 200.
76. Dowries for wives do not directly affect the relations of brothers and sisters, and therefore I exclude them from consideration here. I have as a consequence also left out of account all dowries in which the relationship of the donor and the woman dowered is unknown. The amounts involved in these dowries are not significantly different from those discussed here.
77. The evidence is set out in convenient form by Casson (1976), especially 53–59, Schaps (1979) 74–88, 99, and Cox (1998) 116–120. Discrepancies between their figures and mine stem from differing interpretations of individual pieces of evidence.
78. The dowries of New Comedy do seem rather high, but the milieu in which they occur is clearly portrayed as prosperous; if they are larger than was usual, even for well-off Athenians, they may

be explained as comic exaggerations or as consequences of the fact that comic bridegrooms appear to be young, in their twenties rather than their thirties, and so in need of more support for their household.

79. Lys. 19.16–17, 32.6, Isae. 5.5 and 26, 8.7–8 and 35, Dem. 27.4–5 and 28.15–16, 29.48 and 31.6–9, [Dem.] 42.27. We can come up with an eighth instance if we accept the tradition that Callias had a fortune of 200 talents and assume that it was substantially from this estate that his son paid Alcibiades a dowry of 10 talents, but our source for Callias's wealth mentions it only in the context of an argument that many rich men are poorer than they are thought to be (Lys. 19.48).
80. One comic father, the misanthrope Cnemon in *Dyscolus,* is prepared to give his daughter half his estate as a dowry even though he has adopted a son (Men. *Dysc.* 737–739). Relying on *dikaion* in *Dysc.* 763, Paoli argued that a law set a daughter's dowry at one-half the value of the estate when a son was adopted as heir (Paoli [1961] 61–62). But the line is too corrupt to bear such weight, and his proposal to emend Isae. 3.51, where Endius is criticized for dowering his adoptive sister with not even a tenth (*dekaton*) of the estate, to read "not even a just portion" (*dikaion*) is not persuasive.
81. Dem. 27.9, 37.5 (and cf. 27.17, 23, 28.13), Aeschin. 3.104, *IG* 2^2 2492, 345/4; Billeter (1898) 10–18; cf. Thompson (1978) 417.
82. These records present special problems. We cannot be sure in any case that the sum mentioned represents the entire dowry, and it is occasionally clear that it does not. M. I. Finley, in his fundamental study of these stones (1952), regards such instances as exceptional. It sometimes appears that the sum in question is more than the dowry as well. We can only assume that these two classes more or less cancel each other out.
83. [Andoc.] 4.13–14, Plut. *Alcib.* 8.6; Plut. *Mor.* 179F.
84. On sisters in Sophocles, see now Coo (2013) (quotation: 349).
85. Davis (1977) 189–190. However, some Athenian families seem to have made a practice of marrying their kinswomen into the same deme, apparently to consolidate political ties; Cox (1988).
86. Isae. 2.5, 5.6, perhaps Lys. 19.16–17.
87. For the solidarity of sisters in Roman comedies based on Athenian originals, see, e.g., Plaut. *Cist.* 3–5, Ter. *Andr.* 121–136, *Eun.* 144–146.
88. Further assumptions include: men's age at first birth, thirty-two; women's age at first birth, twenty; spacing between births, 2.5 years; completed family size, 6; no population growth (Golden [1985a] 10 n. 8).
89. The expectation that a father's father be aged and gray-haired makes possible the riddle playing on two meanings of *pappos,* "grandfather" and "thistledown" (Eubulus fr. 106.16–20K.-A. = Ath. 10.450B, cf. Soph. fr. 868R.).
90. This relationship and its roots are discussed by Bremmer (1983).
91. Cf. Ter. *Hec.* 116–123.
92. *IG* 2^2 3453 (great-grandmother), 5673 (grandmother), 6214, 6288 (grandmother), 7195, 7393 (Athenians); *IG* 2^2 11375, 11998 (grandmother) (not necessarily Athenian citizens). *IG* 2^2 5421a may have been set up by grandsons, *hyiōnoi,* for their grandfather; *IG* 2^2 530 may be a dedication by a grandfather and his grandson.
93. *IG* 2^2 10650, Ceramicus Museum P695, about 410, Beaumont (2012) 99 fig. 3.36.
94. Athens NM 777, 425–400, Rühfel (1984a) pl. 52.
95. For a grandfather's concern for a baby grandchild, see Men. *Sam.* 553–554, Ter. *Ad.* 333–334, Plaut. *Aulul.* 796–798.
96. Harrison (1968) 190–193.
97. E.g., the amphora by Lydos, 560–540, Berlin 1685, *ABV* 109.24, Boardman (1974) pl. 67; the

cup by the Brygos Painter, 480–470, Paris Louvre G 152, *ARV*² 369.1, Boardman (1975) pl. 245.2. See also, e.g., Eur. *Tro.* 1209–1215; Touchefeu (1983).

98. Eur. *Andr.* 1066–1069, 1171–1225, especially 1181. Cf. Hecuba's lament over her grandson Astyanax, Eur. *Tro.* 1156–1201, especially 1182–1184.
99. Isae. 1.39, 8.32.
100. See Gernet (1955) 19–28, Bremmer (1983) 174–177. Eurysaces is entrusted to his father's father; but his mother is a slave, and her father is dead (Soph. *Ajax* 507–509).
101. In Herodotus's version, Astyages is first to recognize Cyrus's real identity as his daughter's son because of a family resemblance to himself (Hdt. 1.116.1).
102. On Diogeiton's activities, see Moore (1982).
103. Radcliffe-Brown (1952) 90–116. Cf., however, the critical discussion by Apple (1956).
104. Cf. Pl. *Gorg.* 527A, *Lys.* 205D, *Resp.* 1.350E, 2.378D, *Tht.* 176B; Massaro (1977) and, on old women in general, Bremmer (1987), Jeffrey Henderson (1987b). For children's close attention to such stories, see Pl. *Pol.* 208E.
105. *Tēthalladous: Com. Adesp.* fr. 196K.-A., cf. Eustath. *Il.* 971.39, Poll. 3.20. *Mammothreptos:* Phryn. *Ecl.* 267 Rutherford, Poll. 3.20, Schol. Ar. *Ach.* 49, *Ran.* 1021. A boy in a Roman comedy is said to be fortunate because he has two grandmothers (Plaut. *Truc.* 808).
106. Number of widows: Golden (1981) 328–329. Mothers living with their children: see Chapter 4 above.

Chapter 6. Outsiders and Alliances

1. Yanagisako (1979) 161–164; Sieder and Mitterauer (1983) 336–345. Fluidity: Gallant (1991).
2. O. Harris (1982) 146–148.
3. A regular visitor: Antiph. 1.14. Apprentices: Xen. *Eq.* 2.2. Temporary residences in the fields: Osborne (1985a), especially 126–127.
4. The speaker of Lys. 3 took in his nieces (6–7), Cleonymus his nephews (Isae. 1.15); for a returning daughter, see Isae. 8.8.
5. Dem. 45.70, Isae. 5.11.
6. Isoc. 16.26, Craterus 342 F 5, 17, Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 273; Connor (1985).
7. For adoption at Athens, see Rubinstein (1993).
8. See also Eur. fr. 359, 491K., and note [Arist.] *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1.1421a31. Interests of the household's blood kin were protected by restrictions on an adopted son's ability to adopt in his turn; Harrison (1968) 84–87. One Theozotides proposed that adopted sons be excluded from the ceremony honoring war orphans at the City Dionysia (Lys. fr. 6 Gernet), but his motive may have been financial rather than ideological (N. Slater [1993]).
9. For Athenian stepmothers, see Watson (1995) 50–91. Nineteen of the twenty-three men known to have remarried had children from both unions.
10. Hes. *Op.* 825, cf. Men. *Monos.* 127; Aesch. *PV* 727 (where this epithet for Salmydessus is surely influenced by the story of Phineus and Cleopatra, cf. Soph. *Ant.* 966–987); Hdt. 4.154.2, cf. Eur. *Alc.* 313–319; Eur. *Alc.* 302–309, cf. *Ion* 1025, fr. 4, 824K.; *Com. Adesp.* fr. 148K.-A. Note too Aristotle's remark that all creatures that concern themselves with children care only for those they consider their own (Arist. *Gen. An.* 3.759a36). Tragedy regards mothers who kill their own children as mad or wicked—but Athenian audiences perceived a stepmother who murders her husband's as acting rationally (McHardy [2005]).
11. Isae. 12.5; Lys. 32.17; Watson (1995) 51–54.
12. See Pomeroy (1997) 152–191. It is striking that stepfathers escape the bad press that stepmothers attract so regularly, all the more so in that the Athenian preference for younger wives surely led to some sexual attention to their stepdaughters at times and that comparative

evidence on the frequency of violence against young stepchildren suggests that stepfathers were not always beyond reproach (Golden [2009] 51–53).

13. Hdt. 8.41.1, Thuc. 1.89.3, Lys. 2.34, M-L 23.6–8, cf. Thuc. 2.6.4, 2.78.3, 4.123.4, Isoc. 6.73–74; Lys. 16.4; Lys. 12.97, cf. Dem. 19.194, Men. *Sic.* 281–282.
14. For a boy's proposal of *xenia,* and its long-term benefits, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.39–40; for sons and their fathers' *xenoi,* see Lys. 5.1, 18.10, [Dem.] 50.56, cf. Isoc. 1.2, 19.10.
15. See the studies collected in Corbier (2000).
16. Herlihy (1985) 149–155.
17. Cf. McCracken (1983) 311.
18. Eur. *IT* 708–710, *El.* 82–83.
19. Aeschin. 3.162, Harpoc. s. *Aristiōn.*
20. Herman (1987) 142–145.
21. Golden (1985b).
22. Golden (1984).
23. For the importance of the subject, cf. Laslett (1977) 43.
24. What follows is a revised version of Golden (1988b).
25. So, for example, Vogt (1974) 103–121. For general accounts of their duties and roles, see Rühfel (1988), Garland (1990) 113–118, Vilatte (1991), Schulze (1998) (with many illustrations).
26. Slaves could not form legally recognized families. However, a recently discovered fragment of a speech by Hyperides, *Against Timandrus,* contains the claim that even profit-hungry slave-traders avoid breaking up family groups, and, whatever its rhetorical role in his client's case, this must have corresponded to some degree with the experience of an Athenian jury; see C. P. Jones (2008), Rubinstein (2009). In fact, a naive young man named Epicrates became enamored with a slave boy and was willing to buy and free the boy, his brother, and his father—as well as take on the perfume shop that they all worked in—in order to move him into his own home (Hyper. 3 *Against Athenogenes*). Prescriptive texts recommend allowing slaves to form permanent unions as an exceptional reward and a guarantee of compliance (Xen. *Oec.* 9.5; [Arist.] *Oec.* 1.1344b15–22); see Schmitz (2012). Xenophon has Ischomachus say that marriage and children make good slaves better but bad slaves worse. Lampis, a slave involved in importing grain, was likely a slave at the time of a lawsuit brought against him; he lived with his wife and children (Dem. 34.5, 10, 17). A surprising number of those listed in the Attic manumission documents were freed along with children, sometimes in what look like family groups formed while they were slaves (*IG* 2^2 1553–1578); see Rosivach 1989, Faraguna (1999) 69–79, Wrenhaven (2009). The (hugely inadequate) evidence of New Comedy and archaeology suggests that slaves shared their masters' ideas on issues of family formation and function and used much the same domestic pottery as ordinary Athenian households. See Cox (2002); Morris (1998) 197–211.
27. W. J. Slater (1974).
28. For such depictions, see Rühfel (1984b) 61–76, and, on the problems posed by these conventions in general, Himmelmann (1971), Kosmopoulou (2001) 302–306, Wrenhaven (2012) 77–86.
29. About 425, Athens NM 715, Clairmont (1993) 1.550, Rühfel (1984a) nos. 56, 57.
30. For citizen and other free nurses, see *IG* 2^2 7873 and Kosmopoulou (2001).
31. Lys. 1.41; Lys. 1.9, 12.
32. Our best evidence on the age at which babies were weaned comes from outside classical Athens, in wet-nursing contracts from Hellenistic and Roman Egypt. The terms of these agreements run from six months to three years, most stipulating a duration of two years; see Bradley (1980), Pomeroy (1984) 162, Beaumont (2012) 54–55.
33. Lys. 1.11; Ar. *Lys.* 908.

34. Evidence that ownership of slaves was widespread: Thuc. 3.17.4, Lys. 5.5, 24.6, Dem. 45.86, Theophr. *Char.* 25.4. To be sure, not everyone accepts this conclusion. For a judicious account of the evidence and its force, see now Tordoff (2013) 5–33.
35. Note the vignette concerning Chaerea and his father's slave in New Comedy: Chaerea used to take treats to him in his little room (Ter. *Eun.* 307–310).
36. That this was so at Rome is stressed by Bradley (1985) 506–512.
37. It is strange that the relations of slaves and children have not been discussed more fully in psychoanalytic treatments of Greek myth and society such as P. Slater (1968); cf. Humphreys (1983) 59. Freud himself was well aware of the influence of servants, nurses in particular: see, e.g., "Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology" (1914) in the *Standard Edition* of his works (London 1955) 13:243: "The nature and quality of the human child's relations to people of his own and the opposite sex have already been laid down in the first six years of his life. The people to whom he is in this way fixed are his parents and his brothers and sisters . . . (we should perhaps add to his parents any other people, such as nurses, who cared for him in his infancy)."
38. See Mactoux (1990). We should note, however, that Athenian slaves could bear witness against their masters and win their freedom as a result, unlike Roman ones, and that freed slaves were not assimilated to kin members of the household by naming as they typically were at Rome.
39. Men. *Dysc.* 903–904. Quotation: Lape (2004) 135. Menander's comedies often raise questions about the makeup of the family and of the place of slaves within it; see Patterson (1998) 180–225, Cox (1998) 190–194.
40. Hdt. 8.75; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.3.14, cf. Eur. *Med.* 821.
41. The situation of the *titthē* in Menander's *Samia* seems rather similar; she has been freed but is still in Demeas's service. It is noteworthy that it is she who is said to have soothed the crying (and as yet unidentified) son of her former charge Moschion when no one else in the household pays it any mind (Men. *Sam.* 219–250; Heap [2002–2003] 87–90). See also, e.g., *IG* 2^2 1559 A col. 3.59–66, dedications by two *titthai* freed by Aristophon of Aphidna in the later fourth century. Note, however, that these documents provide a caution against becoming oversentimental about this relationship; they seem to indicate that Aristophon (unsuccessfully) accused his ex-slaves of failing to fulfill the conditions of their emancipation.
42. For classical Athenian gravestones for slave nurses and *paidagōgoi,* see Bielman Sánchez (2008) 163–173, Wrenhaven (2012) 91–100. Beaumont notes that all the children who appear alongside a nurse are depicted as having outgrown infancy and suggests that their care continued as children grew and likewise their value in the family (Beaumont [2012] 118); but the point may simply be that the children survived.
43. Aesch. *Cho.* 752; Eur. *El.* 506–508.
44. Hieronymus of Rhodes fr. 19 Wehrli. Cf. the proverb referred to in a similar context by Plutarch: "If you dwell with a lame man, you will learn to limp" (*Mor.* 4A).
45. Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.19 provides a convenient collection of passages on the vices of slaves.
46. For the importance of association and imitation, see, e.g., Eur. *Hel.* 940–943, Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.86, Isoc. 15.92; Beck (1964) 309.
47. Plato praises Persian education at the hands of "the most highly approved eunuchs of the court" at the expense of Athenian upbringing by "a female nurse [*trophos*] of little worth" (*Alcib. I* 121D). The point of the contrast is to emphasize the Athenians' carelessness in giving their children to slaves with no special merit.
48. Xen. *Lac.* 2.1–2, cf. Plut. *Lyc.* 16.4–6. Similarly, a passage of fourth-century comedy, Antiphanes fr. 157K.-A., praises the Scythians because they don't provide *titthai* or *paidagōgoi* for their children.
49. Cf. the retort of Pistoclerus to his *paidagōgos* at Plaut. *Bacch.* 162: "Am I your slave or you mine?"

50. At Men. *Sam.* 85, Chrysis worries that Plangon's baby may be put out to a wet nurse (*titthē*) in a tenement; but there is nothing to indicate that her status is the source of anxiety; cf. Heap (2002–2003) 81–98 (on Chrysis's reactions and their causes).
51. Syrus, chief slave of Micio in Terence's *Adelphoe,* provides a glaring example of a bad influence from New Comedy. He claims to have raised Aeschinus and Ctesipho from birth and to have taught them all he could. But what he taught, says Demea, was all bad (961–968). And there are frequent references to Syrus's leading role in the abduction of Aeschinus's girlfriend and the deception of Demea (314, 527ff., 560). There is another slave whose services are denigrated in the *Adelphoe.* When Syrus pleads for the freedom of his wife, Phrygia, Demea is at first reluctant. He is unimpressed by the grounds of Syrus's claim, that Phrygia was the first to nurse Aeschinus's newborn son (974–976). The influence of Syrus adds a nice irony to a play that deals with the responsibility of fathers for their sons.
52. Stories: Pl. *Leg.* 7.794DE, 10.887D, *Resp.* 2.377B–378A. Orders: Pl. *Leg.* 7.790A. Food: Ar. *Eq.* 716–718, Arist. *Rh.* 3.1407a6, cf. Sext. Emp. *Rhet.* 2.42, Ter. *Hec.* 767–769, Apost. 9.55 (on Cleon). Alcohol: Arist. *Somn.* 457a14, cf. Soran. *Gyn.* 2.19.88. Older nurses had a reputation for drunkenness: see, e.g., Eubulus fr. 80K.-A., Men. *Sam.* 295–303, fr. 412K.-A.; Oeri (1948) 53–61. A father in a third-century comedy upbraids a *paidagōgos* for leading his son to drink (Baton fr. 5K.-A.). Favorinus (in Aul. Gell. *NA* 12.1) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 3CD) later urge mothers to breast-feed their children rather than entrust them to wet nurses, slaves in particular. Such foster mothers infect children with inferior blood and spirit and may neglect them because of their lack of natural ties of affection (cf. Tac. *Dial.* 29). On such concerns at Rome, see Bradley (1991) 23–24. No classical Greek source makes a similar appeal on behalf of human children, but Xenophon does recommend against giving puppies to a foster mother to nurse (*Cyn.* 7.3).
53. Finley (1980) 107. S. C. Humphreys (1983) goes still further: "The ethical deficiencies attributed to slaves in antiquity—deceit and laziness—were recognised to be related to their structural position, and there was therefore no reason to suppose that they could contaminate the morals of free women and children" (76 n. 6).
54. For surveys of the roles of nurses and *paidagōgoi* in extant tragedies, see Karydas (1998) 64–180, Wrenhaven (2012) 112–119, Yoon (2012) 13–21.
55. See Karydas (1998) 115–180, Yoon (2012) 86–92.
56. See Yoon (2012) 92–93. In Euripides's *Hypsipyle,* the child Opheltes is left unattended by Hypsipyle, his nurse, and is killed by a snake. Though Hypsipyle is of noble birth, she is in exile and regarded as a slave (*dmōis:* fr. 34/35.5 Bond/754cK.; cf. *douleian,* fr. 61.8 Bond/758dK.). When Deianira gets good advice from a slave nurse, her reaction is surprise, and her words imply a lucky throw of the dice rather than conscious deliberation (Soph. *Trach.* 61–63, cf. 52–53).
57. Despite Fraenkel (1950) 2.3 (on *Ag.* 3) and Metzger (2005), this is the usual conclusion of recent studies: see, e.g., Taplin (1977) 276–277, Lloyd-Jones (1979) 15, Raeburn and Thomas (2011) 65.
58. So, very briefly, Taplin (1977) 440.
59. See also *Ag.* 699–700, 841–842, 1374–1376, 1561–1564.
60. For the tradition and Aeschylus's relation to it, see Prag (1985), especially 68–84 (on the literary tradition). Prag discusses Aeschylus's expansion of Cassandra's role on 79–80.
61. Line 1226 was regarded as "indubitably interpolated" by Fraenkel (1950), deleted in the editions of West (1990) and Sommerstein (2008), and branded "feeble . . . and very offensive to our taste" by Denniston and Page (1957) 181 *ad loc.* Yet, as these last note, "it contains no fault of sense, syntax, metre, or style," and they retain it in their text (as Page does in his Oxford Classical Text, 1972). Perhaps its function is simply to underscore Cassandra's status as a slave.

62. There are numerous references throughout the play to Hermes (124ab, 727, 812–818) and other denizens of the underworld (15, 40, 376–377, 399, 405, 475–476, 833).
63. For a discussion of the chorus's role, see Conacher (1974), especially 330–339.
64. Golden (1982). The only other similar use known in drama outside comedy is in a third-century satyr play by Lycophron (100 F 2.7 Snell). It seems to have been too colloquial for tragedy and may be meant here to emphasize that Prince Orestes is in disguise.
65. The passage is of course particularly untypical of tragedy if the slave actually comes on stage to deliver the line, as argued by, e.g., Bain (1981) 46 n. 1. But this is uncertain; see, contra, Taplin (1977) 341, Garvie (1986) 225 (on *Cho.* 657).
66. On the nurse, see Goheen (1955) 132–137, A. R. Rose (1982), Margon (1983), Karydas (1998) 64–76, Yoon (2012) 130–133. Note here that Sophocles, in contrast, has Electra claim to have filled the role of Orestes's nurse as well as of his mother (*El.* 1145–1147).
67. See Prag (1985) 75–79.
68. Stesichorus 41P., Pherecydes 3 F 134, Pind. *Pyth.* 11.26. A Laodameia is daughter of Acastus, king of Iolcus, and wife of Protesilaus; an Arsinoe is daughter of Phegeus, king of Psophis, and wife of Alcmaeon.
69. I assume that the Furies do not appear on stage at the end of *Choephori;* see Brown (1983), Garvie (1986) 317 (on *Cho.* 973–1076).
70. *Politēs: Eum.* 820, 854, 927, 980, 991, 1013. *Astos: Eum.* 487, 697, 708, 807, 862, 908, 1045, cf. 997.
71. As there is, for example, in Agamemnon's use of the phrase *prodoulon embasin podos* for his sandals (*Ag.* 945).
72. Finley (1980) 108.
73. I cite the Harper paperback edition in two volumes (New York 1971), *The Hellenic World: A Sociological Analysis* and *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory, Part II.*
74. Unfortunately, Finley says almost nothing about Gouldner's hypothesis in his review of the book (*New York Review of Books* 7 [18 August 1966] 27–29). As far as I know, only Reinhold (1976) 29 has made use of this aspect of Gouldner's work.
75. Cf. Genovese (1974) 3–7, 114–143, who stresses that slaves integrated the masters' values into an ideology that helped them resist dehumanization.
76. See Gathorne-Hardy (1972) 71–74. Similarly, house slaves in the antebellum South were (or at least appeared to be) more assimilated than other slaves; see, e.g., Blassingame (1976), Sutherland (1981).
77. There is some evidence that Spartan women were especially valued as nurses at Athens; see Plut. *Lyc.* 16.3, cf. *Alcib.* 1.2, and, for a gravestone for a nurse from Cythera (before 350), *IG* 2^2 9112. An Athenian gravestone from the second or first century B.C. commemorates a nurse from Corinth, *IG* 2^2 9080. But we hear of nurses from elsewhere as well, such as Thrace (Bäbler [2005]).
78. On the tendency of slaves in the U.S. South to display deference (even when they did not feel it), see Stampp (1971), especially 388. The "mask of deference" adopted by black domestics in South Africa under apartheid was similar (Cock [1980] 102–106).
79. McMillen (1985).
80. Cartledge (1985). On 20–23, Cartledge provides an excellent discussion of the advantages and shortcomings of the comparative method. See also Golden (1992b).
81. Franklin's comments, composed in 1751, are quoted in Finley (1980) 29–30.
82. For the opinions of slaves, see Feldstein (1971) 224–227. For de Tocqueville on slavery, see Franklin (1956) 67. For Fanny Kemble's comments, see Calhoun (1918) 285; and for many other similar sentiments, see 281–289 of the same book.
83. Quoted in Calhoun (1918) 285–286. For similar sentiments from late-nineteenth-century Brazil, see Conrad (1983) 221–225.

84. For parents' insistence that their children receive deference, some examples of children exercising authority, and more indications of concern, see Genovese (1974) 515–519, Blake (1978) 113, Blassingame (1979) 267.
85. See, for example, Franklin (1956) 66–70, and others cited by Bruce (1979) 243 n. 10.
86. Jefferson (1955) 162–163.
87. Bruce (1979) 57–66.
88. Pl. *Lys.* 223A, Plut. *Lyc.* 30.6, cf. Ter. *Ad.* 562–563, *Phorm.* 71–77, 286–288 (based on a play by Apollodorus of Carystus, who lived in the generation after Menander, and set in Athens).
89. Winkler (1985) 26.
90. See, e.g., Hackney (1969), A. C. Smith (1985).
91. The argument that follows is not based on any one psychological theory, but borrows from a number of different approaches. I have found especially useful the concepts of cognitive dissonance (see Festinger [1957], A. R. Cohen [1967]) and reaction formation (see Sarnoff [1962]).
92. Harrison (1968) 168–171.
93. Harrison (1971) 147–150, Wrenhaven (2012) 67–70. Slaves were not in fact tortured in the private lawsuits known to us; for instances of slave torture in other cases, see, e.g., Andoc. 1.64, Lyc. *Leocr.* 112.
94. Cf. Dover (1972) 206.
95. Dover (1972) 11.
96. Saller (1987b) 79–82.
97. See Walcot (1987) and the critical comments of de Vries (1988).
98. E.g., Aesch. *Eum.* 835, Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.4, Isae. 6.24, [Dem.] 59.122, Theophr. *Char.* 28.4, Men. *Dysc.* 842.
99. Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 877–879, where Clytemnestra explains away the absence of the boy Orestes, "the guarantor of my pledge and yours."
100. Dem. 39.23, [Dem.] 40.29.
101. Thompson (1972), especially 223.
102. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35–37, cf. Plut. *Pelop.* 35.3.
103. Fantham (1986) 277; cf. Rawson (1986) 15. A comment by Diotima hints at the strain children's deaths could put on a marriage: homosexual companionship, which gives birth to ideas, makes for greater sharing (*koinōnian*) than that which comes with children, as ideas are both more beautiful and more undying (Pl. *Symp.* 209C). Electra's comment "Women are *philai* of their husbands, not their children," referring as it does to Clytemnestra, is heavily ironic (Eur. *El.* 265).
104. E. M. Forster, *Where Angels Fear to Tread* (1905), Penguin ed. (Harmondsworth 1959) 10.
105. Harrison (1968) 44–45.
106. Thuc. 1.127.1 and, on the definition of the Alcmaeonidae, Dickie (1979).
107. Notably by P. Slater (1968); usually (and unfairly) ignored by classicists, usefully reviewed by Foley (1975), who provides due praise and devastating criticism.
108. Plato recognizes the force of compulsion in resolving this dilemma, forbidding children to forgive a parent who kills a spouse (*Leg.* 9.868C).
109. Aesch. *Ag.* 1417–1418, cf. 1432, Soph. *El.* 530–581.
110. Humphreys (1986) 88. But even these hesitant conclusions may be undermined by the fact that witnesses called by one side in a lawsuit are not necessarily hostile to the other; Cox (1998) 122 n. 66.
111. Cf. Lee (1919) 49.
112. Cf. Eur. *IA* 638–639, where Clytemnestra says that Iphigenia loves her father more than her siblings do.

Chapter 7. Change over Time

1. See further Golden (1992a).
2. Shorter (1975) 168; cf. Firestone (1970), Stone (1977), Mitterauer and Sieder (1982) 60–61, Zaretsky (1986) 84–85.
3. DeMause (1974) 1–73; cf. deMause (1990) 13–15 (with some modifications).
4. Pollock (1983); cf. S. Wilson (1984), Pollock (1987) 11–15.
5. Johansson (1987a), (1987b).
6. Rokeah (1990); Thornton and Olson (1991).
7. Sourvinou-Inwood (1981) 34–35.
8. Manson (1991) 55.
9. Raepsaet and Decocq (1987); cf. Müller (1990) 47–54.
10. Bertier (1990), Deissmann-Merten (1984) 276–281, Green (1990) 359, Lane Fox (1986) 363, Rühfel (1984a) 187, Zahn (1970) 27 (but first delivered as a lecture in 1926).
11. Manson (1983).
12. Eyben (1980–1981) 52–53, Néraudau (1984) 380.
13. Wiedemann (1989).
14. For an exception, an argument that imperial wealth caused the Athenian, Spartan, and Roman elite to abdicate child-rearing responsibilities to slave nurses and *paidagōgoi,* see French (1988) 1361–1362, with the comments of Golden (1992a) 11.
15. What follows is based on Golden (1997) 176–181.
16. Quotations: Lane Fox (1986) 363; Green (1990) 345, cf. 341, Pollitt (1986) 128.
17. Bertier (1990).
18. Nilsson (1957) 111; cf. Lambrechts (1957).
19. Deissmann-Merten (1984) 276–281.
20. Herter (1927) 256; cf. Zahn (1970) 27, Rühfel (1984a) 187, Green (1990) 359.
21. Van Hook (1920) 144; cf. Rühfel (1984a) 186.
22. Sallares (1991) 151–160.
23. Patterson (1985) 104 n. 3, Brulé (1992) 64.
24. For a discussion of some factors that influence the incidence of inscriptions, see now Meyer (2013).
25. Soph. fr. 87R., Eur. *Andr.* 638, *Hipp.* 309, fr. 141, 377K.; cf. Lape (2004) 102–106.
26. Pomeroy (1983), Brulé (1990).
27. Martin (1994); Johansson (1991).
28. Lagia (2007) 296–297, with the caveat on the difficulty of dating the evidence precisely at 305.
29. Cf. W. V. Harris (1982) 115, Pomeroy (1986) 160–161, Kudlien (1989) 28, W. V. Harris (1994) 2.
30. Rühfel (1984a) 186, cf. Pollitt (1993) 97, Beaumont (2003) 78; Fowler (1989) 51 n. 2, cf. Bergemann (2002) 83–84; Zahn (1970) 26.
31. Herter (1993) 372.
32. M. Atwood, *The Robber Bride* (Toronto 1993) 522.
33. P. W. Rose (1992) 372.
34. Polybius: Golden (1997) 181–191; epigrams: Vérilhac (1982) 157; quotation: R. R. R. Smith (1991) 188–189; diverse: Beaumont (2003) 79–81.
35. Golden (1986) 257–267.
36. Houby-Nielsen (2000) 161; cf. Lagia (2007) 299–302.
37. Beaumont (2012) 209–210.
38. Beaumont (2003).
39. For an argument that children aged three to six in fact weathered the plague relatively well, see Hillard (2006–2007) 163–167.

40. Houby-Nielsen (2000) 159.
41. See especially Morris (1987) 57–69.
42. Houby-Nielsen (1995) 164; Lagia (2007) 304–305.
43. Elsner (2006). Similarly the more prominent and more realistic depictions of children on Hellenistic tombstones occurred along with their less frequent representations of families and fewer genealogies; the change has more to do with an increased interest in individuals than changing attitudes toward children (Bergemann [2002] 90).
44. Paleothodoros (2012) 24.
45. See, e.g., Houby-Nielsen (1995) 131, (2000) 155, Beaumont (2003) 60–61, Crelier (2008), Bobou (2010) 33.
46. Ginsburg and Opper (1969) 450–451; cf. J. Wilson (1985) 298.
47. Greenstein (1965) 68–69.
48. See Golden (1994) 371–376.
49. Beaumont (2012) 210.
50. Houby-Nielsen (2000) 163.
51. Lagia (2007); Beaumont (2012) 89–90. Houby-Nielsen herself observes that the reduction in child burials coincides with the appearance of relief-decorated gravestones for babies and small children who were not given a formal burial (Houby-Nielsen [2000] 163). Similarly, images of children on red-figure vases are rare from the period in which child burials are common; lekythoi make up a class of exceptions, perhaps because of their funerary function (Crelier [2008] 217–218).
52. Raepsaet and Decocq (1987) 14–15, Ham (1999) 209–213; cf. Rühfel (1984b) 165–168, Beaumont (2003) 75, (2012) 74–75, Oakley (2003) 177. For a skeptical response, see Zeitlin (2008) 330–331.
53. Ingalls (1998), Pratt (2007).
54. Dyke (1990) 373, 385.

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Source Index

Literary Texts

Aelian (Ael.)
VH (*Historical Miscellany*): *7.12,* 171n18; *7.15,* 173n58; *12.15,* 171n12
Aelius Aristides (Ael. Arist.)
Or. (*Orations*): *20.9,* 166n64
Aeneas Tacticus (Aen. Tact.)
40, 158n13
Aeschines (Aeschin.)
1 (*Against Timarchus*): *6,* 180n75; *9–12,* 51, 173n53, 174n97; *11,* 174n80; *12,* 174n97; *13,* 180n75; *13–16,* 172n39; *17,* 134; *18,* 159n22; *28,* 180n75, 182n120; *29–32,* 172n39; *39,* 159n22; *42,* 172n36; *94,* 172n36; *102,* 185n25; *126,* 179n65; *135,* 172n48; *138,* 172n48; *187,* 168n76, 172n49
2 (*On the Embassy*): *23,* 167n75; *28,* 101; *80,* 166n57; *99,* 161n87; *152,* 167n75, 180n71; *167,* 161n87; *179,* 86, 180n71, 185n7; *180,* 185n15
3 (*Against Ctesiphon*): *77–78,* 81–82; *104,* 188n81; *120,* 167n75; *135,* 174n74; *154,* 161n84, 164n22, 167n74; *156–157,* 161n75; *161,* 161n84; *162,* 190n19; *251,* 184n156; *258,* 167n74
Aeschylus (Aesch.)
Ag. (*Agamemnon*): *3,* 192n57; *10–11,* 126; *36–37,* 126; *72–82,* 129; *75,* 4; *81,* 4; *208,* 181n101; *243–245,* 166n62; *277,* 159n29; *394–395,* 159n42, 161n77; *399,* 161n77; *479,* 159n29; *648,* 126; *650–651,* 126; *699–700,* 192n59; *841–842,* 192n59; *877–879,* 194n99; *898,* 180n84; *945,* 193n71; *953,* 127; *1035–1046,* 127; *1065–1067,* 127; *1083,* 127; *1162–1163,* 13; *1226,* 127; *1326,* 127; *1374–1376,* 192n59; *1417–1418,* 181n104, 194n109; *1432,* 181n104, 194n109; *1561–1564,* 192n59; *1567–1576,* 126; *1625,* 127; *1643–1645,* 127
Cho. (*Libation Bearers*): *15,* 193n62; *40,* 193n62; *76–77,* 127; *84,* 127; *87,* 128; *100,* 128; *101,* 128; *103–104,* 128; *115,* 128; *118–122,* 128; *124ab,* 193n62; *135,* 128; *178,* 128; *264–268,* 128; *376–377,* 193n62; *399,* 193n62; *405,* 193n62; *475–476,* 193n62; *510–513,* 128; *652–656,* 128; *657,* 193n65; *719,* 128; *727,* 193n62; *732,* 128; *750–760,* 162n96; *751,* 160n47; *752,* 191n43; *770–773,* 128–129; *812–818,* 193n62; *833,* 193n62; *896,* 161n74; *915,* 128; *919–921,* 185n28; *931–971,* 129; *973–1076,* 193n69; *1048–1058,* 129; *1059–1060,* 129
Eum. (*Eumenides*): *38,* 129, 159n23; *235,* 129; *487,* 193n70; *496,* 161n77; *640–643,* 183n140; *657–666,* 87; *697,* 193n70; *708,* 193n70; *723–724,* 129; *807,* 193n70; *820,* 193n70; *835,* 194n98; *854,* 193n70; *862,* 193n70; *908,* 193n70; *927,* 193n70; *980,* 193n70; *991,* 193n70; *997,* 193n70; *1011,* 129; *1013,* 193n70; *1018,* 129; *1045,* 193n70

Aeschylus (Aesch.) (*cont.*)
Pers. (*The Persians*): *177,* 161n74; *189,* 161n74; *197,* 161n74; *403–405,* 167n75
PV (*Prometheus Bound*): *727,* 189n10; *865,* 179n60; *987–988,* 159n29
Sept. (*Seven Against Thebes*): *16,* 167n73; *348,* 160n48
Supp. (*The Suppliants*): *600,* 161n74; *707–709,* 182n120; *739,* 161n74; *753,* 161n74; *980,* 161n74
fr. 43R., 176n125
fr. 47a.770–771R., 124
fr. 47a.787R., 161n91
fr. 47a.805–814R., 171n30
fr. 47a.813R., 161n91
Alexis
fr. 130.9K.-A., 166n65
fr. 145.14–16K.-A., 178n30
fr. 282K.-A., 182n119
fr. 290K.-A., 172n49
fr. 305K.-A., 173n53
Anaxandrides
fr. 25K.-A., 91
Andocides (Andoc. / [Andoc.])
1 (*On the Mysteries*): *31,* 180n71; *48,* 121, 187n68; *49–50,* 122; *64,* 194n93; *125–127,* 163n9, 163n13; *130,* 167n68; *148,* 185n7
4 (*Against Alcibiades*): *13–14,* 137, 188n83; *20–21,* 174n81; *22–23,* 138; *31,* 172n36
Anecd. Bekk. (I. Bekker, ed., *Anecdota Graeca*)
202.3, 169n112, 170n116
235.1, 170n115
255.15, 164n24
270.31, 169n112
444.30, 176n131
Anth. Pal. (*Palatine Anthology*)
6.280, 171n16
6.282, 171n16
6.308, 174n75
6.309, 171n16
12.4, 49
13.19, 60
Antiphanes
fr. 157K.-A., 91n48
fr. 194K.-A., 167n70
fr. 261K.-A., 182n125
fr. 319K.-A., 182n120
Antiphon (Antiph.)
1 (*Against the Stepmother for Poisoning*): *1,* 99; *5,* 99; *14,* 189n3
3 / *Tetr.* (*Second Tetralogy*): *2.9,* 168n77; *2.11,* 161n88; *3.7,* 168n77; *4.5–6,* 161n85; *4.6,* 161n84; *4.10,* 168n77
5 (*On the Murder of Herodes*): *69,* 18; *74,* 182n117; *76,* 180n73
6 (*On the Chorus Member*): *11,* 174n79; *11–14,* 56; *19,* 168n79; *21,* 185n7; *22,* 168n79
87 B 49D.-K., 179n55
87 B 60D.-K., 158n6
fr. 66 Thalheim, 160n64
Apollodorus (Apollod.)
Library: *1.6.3,* 4; *2.4.9,* 173n68; *3.11.2,* 185n12
Apollodorus Com.
fr. 13K.-A., 170n3
Apostolius (Apost. / Apostol.)
1.60, 167n69
8.16, 164n34
9.55, 192n52
11.48, 167n69
11.53, 173n65
12.42a, 182n119
12.48, 167n69
12.93, 160n43
Apuleius (Apul.)
Apol. (*Apology*): *37.1–2,* 184n157
Archippus
fr. 48K.-A., 183n133
Aristodemus
383 F 9, 168n92
Aristophanes (Ar.)
Ach. (*Acharnians.*): *241–262,* 165n40; *444,* 171n32; *680,* 161n84; *729–835,* 181n97; *863,* 172n51
Av. (*Birds*): *128–134,* 164n33; *137–142,* 52; *388–392,* 171n8; *756–759,* 135; *1313–1336,* 135; *1337–1370,* 135; *1353–1357,* 180n75; *1439–1445,* 179n64
Ecc./Eccl. (*The Assemblywomen*): *88–92,* 85; *112–113,* 172n43; *549,* 180n87; *678–680,* 166n62; *1146,* 169n100
Eq. (*Knights*): *188–189,* 173n64, 173n64–65; *412,* 182n126; *417–420,* 1; *451,* 161n77; *453,* 161n77; *556,* 161n85; *716–718,* 192n52; *729,* 169n94; *731,* 161n85; *736–740,* 51; *876–880,* 172n39; *1126,* 160n52; *1195–1200,* 1; *1381,* 171n32
Lys. (*Lysistrata*): *327–329,* 165n53; *567–586,* 170n114; *641–647,* 40–41; *700–702,* 62; *781–796,* 38; *881,* 123; *908,* 190n33; *1065–1071,* 31; *1216–1224,* 135
Nub. (*Clouds*): *34,* 180n82; *537–539,* 159n30, 169n100; *653–654,* 171n32; *763,* 171n13; *820–821,* 184n166; *844–846,* 184n156; *861–864,* 61, 168n82; *862,* 160n51; *877–881,* 9; *904b–906,* 183n140; *961–983,* 172n49; *965,* 53; *972,* 173n67; *1093–1094,* 172n43; *1156,* 180n82; *1374–1375,* 135; *1380–1390,* 179n65; *1381,*

160n51; *1382–1385,* 160n52; *1399–1451,* 87, 135, 182n126; *1409–1429,* 135; *1410–1419,* 159n28
Pax (*Peace*): *50–53,* 169n100; *110–149,* 82–83; *123,* 182n126; *549,* 171n32; *743–747,* 134–135; *765–766,* 169n100; *872–876,* 67, 176n135; *1265–1304,* 164n33, 166n62; *1300,* 171n29
Plut. (*Wealth / Plutus*): *242–244,* 172n36; *816,* 171n13, 171n22; *874–876,* 135; *975,* 161n85; *984–985,* 187n59; *1011,* 179n65; *1016,* 161n85; *1056–1057,* 171n13, 171n22
Ran. (*Frogs*): *422,* 163n13, 163n122; *616–624,* 135; *727–730,* 173n64
Thesm. (*Women at the Thesmophoria*): *130–133,* 181n98; *289–291,* 171n29, 181n97; *478–480,* 171n33; *502–519,* 179n64; *505–506,* 160n59; *564–565,* 81; *689–761,* 181n104; *690–691,* 176n130; *733–734,* 176n130; *845,* 180n82
Vesp. (*Wasps*): *158–160,* 95; *251–253,* 96; *293–313,* 96; *295,* 47; *320–324,* 95; *340,* 95; *354–357,* 96; *568–573,* 180n71; *570,* 160n48; *583–586,* 95; *605–609,* 82; *619–627,* 95; *959,* 173n64; *960–961,* 173n65; *976–978,* 180n71; *989,* 173n64; *997,* 96; *1023–1028,* 172n48; *1122–1124,* 96; *1133–1153,* 96; *1167,* 184n164; *1183–1185,* 160n63; *1200–1201,* 96; *1292–1296,* 135; *1297–1298,* 161n77; *1299,* 184n164; *1307,* 161n77, 184n165; *1309–1310,* 184nn164–165; *1316,* 184n164; *1332–1334,* 184n165; *1336,* 184n166; *1351–1363,* 184n169; *1417,* 184n164
fr. 360K.-A., 33
fr. 604K.-A., 159n30
fr. 849K.-A., 42
fr. 971K.-A., 160n52
Aristophanes of Byzantium (Ar. Byz.)
fr. 37–66 Slater, 161n82
Aristotle (Arist. / [Arist.])
Ath. Pol. (*The Athenian Constitution*): *6.1,* 166n54; *9.1,* 166n54; *18.2,* 169n113, 174n84; *24.3,* 166n57, 167n74; *30.2,* 167n71, 183n146; *42.1,* 161n87; *42.2,* 56; *43.3,* 166n57; *53.4,* 92; *54.7,* 176n135; *55.3–4,* 180n76; *56.3,* 174nn78–80, 176n127; *56.6,* 180n75, 184n156; *56.7,* 161n87, 181n107; *62.2,* 166n57; *63.3,* 167n71, 183n146
Aud. (*On Things Heard*): *801b5,* 159n37, 163n127; *803b19,* 160n49
Col. (*On Colours*): *797b24,* 162n97; *798a30,* 162n97
EE (*Eudemian Ethics*): *1.1214b30,* 159n37; *1.1215b24,* 159n38; *1.1216a6,* 162n98; *2.1219b5,* 159n40; *2.1224a29,* 159n36; *2.1226b23,* 159n21; *3.1229a18,* 159n24; *3.1229a29,* 160n57; *7.1236a1,* 159n36; *7.1236a38,* 170n1; *7.1238a33,* 159n36; *7.1239a6,* 182n123; *7.1239a38,* 178n41; *7.1240a31,* 177n16; *7.1240b33,* 159n21, 159n36; *7.1241b1,* 181n105; *7.1242a4,* 185n16; *7.1242a33,* 182n123; *7.1242a36,* 185n16; *7.1244a14,* 182n122
Eudemus: *fr. 44 Rose (= fr. 6 Ross),* 178n30
Gen. An. (*Generation of Animals*): *1.724a23,* 2; *1.728a10,* 171n31; *1.728a17,* 159n36; *2.733b2,* 158n19; *2.740a6,* 183n154; *2.744a26,* 161n95; *3.753a8,* 180n68; *3.759a36,* 189n10; *3.759b7,* 104, 181n103; *5.778b21,* 162n98; *5.779a13,* 162n98; *5.779a25–27,* 162n97; *5.780b1,* 162n97; *5.786b16,* 160n49
HA (*History of Animals*): *2.500b34,* 162n100; *4.536b5,* 160n51, 163n127; *5.537b13,* 162n99; *5.544b20,* 163n124; *5.544b26,* 164n21; *5.545b27,* 184n155; *5.557a7,* 160n53; *7.581a9,* 163n124; *7.581a11,* 164n21; *7.581b9,* 158n13, 160n49; *7.584a23,* 158n13; *7.587a28,* 160n47; *7.587b5,* 158n4; *7.588a31,* 159n36; *9.608b15,* 180n88
Inc. An. (*On the Beginnings of Animals*): *710b10,* 162n100
Insomn. (*On Dreams*): *3.461a13,* 162n99; *3.462b5,* 162n99
Mag. Mor. (*Great Ethics*): *1.1185a3,* 159n21
Mem. (*On Memory*): *453b5–6,* 159n39, 163n121
NE (*Nicomachean Ethics*): *1.1100a1,* 159n21, 159n36; *2.1105a1–2,* 60n57, 161n88; *3.1110a25,* 139; *3.1111a26,* 159n21, 159n36; *3.1111b8,* 159n21, 159n36; *3.1119b6–8,* 160n57, 161n85; *5.1134b8,* 183n154; *6.1144b9,* 159n36; *7.1148b15,* 51; *7.1149b8,* 87, 182n126; *7.1152b20,* 159n36; *7.1153a30,* 159n36; *7.1154b10,* 159n37; *8.1155a17,* 180n68; *8.1156a31,* 170n1; *8.1157a28,* 170n1; *8.1158a6,* 170n1; *8.1158b11,* 88; *8.1159a28,* 178n41; *8.1159b35,* 185n7; *8.1160b25,* 185n16; *8.1161b16,* 84; *8.1161b27,* 185n16; *8.1162a27,* 138, 185n26; *8.1163b15,* 88; *9.1164b5,* 182n120; *9.1165a15,* 182n122; *9.1165a24,* 182n120; *9.1165b25,* 170n1; *9.1166a8,* 181n105; *9.1168a23,* 181n105; *10.1174a1,* 159n38; *10.1180a24,* 173n54
Oec. (*Economics*): *1.1343b20,* 180n77; *1.1344a6–7,* 182n127, 186n33; *1.1344b15–22,* 79, 190n26; *2.1347a17,* 163n3
Part. An. (*On the Parts of Animals*): *4.686b10,* 162n100; *4.686b24,* 159n36
Phil. (*de Philosophia*): *fr. 26 Rose (= fr. 19c Ross),* 159n41
Phys. (*Physics*): *1.184b12,* 18; *2.197b7,* 159n21, 159n36; *7.247b19,* 6

Aristotle (Arist./[Arist.]) (*cont.*)
Pol. (*Politics*): *1.1257a22,* 185n26; *1.1258b6,* 180n82; *1.1259a38–b18,* 88; *1.1260a14,* 159n40; *1.1260b20,* 167n67; *2.1263b24,* 185n26; *2.1268a11,* 167n74; *3.1275a14,* 167n67; *3.1278a4,* 167n67; *4.1294b21,* 173n63; *4.1295b15,* 30, 54; *4.1300a4,* 185n31; *5.1303b33,* 102; *5.1305b1,* 185n14; *5.1310a24,* 30; *5.1311a36,* 169n113; *5.1313b1,* 170n4; *6.1323a3–5,* 165n53, 185n31; *7.1323a33,* 159n37; *7.1328a15,* 185n14; *7.1333a8,* 30; *7.1334b25,* 160n57; *7.1334b29–1335a6,* 183n150; *7.1334b29–1335b20,* 158n5; *7.1335a28–29,* 181n107; *7.1335a36,* 184n155; *7.1336a2–24,* 17; *7.1336a4,* 125; *7.1336a10,* 160n46; *7.1336a24–40,* 17; *7.1336a29–34,* 46; *7.1336a35,* 160n47; *7.1336b1–36,* 17; *7.1336b18–22,* 26–27, 159n30, 166n60, 169n100; *7.1336b36–1337a7,* 17, 173n59; *8.1337a24,* 173n54; *8.1337b22,* 173n60; *8.1339a1,* 58; *8.1339a30,* 159n40; *8.1340b26,* 54; *8.1340b29–30,* 160n60, 161n88; *8.1341a16,* 160n59
Probl. (*Problems*): *1.16.861a16,* 160n53; *1.19.861b3,* 160n55; *3.7.872a2,* 160n55; *3.34.876a15–20,* 160n55, 162n99; *4.4.877a1,* 160n55; *4.12.877b20,* 160n45; *4.24.879a22,* 160n45; *4.26.879b19,* 171n31; *4.26.879b37,* 172n46; *4.28.880a20,* 160n53; *8.9.888a19,* 171n21; *8.20.889a15,* 160n56; *10.4.891a27,* 160n53; *10.39.895a13,* 59n36; *10.45.895b30,* 160n56; *10.46.896a19,* 159n40; *11.1.898b33,* 163n127; *11.14.900a33,* 160n49; *11.24.901b25–27,* 160n49, 161n88; *11.27.902a5,* 163n127; *11.30.902b10,* 159n36; *11.30.902b16–29,* 160n50; *15.3.911a3,* 159n39; *20.7.923a37,* 181n107; *30.1.953b36,* 171n31; *30.14.957a43,* 159nn36–37, 160n55; *33.18.963b10,* 160n53; *34.10.964a33,* 158n19
Protr. (*Protrepticus*): *fr. 55 Rose,* 159n37; *fr. 57 Rose (= fr. 3 Ross),* 167n69
Rh. (*Rhetoric*): *1.1360b20,* 180n67; *1.1361a1,* 167n74; *1.1371a15,* 159n36; *2.1384b24,* 159n36; *2.1389a1–1390b12,* 2; *2.1390b9,* 181n107; *2.1398b26,* 173n66; *2.1399a35,* 174n93; *3.1407a2,* 5; *3.1407a6,* 192n52; *3.1408b24,* 168n76; *3.1411a18,* 114; *3.1417a5,* 180n74
Rhet. ad Alex. (*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*): *1.1421a31,* 189n8
Somn. (*On Sleep and Waking*): *457a4,* 162n98; *457a14,* 192n52
Aristoxenus
fr. 35 Wehrli, 160n62
Astydamas II
60 F 2 Snell, 159n23

Athenaeus (Ath.)
The Deipnosophists: *1.20F,* 173n64; *4.182C,* 160n49; *5.214A,* 167n69; *6.264D,* 165n53; *10.450B,* 188n89; *10.453CD,* 160n54; *11.494F,* 164n17; *11.495E,* 168n92; *14.641A,* 166n62
Aulus Gellius (Aul. Gell.)
NA (*Attic Nights*): *12.1,* 192n52

Baton
fr. 5K.-A., 192n52
?Biotus
205 F 1 Snell, 72

Callias
fr. 36K.-A., 160n52
Callimachus (Callim.)
Hymn., 4 (*Hymn to Delos*): *278–282,* 176n127
fr. 75.9 Pfeiffer, 167n69
Carmina Minora (*Carm. Min.*)
876cP., 176n119
Chaeremon
71 F 32 Snell, 182n125
Cicero (Cic.)
Sen. (*On Old Age*): *7.22,* 184n157
Verr. (*Against Verres*): *2.1.26.66,* 166n62; *2.4.45.99,* 176n130
Clearchus
fr. 7 Wehrli, 159n33
Com. Adesp. (*Comica Adespota*)
fr. 148K.-A., 189n10
fr. 196K.-A., 189n105
fr. 201K.-A., 163n122
fr. 202K.-A., 163n12
fr. 578K.-A., 172n36
fr. 901K.-A., 182n125
fr. 1014 col. ii. 40–42K.-A., 181n103
Comp. Men. et Philist. (*Comparison of Menander and Philistio*)
99, 179n55
366, 182n120
Craterus
342 F 5, 189n6
342 F 17, 189n6
Cratinus
fr. 183K.-A., 164n22, 167n74

Democritus (Democr.)
68 B 278D.-K., 180n82
68 B 279D.-K., 102
Demosthenes (Dem. / [Dem.])
10 (*Philippic 4*): *40,* 180n75
14 (*On the Symmories*): *16,* 103

18 (*On the Crown*): *186,* 181n102; *205,* 167n73; *257,* 173n63; *258–259,* 165n51; *265,* 173n64
19 (*On the False Embassy*): *125,* 167n66; *194,* 190n13; *199,* 165n51; *240,* 167n75; *283,* 182n114; *292,* 167n75; *310,* 180n71
21 (*Against Meidias*): *10,* 174n78; *46,* 134; *64,* 174n78; *78–79,* 185n8, 185n29; *99,* 180n71; *147,* 174n81; *154,* 161n87; *186–188,* 180n71
22 (*Against Androtion*): *65,* 91
23 (*Against Aristocrates*): *53–55,* 171n33; *130,* 166n57; *136,* 166n57, 180n73
24 (*Against Timocrates*): *60,* 182n120; *103,* 180n75; *105–107,* 180n75; *128,* 167n66; *150,* 167n71, 183n146; *202–203,* 111
25 (*Against Aristogeiton 1*): *24,* 88; *54,* 182n116; *55,* 111, 185n10; *66,* 182n120; *79,* 185n10; *84,* 180n71, 182n114; *87–88,* 183n130, 183n152; *101,* 167n75
27 (*Against Aphobus 1*): *4–5,* 45, 114, 181n107, 188n79; *9,* 188n81; *17,* 114, 188n81; *23,* 188n81; *36,* 91; *66,* 187n61
28 (*Against Aphobus 2*): *13,* 188n81; *15–16,* 188n79; *20,* 180n72
29 (*Against Aphobus 3*): *15,* 185n9; *23,* 170n3, 185n9; *26,* 180n71; *43,* 181n107; *48,* 188n79; *52,* 180n71; *54,* 180n71
30 (*Against Onetor 1*): *12,* 110
31 (*Against Onetor 2*): *6–9,* 188n79; *11–12,* 187n68
32 (*Against Zenothemis*): *5,* 164n20
33 (*Against Apaturius*): *20,* 77; *33–34,* 77
34 (*Against Phormio*): *5,* 190n26; *10,* 190n26; *17,* 190n26; *37,* 180n74
36 (*For Phormio*): *9,* 185n25; *11,* 185n18; *20,* 98; *34,* 185n18
37 (*Against Pantaenetus*): *5,* 188n81; *46,* 185n29
38 (*Against Nausimachus and Xenopeithes*): *20,* 158n8
39 (*Against Boeotus 1*), 184n5; *23,* 194n100; *27,* 185n18; *29,* 185n18
40 (*Against Boeotus 2*), 184n5; *2,* 120; *4,* 183n152; *8,* 79; *10,* 111; *12,* 116; *13,* 88; *25,* 110; *29,* 194n100; *45–47,* 88; *50,* 91
41 (*Against Spudias*): *26,* 115
42 (*Against Phaenippus*): *27,* 188n79
43 (*Against Macartatus*): *12,* 158n8; *19,* 185n18; *74,* 185n6; *77,* 158n8; *82,* 164n32
44 (*Against Leochares*), 103; *10,* 185n6, 185n25; *18,* 185n25
45 (*Against Stephanus 1*): *70,* 189n5; *83–84,* 99; *86,* 191n34
46 (*Against Stephanus 2*): *20,* 164n23; *24,* 164n23
47 (*Against Evergus and Mnesibulus*); *11,* 185n9; *34–35,* 183n148; *46,* 185n9; *53,* 120, 185n8; *55,* 33; *56,* 124; *61,* 33; *70,* 168n79; *73,* 168n79; *80,* 183n148
48 (*Against Olympiodorus*), 184n5; *12,* 102–103; *54–55,* 187n64
49 (*Against Timotheus*): *66,* 183n152
50 (*Against Polycles*): *56,* 190n14; *62,* 180n73
53 (*Against Nicostratus*): *16,* 28; *19,* 161n94; *28,* 85, 185n8; *29,* 182n114
54 (*Against Conon*): *23,* 87; *38,* 180n71; *39,* 33; *40,* 180n71
55 (*Against Callicles*): *2,* 185n7; *3,* 183n154
57 (*Against Eubulides*): *19–21,* 185n25; *20,* 181n108; *35,* 123; *54,* 27, 163n13; *70,* 180n76, 182nn114–115
58 (*Against Theocrines*): *2,* 88; *28,* 185n10; *30,* 166n57; *31,* 158n8; *58,* 88; *60,* 182n117; *66,* 175n106
59 (*Against Neaera*): *1,* 187n59; *6,* 187n59; *12,* 187n59; *18,* 161n94; *18–19,* 171n34; *22,* 86, 183n154; *24,* 166n63; *33,* 166n63; *48,* 166n63; *50,* 164n16; *52,* 114; *55–61,* 163n9; *110–111,* 168n76; *122,* 82, 194n98
60 / *Epit*. (*Funeral Speech*): *4,* 120; *5,* 167n73; *8,* 181n102; *16–17,* 167n66; *36,* 182n118
61 (*Erotic Essay*): *2,* 172n42; *6,* 172n42; *34–57,* 172n42
Ep. (*Letters*): *4.1,* 158n5
Dicaeogenes
52 F 5 Snell, 182n120
Dinarchus (Din.)
Aristog. (*Against Aristogeiton*): *8,* 182n116; *14,* 182n116; *17–18,* 180n76; *18,* 182n116; *20,* 182n116
Demos. (*Against Demosthenes*): *23,* 165n53; *65,* 167n75; *99,* 167n75; *101,* 166n57; *109,* 167n75
Phil. (*Against Philocles*): *2,* 167n75; *18,* 183n143
fr. E21, 168n79
Dio Cassius (Dio Cass.)
Roman History: *52.14.2,* 167n69
Dio Chrysostomus (Dio Chrys.)
Orations: *74.9,* 166n65
Diodorus Siculus (Diod. Sic.)
Library of History: *3.67.2,* 173n68; *9.2.5,* 175n107; *11.40.1,* 167n66; *13.55.4–5,* 167n66; *13.56.7,* 167n66; *15.83.3,* 167n66
Diogenianus (Diogen.)
1.1, 166n62
3.18, 173n65
4.18, 159n28
6.46, 167n69
6.56, 173n65
7.11, 160n43

Diogenes Laertius
1.55, 175n107, 180n75
8.47–48, 174n94
9.3, 171n12
9.66, 187n68
10.2, 53
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dion. Hal.)
Ant. Rom. (*Roman Antiquities*): *2.26,* 164n24
Comp. (*de Compositione Verborum*): 14 *ad fin*, 183n131
Diphilus
fr. 42.26–27K.-A., 172n36
fr. 73K.-A., 160n54
fr. 91K.-A., 181n98

Epicrates
fr. 5K.-A., 131
Ep. Diogen. (*Epitome Diogeniani*)
3.47, 160n43
Etym. Magn. (*Etymologicum Magnum*)
s. *Apatouria*, 163n13
s. *arrhēphorein*, 169n112, 170n116, 170n121
s. *chalkeia*, 170n121
s. *drapetinda*, 171n27
s. *epi dietes hēbēsai*, 164n24
Eubulus
fr. 80K.-A., 192n52
fr. 106.16–20K.-A., 188n89
Eupolis
fr. 104K.-A., 172n43
fr. 112K.-A., 160n48
fr. 133K.-A., 34
fr. 146K.-A., 164n17
fr. 261K.-A, 159n30, 169n100
Euripides (Eur.)
Alc. (*Alcestis*): *189–190,* 160n47; *290–294,* 177n17; *302–309,* 189n10; *313–319,* 189n10; *393–416,* 186n56; *402–403,* 186n56; *882–888,* 179n55
Andr. (*Andromache*): *418–420,* 179n61; *441,* 186n56; *504–505,* 186n56; *595–600,* 175n112; *638,* 195n25; *714,* 161n75; *722–726,* 116, 162n119; *746–748,* 116; *1066–1069,* 189n98; *1171–1225,* 189n98
Archel. (*Archelaus*): *fr. 2.19–21 Austin (= fr. 228aK.),* 179n60
Ba. (*Bacchae*): *1302–1325,* 117; *1305,* 161n75
Cycl. (*Cyclops*): *276,* 174n73
El. (*Electra*): *30,* 85; *82–83,* 190n18; *265,* 194n103; *283–284,* 158n10; *506–508,* 191n43; *541–544,* 158n10; *933–935, 163n6; 1102–1104,* 140
Erechtheus: fr. 60.80 Austin (= fr. 270K.), 176n127; *fr. 358K.,* 86
Hcld. (*Heraclidae*): *239,* 186n56; *408–414,* 83; *574–580,* 186n52; *777–783,* 176n127; *826–827,* 167n73
Hec. (*Hecuba*): *171,* 161n75; *895–897,* 186n40; *992,* 121–122
Hel. (*Helen*): *940–943,* 191n46
HF (*Heracles*): *71–72,* 186n56; *98–99,* 160n47; *462–489,* 85; *634–636,* 179n61; *1317–1318,* 183n140
Hipp. (*Hippolytus*): *309,* 195n25; *857–859,* 175n114
Hyps. (*Hypsipyle*): *fr. 34/35.5 Bond* (= *fr. 754cK.*), 192n56; *fr. 60.8–12 Bond* (= *fr. 757.839–843K.*), 124; *fr. 60.90–96 Bond* (= *fr. 757.921–927K.*), 177n17; *fr. 61.8 Bond* (= *fr. 758dK.*), 192n56
IA (*Iphigenia at Aulis*): *115–123,* 175n114; *376–377,* 185n14; *638–639,* 194n112; *690,* 161n77; *821–834,* 185n28; *1241–1248,* 109–110
Ion: *67,* 179n60; *585–632,* 162n119; *961,* 162n119; *1025,* 189n10; *1227,* 179n60
IT (*Iphigenia at Tauris*): *708–710,* 190n18; *1249–1282,* 158n17
Med. (*Medea*): *46–48,* 158n16; *231,* 170n127; *238–240,* 170n127; *714–715,* 179n60; *821,* 191n40; *1021–1077,* 85; *1071–1075,* 160n44; *1090–1115,* 85, 179n55; *1101–1105,* 158n8; *1402–1403,* 160n44
Or. (*Orestes*): *108,* 185n30; *377–379,* 158n10; *462–465,* 117
Pho. (*Phoenician Women*): *93–94,* 185n29; *355–356,* 181n103; *965–966,* 179n61; *1276,* 185n29
Rh. (*Rhesus*): *982,* 179n58
Supp. (*Suppliant Women*): *506–508,* 179n61; *786–793,* 179n58; *913–917,* 158n6; *1087–1091,* 179n58; *1101–1103,* 82
Tro. (*Trojan Women*): *191–196,* 131; *371–372,* 181n101; *392–393,* 181n101; *557–559,* 181n110; *647–653,* 185n28; *740–763,* 181n110; *749,* 160n47, 162n119; *750–751,* 186n56; *757–758,* 160n44; *1089–1099,* 181n110; *1156–1201,* 189n98; *1180–1184,* 162n119; *1209–1215,* 188n97
fr. 4K., 189n10
fr. 103K., 179n61
fr. 141K., 195n25
fr. 271K., 159n42
fr. 272K., 171n11
fr. 316K., 179n61
fr. 317K., 183n150
fr. 338K., 184n5
fr. 346K., 179n61
fr. 359K., 189n8
fr. 377K., 195n25

fr. 449K., 178n30
fr. 491K., 189n8
fr. 500K., 183n132
fr. 518K., 179n61
fr. 543K., 179n55
fr. 603K., 160n64
fr. 652K., 179n61
fr. 824K., 189n10
fr. 852K., 87
fr. 853K., 182n125
fr. 950K., 183n132
fr. 951K., 182n119
fr. 952K., 183n131
fr. 975K., 185n14
fr. 1015K., 181n103
fr. 1027K, 158n6
fr. 1064K., 87, 163n6
Eusebius (Euseb.)
Chron. (*Chronica*): *1.212 Schöne,* 59
Eustathius of Thessalonica (Eust.)
Il. (*Commentary on Homer's Iliad*): *165.4,* 164n17; *565.20,* 115; *907.18,* 164n17; *971.39,* 189n105; *1111.24,* 171n21; *1283.7,* 169n94; *1292.66,* 164n17
Od. (*Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*): *1726.18,* 164n34; *1885.15,* 169n112; *1914.56,* 176n119

Harpocration (Harpoc.)
s. *aph' hestias myeisthai,* 169n97
s. *Aristiōn*, 190n19
s. *arrhēphorein,* 169n112
s. *dekateuein*, 170n115
s. *epi dietes hēbēsai,* 164n24
s. *hoti paidi*, 166n65
s. *kakōseōs*, 180n75
s. *katatomē*, 174n82
s. *koinōnikōn*, 103
s. *meion kai meiagōgos,* 164n16
Heraclitus
22 B 52D.-K., 171n10
Hermias Alexandrinus (Hermias Alex.)
Pl. Phdr. (*in Platonis Phaedrum scholia*): *231E,* 172n48
Hermippus
fr. 25K.-A., 42
fr. 86K.-A., 160n52
Herodotus (Hdt.)
1.30, 116
1.64.1–2, 167n66
1.111, 161n89
1.114–115, 158n3
1.116.1, 189n101
2.2, 160n48
2.30.4, 180n74
2.35.2, 185n28
2.35.4, 180n75
3.3, 158n3
3.119, 177n17
3.153, 161n89
4.154.2, 189n10
5.4.2, 178n30
5.49–51, 8
5.51, 161n92
5.92γ, 158n3
6.27.2, 173n58, 173n71, 179n54
6.137.3, 165n53
8.41.1, 190n13
8.75, 191n40
Herondas (=Herodas) (Herod.)
3.5–6, 171n7
3.59–61, 173n69
65, 171n7
Hesiod (Hes.)
Op. (*Works and Days*): *127–131,* 158n18; *328–330,* 185n17; *376–379,* 102; *825,* 189n10
Th. (*Theogony*): *37–182,* 102; *138,* 90; *159–168,* 90–91; *233–236,* 102; *333–335,* 102; *453–506,* 91, 102; *485–491,* 13–14; *820–835,* 102
Hesychius (Hesych./ Hsch.)
s. *aletrides*, 169n112, 170n123
s. *chytrinda*, 171n7
s. *dekateuein*, 170n115
s. *drapetinda*, 171n27
s. *ekshēbos*, 181n107
s. *ephygon kakon . . .*, 164n34
s. *ergastinai*, 170n124
s. *kanēphoroi*, 169n112
s. *Koureōtis*, 164n17
s. *limnomachai*, 168n89
s. *mamman*, 160n52
s. *oinistēria*, 164n17
s. *spargana*, 162n102
s. *stephanon ekpherein*, 163n3
Hieronymus of Rhodes
fr. 19 Wehrli, 191n44
Hippocrates & the Hippocratic corpus (Hippoc.)
Septim. (*Seventh Month Child*): *7.450L,* 158n4 (cf. Philo, *Opif. Mundi* 36.105)
Homer
Il. (*Iliad*): *9.447–451,* 90; *15.362–364,* 159n41; *24.255–260,* 116; *24.751–753,* 116
Od. (*Odyssey*): *11.298–304,* 185n12
Homeric Hymns
Hym. Cer. (*Hymn 2 to Ceres*), 181n104; *4–19,* 64; *414–428,* 64

Homeric Hymns (*cont.*)
Hym. Merc. (*Hymn 4 to Mercury*): *17–396,* 158n17; *294–298,* 160n54
Hyperides (Hyper.)
Against Athenogenes, 190n26
Against Timandrus, 98, 190n26
Epit. (*Epitaphius*): *8,* 173n72; *27,* 187n61; *29,* 5
Euxen. (*For Euxenippus*): *6,* 180n75; *22,* 161n92, 167n68; *41,* 180n71
Lycoph. (*For Lycophron*): *3–8,* 110; *15,* 158n11
Phil. (*Against Philippides*): *9,* 180n71
fr. 192 Jensen, 164n23
fr. 205 Jensen, 104

Isaeus (Isae.)
1 (*Cleonymus*): *15,* 189n4; *39,* 189n99
2 (*Menecles*): *1,* 185n10; *5,* 188n86; *6–9,* 137–138; *18,* 120; *29,* 99
3 (*Pyrrhus*): *14*, 166n63; *36,* 187n59; *39,* 187n59; *71,* 187n59; *80,* 65
4 (*Nicostratus*): *18,* 31; *26,* 161n84
5 (*Dicaeogenes*): *5,* 188n79; *6,* 188n86; *6–7,* 158n8; *11,* 189n5; *26,* 188n79; *47,* 166n57
6 (*Philoctemon*): *10,* 104; *14,* 23; *18–26,* 23; *21–22,* 163n13; *22,* 164n20; *24*, 194n98; *26*, 185n18; *27*, 23, 164n20
7 (*Apollodorus*): *5,* 103; *13,* 22; *14,* 79, 111; *15,* 22, 163n11; *17,* 22; *25,* 181n108; *26,* 22; *31–32,* 187n69; *33–34,* 158n8; *40,* 174n82; *43,* 22
8 (*Ciron*): *7–8,* 188n79; *8,* 189n4; *15–16,* 117; *19,* 65, 163n13; *31,* 164n23; *32,* 180n75, 189n99; *35,* 188n79; *36,* 187n64, 187n68; *37,* 117; *41–43,* 187n64
9 (*Astyphilus*): *17,* 102; *20,* 28; *30,* 27, 98
10 (*Aristarchus*): *5–6,* 187n74; *10,* 166n65; *12,* 164n23; *15,* 187n74; *25,* 172n36, 187n61
11 (*Hagnias*): *8ff.,* 158n8; *17,* 181n103; *37,* 161n85; *39,* 113; *41,* 158n8
12 (*Euphiletus*): *3,* 183n142; *4,* 184n5; *5,* 189n11; *10,* 18, 35
fr. 25 Thalheim, 164n23
Isocrates (Isoc.)
1 (*To Demonicus*): *2,* 190n14; *14,* 182n119
2 (*To Nicocles*): *38,* 182n119
4 (*Panegyricus*): *56–60,* 181n102
6 (*Archidamus*): *73–74,* 190n13; *108,* 167n73
7 (*Areopagiticus*): *37,* 173n54; *44–45,* 173n64
8 (*On the Peace*): *1–2,* 117; *10,* 117; *92,* 167n66
9 (*Evagoras*): *22,* 4
11 (*Busiris*): *38,* 183n140
12 (*Panathenaicus*): *198,* 173n72
14 (*Plataicus*): *48,* 166n5
15 (*Antidosis*): *92,* 191n46; *93,* 170n3; *155–156,* 183n142; *207,* 170n4; *289–290,* 173n72; *321,* 180n71
16 (*On the Team of Horses*): *26,* 189n6
18 (*Against Callimachus*): *60,* 185n25
19 (*Aegineticus*): *10,* 190n14; *26,* 187n69; *30,* 187n69
Ep. (*Letters*): *9.10,* 185n28

Lucian (Luc.)
Macr. (*The Long-livers*): *24,* 184n157
Lycophron
100 F 2.7 Snell, 193n64
Lycurgus (Lyc.)
Leocr. (*Against Leocrates*): *2,* 167n75; *15,* 88; *40,* 111; *48,* 120; *53,* 167n66, 167n74; *87,* 166n57; *94,* 87; *95–97,* 88; *99–101,* 84; *112,* 194n93; *141,* 167nn75–76
Lysias (Lys.)
1 (*On the Murder of Eratosthenes*): *4,* 50; *6,* 137, 164n20; *9,* 190n31; *10–11,* 160n47, 190n33; *12–13,* 172n35, 190n31; *14,* 111, 159n25; *16,* 50; *23,* 33; *25,* 50; *30–32,* 171n33; *41,* 190n31; *49,* 171n33
2 (*Funeral Oration*): *11,* 181n102; *13,* 158n8; *34,* 190n13; *50–53,* 167n66; *70,* 167n74; *72–73,* 182n118; *75,* 79
3 (*Against Simon*), 174n84; *6–7,* 185n29, 189n4; *10,* 161n85
4 (*On a Wound by Premeditation*): *20,* 180n72
5 (*For Callias*): *1,* 190n14; *5,* 191n34
6 (*Against Andocides*): *49,* 167n74
7 (*On the Olive Stump*): *41,* 182n114
10 (*Against Theomnestus 1*): *4–5,* 102, 163n125
12 (*Against Eratosthenes*): *34,* 185n9; *97,* 190n13; *98,* 166n54
13 (*Against Agoratus*): *39,* 187n68; *39–42,* 185n7; *45,* 182n118, 187n61; *91,* 167n73, 180n75
14 (*Against Alcibiades 1*): *17,* 158n8; *25,* 160n64
16 (*For Mantitheus*): *4,* 190n13; *10,* 102–103, 115
18 (*On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias*): *10,* 190n14; *21,* 103
19 (*On the Property of Aristophanes*): *9,* 183n142; *10,* 172n36; *16–17,* 188n79, 188n86; *33,* 110; *36–37,* 92, 94; *48,* 188n79; *55,* 88
20 (*For Polystratus*): *4,* 167n75; *11,* 165n50, 173n64; *34–36,* 158n8, 180n71
21 (*Defence Against a Charge of Taking Bribes*): *1–5,* 174n81
24 (*On the Refusal of a Pension*): *6,* 182nn114–115, 191n34; *16,* 184n170
26 (*On the Scrutiny of Evandrus*): *21,* 163n125
30 (*Against Nicomachus*): *2,* 163n13; *7,* 163n125

31 (*Against Philon*): *20–23,* 84–85
32 (*Against Diogeiton*): *1–3,* 118; *4–6,* 185n6, 185n25; *6,* 188n79; *9,* 161n85; *13,* 180n71; *14–15,* 175n114; *17,* 189n11; *19,* 161nn84–85; *20,* 91; *28–29,* 91, 114
fr. 6 Gernet (*Theoz.*), 164n22, 189n8
fr. 22 Thalheim, 111
fr. 24 Thalheim, 183n152

Macarius (Macar.)
1.57, 167n69
5.94, 167n69
Menander (Men.)
Asp. (*The Shield*): *8–10,* 187n62; *122–129,* 62; *172,* 101; *255,* 101; *257–258,* 101
Dys./Dysc. (*Old Cantankerous*): *17–20,* 180n90; *226–228,* 187n62; *239–240,* 111; *333–334,* 30; *384–389,* 125; *500,* 161n72; *648–649,* 83; *673–674,* 83; *737–739,* 188n80; *763,* 188n80; *842,* 194n98; *846–847,* 187n62; *903–904,* 191n39; *965–967,* 164n28, 169n100
Epitr. (*The Arbitration*): *468–470,* 81
Georg. (*The Farmer*): *67,* 161n85; *69,* 161n85
Heros (*The Hero*): *hyp.,* 166n54; *20,* 166n54; *36,* 166n54
Periciromene (*The Rape of the Locks*): *774–776,* 146; *801,* 146
Phasma (*The Phantom*): *91–92,* 111
Sam. (*The Girl from Samos*): *37–40*, 181n104; *84–85,* 178n39, 192n50; *130ff.,* 146; *219–250,* 191n41; *239,* 160n47; *240–244,* 179n65; *254,* 161n91; *295–303,* 192n52; *553–554,* 188n95; *733–734,* 169n100
Sic. (*The Sicyonian*): *281–282,* 190n13; *354–364,* 83
fr. 58K.-A., 181n99
fr. 148K.-A., 165n53
fr. 186K.-A., 166n63
fr. 187K.-A., 187n62
fr. 313K.-A., 179n55
fr. 337K.-A., 181n104
fr. 387K.-A., 173n64
fr. 407K.-A., 187n62
fr. 412K.-A., 192n52
fr. 456K.-A., 84
fr. 461K.-A., 181n104
fr. 494K.-A., 12
fr. 630K.-A., 180n90
fr. 668K.-A., 160n48
fr. 798K.-A., 179n55
fr. 823K.-A., 182n125
fr. 824K.-A., 184n158
fr. 833K.-A., 98

Monos. (*Monostichoi*)
127, 189n10
422, 182n126
641, 179n55
690, 160n63
736, 137
765, 183n130
767, 183n130
Musonius Rufus
fr. 15, 76

Nepos
Cimon: 1.2, 181n108
Praef. (*Praefatio*): *6–7,* 166n63

Panyassis
fr. 27 Bernabé, 171n30
Pausanias (Paus.)
Description of Greece: 1.27.3, 169n112; *1.35.5,* 59; *2.10.4–6,* 179n60; *3.11,* 175n102; *4.11,* 175n102; *6.2.2,* 174n94; *6.2.10–11,* 174n91; *6.3,* 174n91, 175n102; *6.7.8,* 175n102; *6.7.9,* 174n91; *6.9.6,* 173n71; *6.14.1,* 58; *6.14.2–3,* 58, 174n94; *6.17.2,* 175n103; *8.1,* 175n102; *8.5,* 175n102; *8.47.3,* 168n81; *9.10.4,* 168n81; *9.29.9,* 173n68; *10.34.8,* 168n81
Pherecrates
fr. 164K.-A., 160n64
Pherecydes
3 F 134, 193n68
Philemon
fr. 143K.-A., 182n114
fr. 169K.-A., 183n132
Philo
Opif. Mundi (*On the Creation of the World*): *6.105,* 161n83, 163n122, 164n21
Spec. Leg. (*On the Special Laws*): *3.22,* 181n108
Philochorus
328 F 8, 169n112
328 F 183, 170n125
Philostratus (Philostr.)
Heroicus: 35.9 De Lannoy, 36
Photius (Phot.)
s. *hatapygōn*, 171n32
s. *kanēphoroi*, 169n112
s. *oinistēria*, 164n17
s. *oinos aneu paideutōn*, 160n66
s. *sparganōmata*, 162n102
Phrynichus (Phryn.)
Ecl. (*Ecloga*): *267 Rutherford,* 189n105
Praep. Soph. (*Praeparatio Sophistica*): p. 44.3 = *Com. Adesp.* fr. 578K.-A.

Pindar (Pind.)
Nem. (*Nemean Odes*): *1.33–59,* 158n17; *3.43–52,* 158n3
Ol. (*Olympian Odes*): *1.25–27,* 171n30; *6.55–56,* 160n44; *8.54–59,* 175n110
Pyth. (*Pythian Odes*): *8.85,* 186n37; *11.26,* 193n68
fr. 198a, 174n73
Plato (Pl. / [Pl.])
Alcib. I (*Alcibiades 1*): *105D,* 163n6; *110B,* 171n22; *121D,* 191n47; *122B,* xv, 125, 163n126; *122C,* 4; *123C,* 163n6; *123D,* 158n11; *127E,* 158n11
Alcib. II (*Alcibiades 2*): *142BC,* 179n58
Ap. (*Apology*): *18B,* 158n6; *34C,* 180n71; *34D,* 161n92; *36DE,* 166n57, 175n107
Ax. (*Axiochus*): *365B,* 159n33, 161n88; *366D,* 161n88, 173n59; *366D–367A,* 17; *367A,* 161n88; *367B,* 159n28
Charm. (*Charmides*): *153A,* 172n48; *154AC,* 172n48; *154D–155A,* 161n93; *161D,* 172n51
Clit. (*Clitopho*): *407BC,* 173n60; *408E,* 159n33; *409DE,* 159n35, 159n45
Crat. (*Cratylus*): *392BD,* 161n85; *414B,* 163n121
Cri. (*Crito*): *46C,* 159n25; *46D,* 159n33; *49B,* 159n33; *50D,* 173n53; *50E,* 163n126, 167n73; *51C,* 163n126
Ep. (*Letters*): *2.313A,* 163n6; *4.320C,* 159n34; *4.321A,* 169n99; *7.324B,* 92; *7.331CD,* 167n73; *8.355C,* 159n33; *13.361A,* 160n59
Epin. (*Epinomis*): *974A,* 159n33
Euthd. (*Euthydemus*): *277CD,* 161n85, 169n96; *279D,* 159n33, 159n34; *282B,* 172n42; *291B,* 159n42; *294E,* 159n33; *301C,* 159n34; *306DE,* 173n56
Euthyphro: *5E–6A,* 183n140
Gorg. (*Gorgias*): *464D,* 159n33; *470C,* 159n34; *471D,* 159n34; *479A,* 159n23; *485B,* 160n51, 161n85; *499C,* 159n33; *502BD,* 169n100; *502E,* 159n33; *527A,* 189n104
Hipparch. (*Hipparchus*): *229CD,* 169n113, 172n42
Hipp. Maj. (*Greater Hippias*): *285E–286A,* 118
Lach. (*Laches*): *179AB,* 33; *180B,* 177n16; *187E,* 35, 165n41; *197AB,* 159n24
Leg. (*Laws*): *1.627C,* 101; *1.642BD,* 45; *1.643BC,* 171n15; *1.644D,* 171n10; *1.645E–646A,* 159n32; *1.646A,* 159n28; *1.647D,* 171n6; *2.653A,* 160n58; *2.658BD,* 18, 169nn99–100; *2.663B,* 159n33, 160n53; *2.664A,* 159n33; *2.664E,* 160n58, 160n60; *2.666A,* 166n61; *2.672C,* 160n60; *3.685A,* 160n63; *3.689D,* 173n65; *3.700C,* 169n99, 173n67; *4.710A,* 159n35; *4.717B–718A,* 182n120; *4.720A,* 159n33; *4.721B,* 181n107; *5.732D,* 171n6; *5.740A,* 186n33; *6.753E,* 158n6; *6.754B,* 90; *6.764E,* 174n80; *6.765E,* 158n6; *6.769B,* 165n48; *6.771E–772A,* 175n112; *6.772D,* 181n107; *6.776AB,* 183n153; *6.781C,* 185n28; *6.785B,* 181n107; *7.788D,* 17; *7.788D–790A,* 158n5; *7.789B,* 171n21; *7.789E,* 17, 160n46, 162n103; *7.790A,* 192n52; *7.790C–791A,* 159n23; *7.791E,* 160n47; *7.791E–792E,* 17; *7.792A,* 160n47; *7.793E–794A,* 17, 27–28, 46; *7.794C,* 17, 61, 173n59; *7.794DE,* 192n52; *7.796D,* 171n6; *7.797A–798C,* 171n14; *7.797B,* 7; *7.803BC,* 171n10; *7.804D,* 53; *7.806A,* 105; *7.808CE,* 159n35, 160n61, 172n49; *7.808E,* 105; *7.809E–810B,* 173n61; *7.810A,* 17; *7.810E–811A,* 174n74; *7.817C,* 169n99; *7.819BC,* 171n15; *8.833D,* 181n107; *8.836A,* 174n84; *9.868C,* 194n108; *9.878E,* 120; *10.887D,* 169n99, 192n52; *10.904E,* 161n84; *11.928DE,* 184n158; *11.928E–929E,* 184n156; *11.929C,* 158n11; *11.929E,* 159n33; *11.931A,* 183n148; *11.932B,* 183n145; *11.933B,* 159n23; *11.937AB,* 168n79; *12.963E,* 159n24, 159n35
Lys. (*Lysis*): *204E,* 163n6; *204E–205B,* 161n84; *205B,* 172n42; *205D,* 189n104; *206DE,* 171n19, 171n22; 174n97; *208C,* 125, 172n49; *208D,* 186n37; *208E,* 182n126; *211D,* 158n7; *212E,* 182n126; *219D,* 78; *223A,* 172n49, 194n88
Menex. (*Menexenus*): *236C,* 160n63; *237E–238B,* 167n73; *239B,* 181n102; *247C,* 182n118; *248B,* 182n118; *248D,* 182n118; *248E,* 167n74; *249A,* 161n87, 164n22, 182n118
Meno: *71E,* 3; *94D,* 61
Parm. (*Parmenides*): *126B,* 163n6
Phd. (*Phaedo*): *75B,* 3; *77DE,* 159n23; *110BC,* 171n10; *116B,* 161n92
Phdr. (*Phaedrus*): *241B*, 171n9; *255A,* 172n50; *275DE,* 182n117; *279A,* 159n34
Phlb. (*Philebus*): *14D,* 159n33; *65C,* 159n33
Pol. (*Statesman*): *208E,* 189n104; *257D,* 22; *270E,* 161n95; *288C,* 171n6; *308D,* 171n15
Prot. (*Protagoras*): *325C,* 124; *325D,* 55, 182n126; *325E,* 174n74; *326C,* 173n64; *328A,* 165n48; *342E,* 159n34
Resp. (*Republic*): *1.328D,* 161n93; *1.330E,* 159n23; *1.350E,* 189n104; *2.372BC,* 32, 76; *2.374C,* 171n20; *2.377AB,* 158n6, 160n46; *2.377B–378A,* 192n52; *2.377B–378E,* 159n33; *2.377E–378B,* 183n140; *2.378D,* 189n104; *2.381E,* 159n25; *3.397D,* 126; *4.424E–425A,* 171n14; *4.431C,* 159n35, 160n58; *4.441AB,* 159n35, 160n58; *5.450C,* 163n126; *5.459B,* 183n150; *5.460D,* 162n96; *5.460E,* 181n107; *5.466E–468B,* 167n66; *5.467A,* 165n48; *6.506C–507A,* 180n82;

7.520B, 167n74; *7.521C,* 171n9; *7.536D–537A,* 171n15; *7.540E–541A,* 17, 29; *8.545E,* 5; *8.548B,* 182n127; *8.549E,* 125–126; *8.555E,* 180n82; *8.557C,* 159n33; *8.562C–563A,* 173n66, 182n123; *9.577A,* 159n33; *9.579B,* 185n28; *10.598C,* 159n33; *10.602B,* 171n6; *10.604CD,* 159n31, 160n47; *10.615C,* 177n16

Soph. (*Sophist*): *234BC,* 159n33; *242C,* 159n33

Symp. (*Symposium*): *176E,* 166n63; *181DE,* 49; *183CD,* 172nn49–50; *184DE,* 172n42; *192A,* 172n43; *195BC,* 183n140; *198A,* 161n84; *204B,* 159n33, 159n34; *207D–208A,* 1–2; *209C,* 194n103; *217E,* 160n66; *222B,* 161n88

Thg. / Theag. (*Theages*): *122B,* 173n56; *122D,* 161n93; *122E,* 173n60; *131A,* 161n93

Tht. (*Theaetetus*): *151C,* 180n85; *166A,* 159n23; *168D,* 159n23; *168E,* 160n63; *171E,* 159n35; *176B,* 189n104; *177B,* 159n34; *181A,* 171n21; *197E,* 159n33

Tim. (*Timaeus*): *21B,* 173n56; *23B,* 159n33; *26B,* 158n6; *81CD,* 6–7

Plato Com.
fr. 168K.-A., 171n9
fr. 202K.-A., 172n43
fr. 206K.-A., 169n100
fr. 293K.-A., 165n50

Plautus (Plaut.)
Asinaria (*The Comedy of Asses*): *64–83,* 139
Aulul. (*The Pot of Gold*): *120–132,* 187n63; *682–687,* 187n63; *796–798,* 188n95
Bacch. (*The Two Bacchises*): *162,* 191n49; *440,* 173n59
Cist. (*The Casket*): *3–5,* 188n87
Men. (*The Brothers Menaechmus*): *59,* 180n82; *1116,* 163n122
Merc. (*The Merchant*): *289–304,* 173n59
Mil. Glor. (*The Braggart Soldier*): *719–722,* 179n55
Most. (*The Ghost*): *755–761,* 183n153
Pseud. (*Pseudolus*): *1081–1083,* 169n100
Truc. (*Truculentus*): *808,* 189n105; *902–908,* 162n96

Pliny (the Elder)
NH (*Natural History*): *9.12.37,* 175n118; *34.19.55,* 171n19

Plutarch (Plut.)
Ages. (*Life of Agesilaus*): *13.3,* 174n93; *25.5,* 171n12
Alcib. (*Life of Alcibiades*): *1.2,* 193n77; *1.4,* 183n133; *2.3,* 158n3; *3,* 160n64; *8.6,* 188n83; *16.4,* 174n81
Arist. (*Life of Aristides*): *27,* 167n74
Comp. Lyc. et Num. (*Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa*): *3.3–4,* 175n112
Life of Cato Maior: *24.4–5,* 184n5
Lyc. (*Life of Lycurgus*): *16.3,* 162n104, 193n77; *16.4–6,* 191n48; *22.1,* 164n18; *30.6,* 194n88
Mor. (*Moral Essays*): *3CD,* 192n52; *4A,* 191n44; *142D,* 175n118; *143B,* 180n92; *152D,* 172n48; *179F,* 188n83; *185F,* 166n64; *189D,* 184n5; *229B,* 171n18; *296DE,* 167n70; *328F,* 166n64; *330F,* 171n18; *381E,* 175n118; *439F,* 125; *478A–492D,* 101; *480D,* 184n5; *483C,* 99; *493A–497E,* 180n82; *495A,* 181n96; *508C,* 160n43; *595B,* 106; *602A,* 166n64; *639A,* 59; *714E,* 167n69; *751B,* 172n48; *766A,* 159n42; *785A,* 184n157; *839C,* 176n128; *849A,* 167n66; *982B,* 175n118
On Affection for Offspring = *Mor*. 493A–497E
On Brotherly Love = *Mor*. 478A–492D
Pel. (*Life of Pelopidas*): *9.5,* 106; *35.3,* 194n102
Per. (*Life of Pericles*): *10.4–5,* 187n66; *16.4,* 93
Sol. (*Life of Solon*): *1.3,* 172n48; *6.1–3,* 179n55; *13.2,* 166n54; *15.3,* 166n54; *22,* 29, 173n53, 180n75; *23,* 171n33, 175n107
Them. (*Life of Themistocles*): *2.1–2,* 158n3; *10.3,* 173n58; *29.7,* 166n64; *32.2,* 181n108
Thes. (*Life of Theseus*): *5.1,* 164n17; *14.2,* 179n65; *18.1,* 42; *22.5,* 169n94; *23,* 38, 168n92, 170n125
fr. 131 Sandbach, 167n69

Pollux (Poll.)
1.182, 163n122
2.184, 171n32
3.20, 189n105
3.39–40, 26
8.107, 176n135
8.122, 167n71, 183n146
9.94–98, 171n19
9.104, 46
9.111–112, 171n9
9.112, 171n21
9.113–114, 171n7
9.125, 171n7, 176n119

Polybius (Polyb.)
Histories: *20.6.5–6,* 147; *36.17.5–7,* 76, 145

Porphyry
Abst. (*de Abstinentia*): *4.5,* 39

Posidippus
fr. 12K.-A., 181n99

Proclus
Chrest. (*Chrestomathia*): *92,* 168n92

Quintilian (Quint.)
1.1.15–16, 163n122, 173n59
1.10.18 = Menfr. 387K.-A.

Scholiast to Aeschines
3.122, 164n24

Scholiast to Aristophanes
Ach. (*Acharnians*): *49,* 189n105; *242,* 169n112
Ecc./Eccl. (*The Assemblywomen*): *255,* 172n51
Eq. (*Knights*): *729,* 169n94; *1126,* 160n52; *1381,* 171n32
Lys. (*Lysistrata*): *273,* 189n6; *643,* 169n112, 170n123; *645(L.),* 169n112, 170n115, 176n132; *645(R.),* 176n130
Nub. (*Clouds*): *1371,* 181n108
Pax (*Peace*): *872–876,* 176n135
Plut. (*Wealth*): *314,* 172n50
Ran. (*Frogs*): *798,* 164n16; *1021,* 189n105
Thesm. (*Women at the Thesmophoria*): *505–506,* 160n59
Vesp. (*Wasps*): *1353(R.),* 184n167; *1359,* 184n167
Scholiast to Homer
Il. (*Iliad*): *8.39,* 180n87
Scholiast to Lucian
Dial. Mer. (*Dialogues of the Courtesans*): *7.4 Rabe,* 176n130
Scholiast to Nicander
Alex. (*Alexipharmaca*): *109,* 168n92
Scholiast to Pindar
Ol. (*Olympian Odes*): *8.54–59,* 175n110
Scholiast to Plato
Lys. (*Lysis*): *206DE,* 174n97
Phdr. (*Phaedrus*): *241B,* 171n9
Tim. (*Timaeus*): *21B,* 163n13
Scholiast to Theocritus
4.25c Wendel, 176n130
Scholiast to Thucydides
2.46.1, 164n22
Seneca (the Younger) (Sen.)
Tranq. (*On Tranquillity of Mind*): *17.4,* 171n12
Sextus Empiricus (Sext. Emp.)
Rhet. (*Against the Rhetoricians*): *2.42,* 192n52
Simonides
543P., 152
Solon
27W., 161n83, 163n122, 164n21, 180n67, 181n107
Sophocles (Soph.)
Ajax: *507–509,* 189n100; *552–555,* 158n16; *558–559,* 162n119; *595,* 173n67; *1409–1411,* 162n119
Ant. (*Antigone*): *578–579,* 185n28; *639–644,* 88; *904–920,* 112; *909–912,* 177n17; *966–987,* 189n10; *1012–1014,* 8–9
El. (*Electra*): *365–367,* 163n6; *530–581,* 181n104, 194n108; *603–604,* 109; *770–771,* 182n112; *1143–1148,* 109, 193n66
OC (*Oedipus at Colonus*): *343,* 185n30; *535,* 111; *760,* 125; *919,* 174n73; *978–980,* 111–112; *1140,* 161n77; *1224–1228,* 178n30; *1229–1232,* 158n16; *1275,* 112; *1405,* 112; *1422–1423,* 101
OT (*Oedipus the King*): *1462–1465*, 166n62; *1476–1477,* 82; *1511–1512,* 5; *1522,* 82
Philoctetes: *1423,* 10
Trach. (*Women of Trachis*): *52–53,* 192n56; *61–63,* 192n56; *141–152,* 158n16, 170n127; *529–530,* 170n127; *557,* 161n87
fr. 87R., 195n25
fr. 149R., 160n43
fr. 171R., 7–8
fr. 314.161R., 159n23
fr. 314.277–282R., 158n17
fr. 564R., 163n6
fr. 583R., 158n16, 170n127
fr. 868R., 188n89
Soranus (Soran.)
Gyn. (*Gynaecology*): *2.14–15.83–84*, 162n103; *2.19.88,* 192n52; *2.42.111,* 162n103; *2.45.114,* 162n101
Sosipater
fr. 1.7K.-A., 165n48
Stesichorus
41P., 193n68
Stobaeus (Stob.)
Flor. (*Anthology*): *4.19,* 191n45; *4.25,* 182n121
Suda
s. *arkteusai*, 176n131
s. *arktos ē Braurōniois,* 170n115, 176n131
s. *chalkeia*, 170n121
s. *chytrinda*, 171n7
s. *dis paides*, 159n28
s. *eiresiōnē*, 169n94
s. *epaulia*, 165n35
s. *ephygon kakon* . . . , 164n34
s. *epiōpsato*, 169n112
s. *Koureōtis*, 164n17
s. *Kourotrophos*, 179n56
s. *mamman*, 160n52
s. *mēte nein mēte grammata,* 173n65
s. *proteleia*, 176n133
s. *Tritogeneia*, 180n87

Tacitus (Tac.)
Dial. (*Dialogus de Oratoribus*): *29,* 192n52
Telecleides
fr. 1K.-A., 171n13
Terence (Ter.)
Ad. (*The Brothers*): *314,* 192n51; *333–334,* 188n95; *527ff.,* 192n51; *560,* 192n51; *562–563,* 194n88; *961–968,* 192n51; *974–976,* 192n51

Andr. (*The Fair Andrian*): *51–59,* 158n8; *121–136,* 188n87
Eun. (*The Eunuch*): *144–146,* 188n87; *307–310,* 191n35
Haut. (*The Self-Tormentor*): *603,* 166n54; *633–643,* 180n85; *664–665,* 180n85; *793–795,* 166n54; *991–993,* 139
Hec. (*The Mother-in-Law*): *116–123,* 188n91; *198–204,* 139–140; *767–769,* 192n52
Phorm. (*Phormio*): *71–77,* 194n88; *286–288,* 194n88
Theocritus (Theoc.)
12.33, 186n37
15.12, 161n91
15.42, 161n91
Theognis (Theog.)
425–428, 178n30
Theophrastus (Theophr.)
Char. (*Character Sketches*): *2.6,* 180n66; *5.5,* 33, 171n11, 180n66; *7.5,* 53; *7.9,* 160n52; *7.10,* 179n65; *9.5,* 164n28, 169n99; *14.10,* 171n11; *16.12,* 27; *17.7,* 91; *20.5–6,* 179n65; *21.3,* 164n17; *22.6,* 173n64; *25.4,* 191n34; *27.14,* 172n48; *28.4,* 194n98; *30.6,* 164n28, 169n99; *30.14,* 173n64
fr. 9.18 Wimmer, 12
fr. 662 Fortenbaugh, 175n114
Theopompus
fr. 70K.-A., 159n28
Thucydides (Thuc.)
1.84.4, 174n73
1.89.3, 190n13
1.90.3, 167n66
1.105.4, 167n66
1.115.2–4, 167n66
1.127.1, 194n106
2.6.4, 190n13
2.14.1, 167n66
2.41.1, 174n73
2.44.3, 167n74, 177n17
2.46.1, 164n22, 167n74
2.72.2, 167n66
2.78.3, 190n13
3.17.4, 191n34
3.104, 165n40, 176n127
4.123.4, 190n13
6.54–56, 110
6.54–59, 174n84
6.56.1, 169n113
6.59.3, 109
7.29.5, 173n58, 179n54
7.69.2, 167n75
8.69.4, 161n84
8.74.3, 167n75
Timaeus
566 F 11 = Ath. 6.264D
Trag. Adesp. (*Tragica Adespota*)
fr. 383K.-S., 13
fr. 515aK.-S, 159n22, 173n56

Valerius Maximus (Val. Max.)
Memorable Deeds and Sayings: *8.8 ext. 1,* 171n12
Vita Soph. (*Life of Sophocles*)
13, 184n157
Vitruvius (Vitruv.)
de Arch. (*On Architecture*): 6 *praef.* 3 = Alexis fr. 305K.-A.

Xenophanes
21 B 42D.-K., 172n35
Xenophon (Xen.)
Ages. (*Agesilaus*): *1.17,* 159n32; *1.20–22,* 167n66; *10.4,* 158n7
An. (*The Persian Expedition*): *2.6.11–15,* 173n67; *2.6.12,* 173n68; *3.4.46,* 167n75; *4.8.25,* 168n77; *5.3.10,* 170n2; *5.8.18,* 173n67, 182n126; *7.4.7,* 49
Cyn. (*On Hunting*): *2.1,* 170n2; *7.3,* 192n52
Cyr. (*The Education of Cyrus*): *1.2.2–3,* 173n54; *1.2.6,* 173n72; *1.2.8,* 33; *1.2.15,* 173n64; *1.3–4,* 117; *1.3.8–9,* 9; *1.3.10,* 159n32; *1.3.12,* 9; *1.3.14,* 170n2; *1.3.16–17,* 173n67; *1.4.1,* 9; *1.4.1–4,* 18; *1.4.3,* 9; *1.4.4,* 9; *1.4.12,* 9; *1.4.16–20,* 158n3; *1.6.20,* 173n66; *1.6.32,* 171n22; *1.6.34,* 48; *2.2.14,* 173n67, 182n126; *2.3.9–10,* 160n61; *4.1.17,* 167n75; *4.2.10,* 170n2; *4.3.10–11,* 4; *5.1.2,* 170n2; *7.3.14,* 191n40; *7.5.86,* 191n46; *8.3.37,* 173n64; *8.5.19–20,* 9–10; *8.7.14–19,* 99; *8.7.24,* 99
Eq. (*On the Art of Horsemanship*): *2.2,* 189n3
Eq. mag. (*On the Cavalry Commander*): *1.11–12,* 173n64; *5.10,* 171n22
Hell. (*The History of Greece*): *1.3.19,* 167n75; *2.4.20,* 170n4; *4.1.39–40,* 174n93, 190n14; *4.4.17,* 159n25; *5.4.7,* 166n63; *5.4.32,* 161n85; *6.4.35–37,* 194n102; *7.5.14–15,* 167n66
Hiero: *3.7,* 99
Lac. (*Constitution of the Spartans*): *1.3,* 180n88; *1.6–7,* 183n150; *2.1–2,* 173n60, 191n48; *3.5,* 161n85; *11.3,* 164n18
Mem. (*Memorabilia*): *1.2.33–35,* 183n145; *1.2.35,* 167n71, 183n146; *1.2.49,* 184n156; *1.3.5,* 173n67; *1.4.7,* 159n23, 181n103; *1.5.2,* 83; *2.1.21,* 164n22; *2.2, 89,* 186n37; *2.2.4,* 194n98;

Mem. (*cont.*)
2.2.5, 161n89; *2.2.8,* 159n31; *2.2.13,* 180n75, 180n76; *2.3.1,* 101; *2.3.15–16,* 101; *3.3.12,* 176n127; *3.6.12,* 57; *3.14.4,* 33; *4.1.2,* 172n42; *4.4.20,* 182n120; *4.4.23,* 183n150
Oec. (*The Estate-Manager / Economics*): *7.5,* 181n107; *7.6,* 28, 180n88; *7.12,* 180n77, 182n127; *7.19,* 180n77; *7.24,* 104, 161n89, 181n103; *7.30,* 185n28; *9.5,* 190n26; *9.19,* 186n33
Symp. (*Symposium*): *1.1,* 171n6; *1.2–3,* 52; *1.8,* 166n60; *3.5,* 173n56, 174n74; *3.12–13,* 89; *4.6,* 173n56, 174n74; *4.24,* 51; *4.35,* 185n18; *5.4–6.1,* 52; *8.11,* 52; *8.23–41,* 172n42; *9.2–7,* 52; *19,* 52

Zenobius (Zenob.)
1.1, 166n62
3.52, 167n69
3.98, 164n34
5.58, 160n43

Inscriptions and Papyri

Hesperia 49 (1980)
p. 264 ll. 41–2, 169n97

Inscriptiones Graecae (*IG*)
1^3: *3,* 183n146; *6 C 25–26,* 169n97; *14.9–11,* 167n71, 183n146; *131,* 166n57, 175n107; *573,* 181n106; *597,* 184n2; *655c,* 184n2; *659,* 181n106; *731,* 184n2; *735,* 181n106; *745,* 181n106; *751,* 184n2; *831,* 181n106; *857,* 181n106; *858,* 115; *873,* 184n2; *954,* 184n2; *961,* 174n82; *1136,* 186n53; *1210,* 109; *1241,* 106; *1271,* 184n2; *1386,* 175n101
2^2: *530,* 188n92; *956–965,* 59; *1034,* 170n124; *1036,* 65; *1039.82,* 169n94; *1138,* 174nn78–79; *1237,* 163n13, 164n14, 164n16; 183n146; *1368.130,* 168n84; *1498–1501A,* 162n112; *1553–1578,* 190n26; *1559 A col. 3.5–66,* 191n41; *1609,* 23, 24; *2311,* 60; *2318.320–324,* 174n78; *2345,* 163n6, 165n41; *2492,* 188n81; *2971,* 174n97; *2980,* 174n97; *3022,* 183n133; *3061,* 174n78; *3063,* 174n79; *3065–3068,* 174n79; *3070,* 174n79; *3125,* 175n110, 184n2; *3453,* 188n92; *4147,* 184n2; *4319,* 181n106; *4351,* 179n56, 181n106; *4400,* 179n56, 181n106; *4403,* 179n56, 181n106; *4412,* 179n56, 181n106; *4429,* 179n56, 181n106; *4548,* 173n57; *4588,* 181n106; *4593,* 181n106; *4613,* 165n41, 181n106; *4671,* 181n106; *4883,* 181n106; *4891,* 181n106; *5421a,* 188n92; *5673,* 115, 179n57, 188n92; *6214,* 188n92; *6288,* 188n92; *7195,* 188n92; *7227,* 186n54; *7393,* 188n92; *7711,* 86; *7839a,* 184n2; *7873,* 190n30; *9080,* 193n77; *9112,* 193n77; *10205,* 163n6; *10650,* 188n93; *10660,* 180n92; *10891,* 180n92; *10892,* 163n6, 180n92; *11121,* 186n44; *11169,* 184n2; *11375,* 188n92; *11379,* 186n43; *11568,* 163n6; *11674,* 169n94; *11793,* 163n6; *11813,* 186n55; *11998,* 188n92; *12138,* 163n6; *12147,* 186n49; *12151,* 186n54; *12335,* 179n57; *12575,* 163n6; *13037,* 186n41; *13095,* 186n55; *13102a,* 186n55; *13139,* 168n84
7: *414,* 55; *1765,* 174n92
12.5: *677.2,* 161n90
12.9: *189,* 174n77

LSS (Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supplément.*)
20.17–23, 164n16

M-L (Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*)
23.6–8, 190n13

Pap. Oxy. (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*)
2538 fr. 1+2 col. iii.25–28, 163n13
2538 fr. 1+2 col. iv.1–5, 173n55
2538 fr. 1+2 col. iv.1–20. 170n4
Peek, *GVI*
961.4, 185n19

Raubitschek, *Dedications*
243 no. 212, 184n2
251 no. 221, 184n2
304 no. 284, 187n67
Reinmuth, *Ephebic Inscriptions*
no. 1, 161n84
no. 9, 161n84

SEG (*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*)
10.452a, 186n40
20.621, 177n14
21.192, 184n2
26.1555, 177n14
28.46, 167n74
30.61.A.30–31, 183n146
46.255, 184n2
51.215, 109

Usener, *Epicurea*
p. 320 fr. 527 = Plut. *Mor.* 495A

Subject Index

Page numbers in italics indicate figures.

abortion, reasons for, in modern world, 75–76
Achilles, 1, 6, 90, 116, 121
adoption, 22, 27, 69, 79, 85, 95, 101, 111, 116, 119–120, 137, 146, 158n8, 163n11, 187n65, 187n69, 188n80, 189n8; of adults, reasons for, 2; loyalty of adopted children, 120
adultery, use of make-up, as indicator of, 111. *See also* Solon
adult-child relations, changes in, 141–148
advice to adults, from children: to The Chisholm, from Mary, 160n68; to Cleomenes, from Gorgo, 8
Aegisthus, 85, 126–129, 138
Aeschylus, *Oresteia* trilogy as critique of slaves' influence, 126–130
Agesilaus, 1, 5, 46, 59, 167n66
Aiora. *See* festivals: Anthesteria
Alcibiades, xv, 1, 4, 8, 56, 89, 114, 125, 137–138, 163n6, 172n40, 174n81, 188n79
aletris/aletrides, 41, 42
Alexander of Macedon, 122, 147
Alexander of Pherae, 138
amphidromia, 20, 26
anagkaioi, 79
Andromache, 85, 116
anēr, 12
Antigone, 8, 111, 112, 114, 187n71
Aphrodite, 65, 90, 179n60; precinct of, on Acropolis, 42
Apollo, 4, 27, 38, 41, 77, 89, 129, 176n127
Apollodorus of Carystus, 194n88
appha, 115
Areopagus, 35
Ares, 112
Ariès, Philippe, 11, 71, 74, 141
Aristagoras and Cleomenes, 8
Aristophanes, xvii, 1, 39, 53, 65–66, 78, 82, 85, 179n64; *Av.*, 46; *Eq.*, 1; *Lys.*, 38, 41; *Nub.*, 53; revision of, ix; *Vesp.*, 47, 82, 95–97; violent treatment of slaves, 134–135
Aristophanes of Byzantium. *See* stages of childhood
Aristotle, xviii, 1, 4, 5–6, 87–88, 94; on children and citizenship, 34; on children bringing happiness, 78; on education, 54; on familial affection, 84; on the household, in *Politics*, 68; on menial duties, 30; on property in common, 103, 185n26; on rates of interest, 114. *See also* stages of childhood
arktos/arktoi ("bears"), 41, 42, 66–67
arrhēphoros/arrhēphoroi, 41, 42, 43, 65, 170n120, 176n128; playing ball, *66*
Artemis, 15, 26, 46, 63, 66–67, 169n110, 170n115; abduction of girls at festivals of, 176n124
Asclepius, 26; sacrifice of sheep to, by family, *29*

Astyages, 5, 9, 44–45, 117, 189n101
Astyanax, 6; death of, 77, 116
Athena, 5, 29, 39, 42, 60, 65–66, 90, 111, 129, 163n3
athletics competitions, 32, 58–61, 168n89, 174n91, 174n94, 175n110, 184n2
Atossa, 32
Attica: evacuation of, in Persian Wars, 121; as mother of Athenians, 35
Atwood, Margaret, 147
autochthony, Athenian, 120

Barthes, Roland, 150
Beaumont, Lesley, xi, xiii, 14, 15, 148–149, 150, 151
behavior, xvi; adult, not predicted by childhood, 1–2; adult, predicted by childhood, 1, 8; age-appropriate, 8, 46; influenced by religious imagery, 27; inherited, 86–87
bekos, 160n48
Bertier, J., 143
blēkhanō, 7
Boardman, John, 75
Bobou, Olympia, 14
boys. *See* gender
Bradley, Keith, 75
Brauron, 66
breast-feeding: by mothers in antebellum American South, 132; by mothers in antiquity, 123, 192n52
brothers. *See* relationships
Bruce, D. D., Jr., 133–134
brykhaomai, 7

Cadmus, 117
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 151
Cartledge, Paul, 132
Cassandra, 13, 127–128, 192n61
Catullus, 143
Ceramicus cemetery, Athens, 73
child care, 70, 104–105, 109; older girls supervising younger ones on swing, *30*
child development, xvi, 151
childhood: changes over time, 148–152; of Cyrus, 9–10, 117; limitations on activities, 33–34, 151; nostalgia for, 4; and play, 45–48; prodigious feats in, 1, 4. *See also* stages of childhood
children: absorption into others' households, 121; acceptance into own household, 20; acting for women, 165n44; as actors, 39–40; as agents, xi–xii; and *amphidromia,* 20, 26; archaeology of, xii–xiii; attitudes toward parents, 86–88; as binding force in marriage, 138; characteristics of, 2–6; and crying, 5, 7, 13, 17, 72, 110, 191n41; cuteness of, 9; and debt slavery, 166n54; and *dekatē,* 20, 26; easily frightened, 5, 159n25; effects on development of, 1, 122, 158n5; evacuated, in wartime, 121; evidence for Hellenistic attitudes to, 147–148; as financial burden, 91–92; firstborn son, privileges of, 101; as foci of attention, 72; and grandparents, 115–118; and *hēbē,* 18, 24; and homicide, 35; increased status through increased visibility, 150–151; innocence of, 8–9, 167n70; intellectually incompetent, 5–6; and *koureion,* 23–24, 26; legal obligations toward grandparents, 116–117; legal obligations toward parents, 79, 86; limited geographical knowledge, 57; living with parents, as adults, 93; as love interests of deities, 171n30; and *meion,* 23, 164n15; in military contexts, as inspiration, 35; moist and hot nature, 7; morally incompetent, 4–5; names and naming of, 21–22, 81, 163n6; newborn, characteristics of, 12–13; oracular qualities of, 8–9, 160n67; physically weak, 4; as prostitutes, 171n34; smell of, 6; social status of, in modern world, xi; softness of, 6–7; some especially prized, 81; speech of, 7; spoilt, 118; susceptible to hypnosis, 159n33; and *symposium,* 31–33; in theatre audiences, 39; as truth-tellers, 8; undisciplined, 7; unpredictability of, 7–8; use of, in judicial proceses, 35, 77–79; use of, in politics, 35; wartime treatment of, 167n66; as wedding guests, 164n33;. *See also* children in art; cult activities; death and burial; festivals; funerary iconography; labor, of children; parents; terminology for children
children in art, xiii, 147, 196n51; boys and girls together, 106, 186n48; boys and women, in domestic contexts, *105*, 105–106; changes in iconography, xiii, 148–149; father and son at shoemaker's, *25*; girl and tortoise, *64*; girl shaking rattle for baby boy, *107*; school scenes, 53, 149. See also *chous/choes*
Choes, festival of. *See* festivals: Anthesteria
choragus: increase in minimum age of, 56, 148; responsibilities of, 56
chous/choes, xiii, 36–37, 47, 98, 106, 143, 147, 149, 152, 159n26, 165n50, 168n86, 168n89, 169n104, 175n118; depiction of brothers, *100*. *See also* festivals: Anthesteria
Chytroi. *See* festivals: Anthesteria
Cimon, 21, 111, 187n66
Cleisthenes, 21, 24, 149, 150
Clytemnestra, 10, 85, 99, 104, 109–110, 126–129, 139–140, 182n112, 194n99, 194n103, 194n112
Cohen, David, 49–50
coins, Roman, 143
coming of age. *See* festivals: Apaturia, Oschophoria
competition, 53, 55–61. *See also* athletics competi-

tions; choragus; festivals: Amphiaraia, Arkteia, Artemisia, Panathenaea; panhellenic games
conflict: between brothers, over property division, 101–103; between brothers, reasons for, 101, 185n17; between brothers and sisters, on sister's marriage, 112; effects on the community, 94–95; from financial concerns, 91–94; between generations, 90–97, 139; between generations, in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, 95–97; between generations, in New Comedy, 139–140; between household and "outsiders," 120–121; over inheritances, 93, 101, 102–103, 138; between *polis* and *oikos*, 40; from sexual rivalry, 90–91; between (step-)parents and (step-)children, 121
Conon, 33, 87
corporal punishment, 55, 88, 135, 151
costs of living, 91, 114
cousins, 62, 121
crawling, 37
Crelier, Marie-Claire, 14, 15
cross-dressing. *See* festivals: Oschophoria
cult activities: *arktoi* in, 41, 42, 66–67; Corybantic mysteries, 169n96; Dionysiac mysteries, 145; Eleusinian Mysteries, 38–39, 65, 122; familial, 26, 116, 117; and friendships, 45; initiatory functions of, 41–42; in literature, 26–27; participation in, xi–xii, 26–28, 35–43, 55–57, 65–67, 165n40; as preparation for adult life, for girls, 40–43; Sabazius, in cult of, 169n96; in visual arts, 26. *See also* competition
Cypselus, 1
Cyrus, 1, 4, 5, 9–10, 18, 44, 99, 117, 160n69, 189n101

Danaë, 48, 152
daughters. *See* fathers; mothers and children; parents; relationships
death and burial, 71–73, 81, 150; changes in practices, 148, 152; cremation, 15; exposure, 75, 81, 114, 144–147; inhumation, 15, 73. *See also* funerary iconography
Deceleieis, 23, 164n15
Decocq, C., 143, 152
dedications on behalf of children, 84
deipnophoroi, 42
Deissmann-Merten, Marieluise, 143, 144, 145, 146
dekatē, 20, 26
deMause, Lloyd, 142
Demes, 21–22, 158n15
Demeter, 15, 65, 109
demography and emotions, 71
Demotionidae, decree of, 23
dining practices: Athenian, 31–33; Persian, 33; Roman, 31
Dionysus, ix, xi, 8, 13, 26, 39, 41, 52, 135, 145, 168n89
divorce, 137–138
Dixon, Suzanne, 140
domestic architecture, xii–xiii; Athenian, 69–70; destruction of houses, as punishment, 120. See also *gynaikōn/gynaikōnitis*
domus, 11
Dover, Kenneth, 50
dowries, 110–115, 188n79, 188n80
Dyke, Charles, 153

early childhood, paraphernalia of, 13
education, 1, 39, 52–55, 74, 173n64; of girls, 62; *paideia,* 18. See also *paidagōgos/paidagōgoi*
eiresiōnē. *See* festivals: Pyanopsia
Electra, 2, 85, 109–110, 114, 128–129, 140, 186n52, 193n66, 194n103
Epicurus, 53, 81
erastēs, 50, 52
ergastinai, 42, 65
Erichthonius, 36; and sacrifices to Kourotrophos, 179n56
Erinna, 62–63
Erinyes/Furies, 5, 110, 129, 139, 193n69
erōmenos, 50
erotic imagery, in visual arts, 150, 170n127
Eteocles, 100
eukosmia, 55
Euripides, x, xvii, 10, 39, 78, 89, 116, 139, 147, 152, 181n111, 182n119; *Alc*., 186n56; *El*., 140; *Erechtheus*, 84, 86; *Hcld*., 83–84; *Hec*., 122–123; *Hipp*., 126; *Hyps*., 192n56; *IA*, 109–110; *Or*., 117; *Supp*., 39, 77, 82; *Tro*., 40, 131, 181n101
exposure, 75, 81, 114, 144–147; especially of girls, 81, 146
Eyben, E., 143

familia, 11
family: attempts to define, 119; continuation through grandchildren, 116; differences in Greek and Roman life, 140; life in Roman world, 26; planning, 76, 102; and the *polis*, 34–35
fathers: in *amphidromia,* 20, 26; and daughters, 81–83; respect for, 87–88; and sons, 25, 82, 86–88, 93–95, 182n124. *See also* conflict; parents
festivals: Amphiaraia at Oropus, 55; Anthesteria, 36–38, 98; Apaturia, 22, 24, 53, 169n94; Arkteia, 65–67; Artemisia at Eretria, 55; Brauronia, 36, 41, 67; City Dionysia, 56; Diasia, 36; Eleusinia, 59;

festivals (*cont.*)
Hephaisteia, 56; Heracleia at Marathon, 59; Hermaea, 59; Mouseia, 168n81; Oschophoria, 38, 43, 59, 169n94; Panathenaea, 36, 41–42, 60–61, 65, 67, 175n113; Proerosia, 38; Prometheia, 56; Pyanopsia, 38, 169n94; Rural Dionysia, 117; Tauropolia, 36; Thargelia, 56, 57, 163n11; Theseia, 59–60; Thesmophoria, 65–66
Finley, M. I., 70–71, 72, 126, 130
Forster, E. M., 138
fosterage, 74
Fowler, B. H., 147
Franklin, Benjamin, 133
friendships of children, 44–45; of girls, changed by marriage, 63–64; lasting into adulthood, 45, 122; sexual possibilities, 122; with slaves, 123
Frier, Bruce, 115
funerary iconography: gravestones and grave reliefs, 105–109, 116; votive reliefs, with children, 26; votive statues, 81; white-ground lekythoi, 149

games, 46–48, 62, 171n22
Garland, Robert, ix, 75, 81
gender: attitudes toward, 82; changes in relations, 146; depiction of roles, in visual arts, 37–38; differential treatment, 81, 83, 103, 166n65; differentiation in funerary iconography, 61; differing life expectancies, 118; distinctions between boys and girls, 3; and engagement in civic life, 81, 103; roles of daughters, in literature, 83–84; social separation of boys and girls, 61–62; women, sheltered lives of, 104
genesis, 18
genos/genē, 123; introduction of children, 22, 26, 35
gerōn, 12
girls. *See* gender
Gorgo, daughter of Cleomenes, 8
Gouldner, A. W., 130–131, 132
grammata, 53
grandparents and grandchildren, 115–118
graphē paranoias, 94
Green, P., 143
Greenstein, F. I., 151
Griffiths, Emma, 40
Grossman, Janet, 14
guardians and guardianship, 44–45, 52, 83, 117, 166n65
gymnastikē, 53
gynaikōn/gynaikōnitis, 70, 106, 185n28

hair styles, 23
Ham, Greta, 152
Hamilton, R., xiii
Harmodius, 110
hēbē, 18, 24
Hector, 6, 85, 116
Hecuba, 10, 121, 131
Helen, ix, 64, 99, 104, 110
Hephaestus, 78
Hera, 4, 112
Heracles, 55
Herlihy, David, 121
Hermes, 4–5, 46, 59, 127, 129, 152
Hermione, 104
Herter, Hans, 143–144, 147
Hertz, Robert, 73
Hesiod, 102
Hewitt, Margaret, 71
Hipparchus, 110
Hippias, taxes new fathers, 163n3
Hippocrates. *See* stages of childhood
Hippolytus, 90–91
Hopkins, Keith, 75
Horace, x
horoi, 113–114
Houby-Nielsen, Sanne, xii, 149, 152
household, 69, 137; acceptance of children into, 20; interaction of siblings within, 104; members of, 119–120, 137. See also *oikos/oikia*
hybris, 49, 50, 52, 96, 134

immigrants, like adopted children, 120
infanticide, 75, 81, 114, 144–147
inheritance: diminished by dowries, 112; problems of, and solutions to, 101–103, 185n23
Iphigenia, 81, 110, 139, 166n62, 194n112
isknophōnia, 7
Isthmian Games, 57–58, 61
Itys, 36

Jefferson, Thomas, on slavery and violence, 133
Joad, Cyril. *See* Murray, James
Jocasta, 90, 112
Johansson, Sheila, 75, 142

Kalahari Desert San people, 72, 75
kanēphoros/kanēphoroi, 40, 41, 42, 110
katachysmata, 124
kinship: and the family, 119; and names, Socrates on, 22; and the place of residence, 120; relations based on duty, 79
kitharistēs, 53
koureion, 23–24, 26
kyrios/kyrioi, 20, 42, 44, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 110, 115
Kurtz, Donna, 75

Labarbe, Jules, 23–24
labor, of adults: necessity of work, for poor women, 104; of women, in agriculture, 165n52
labor, of children: agricultural, 28–31; boys feeding chickens, *32*; in child care, 28, 109; controversial aspects, 80; domestic, 28–29; importance of, in poorer families, 29–30; industrial, 29; as preparation for later life, 28–29; as water carriers, 165n53. *See also* Murray, James
Lacey, W. K., 68–69
Lagia, Anna, 146, 150
Lane Fox, R., 143
Langdon, Susan, 73
life, division into stages, 2
Lillehammer, Grete, xii
Linus, 55
literacy, 53–54; of women, 62
loutrides, 42
loyalty, of citizens, to *xenos* or *polis*, 122
Lycurgus (Spartan lawgiver), 125

majority, 49; legal age of, 24; limitations on activities prior, 33
Manson, Michel, 143; on Roman childhood, 11
Mao, Chairman, on French Revolution, 141
marriage, 42–43, 61–62, 92, 93, 137–138, 183n153; ages at, 84, 103–104; disruptive effects on household, 112; divorce, 137–138; dowries and, 110–115, 188n79, 188n80; effects on girls' friendships, 63; *katachysmata,* 124; patrilocal, 115; and relocation, 63–64; role of *pais amphithalēs*, 26; strengthened by children, 137; *synoikein*, 120
McNiven, Tim, xiii
Medea, 42, 112, 181n111
Melanion, 38
Menander, xvii, 12, 84, 88, 98, 113, 140, 182n119, 182n123, 191n39, 194n88; *Asp.*, 62, 101; *Dysc.*, 83, 110–111, 124–125; *Monos.*, 137; *Phasma*, 111; *Sam.*, 146, 178n39, 191n41
midwives, gifts to, 81
money, methods of acquiring, 92–93
morality, as marker of adults, 4
Morris, Ian, 70
mortality, infant, 71; intimations of, 94. *See also* Johansson, Sheila
mothers and children, 25, 84–86, 88–89. *See also* parents
mousikē, 53, 55, 62, 117
Murray, James, 80
Mycalessus, slaughter of children by Thracians, 77

names and naming, 21–22, 81, 163n6
neanieuointo, 8
Nemean Games, 57–58
Neoptolemus, 10, 40, 116
nēpiazoien, 8
Néraudau, J.-P., 143
New Comedy, x, xvii, 39, 49, 81, 83, 113, 139–140, 146, 165n48, 166n63, 187n63, 187n78, 190n26, 191n35, 192n51

Oedipus, 5, 10, 82, 90, 100, 104, 111, 125, 166n62
oikos/oikia, 20, 40, 42, 43, 68, 120, 130, 149
Old Comedy, xvii, 5, 46
Olympic Games, 57–58, 60–61, 174n94
Orestes, 2, 10, 13, 37, 109–110, 117, 121–122, 125, 127–129, 152, 182n112, 193n64, 193n66, 194n99
Orphic rites, 27
Otis, Brooks, x
Ovid, ix, x

paidagōgos/paidagōgoi, 17, 25, 51, 54, 55, 62, 72, 105, 123–126, 130, 134, 135, 191n42, 191n48, 191n49, 195n14; criticisms of, 125–126; rewards for services, 124; role of, 52–53
paidarieuointo, 8
paideia, 18
paideuō, 54
paidika, 50
paidonomoi, 17, 125
pais amphithalēs, 26, 38, 43, 165n35, 168n92; rides in wedding procession, *27*
pais aph' hestias, 43. *See also* cult activities: Eleusinian Mysteries; festivals
paizein, 8
palaestra, 51, 53, 59, 101, 172n47, 172n48, 176n134
panhellenic games, 57–58; age classes, 58; age limits, 58; boys' programs compared to men's, 59, 60; events, 59, 60; prizes, 60–61; and social mobility, 61. *See also* athletics competitions
pannychides, 36
parents: attachment to children, invoked in judicial contexts, 78–79; attachment to children, in literature, 77–78; beaten by children, in comedy, 135; care of, by children, 79; concern for children's welfare, 77; desire for children, 77–78; disowning children, 94; disposition of property to children, 92–95; gratitude toward, by children, 89; responses to children's deaths, in ancient Greek world, 70–73, 75, 76, 77, 152, 194n103; responses to children's deaths, in post-classical world, 71–73, 74–75, 76; single, 84. *See also* fathers; Finley, M. I.; mothers and children; Stone, Lawrence; Scheper-Hughes, Nancy
Parthenon, *peplos* ceremony frieze, 39

parthenos/parthenoi, 63
patria potestas, 94
Patterson, Cynthia, 69
pederasty, 49–52, 56, 172n40. See also *erastēs*; *erōmenos*
Peloponnesian War, 95, 121–122, 143–144, 152, 167n66
Pentheus, 117
peplos, 42, 65
Pericles: bribery charges against Cimon, 111; citizenship law of 451/0, 149, 150; dismissive of *paidagōgoi*, 125; member of the Alcmaeonidae, 138; tight-fisted, 93
Persephone, 64–65
Perseus, 48, 124, 152
Phaedra, 90, 126
Philip of Macedon, 101
phratries, 22–24, 26, 35, 163n11. See also *koureion*; *meion*
phrenes, 5
Pinchbeck, Ivy, 71
plague, 149
Plato, xviii, 1; appropriate play for children, 46; criticisms of slaves, 125–126, 132; on disobedient students, 54; on education, 53; groups children with women, slaves, animals, 5; on judges, 120; on potential marriage-partners, 61–62; on segregation of boys and girls, 61; Socrates on children and childhood, xv; on swaddling, 17; *Symposium*, 1–2, 49–50. *See also* stages of childhood
play: as characteristic of children, 45, 171n6; and games, 46–48, 62, 171n22; as part of child-care, 109; as preparation for adult life, 46–47; subversive, 47–48. *See also* games
plyntrides, 42
Pnyx, 65
polis, xvi, 2, 31, 32, 34, 35, 39, 40, 43, 55, 68, 83, 103, 120, 122
Pollock, Linda A., 74, 142
Polybius, 147
Polyneices, 100–101, 112
Polyxena, 10, 186n40
Pomeroy, Sarah, 69
popana, 42
population control, ancient writers on, 76
Priam, 116
prohairesis, 4
propaganda, Augustan, 143
proverbial sayings: in comedy by Eupolis, 34; insult, 172n50
prytaneion, right to dine in, 31
prytaneis, 31
psellotēs, 7
puberty, 49; age at, 24
Pylades, 122, 128
Pythaïs, 35–36
Pythian Games, 57–58, 175n104

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 118
Raepsaet, G., 143, 152
Rawson, Beryl, 26
relationships, 87–88; adult-child, changes in, 141–148; between brothers, 98–101; between brothers and sisters, 104–114; between brothers and sisters, in adult life, 109–112; between children and slaves, 122–126, 134–136; familial, in legal arguments, 98–99; between generations, 87–88, 89–91, 102; between grandparents and grandchildren, 115–118; between half-brothers, 98, 184n5; between household's children and other resident free children, 121; lack of relatives, as advantageous, 187n62; between mothers and children, 25, 84–86, 88–89; reciprocal concern between siblings, 107; between siblings, in Aeschylus's *Oresteia*, 110; between sisters, 114–115; in Sophocles's *Oedipus at Colonus* and *Antigone*, 110–111; with stepfathers, 189n12; with stepmothers, 120–121; *xenia,* 121–122. *See also* adoption; childhood; children; conflict; fathers; funerary iconography; slaves
Rose, Peter, 148
Rühfel, Hilde, xiii, xviii, 143, 147, 168n89

sacrifice, of daughters in literature, 83–84
Sallares, Robert, 145
Saller, Richard, 94–95, 112, 137. See also *patria potestas*
Sappho, 34
Sarakatsan shepherds, 72
Satyr plays, 6, 12, 39, 48, 158n17, 169n101, 193n64
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy, 71
Scott, Eleanor, xi
self-expression, of children, xi
sexual innuendo, in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, 82
sexual misconduct: insinuation of, as insult, 41, 110; insinuation of, as legal tactic, 111
sexuality, 48, 49, 61–62; choragus and choristers, 56–57; disruptive nature of the young, 56. *See also* pederasty
Shorter, Edward, 71, 142
siblings. *See* relationships
Sifakis, G., 39–40
sisters. *See* relationships
slaves: in Aeschylus's *Oresteia*, 126–130; affection for children, 79; in antebellum American South,

132–133; as children's playmates, 123; criticisms of their roles in child rearing, 125–126; differences from Roman slaves, 191n38; families, 190n26; and friction within household, 131; friendships with children, 123; intellectually and morally inferior to citizens, 125; and judicial processes, 35; and *katachysmata,* 124; as male presences in households, 124; and the "mask of deference," 193n78; as negative influences on households, 126; occupations of, 124; and schoolgirl (?), *63*; shared values with masters, 131–132; ubiquity of, 124; and violence, 134; violent treatment of, 134–136; as wet nurses, 123. See also *paidagōgos*; wet nurses and wet-nursing
socialization of girls through choruses, 64–65
Socrates, xv, 1, 8, 12, 22, 33, 35, 45–46, 51, 78, 88–89, 134–135, 152, 163n6, 186n37; on brothers, 101; differentiating Athenians from Spartans, 4; on games, 47; on guardians, 83; on the *polis*, 32; on Spartan treatment of Hippias, 118; on stages of childhood, 17; on upbringing of children, 125; in Xenophon, *Symp.*, 52
Solon: on children and happiness, 78; law about adultery, 49; law on debt, 166n54; on support for parents, 29, 79
sons. *See* fathers; mothers and children; parents; relationships
Sophocles, 7–9; *Antigone*, 112; *Lovers of Achilles*, 6; *Oedipus at Colonus*, 111–112; *Tereus*, 114–115; *Trachiniae*, 78. See also *graphē paranoias*
sōphrosynē, 4, 159n20
sources of evidence, xvii–xviii; shortcomings of, 3
Sourvinou-Inwood, C., xiii, 143, 170n127, 176n124
spargana, 13–14
Sparta and Spartans, 4, 8, 13, 21, 45, 58–59, 62, 64, 68, 99, 106, 118, 122, 125, 149, 167n66, 167n75, 168n77, 193n77, 195n14
stages of childhood, 11–12, 14–15, 17–18, 161n83
stepfathers, 189n12
stepmothers, 120–121
Stesichorus, ix
Stone, Lawrence, 71, 72, 74, 75
swaddling and swaddling clothes, 13–14
sympaistores, 44
symposium, 31; presence of children at, 31–33

teachers, 17, 33, 47, 52–55, 89, 105, 117
Telemachus, epitaph of, 86
terminology for children (Greek): 10–13, 110, 160n70, 161n75; *antipais*, 11, 129; *ateknos paidōn*, synonymous with *apaidas teknōn*, 10; *boupais*, 11; *brephos/brephē*, 11, 12, 34; *ephēbos/ephēboi*, 11, 12, 59, 161n82; *mammothreptos*, 118; *meirakion/meirakia*, 10, 11, 12, 33, 35; *meirakiskos*, 12; *meiraks*, 11; *meirakyllion*, 131; *mellephēbos*, 11; *mikkos*, 12; *mikros*, 12; *neanias*, 11, 12; *neaniskos/neaniskoi*, 10, 11, 12, 35, 59, 186n37; *neos/neoi*, 2, 92, 93, 96; *neossos*, 110; *nēpios*, 12, 161n88; *paidarion*, 11, 12; *paides aphrones*, 5; *paidion/paidia*, 11, 12, 137, 161n92, 168n79; *paidiskos*, 11, 162n112; *pais/paides*: xv, 3, 10, 11, 12, 45, 49, 50, 51, 56, 58, 59, 60, 101, 122, 161n85, 161n87, 162n112; *pallēks*, 11; *tēthalladous*, 118; *teknidion*, 12; *teknon/tekna*, 10–11
terminology for children (Latin), *infans*, *infantia*, 11
theater, children's attendance at, 39
Thebes, 10, 55, 77, 90, 106, 125
Themistocles, 124, 166n64
tholos, 31
Thompson, E. P., 80–81
tokos, 80
traulotēs, 7
Triballi, 33
trophē, 18
tropheia, 35, 86, 91
Typhoeus, 4, 102

van Hook, Larue, 145
Virgil, x

weaning, 190n32
wet nurses and wet-nursing, 74, 123–124, 126, 190n32
Wiedemann, T., 143
Wolfe, Thomas, xvi
Woods, Robert, 74–75
Woolf, Virginia, xiii
wool-working, 85–86; woman wool-working in presence of girl, *31*
Wordsworth, William, 1

Xanthippus, stele of, *16*
xenia, 121–122
Xenophon, xviii, 5, 12, 47, 49, 52, 56, 83, 89, 99, 101, 104, 125, 182n127, 186n37, 190n26, 192n52. *See also* Cyrus
xenos/xenoi, 119, 121, 122
Xerxes, 10, 163n6

Young, David, 61

Zahn, R., 143, 147
Zeus, 4, 13, 77–78, 90–91, 99, 102, 112, 139, 182n122; Ktesios, 117, 127; Meilichios, 36–37; relief with father and son, *37*

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